# Rajesh Chaudhary v. State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2019) 4 ILRA 239
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2019-12-02
- **Case number:** Service Single No. 32015 of 2019
- **Bench:** Rajesh Singh Chauhan
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/rajesh-chaudhary-v-state-of-u-p-anr-44989
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

A. Service Law - U.P. Government
Servant
(Discipline
and
Appeal)
Rules,1999-Rule
9-
Inquiry
report
rejected
by
disciplinary
authoritywithout assigning valid and cogent
reason-re-enquiry ordered against the
Petitioner-for the 4th time in 10 yearsorder for denovo inquiry illegal, arbitrary
and uncalled.
240 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Held, Rule 9(1) clearly mandates that the
disciplinary authority may, for the reasons to
be recorded in writing, remit case for reinquiry
to the same, meaning thereby if the
disciplinary authority remits the matter for reinquiry the reasons to that effect must be
recorded. (Para 6)

Writ Petition allowed. (E-9)

List of Cases cited: -

## Text

4 All. Rajesh Chaudhary Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
239
was passed in breach of principles of
natural justice. This Court noticed that
the setting aside of the latter order dated.
18.4.63 would restore the earlier order of
Government dated 7.3.62 which was also
passed without notice to the affected
party, namely, the Panchayat Samithi. It
would also result in the setting aside of a
valid resolution dated 29.5.61 passed by
the Panchayat Samithi. This Court
refused relief and agreed that the High
Court was right in not interfering under
Article 226 even if there was violation of
natural justice. Subba Rao, J (as he then
was) observed (p. 189) as follows:

Both
the
orders
of
the
government, namely, the order dated
March 7, 1962 and that dated April 18,
1963, were not legally passed : the
former, because it was made without
giving notice to the Panchayat Samithi
and the latter, because the Government
had no power under Section 72 of the Act
to review an Order made under Section
62 of the Act and also because it did not
give
notice
to
representatives
of
Dharmajigudem village.

His Lordship concluded as
follows:

In those circumstances, was it a case
for the High Court to interfere in its discretion
and quash the order of the government dated
April 18, 1963? If the High Court had quashed
the said order, it would have restored an illegal
order it would have given the Health center to a
village contrary to the valid resolutions passed
by the Panchayat Samithi. The High Court,
therefore, in our view, rightly refused to exercise
its extraordinary discretionary power in the
circumstances of the case.

18. The above case is clear
authority for the proposition that it is not
always necessary for the Court to strike
down an order merely because the order
has been passed against the petitioner in
breach of the natural justice. The Court
can under Article 32 or Article 226 refuse
to exercise its discretion of striking down
the order if such striking down will result
in restoration of another order passed
earlier in favour of the petitioner and
against the opposite party, in violation of
principles of natural justice or is
otherwise not in accordance with law"

22. Taking into consideration the
aforesaid
discussion,
no
case
for
interference is made out with the impugned
order. The writ petition is dismissed.
----------
(2019)12 ILR A239

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 02.12.2019

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE RAJESH SINGH CHAUHAN, J.

Service Single No. 32015 of 2019

Rajesh Chaudhary ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Neel Kamal Mishra

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

A. Service Law - U.P. Government
Servant
(Discipline
and
Appeal)
Rules,1999-Rule
9-
Inquiry
report
rejected
by
disciplinary
authoritywithout assigning valid and cogent
reason-re-enquiry ordered against the
Petitioner-for the 4th time in 10 yearsorder for denovo inquiry illegal, arbitrary
and uncalled.
240 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Held, Rule 9(1) clearly mandates that the
disciplinary authority may, for the reasons to
be recorded in writing, remit case for reinquiry
to the same, meaning thereby if the
disciplinary authority remits the matter for reinquiry the reasons to that effect must be
recorded. (Para 6)

Writ Petition allowed. (E-9)

List of Cases cited: -

1. in re: Vijay Shankar Pandey vs. Union of
India and another (2014)10 SCC 589

2. Dr. Atul Darbari vs. State of U.P. and
others- Writ-A No. 10552/2016

(Delivered by Hon'ble Rajesh Singh
Chauhan, J.)

1. Heard Sri Upendra Nath Mishra,
learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri
Neel Kamal Mishra, learned counsel for
the petitioner and Sri Ran Vijay Singh,
learned
Additional
Chief
Standing
Counsel for the State-respondents.

2. By means of this petition the
petitioner has assailed the validity of the
order dated 14.10.2019 passed by the
respondent no. 1 whereby the inquiry
report submitted by the inquiry officer
vide letter dated 23.7.2019 has been
rejected by the disciplinary authority in a
mechanical and routine manner without
assigning any valid or cogent reasons and
a re-inquiry for the 4th time in a span of
10 years, have been ordered against the
petitioner.

3. On the first date of admission this
Court passed order dated 21.11.2019 as
under :

"Heard Sri Upendra Mishra,
learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri
Neel Kamal Mishra, learned counsel for
petitioner and learned State Counsel
appearing on behalf of opposite parties.

Under challenge is order dated
14.10.2019 whereby inquiry report dated
23.07.2019 submitted in third inquiry
proceedings against petitioner have been
disbelieved and directions have been
issued for holding a fresh inquiry with
regard to the same.

Learned counsel for petitioner
submits that earlier two inquiries were
initiated against petitioner with regard to
similar charges. In the first inquiry,
petitioner had been exonerated from
charges levelled against him on the
ground that charges could not be proved
against him although recommendation
was made by inquiry officer for issuance
of
fresh
charge-sheet
to
petitioner
specifically indicating charges against
him. In pursuance of same, a second
charge-sheet was issued to petitioner on
08.06.2010 containing similar charges. In
the said proceedings, inquiry report were
submitted on 18.01.2011 where after
punishment
order
was
passed
on
19.06.2013.

Said punishment order was
challenged by petitioner before the U.P.
Public State Service Tribunal in which
punishment was quashed granting liberty
to authorities for initiating fresh inquiry
proceedings against petitioner which was
concluded within a period of four months.
However it has been submitted that reinquiry was directed after expiry of period
of four months. However the aforesaid
inquiry was permitted to be concluded
within a further period of three months in
petition filed by petitioner.

It has been submitted that in
pursuance
thereof,
third
inquiry
proceedings on the basis of same chargesheet ensued and in which the inquiry
report
dated
23.07.2019
has
been
4 All. Rajesh Chaudhary Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
241
submitted which has been rejected by
means of order dated 14.10.2019 which is
impugned herein.

Learned counsel for petitioner
submits that the impugned order ordering
re-inquiry has been passed without
indicating any reasons for disagreement
with the inquiry report and in violation of
Rule 9(1) of U.P. Government Servant
(Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1999 and
various judgments on the said aspect as
such it has been submitted that the order
impugned is clearly non-speaking in
nature and indicates non-application of
mind by authority concerned.

Learned State Counsel seeks
time to obtain instructions in this matter.

Prima facie, the submissions
advanced
by
learned
counsel
for
petitioner require consideration since a
perusal of order impugned does not
indicate any reasons or disagreement
being
recorded
by
the
authority
concerned.

As such opposite parties are
granted
three
days'
time
to
seek
instructions.

List on 28.11.2019 as a fresh
case in the additional cause list. On the
said date, learned State Counsel shall also
produce the inquiry report submitted vide
letter dated 23.07.2019."

4. In compliance of the aforesaid
order Sri Ran Vijay Singh has produced
the copy of the letter dated 27.11.2019
preferred by Special Secretary of the
Department addressed to the Chief
Standing Counsel, High Court, Lucknow
Bench, Lucknow enclosing therewith the
copy of the inquiry report dated 18.7.2018
submitted on 23.7.2019, the same are
taken on record. The findings of the
inquiry officer reveals that the charge no.
1 has, however, not proved against the
petitioner
but
he
has
been
held
responsible
for
supervisory
control.
Charge nos. 2,3 and 4 has not been proved
against the petitioner. It appears that this
is a detailed inquiry report which runs in
23 pages.

5. Considering the stand of the
department, evidences of the department
and the submission of the petitioner this is
a peculiar case wherein the third inquiry
has been conducted and concluded against
the petitioner for the reasons indicated in
the order dated 21.11.2019 passed by this
Court. It would be apt to reproduce Rule 9
of
the
U.P.
Government
Servant
(Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999 as
under :

"9. Action on Inquiry Report.
- (1) The disciplinary authority may, for
reasons to be recorded in writing, remit
the case for re-inquiry to the same or any
other Inquiry Officer under intimation to
the charged Government servant. The
Inquiry Officer shall thereupon proceed to
hold the inquiry from such stage as
directed by the disciplinary authority,
according to the provisions of Rule 7.(2)
The disciplinary authority shall, if it
disagrees with the findings of the Inquiry
Officer on any charge, record its own
findings thereon for reasons to be
recorded.(3) In case the charges are not
proved, the charged Government servant
shall be exonerated by the disciplinary
authority of the charges and inform him
accordingly;(4)
If
the
disciplinary
authority having regard to its findings on
all or any of charges is of the opinion that
any penalty specified in Rule 3 should be
imposed on the charged Government
servant, he shall give a copy of the
inquiry report and his findings recorded
under sub-rule (2) to the charged
242 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Government servant and require him to
submit his representation if he so desires,
within a reasonable specified time. The
disciplinary authority shall, having regard
to all the relevant records relating to the
inquiry and representation of the charged
Government servant, if any, and subject to
the provisions of Rule 16 of these rules,
pass a reasoned order imposing one or
more penalties mentioned in Rule 3 of
these rules and communicate the same to
the charged Government servant."

6. Rule 9(1) clearly mandates that
the disciplinary authority may, for the
reasons to be recorded in writing, remit
case for re-inquiry to the same, meaning
thereby if the disciplinary authority remits
the matter for re-inquiry the reasons to
that effect must be recorded. What the
impugned order dated 14.10.2019 reveals
that no reasons as such has been
explained and only this much has been
indicated that the inquiry officer has
conducted the inquiry in a cursory
manner. For the brevity the impugned
order
dated
14.10.2019
is
being
reproduced as under:

" mRRkj izns'k 'kklu

yksd fuekZ.k vuqHkkx&13

la[;k
&
1974@23&13&19&021⁄4lh0ih01⁄2@14

 y[kuÅ
%
fnukad
14
vDVwcj] 2019

dk;kZy;&Kkiu

Jh jkts'k pkS/kjh] rRdkyhu lgk;d
vfHk;Urk] izkUrh; [k.M] yksd fuekZ.k foHkkx]
tkSuiqj dh mDr rSukrh vof/k esa dsUnzh; Hk.Mkj
esa ik;h x;h de lkefxz;ksa ds dkj.k gqbZ
'kkldh; {kfr ds fy, 'kklu ds dk;kZy; Kki
la[;k&2884@23&13&09&121⁄461⁄2bZ,e@09]
fnukad 13-7-2009
}kjk muds fo:) m0iz0 ljdkjh lsod
1⁄4vuq'kkld ,oa vihy1⁄2 fu;ekoyh&1999 ds
fu;e&7 ds vUrxZr vuq'kkfld dk;Zokgh
lafLFkr djrs gq, eq[; vfHk;Urk 1⁄4eq0&11⁄2] yksd
fuekZ.k foHkkx] y[kuÅ dks tkap vf/kdkjh
ukfer fd;k x;kA dkykUrj esa 'kklu ds
dk;kZy;
vkns'k
la[;k&2337@23&13&10&121⁄461⁄2bZ,e@09]
fnukad 7-6-2010 }kjk eq[; vfHk;Urk 1⁄4eq0&11⁄2]
yksd fuekZ.k foHkkx] y[kuÅ ds LFkku ij eq[;
vfHk;Urk 1⁄4ifjokn1⁄2] yksd fuekZ.k foHkkx] y[kuÅ
dks tkap vf/kdkjh ukfer fd;k x;kA

2& iz'uxr vuq'kklfud dk;Zokgh esa
Jh pkS/kjh ds fo:) vkjksi fl) ik;s tkus ds
n`f"Vxr
'kklu
ds
dk;kZy;
vkns'k
la[;k&1259@23&13&13&121⁄461⁄2bZ,e@09]
fnukad 19-6-2013 }kjk mUgsa lgk;d vfHk;Urk
ds fuEurj izdze ij inkour fd;s tkus ,oa
izdj.k esa dkfjr dh x;h dqy 'kkldh; {kfr
:0 63]17]025-00 dh olwyh fd;s tkus dk n.M
fn;k x;kA

3& mDr n.Mkns'k fnukad 19-6-2013 ds
fo:) funsZ'k ;kfpdk la[;k&1788@2013 jkts'k
pkS/kjh cuke m0iz0 jkT; o vU; ;ksftr dh x;h]
ftlesa ek0 vf/kdj.k }kjk ikfjr vkns'k fnukad 1901-2017 ds vuqikyu esa Jh jkts'k pkS/kjh] rRdkyhu
lgk;d vfHk;Urk] izkUrh; [k.M] yksd fuekZ.k
foHkkx] tkSuiqj ds fo:) fuxZr n.Mkns'k fnukad
19-6-2013 dks fujLr djrs gq,] dk;kZy; Kki
la0&1537@23&13&17&21⁄4lh0ih01⁄2@14] fnukad 276-2017 }kjk vkjksi i= dk mRrj fn;s tkus ds Lrj
ls vuq'kklfud dk;Zokgh fj&vksisu dh x;h rFkk
eq[; vfHk;Urk 1⁄4eq0&11⁄2] yksd fuekZ.k foHkkx]
y[kuÅ dks tkap vf/kdkjh ukfer fd;k x;kA

4&
bl
laca/k
esa
tkap
vf/kdkjh@eq[; vfHk;Urk 1⁄4eq0&11⁄2] yksd fuekZ.k
foHkkx]
y[kuÅ
ds
i=kad&296
dSEi
eq0vfHk01⁄4eq0&11⁄2tkap@19] fnukad 23-7-2019 ds
ek/;e ls tkap vk[;k miyC/k djk;h x;h gSA
tkap vk[;k ,oa izdj.k esa miyC/k vU; lqlaxr
vfHkys[kksa ds ijh{k.kksijkUr ik;k x;k fd tkap
vf/kdkjh }kjk furkUr lrgh rkSj ij izdj.k dh
tkap dj tkap vk[;k miyC/k djk;h x;h gS]
tks Lohdkj ;ksX; ugha gSA

5&
of.kZr
fLFkfr
esa
lE;d
fopkjksijkUr Jh jkts'k pkS/kjh] rRdkyhu
lgk;d vfHk;Urk] izkUrh; [k.M] yksd fuekZ.k
4 All. Rajesh Chaudhary Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
243
foHkkx] tkSuiqj ds fo:) tkap vf/kdkjh+@eq[;
vfHk;Urk 1⁄4eq0&11⁄2] yksd fuekZ.k foHkkx] y[kuÅ
ds mDr lUnfHkZr i= fnukad 23-7-2019 }kjk
miyC/k djk;h x;h tkap vk[;k dks vLohdkj
djrs gq, iz'uxr tkap dk;Zokgh esa eq[;
vfHk;Urk 1⁄4eq0&11⁄2] yksd fuekZ.k foHkkx] y[kuÅ
ds LFkku ij eq[; vfHk;Urk] b.Mks&usiky ckMZj]
yksd fuekZ.k foHkkx] y[kuÅ dks tkap vf/kdkjh
ukfer fd;k tkrk gSA

vf/k'kklh vfHk;Urk] izkUrh; [k.M]
yksd fuekZ.k foHkkx] tkSuiqj izLrqrdrkZ vf/kdkjh
gksaxsA

Jh
jkT;iky dh vkKk ls]

 fufru jes'k xksd.kZ
izeq[k lfpoA

la[;k&19741⁄411⁄2@23&13&2019&rn~fnukad

izfrfyfi fuEufyf[kr dks lwpukFkZ ,oa
vko';d dk;Zokgh gsrq izsf"kr %&

1& izeq[k vfHk;Urk 1⁄4fodkl1⁄2 ,oa
foHkkxk/;{k]
yksd
fuekZ.k
foHkkx]
m0iz0
y[kuÅA

2&
eq[;
vfHk;Urk
1⁄4ifjokn1⁄2]
yks0fu0fo0] y[kuÅ dks ,d vfrfjDr izfr
lfgr bl vk'k; ls izsf"kr fd lacaf/kr vf/kdkjh
dh izfr rkehy djkdj rkehyh dh lwpuk
'kklu dks ,d lIrkg esa miyC/k djkus dk d"V
djsaA

3& eq[; vfHk;Urk 1⁄4eq0&11⁄2] yksd
fuekZ.k foHkkx] y[kuÅ dks bl vk'k; ls izsf"kr
fd mDr tkap ls lacaf/kr leLr vfHkys[k eq[;
vfHk;Urk] b.Mks&usiky ckMZj] yksd fuekZ.k
foHkkx] y[kuÅ 1⁄4uohu tkap vf/kdkjh1⁄2 dks
vfoyEc miyC/k djkuk lqfuf'pr djsaA

4& eq[; vfHk;Urk] b.Mks&usiky
ckMZj] yksd fuekZ.k foHkkx] y[kuÅ 1⁄4uohu tkap
vf/kdkjh1⁄2 dks bl funsZ'k ds lkFk izsf"kr fd os
iwoZ tkap vf/kdkjh ls tkap laca/kh leLr
vfHkys[k izkIr dj] 'kklu ds dk;kZy; Kki
fnukad 13-7-2009 }kjk fn;s x;s funsZ'kksa ds dze
esa vkjksi i= dk mRrj fn;s tkus ds Lrj ls
fj&vksisu vuq'kklfud dk;Zokgh esa Jh jkts'k
pkS/kjh] rRdkyhu lgk;d vfHk;Urk] izkUrh;
[k.M] yksd fuekZ.k foHkkx] tkSuiqj dks lquokbZ
dk iw.kZ volj nsrs gq, le;kUrxZr tkap vk[;k
'kklu dks miyC/k djk;saA

5& eq[; vfHk;Urk] okjk.klh {ks=]
yksd fuekZ.k foHkkx] okjk.klhA

6& vf/k'kklh vfHk;Urk] izkUrh;
[k.M] yksd fuekZ.k foHkkx] tkSuiqj 1⁄4izLrqrdrkZ
vf/kdkjh1⁄2A

7& lEcfU/kr vf/kdkjh }kjk eq[;
vfHk;Urk 1⁄4ifjokn1⁄2] yksd fuekZ.k foHkkx]
y[kuÅA

8& yksd fuekZ.k vuqHkkx&4

9& foHkkxh; iqfLrdkA

vkKk ls]

gLrk{kj & viBuh;

1⁄4jkts'k dqekj ik.Ms;1⁄2

vuq lfpoA

7. Para 4 of the impugned order is
satisfaction of the disciplinary authority
which
is
against
Rule
1
of
the
Disciplinary Rules, 1999. The disciplinary
authority must have indicated the specific
reasons as to why he is not agreeable with
the findings of the inquiry officer and
what are the flaws and lapses in the
inquiry report which convinced him to
issue direction for re-inquiry. Therefore,
the
subjective
satisfaction
of
the
disciplinary authority is not in conformity
with Rule 9(1) of the Rules, 1999. The
Division Bench of this Court in the
identical facts and circumstances has
passed the judgment and order dated
5.4.2016 i Writ-A No. 10552/2016 ( Dr.
Atul Darbari vs. State of U.P. and others)
allowing the said writ petitions quashing
the
impugned
order
directing
the
disciplinary authority to pass appropriate
order on the basis of inquiry report. Para 5
of the said judgment indicates the
impugned order of that writ petition dated
4.2.2016
and
paras
8,13,16,17,19,20,22,23,25,27,28,29
clarifies the factual and legal matrix of the
issue, therefore, for the brevity the
244 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
impugned order of that writ petition dated
4.2.2016 and other relevant paras are
being reproduced as under :

" mRRkj izns'k 'kklu

 Je vuqHkkx&6

la[;k & 85@36&6&2016&6
fjV@2010

 y[kuÅ] fnukad 4 Qjojh]
2016

Mk0
vrqy
njckjh]
fpfdRlk
vf/kdkjh
dk0jk0ch0
fpfdRlky;]
uSuh]
bykgkckn ds fo:) uksMy vf/kdkjh dksVZdsl
dk0jk0ch0 ;kstuk] Je fpfdRlk lsok,W
bykgkckn ds :i esa fjV ;kfpdk la[;k
8350@1991 esa fnukad 12-3-2004 dks ek0 mPp
U;k;ky;] bykgkckn }kjk ikfjr vkns'k dh
izekf.kr izfr funs'kky; esa miyC/k u djkus ds
dkj.k ek0 U;k;ky; }kjk fn, x, vkns'k dk
fdz;kUo;u vfrfoyEc ls djrs gq, fu;qfDr gsrq
vik= Jh fot; ukjk;u ;kno b0lh0th0
VSDuhf'k;u o Jh jke y[ku lSuh] vks0Vh0
VSDuhf'k;u dh lsok fnukad 11-5-2010 dks
lekIr dh x;hA bl izdkj vik= deZpkfj;ksa
dks fnukad 12-2-2004 ls 11-5-2010 rd lsok esa
j[kdj osru ds :i esa ljdkj dk vuko';d
:i ls :0 17]41]755@ dk vf/kd Hkqxrku
djuk iM+k rFkk vk;ksX; dfeZ;ksa ls ejhtksa ds
mipkj esa lg;ksx ysus dk [krjk mBkuk iM+kA
Mk0 njckjh ds drZO; ds izfr mnklhurk o
ykijokgh
ds
dkj.k
ljdkj
dks
:0
17]41]755@ dh {kfr igqapkus rFkk ejhtksa ds
mipkj dks [krjs esa Mkyus ds fy;s vkjksfir
djrs
gq;s
dk;kZy;
Kki
la[;k
642@30&6&2012&6 fjV@2010] fnukad 24-82012 }kjk vuq'kklfud dk;Zokgh lafLFkr djrs
gq, vkjksi&i= vuqeksfnr dj iz'uxr ekeys dh
tkap gsrq Jh :nz dqekj xqIrk] fo'ks"k lfpo] Je
foHkkx] mRrj izns'k 'kklu dks tkap vf/kdkjh
ukfer fd;k x;k FkkA

2- izdj.k esa ukfer tkap vf/kdkjh
Jh :nz dqekj xqIrk }kjk fnukad 29-9-2014 ,oa
14-10-2014 dks tkap vk[;k izLrqr dh x;hA
tkap vf/kdkjh }kjk izLrqr tkap vk[;k ls
vlger gksdj izdj.k dh iqu% tkap dk fu.kZ;
fy;k x;k gS] vr% Mk0 vrqy njckjh] fpfdRlk
vf/kdkjh dk0jk0ch0fpfdRlky;] uSuh] bykgkckn
ds fo:) dk;kZy;&Kki fnukad 24-8-2012 }kjk
lafLFkr vuq'kklfud dk;Zokgh dks ,rn}kjk
fujLr djrs gq, izdj.k dh iqu% tkap gsrq Jh
;ksxs'k dqekj] fo'ks"k lfpo] Je] m0iz0 'kklu
dks tkap vf/kdkjh ukfer fd;k tkrk gSA

3- tkap vf/kdkjh ls visf{kr gS fd
izdj.k dh 01 ekg esa tkap iw.kZ dj vk[;k
izLrqr dh tk;sA
g0
 Mk0 vfurk HkVukxj tSu]
izeq[k lfpo

8. Be that as it may, the question
is whether the disciplinary authority
could have resorted to such a practice of
abandoning
the
Inquiry
already
undertaken and resort to appointment of a
fresh enquiring officer.

13. The controversy in hand has
been subjected to detailed scrutiny by a
Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court
in K. R. Deb V/s. the Collector of Central
Excise, Shillong AIR 1971 SC 1447 in
which Hon'ble Apex Court has proceeded
to examine the question in the context of
Rule 15 (1) Rule 15(1) of the Central Civil
Services (Classification, Control and
Appeal) Rules, 1957. It was a case where
an enquiry was ordered against a subInspector, Central Excise. The inquiry
officer held that the charge was not
proved.
Thereafter
the
disciplinary
authority
appointed
another
inquiry
officer "to conduct a supplementary open
inquiry". Such supplementary inquiry was
conducted and a report that there was "no
conclusive
proof"
to "establish
the
charge" was made. Not satisfied, the
disciplinary authority thought it fit that
"another
inquiry
officer
should
be
appointed to inquire afresh into the
charge". In K.K. Deb's case (supra)
Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that an
Enquiry Officer may be asked by the
4 All. Rajesh Chaudhary Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
245
Disciplinary Authority to record further
evidence if there had been no proper
enquiry because of some serious defect or
because some important witnesses were
not examined. The Court categorically
held therein that the previous enquiry
could not be set aside on the ground that
the report of the Enquiry Officer did not
appeal to the disciplinary Authority.
Relevant paragraphs 12 and 13 of the
judgement are reproduced hereinafter:-

"12. It seems to us that Rule 15,
on the face of it, really provides for one
inquiry but it may be possible if in a
particular case there has been no proper
enquiry because some serious defect has
crept into the inquiry or some important
witnesses were not available at the time of
the inquiry or for some other reason, the
Disciplinary Authority may ask the
Inquiry Officer to record further evidence.
But there is no provision in Rule 15 for
completely
setting
aside
previous
inquiries on the ground that the report of
the Inquiring Officer or Officers does not
appeal to the Disciplinary Authority. The
Disciplinary Authority has enough powers
to reconsider the evidence itself and come
to its own conclusion under Rule 9.

13. In our view the rules do not
contemplate an action such as was taken
by the Collector on February 13, 1962. It
seems to us that the Collector, instead of
taking
responsibility
himself,
was
determined to get some officer to report
against the appellant. The procedure
adopted was not only not warranted by
the rules but was harassing to the
appellant."

16.
It
appears
that
the
respondent no.1 dissatisfied with such
earlier enquiry reports, ordered a de novo
enquiry under the impugned order dated
4.2.2016 and appointed Shri Rudra
Kumar Gupta, Special Secretary, Labour
Department, Government of UP as
Enquiry Officer. This practice of the
respondent
no.1
in
carelessly
and
callously discarding enquiry reports,
which are not to its liking and ordering
for
denovo
enquiry
without
even
disclosing the reasons, which weighed
with it for rejecting the findings of the
previous enquiry Officer, is a clear
transgression of the law and requires to
be deprecated in the strongest terms.

17. In Union of India V/s. M. L.
Capoor and others AIR 1974 SC 87, the
Supreme Court observed:

"28. . . . Reasons are the links
between the materials on which certain
conclusions are based and the actual
conclusions. They disclose how the mind
is applied to the subject matter for a
decision
whether
it
is
purely
administrative or quasi-judicial. They
should reveal a rational nexus between
the facts considered and the conclusions
reached. Only in this way can opinions or
decisions recorded be shown to be
manifestly just and reasonable. . . . "

19. 'Reasons' are the milestones
which chart the journey of the 'decisionmaker' in reaching his destination.
Absence of reasons thus leaves the
decision-making process without a rudder
and open to arbitrariness. Viewed in this
light, the approach of respondent no.1 in
instituting denovo enquiry by appointing
Enquiry Officer afresh without even
setting aside the findings recorded by the
earlier Enquiry Officer, giving due
reasons therefore, is clearly unsustainable
in law.

20. In the present matter, it has
been urged that the impugned order is in
teeth of Rules 8 and 9 of Rules 1999. For
ready reference, Rules 8 and 9 of Rules
1999 are extracted:-
246 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

"8. Procedure for imposing
major penalties - (1) No order imposing
any of the major penalties specified in
Rule 6 shall be made except after an
inquiry is held as far as may be, in the
manner provided in this rule and Rule 10,
or, provided by the Public Servants
(Inquiries) Act, 1850 (37 of 1850) where
such inquiry is held under that Act.

(2) Whenever the disciplinary
authority is of the opinion that there are
grounds for inquiring into the truth of any
imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour
against a member of the Service, it may
appoint under this rule or under the
provisions
of
the
Public
Servants
(Inquiries) Act, 1850, as the case may be,
an authority to inquire into the truth
thereof.

(3) Where a Board is appointed
as the inquiring authority it shall consist
of not less than two senior officers
provided that at least one member of such
a Board shall be an officer of the service
to which the member of the service
belongs.

9. Action on Inquiry Report.--
(1) The Disciplinary Authority may, for
reasons to be recorded in writing, remit
the case for re-inquiry to the same or any
other Inquiry Officer under intimation tot
he charged Government servant. The
Inquiry Officer shall thereupon proceed to
hold the inquiry from such stage as
directed by the Disciplinary Authority,
according to the provisions of Rule 7.

(2) The Disciplinary Authority
shall, if it disagrees with the findings of
the Inquiry Officer on any charge, record
its own findings thereon for reasons to be
recorded.

(3) In case the charges are not
proved, the charged Government servant
shall be exonerated the Disciplinary
Authority of the charges and informed him
accordingly.

(4) If the Disciplinary Authority,
having regard to its findings on all or any
of charges is of the opinion that any
penalty specified in Rule 3 should be
imposed on the charged Government
servant, he shall give a copy of the
inquiry report and his findings recorded
under sub-rule (2) to the charged
Government servant and require him to
submit his representation if he so desires,
within a reasonable specified time. The
Disciplinary
Authority
shall,
having
regard to all the relevant records relating
to the inquiry and representation of the
charged Government servant, if any, and
subject to the provisions of Rule 16 of
these rules, pass a reasoned speaking
order imposing one or more penalties
mentioned in Rule 3 of these rules and
communicate the same to the charged
Government servant."

22. Rule 9 prescribes action on
the enquiry report. Rule 9 (1) provides
that the Disciplinary Authority may, for
reasons to be recorded in writing, remit
the case for re-inquiry to the same or any
other Inquiry Officer under intimation to
the charged Government servant. The
Inquiry Officer shall thereupon proceed to
hold the inquiry from such stage as
directed by the Disciplinary Authority,
according to the provisions of Rule 7.
Rule 9 (2) provides that the Disciplinary
Authority shall, if it disagrees with the
findings of the enquiry Inquiry Officer on
any charge, record its own findings
thereon for reasons to be recorded. Rule 9
(3) provides that in case the charges are
not proved, the charged Government
servant
shall
be
exonerated
the
Disciplinary Authority of the charges and
informed him accordingly. Rule 9 (4)
provides that If the Disciplinary Authority,
4 All. Rajesh Chaudhary Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
247
having regard to its finding on all or any
of charges is of the opinion that any
penalty specified in Rule 3 should be
imposed on the charged Government
Servant, he shall give a copy of the
inquiry report and his finding recorded
under sub-rule (2) of Rule 9 to the
charged Government Servant and require
him to submit his representation if he so
desires, within a reasonable specified
time. The Disciplinary Authority shall
having regard to all the relevant records
relating to the inquiry and representation
of the charged Government Servant, if
any, and subject to the provisions of Rule
16 of these rules, passes a reasoned order
imposing
one
or
more
penalties
mentioned in Rule 3 of these and
communicate the same to the charged
Government Servant.

23. It can be seen from the
above that the normal rule is that there
can be only one enquiry. Hon'ble Apex
Court has also recognized the possibility
of
a
further
enquiry
in
certain
circumstances enumerated therein. The
decision, however, makes it clear that the
fact, that the report submitted by the
enquiring authority is not acceptable to
the disciplinary authority, is not a ground
for completely setting aside the enquiry
report and ordering a fresh denovo
enquiry. Therefore,
we
are
of
the
considered opinion that the principle laid
down in K.R. Deb's case, would squarely
apply to the case in hand.

25. In our opinion, on general
principles, there can be only one enquiry
in respect of charges for a particular
misconduct and that is also what the
Rules usually provide. If, for some
technical
or
other
good
ground,
procedural or otherwise the first enquiry
or punishment or exoneration is found
bad in law, there is no principle that a
second enquiry cannot be initiated.
Therefore, when a completed enquiry
proceedings is set aside by a competent
forum on a technical or on the ground of
procedural infirmity, fresh proceedings on
the same charges is permissible.

27. A bare perusal of the order
impugned and the record in question this
much is accepted position that at no point
of time the disciplinary authority had
proceeded to give any reason for
disagreeing with the earlier enquiry
reports in question. Therefore, in these
circumstances there is no justification for
conducting a second enquiry on the very
same charges. Law is clear on the subject,
and permits only disciplinary proceedings
and same cannot be approved as
harassment and allowing such practice is
not in the interest of public service. Same
view has also been approved by Hon'ble
Apex Court in Nand Kumar Verma vs.
State of Jharkhand and others (2012) 3
SCC 580 and Vijay Shankar Pandey vs.
Union of India and another (2014) 10
SCC 589.

28. We, therefore, have no
hesitation in holding that the impugned
order dated 4.2.2016 for denovo/ a fresh
enquiry against the petitioner on the same
charges, which were subject matter of the
enquiry reports dated 29.9.2014 and
14.10.2014, is illegal and arbitrary; and
hence, is liable to be set aside. The
impugned
order
dated
4.2.2016
is
consequently set aside.

29. The writ petition is accordingly
allowed and the respondent no.1 is directed
to take appropriate decision in the light of
the enquiry reports dated 29.9.2014 and
14.10.2014 within a period of two months
from the date of production of a certified
copy of this order before him. There shall be
no order as to costs."
248 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

8. Not only the above Hon'ble Apex
Court in re: Vijay Shankar Pandey vs.
Union of India and another reported in
(2014)10 Supreme Court Cases 589, vide
para 32 has explained the word 'cursory'.
As per the view of Hon'ble Apex Court
indicating the word that the inquiry
officer has made inquiry in cursory
manner would not suffice but as to how
the findings of the inquiry officer are
cursory should be explained. Para 32 is
being reproduced as under :

"32. Coming to the first reasonthat the report is a cursory report. A copy of
the report is not made available to the
appellant. The content of the said report is
not known. The only admitted fact about the
report is that the appellant was exonerated
of all the charges made against him. If such
a conclusion is otherwise justified, whether
the report is cursory or elaborate, should
make no difference to the legality of the
report. What matters is the correctness of
the conclusions recorded, not the length or
the elegance of the language of the report
which determines the legality of the
conclusions recorded in it. Therefore, this
ground is equally untenable."

9. Sri Ran Vijay Singh has however,
tried to justify the office memo dated
14.10.2019
by
submitting
that
the
disciplinary authority has found that the
inquiry officer has conducted cursory
inquiry, therefore, the direction for re-inquiry
may be issued as this is the domain and
prerogative of the disciplinary authority but
on being confronted in the light of the dictum
of Hon'ble Apex Court in re: Vijay Shankar
Pandey (supra) wherein the term 'cursory' has
been explained and defined, Sri Ran Vijay
Singh has nothing to defend. Further, on
being confronted regarding the judgment in
re: Dr. Atul Darbari (supra) wherein the
similar facts and circumstances have been
considered by the Division Bench of this
Court and the said matter was allowed
considering the various judgments of Hon'ble
Apex Court besides the judgment of
Constitution Bench of Hon'ble Supreme
Court in re: K.R Deb's (supra), Sri Ran Vijay
Singh could not properly justify the office
memo dated 14.10.2019 whereby the
direction of re-inquiry has been issued that
too 4th time in a span of 10 years.

10. Considering the rival submissions of
learned counsel for the parties and considering
the relevant material available on record viz. a
viz. the dictum of Hon'ble Apex Court and the
Division Bench of this Court in the case of Dr.
Atul Darbari (supra) I am of the considered
opinion that the office memo dated 14.10.2019
is illegal, arbitrary and uncalled for and liable to
be quashed. I have also no hesitation in holding
that impugned order dated 14.10.2019 for denovo and fresh inquiry against the petitioner by
the authorities which were subject matter of
inquiry report dated 18.7.2017 is illegal and
arbitrary.

11. Therefore, a writ in the nature of
certiorari is issued quashing the office
memo dated 14.10.2019 passed by the
opposite party no. 1, Annexure no. 1 to
the writ petition.

12. A writ in the nature of
mandamus
is
issued
directing
the
disciplinary authority to take appropriate
decision in the light of the inquiry report
dated 18.7.2019 within a period of two
months from the date of production of the
certified copy of the order of this Court.

13. Writ petition is allowed.

14. No order as to costs.
----------
4 All. Committee of Management Angoori Devi Inter College Aurangabad Bulandshahar & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
249
(2019)12 ILR A249

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 07.11.2019

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE DR. YOGENDRA KUMAR
SRIVASTAVA, J.

Writ-C No. 27906 of 2019

Committee of Management Angoori Devi
Inter College Aurangabad Bulandshahar
& Anr. ...Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Pradip Kumar Srivastava

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., A.S.G.I., Sri Brijesh Kumar, Sri
Jagdish Pathak, Sri Sachindra Upadhyay

A. Civil Law - Employees' Provident
Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act,
1952 - Section 7A and 7I - Employees'
Provident
Fund
Appellate
Tribunal
(Procedure) Rules, 1997 - Rule 7 -
Limitation - Appeal may be preferred
within 60 days from the date of issue of
the order, provided that the Tribunal
may, if it is satisfied that the appellant
was prevented by sufficient cause from
preferring
the
appeal
within
the
prescribed period, extend the said period
by a further period of 60 days. (Para 30)

Held -37. The time limit is prescribed by the
rule making authority for filing an appeal and
also
the
extended
period
having been
provided, and no further extension thereof
having been envisaged or contemplated, the
Appellate Authority could not have granted
any further extension. In view of the
aforesaid, the order passed by the Appellate
Authority recording its conclusion that the
appeal was filed beyond the statutory period
of limitation, cannot be faulted with.
B. Limitation Act, 1963 - Applicability -
Principle of implied exclusion of Act, 1963
by Special law - EPF Act, 1952 is a special
law - In terms of the rules framed
thereunder a certain period of limitation for
filing an appeal having been provided for in
clear terms and a further provision having
been made for extension of such period
only upto a specified time period and no
further, the Appellate Tribunal would have
no jurisdiction to treat within limitation, an
appeal
filed
before
it
beyond
such
maximum time limit specified in terms of
the statutory rules - The provisions
contained under the Act, 1963 would
therefore not be applicable for seeking
extension of time beyond the statutory time
period of 60 days from the date of issue of
the notification/order, extendable by a
further period of 60 days. (Para 31 & 32)

C. Interpretation of statute - Where the
statute confers power on the authority
to condone the delay only to a limited
extent the same cannot be stretched or
extended
beyond
what
has
been
provided under the statute. (Para 33)

Writ Petition dismissed. (E-1)

List of cases cited: -

1. M/s Port Shramik Cooperative Enterprises
Ltd.
Vs.
Employees
Provident
Fund
Organisation 2018 (156) FLR 363 (Cal.H.C.)

2.Assistant Regional Provident FundCommissioner,
Meerut Vs. Employees Provident Fund Appellate
Tribunal & Ors. 2006 (108) FLR 35 (Del.H.C.)

3. Mohd. Ashfaq Vs. State Transport Appellate
Tribunal U.P. & Ors. (1976) 4 SCC 330

4. Dr. A.V. Joseph Vs. Assistant Provident Fund
Commissioner & Anr. 2009 (122) FLR 184 (Ker.H.C.)

5. C.B. Sharma Vs. Employees' Provident
Funds Appellate Tribunal & Ors. 2012 (135)
FLR 637 (P&H H.C.)

6. Saint Soldier Modern Senior Secondary School
Vs. Regional Provident FundCommissioner 2014
(142) FLR 730 (Del.H.C.)