# Rajesh Kumar & Ors v. State of U.P. & Anr. Opp. Parties

- **Citation:** (2020) 12 ILRA 206
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2020-12-01
- **Case number:** Application U/S 482 No. 14973 of 2020
- **Bench:** Ravi Nath Tilhari
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/rajesh-kumar-ors-v-state-of-u-p-anr-opp-parties-45458
- **Pages:** 21

## Headnote

Criminal Law - Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973-
Section
482-
Inherent
power
possessed by the High Court is of wide
plenitude, with no statutory restrictions. The
limitations imposed on exercise of such
power are the self imposed restrictions. Any
provision of the Code cannot limit or affect
the inherent powers of the High Court. But,
this power, being extraordinary, is required
to be exercised sparingly, carefully, with
caution, and circumspection and only when
such exercise is justified by the tests
specifically laid down in Section 482 Cr.P.C.

No provisions of the Cr.Pc restrict the inherent
powers of the High Court but the said powers
are to be exercised sparingly and with caution
for securing the ends of justice and for
preventing the abuse of the Court.

Criminal Law- Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973- Section 482- Section 320- Section
320 Cr.P.C. does not come in the way of
exercise of inherent power of the High
Court
for
quashment
of
criminal
12 All. Rajesh Kumar & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
207
proceeding. The power of the High Court for
quashment of the criminal proceeding is
distinct and different from the power given
to a criminal Court for compounding the
offences under Section 320 of the Code. The
proceedings of the offences which are noncompoundable can also be quashed by the
High
Court
in
exercise
of
inherent
jurisdiction, on the well settled principles,
but sparingly and with caution, forming an
opinion, on either of the two objectives of
securing the ends of justice and to prevent
abuse of the process of any Court. This bar
of Section 320 Cr.P.C. is attracted only
before the Criminal Court, where the prayer
for compounding is made. There, only those
offences
which
have
been
made
compoundable, can be compounded and the
offences
which
are
non-compoundable
cannot be compounded in view of SubSection (9) of Section 320 Cr.P.C.

Section 320 of the Code is not a bar for the
exercise of the inherent powers of the High
Court. The provisions of Section 320 (9) of the
Code operate as a bar only before the trial
court where the prayer for compounding of the
offences is made.

Criminal Law - Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973- Section 482- Indian Penal Code-
Section 376, Section 392- Quashing of
proceedings on basis of compromise- In
respect of serious offences like murder, rape,
dacoity, etc., or other offences of mental
depravity under IPC or offences of moral
turpitude under special statutes, like the
Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences
committed by public servants while working
in that capacity, the settlement between the
offender and the victim can have no legal
sanction at all. Any compromise between the
victim and the offender in relation to such
offences, cannot provide for any basis for
quashing the criminal proceedings- Such
offences are not private in nature and have a
serious impact on society- The offences
under Sectio

## Text

_Characters 0–39,973 of 73,113. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39973 for what follows._

206 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C., it is
not open for the Court to enter into the
sufficiency of the evidence in order to
appreciate
the
documents
and
the
statements in support of the charge. (Vide
Mohd. Akbar Dar vs. State of Jammu &
Kashmir, AIR 1981 SC 1548 & Radhey
Shyam vs. Kunj Behari & others AIR
1990 SC 121)

25. It is not a case where the
uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or
complaint and the evidence collected in support of
the same do not disclose the commission of any
offence and make out a case against the accused.
Further, the criminal proceedings is not manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or the proceedings
maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive
against the applicant merely performing appellate
power in the backdrop of the allegations and
evidences.

26. It is well established proposition of
law that a criminal prosecution, if otherwise
justifiable and based upon adequate evidence
does not suffer on account of mala fide or
vendetta of the complainant. (Refer: State of
Haryana and others vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and
others 1992 AIR 604)

27. Having regard to the facts and
circumstances and the material placed on
record, I am of the opinion that there is prima
facie evidence in support of the charges. The
submission of the learned counsel for the
applicant that the criminal prosecution does not
constitute the ingredients of the offence against
the applicant, lacks substance.

28. Learned counsel for the applicant
failed to point out any illegality, infirmity
or jurisdictional error in the impugned
order.

29. The petition being devoid of merit
is, accordingly, dismissed.

30. Learned trial court to proceed in
accordance with law without being influenced
by any observations made in the order.
----------
(2020)12ILR A206
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 01.12.2020

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAVI NATH TILHARI, J.

Application U/S 482 No. 14973 of 2020

Rajesh Kumar & Ors. ...Applicants
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opp. Parties

Counsel for the Applicants:
Sri Sharique Ahmed

Counsel for the Opp. Parties:
A.G.A., Sri Ashish Dubey, Sri Rakesh
Dubey, Sri Saiyad Iqbal Ahmed

Criminal Law - Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973-
Section
482-
Inherent
power
possessed by the High Court is of wide
plenitude, with no statutory restrictions. The
limitations imposed on exercise of such
power are the self imposed restrictions. Any
provision of the Code cannot limit or affect
the inherent powers of the High Court. But,
this power, being extraordinary, is required
to be exercised sparingly, carefully, with
caution, and circumspection and only when
such exercise is justified by the tests
specifically laid down in Section 482 Cr.P.C.

No provisions of the Cr.Pc restrict the inherent
powers of the High Court but the said powers
are to be exercised sparingly and with caution
for securing the ends of justice and for
preventing the abuse of the Court.

Criminal Law- Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973- Section 482- Section 320- Section
320 Cr.P.C. does not come in the way of
exercise of inherent power of the High
Court
for
quashment
of
criminal
12 All. Rajesh Kumar & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
207
proceeding. The power of the High Court for
quashment of the criminal proceeding is
distinct and different from the power given
to a criminal Court for compounding the
offences under Section 320 of the Code. The
proceedings of the offences which are noncompoundable can also be quashed by the
High
Court
in
exercise
of
inherent
jurisdiction, on the well settled principles,
but sparingly and with caution, forming an
opinion, on either of the two objectives of
securing the ends of justice and to prevent
abuse of the process of any Court. This bar
of Section 320 Cr.P.C. is attracted only
before the Criminal Court, where the prayer
for compounding is made. There, only those
offences
which
have
been
made
compoundable, can be compounded and the
offences
which
are
non-compoundable
cannot be compounded in view of SubSection (9) of Section 320 Cr.P.C.

Section 320 of the Code is not a bar for the
exercise of the inherent powers of the High
Court. The provisions of Section 320 (9) of the
Code operate as a bar only before the trial
court where the prayer for compounding of the
offences is made.

Criminal Law - Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973- Section 482- Indian Penal Code-
Section 376, Section 392- Quashing of
proceedings on basis of compromise- In
respect of serious offences like murder, rape,
dacoity, etc., or other offences of mental
depravity under IPC or offences of moral
turpitude under special statutes, like the
Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences
committed by public servants while working
in that capacity, the settlement between the
offender and the victim can have no legal
sanction at all. Any compromise between the
victim and the offender in relation to such
offences, cannot provide for any basis for
quashing the criminal proceedings- Such
offences are not private in nature and have a
serious impact on society- The offences
under Sections 376 and 392 IPC fall in the
category of serious and heinous offences.
They are treated as crime against the society
and
not
against
individual
alone
and
therefore, the criminal proceeding for the
offences under these sections having a
serious impact on the society, cannot be
quashed in exercise of power under Section
482 of the Code on the ground that the
parties have resolved their entire dispute
among
themselves
through
compromise/settlement- The offences being
of ''Rape' and ''Dacoity' the most heinous
offences, the proceedings cannot be quashed
on the basis of compromise, irrespective of
the stage at which the compromise has been
entered, also considering its impact on the
society.
The
stage
of
entering
into
compromise is a relevant consideration in
proceedings other than those involving
serious or heinous offences- It is not in every
case where the complainant has entered into
a compromise with the accused, there may
not be any conviction. In a given case, it may
happen that the prosecution still can prove
the guilt by leading cogent evidence.

Heinous offences , like murder, rape and
dacoity, are not private in nature but are crimes
against the society and have a serious impact
on the society and therefore the criminal
proceedings in such cases cannot be quashed
on the basis of compromise between the
offender and the victim notwithstanding the
stage at which the said compromise has been
entered into and it cannot be said that the
prosecution cannot prove the guilt of the
accused despite the said compromise.

Criminal Application rejected. (Para 21, 36,
48, 49) (E-3)

Judgements / Case law Cited/ relied
upon:-

1. B. S. Joshi & ors. Vs St. of Har. & anr., (2003)
4 SCC 67

2. Dimpey Gujral & ors. Vs Union Territory &
ors., (2013) 11 SCC 497

3. Gian Singh Vs St. of Punj. & anr., (2012) 10 SCC 303

4. Rahul Vs St. of UK & ors., Crl Misc. Appl.
No.249 of 2020, dec. on 20.02.2020

5. Manga Singh Vs St. of Punj. & ors., Crl. Misc.
No. M-19131 of 2016, dec. on 01.05.2018, High
Court of Punj. & Har.
208 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
6. Deepak Vs St. of Har. & ors. CRM-M No. 31825 of
2017, dec. on 19.01.2018, High Court of Punj. & Har.

7. Yogesh Soni Vs St. of Har. & anr., C.R.M.-M
No.17999 of 2015, dec. on 05.11.2015, High
Court of Punj. & Har.

8. Shubham Shankarlal Tolwan Vs St. of Maha. &
ors., Crl. Appl. No. 298 of 2020, dec. on
21.07.2020, High Court of Bombay, Nagpur Bench.

9. Pushpendra Kushwaha Vs St. of U.P. and 2 ors.,
Appl. u/S 482 No.2095 of 2019, dec. on 24.01.2019

10. Narinder Singh & ors. Vs St. of Punj. & anr.,
(2014) 6 SCC 466

11. St. of M.P Vs Laxmi Narayan & ors., (2019)
5 SCC 688

12. Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai
Karmur & ors. Vs St. of Guj. & anr. (2017) 9 SCC 641

13. Social Action Forum For Manav Adhikar &
anr. Vs U.O.I & Ors. (2018) 10 SCC 443

14. St. of M.P Vs Dhuruv Gurjar & anr., Crl. Appeal
No. 336 of 2019, arising from SLP(Criminal) No.9859
of 2013, dec. on 22.02.2019

15. Shyam Narain Vs State (NCT of Delhi),
(2013) 7 SCC 77

16. Shimbhu Vs St. of Har., (2014) 13 SCC 318

17. St. of M.P Vs Madan Lal", (2015) 7 SCC 681

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ravi Nath Tilhari, J.)

1. Heard Sri Sharique Ahmed, learned
counsel for the applicants, Sri Ashish
Dubey, learned counsel for the opposite
party no.2 and Sri Pankaj Sexena, learned
AGA appearing for the State and perused
the material brought on record.

2. The applicants have filed the
present application under Section 482 Code
of Criminal Procedure (Code/Cr.P.C.) with
the following main prayers:-

"(i)
Quash
the
criminal
proceeding of Criminal Complaint Case
No.105 of 2017 (Shobha Devi Vs. Veerpal
and others), under Sections 392, 504, 506,
376, IPC in respect of applicant no.3 and
under Sections 392, 504, 506, IPC in
respect of applicant nos. 1, 2 & 4, Police
Station-Gursahayganj, District Kannauj,
pending before the Additional District
Judge, Court No.2, Kannauj, in terms of
compromise entered between the parties on
01.02.2020.

(ii) Quash the summoning order
dated 27.07.2018 passed by the learned
Special Judge (D.A.A.)/Additional Sessions
Judge, Court No.2, Kannauj, in Criminal
Complaint Case No.105 of 2017 (Shobha
Devi Vs. Veerpal and others), under
Sections 392, 504, 506, 376, IPC in respect
of applicant no.3 and under Sections 392,
504, 506, IPC in respect of applicant nos.
1, 2 & 4, Police Station-Gursahayganj,
District Kannauj, in terms of compromise
entered
between
the
parties
on
01.02.2020."

3. Facts of the case are that the
alleged incident took place on 29.05.2017
and again on 04.06.2017 with respect to
which the complainant opposite party no.2
filed an application under Section 156(3)
Cr.P.C. on 07.06.2017, registered as a
Complaint Case No.105 of 2017, under
Sections 392, 504, 506, 376, IPC, Police
Station Gursahaiganj, District Kannauj, in
the Court of learned 4th Additional District
& Session Judge/ Special Judge Dacoiti,
Kannauj, inter alia on the averments that
the applicant nos. 1, 2 and 3 are known
criminals, and for last several months the
applicant no.3 Veerpal was trying to
outrage her modesty and tried to commit
rape on her. The applicant nos.1, 2 and 3
forcibly entered in the house of the
complainant on 29.05.2017 around 6.00
12 All. Rajesh Kumar & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
209
P.M. and committed 'marpeet' with her
husband, and also assaulted the son of the
complainant by knife. They received
injuries. The applicants threatened the
complainant that in case she did not
compromise the pending matters, she and
her entire family would be killed. On
04.06.2017 the applicants again entered
forcibly in the house of the complainant
having country made pistol in their hand;
they started abusing her; committed loot in
her house and the applicant no.3 committed
rape upon her and also snatched jewelry
and tried to strangulate the complainant's
neck.

4. The Magistrate proceeded with the
complaint, recorded the statement of the
complainant/opposite party no.2 under
Section 200 Cr.P.C. and of her witnesses
Ram Prakash and Shiva Yadav under
Section 202 Cr.P.C. The Magistrate took
cognizance on 27.08.2017 and passed the
summoning order, whereby the applicant
nos. 1, 2 and 4 were summoned under
Sections 392, 504, 506, IPC and the
applicant no.3 was summoned under
Sections 392, 504, 506, and 376, IPC, to
face the trial.

5. The applicants have further
submitted
that
on
29.05.2017
the
complainant/opposite party no.2 and her
family members committed marpeet with
the mother of the applicants in which she
received injuries. After the incident, one
NCR was lodged by the mother of the
applicant nos. 1, 2 and 3 on 29.05.2017
itself. The opposite party no.2 and her
family members again committed incident
dated 30.07.2017 with respect to which the
applicant no.4 filed a complaint under
Sections 427, 452, 323, 504, 506, 395, 354,
376, IPC, against the opposite party no.2
and her family members registered as
Complaint Case No.156 of 2017 (Smt.
Renu Vs. Sarvesh and others), in which the
statements of the complainant under
Section 200 Cr.P.C. and of the witnesses
under Section 202 Cr.P.C. were recorded
and the matter was pending at the stage of
summoning.

6. Earlier, the applicants approached
this Court in Criminal Misc. Application
under
Section
482
No.32985
of
2018(Veerpal and 3 others Vs. State of U.P.
and another), for quashing of the entire
proceedings of the same Complaint Case
No.105 of 2017, aforesaid, on merits, but
this prayer for quashment of proceedings
was refused by this Court by order dated
20.09.2018.

7. Learned counsel for the applicants
submits that during pendency of the
proceedings of the complaint case, due to
intervention of some respectable members
of the society and family members, the
parties have entered into compromise on
01.02.2020, which was duly notarized on
13.02.2020, Annexure No.-5; whereby it
has been settled between the parties that
three cases pending in different Courts at
Kannauj, shall be withdrawn/all possible
help would be extended to withdraw those
cases,
and
for
quashment
of
the
proceedings thereof. The details of those
case are as under:-

"(1) S.T. No.105 of 2017, under
Section 392, 504, 506, 376, IPC, Police
Station Gursahayganj, District Kannauj
(Present Case) filed by the opposite party
no.2 against the applicants.

(2) Complaint Case No.156 of
2017, under Sections 427, 452, 323, 504,
506, 395, 354, 376, IPC, Police Station
Gursahayganj, District Kannauj, filed by
the applicant no.4 against the husband and
210 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
other family members of opposite party
no.2.

(3) NCR No.0184 of 2017, under
Sections 323, 504, IPC, Police Station
Gursahayganj, District Kannauj, in which
police had submitted charge sheet in the
court of C.J.M., Kannauj."

8. Sri Sharique Ahmed, learned
counsel for the applicants has submitted
that as both the parties have amicably
settled all their disputes, under no fraud,
fear, influence, coercion or force or
compulsion,
the
proceedings
of
the
Complaint
Case
No.105
of
2017,
mentioned above, be quashed, by this Court
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. He has submitted
that the offences are private/personal in
nature and would not disturb the public at
large nor are against the State. The
settlement has been arrived at the initial
stage i.e. the stage of summoning and in
view thereof the chances of conviction of
the applicants are also remote, as no
witness would be coming forward to
depose against the applicants.

9. Learned counsel for the applicants
has placed reliance on the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "B.
S. Joshi and others Vs. State of Haryana
and another", (2003) 4 SCC 67; "Dimpey
Gujral and others Vs. Union Territory
and others", (2013) 11 SCC 497; "Gian
Singh Vs. State of Panjab and another",
(2012) 10 SCC 303; in support his
contention, that, to prevent the abuse of the
process of the Court, the proceedings of the
complaint case filed against the applicants
deserve to be quashed, in the exercise of
inherent jurisdiction to secure the ends of
justice.

10. Sri Sharique Ahmed, learned
counsel for the applicants has further
submitted that the proceedings of the
criminal cases in respect of the offences
under Sections 376 and 392 IPC can also
be quashed on the basis of settlement
between the parties. He has placed reliance
upon the judgment of this Court, in the case
of "Pushpendra Kushwaha Vs. State of
U.P. and 2 others" Application under
Section 482 No.2095 of 2019, decided on
24.01.2019, and has contended that in the
said case the proceedings of sessions trial,
under Sections 363, 366, 376, IPC and
Section 3/4 of Protection of Children from
Sexual Offences Act, were quashed by this
Court
on
the
basis
of
compromise/settlement.

11. Reliance has also been placed on
the judgments of different High Courts, in
the cases of "Rahul Vs. State of
Uttarakhand and others", Criminal Misc.
Application No.249 of 2020, decided on
20.02.2020,
by
the
High
Court
of
Uttarakhand; "Manga Singh Vs. State of
Panjab and others", Criminal Misc. No.
M-19131 of 2016, decided on 01.05.2018,
by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana
at Chandigarh; "Deepak Vs. State of
Haryana and others" CRM-M No. 31825
of 2017, decided on 19.01.2018, by the
High Court of Punjab and Haryana at
Chandigarh; "Yogesh Soni Vs. State of
Haryana
and
another",
C.R.M.-M
No.17999 of 2015, decided on 05.11.2015,
by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana
at Chandigarh; and "Shubham Shankarlal
Tolwan Vs. State of Maharastra and
others", Criminal Application No. 298 of
2020, decided on 21.07.2020, by the High
Court of Bombay, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur;
where, the proceedings were also with
respect to offence under Section 376 IPC,
but the same were quashed, on the basis of
the compromise/settlement arrived at by the
parties.
12 All. Rajesh Kumar & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
211

12. Sri Ashish Dubey, learned counsel
for the opposite party no.2 has submitted
that the compromise dated 01.02.2020 was
entered into which was notarized on
13.02.2020, by which the parties have
amicably settled all their dispute, out of
their free will, without any force and as
such the proceedings of the complaint case
be quashed by this Court, on the basis of
the compromise.

13. Learned counsel for both the
parties submit that as the proceedings of the
criminal
case
can
be
quashed,
the
compromise may be sent to the court of
learned magistrate where the complaint
case is pending for its verification.

14. Sri Pankaj Sexena, learned AGA
appearing for the State has opposed the
prayer for quashing of the proceedings of
the complaint case on the basis of the
compromise. He submits that some of the
offences, are non- compoundable and
heinous
as
well;
they
are
not
private/personal in nature, affecting only
the individuals but they have impact on the
society; they are wrong to the society and
as such neither the offences can be
compounded nor the proceedings can be
quashed on the basis of compromise.
Learned AGA has placed reliance on the
judgments of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in
the cases of "Gian Singh Vs. State of
Panjab and another", (2012) 10 SCC
303; "Narinder Singh and others Vs.
State of Panjab and another", (2014) 6
SCC 466", and "State of Madhya
Pradesh
Vs.
Laxmi
Narayan
and
others", 2019 (5) SCC 688.

15. I have considered the submissions
advanced by the learned counsel for the
parties and also perused the material on
record.

16. The short question which requires
consideration is, whether in the exercise of
jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. the
proceedings
of
the
complaint
case
involving an offence of Rape punishable
under Section 376 and Dacoity punishable
under Section 392, IPC can be quashed in
view of the compromise entered into by the
parties ? and if the answer to this question
is in affirmative, Whether the proceedings
of the complaint case in question, deserve
to be quashed, in the exercise of inherent
jurisdiction, on the considerations which
have been well settled ?

17. Section 482 Cr.P.C. which
provides for saving of inherent powers of
High Court, reads as under:- "Saving of
inherent powers of High Court. Nothing in
this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect
the inherent powers of the High Court to
make such orders as may be necessary to
give effect to any order under this Code, or
to prevent abuse of the process of any
Court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice."

18. The inherent power of the Courts
set up by the Constitution is a power that
inheres in such Courts being Court of
record. This power is vested by the
Constitution itself, inter-alia, under Article
215 of the Constitution of India. Every
High Court has inherent power to act exdebito justitiae to do real and substantial
justice, for the administration of which
alone it exists or to prevent the abuse of the
process of the Court. Section 482 Cr.P.C.
saves inherent powers of the High Court
and it starts with non-obstante clause
"Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to
limit or affect the inherent powers of the
High Court to make such orders as may be
necessary." The inherent power can be
exercised under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (i) to
212 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
give effect to an order under the Code; (ii)
to prevent abuse of the process of Court;
and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of
justice.

19. This inherent power possessed by
the High Court is of wide plenitude, with
no statutory restrictions. The limitations
imposed on exercise of such power are the
self imposed restrictions. Any provision of
the Code cannot limit or affect the inherent
powers of the High Court. But, this power,
being extraordinary, is required to be
exercised sparingly, carefully, with caution,
and circumspection and only when such
exercise is justified by the tests specifically
laid down in Section 482 Cr.P.C. If there is
any specific provision in the statute for
redressal of grievance, the High Court,
ordinarily,
refuses
to
invoke
the
extraordinary powers, and also, in a
situation with respect to the matter where
there is a specific bar of law engrafted in
the statute. The paramount consideration to
the exercise of this power is to prevent the
abuse of the process of the Court. If any
abuse of the process leading to injustice is
brought to the notice of the Court, then the
Court would be justified in preventing
injustice by invoking inherent powers in
absence of any specific provision in the
statute.

20. Section 320 (1) of the Code
provides for compounding of certain
offences punishable under Indian Penal
Code (IPC ) specified in first two columns
of the Table, given there under, by the
persons mentioned in the third Column of
the table. Sub-Section (2) of Section 320 of
the
Code,
further
provides
for
compounding
of
certain
offences
punishable under Indian Penal Code
specified in the first two columns by the
persons specified in the third column of the
table given under Sub-section (2), with the
permission of the Court before which any
prosecution for such offence is pending.
Subsection (9) of Section 320, specifically
provides that, "No offence shall be
compounded except as provided by this
Section" i.e. Section 320 of the Code.

21. Section 320 Cr.P.C. does not come
in the way of exercise of inherent power of
the High Court for quashment of criminal
proceeding. The power of the High Court
for quashment of the criminal proceeding is
distinct and different from the power given
to a criminal Court for compounding the
offences under Section 320 of the Code.
The inherent power of the High Court is
neither restricted nor controlled by Section
320 of the Code. The proceedings of the
offences which are non-compoundable can
also be quashed by the High Court in
exercise of inherent jurisdiction, on the
well settled principles, but sparingly and
with caution, forming an opinion, on either
of the two objectives of securing the ends
of justice and to prevent abuse of the
process of any Court. This bar of Section
320 Cr.P.C. is attracted only before the
Criminal Court, where the prayer for
compounding is made. There, only those
offences
which
have
been
made
compoundable, can be compounded and the
offences which are non-compoundable
cannot be compounded in view of SubSection (9) of Section 320 Cr.P.C.

22. In B.S. Joshi & Ors. Vs. State of
Haryana & Another, "(2003) 4 SCC 675"
the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that if
for the purpose of securing the ends of
justice,
quashing
of
F.I.R
becomes
necessary, section 320 Cr.P.C. would not be
a Bar to the exercise of power of quashing.
It is, however, a different matter depending
on facts and circumstances of each case,
12 All. Rajesh Kumar & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
213
whether to exercise or not, such a power.
The High Court in exercise of its inherent
powers can quash criminal proceedings or
F.I.R or complaint and Section 320 Cr.P.C.
does not limit or affect the powers under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. Paragraph nos. 8, 10,
11 and 15 of B. S. Joshi (Supra) case are
being reproduced as under:-.

"8. It is, thus, clear that Madhu
Limaye case [(1977) 4 SCC 551 : 1978
SCC (Cri) 10] does not lay down any
general proposition limiting power of
quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR
or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the
Code or extraordinary power under Article
226 of the Constitution of India. We are,
therefore, of the view that if for the purpose
of securing the ends of justice, quashing of
FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would
not be a bar to the exercise of power of
quashing. It is, however, a different matter
depending
upon
the
facts
and
circumstances of each case whether to
exercise or not such a power.

10. In State of Karnataka v. L.
Muniswamy [(1977) 2 SCC 699 : 1977
SCC (Cri) 404] considering the scope of
inherent power of quashing under Section
482, this Court held that in the exercise of
this wholesome power, the High Court is
entitled to quash proceedings if it comes to
the conclusion that the ends of justice so
require. It was observed that in a criminal
case, the veiled object behind a lame
prosecution, the very nature of the material
on which the structure of the prosecution
rests and the like would justify the High
Court in quashing the proceeding in the
interest of justice and that the ends of
justice are higher than the ends of mere law
though justice had got to be administered
according to laws made by the legislature.
This Court said that the compelling
necessity for making these observations is
that without a proper realization of the
object and purpose of the provision which
seeks to save the inherent powers of the
High Court to do justice between the State
and its subjects, it would be impossible to
appreciate the width and contours of that
salient jurisdiction. On facts, it was also
noticed that there was no reasonable
likelihood of the accused being convicted of
the offence. What would happen to the trial
of the case where the wife does not support
the imputations made in the FIR of the type
in question. As earlier noticed, now she has
filed an affidavit that the FIR was
registered
at
her
instance
due
to
temperamental differences and implied
imputations. There may be many reasons
for not supporting the imputations. It may
be either for the reason that she has
resolved disputes with her husband and his
other family members and as a result
thereof she has again started living with
her husband with whom she earlier had
differences or she has willingly parted
company and is living happily on her own
or has married someone else on the earlier
marriage having been dissolved by divorce
on consent of parties or fails to support the
prosecution on some other similar grounds.
In such eventuality, there would almost be
no chance of conviction. Would it then be
proper to decline to exercise power of
quashing on the ground that it would be
permitting the parties to compound noncompoundable
offences?
The
answer
clearly has to be in the "negative". It
would, however, be a different matter if the
High Court on facts declines the prayer for
quashing for any valid reasons including
lack of bona fides.

11.
In
Madhavrao
Jiwajirao
Scindia
v.
Sambhajirao
Chandrojirao
Angre [(1988) 1 SCC 692 : 1988 SCC (Cri)
234] it was held that while exercising
inherent power of quashing under Section
214 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
482, it is for the High Court to take into
consideration any special features which
appear in a particular case to consider
whether it is expedient and in the interest of
justice to permit a prosecution to continue.
Where, in the opinion of the court, chances
of an ultimate conviction are bleak and,
therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be
served by allowing a criminal prosecution
to continue, the court may, while taking
into consideration the special facts of a
case, also quash the proceedings.

15.
In
view
of
the
above
discussion, we hold that the High Court in
exercise of its inherent powers can quash
criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint
and Section 320 of the Code does not limit
or affect the powers under Section 482 of
the Code."

23. In "Gian Singh Vs. State of
Punjab and Another (2012) 10 SCC
303", the Constitution Bench of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under,
in paragraph nos. 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57
and 58, which are being reproduced.

"51. Section 320 of the Code
articulates public policy with regard to the
compounding of offences. It catalogues the
offences punishable under IPC which may
be compounded by the parties without
permission
of
the
court
and
the
composition of certain offences with the
permission of the court. The offences
punishable under the special statutes are
not covered by Section 320. When an
offence is compoundable under Section
320, abatement of such offence or an
attempt to commit such offence or where
the accused is liable under Section 34 or
149 IPC can also be compounded in the
same manner. A person who is under 18
years of age or is an idiot or a lunatic is
not competent to contract compounding of
offence but the same can be done on his
behalf with the permission of the court. If a
person is otherwise competent to compound
an offence is dead, his legal representatives
may also compound the offence with the
permission of the court. Where the accused
has been committed for trial or he has been
convicted and the appeal is pending,
composition can only be done with the
leave of the court to which he has been
committed or with the leave of the appeal
court, as the case may be. The Revisional
Court is also competent to allow any
person to compound any offence who is
competent to compound. The consequence
of the composition of an offence is acquittal
of the accused. Sub-section (9) of Section
320 mandates that no offence shall be
compounded except as provided by this
section. Obviously, in view thereof the
composition of an offence has to be in
accord with Section 320 and in no other
manner.

52. The question is with regard to
the inherent power of the High Court in
quashing the criminal proceedings against
an offender who has settled his dispute with
the victim of the crime but the crime in
which he is allegedly involved is not
compoundable under Section 320 of the
Code.

53. Section 482 of the Code, as its
very language suggests, saves the inherent
power of the High Court which it has by
virtue of it being a superior court to
prevent abuse of the process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It
begins with the words, "nothing in this
Code" which means that the provision is an
overriding provision. These words leave no
manner of doubt that none of the provisions
of the Code limits or restricts the inherent
power. The guideline for exercise of such
power is provided in Section 482 itself i.e.
to prevent abuse of the process of any court
12 All. Rajesh Kumar & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
215
or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
As has been repeatedly stated that Section
482 confers no new powers on the High
Court;
it
merely
safeguards
existing
inherent powers possessed by the High
Court necessary to prevent abuse of the
process of any court or to secure the ends
of justice. It is equally well settled that the
power is not to be resorted to if there is
specific provision in the Code for the
redress of the grievance of an aggrieved
party. It should be exercised very sparingly
and it should not be exercised as against
the express bar of law engrafted in any
other provision of the Code.

54. In different situations, the
inherent power may be exercised in
different ways to achieve its ultimate
objective. Formation of opinion by the
High Court before it exercises inherent
power under Section 482 on either of the
twin objectives, (i) to prevent abuse of the
process of any court, or (ii) to secure the
ends of justice, is a sine qua non.

55. In the very nature of its
constitution, it is the judicial obligation of
the High Court to undo a wrong in course
of administration of justice or to prevent
continuation
of
unnecessary
judicial
process. This is founded on the legal maxim
quando
lex
aliquid
alicui
concedit,
conceditur et id sine qua res ipsa esse non
potest. The full import of which is whenever
anything is authorised, and especially if, as
a matter of duty, required to be done by
law, it is found impossible to do that thing
unless something else not authorised in
express terms be also done, may also be
done, then that something else will be
supplied by necessary intendment. Ex
debito justitiae is inbuilt in such exercise;
the whole idea is to do real, complete and
substantial justice for which it exists. The
power possessed by the High Court under
Section 482 of the Code is of wide
amplitude but requires exercise with great
caution and circumspection.

56. It needs no emphasis that
exercise of inherent power by the High
Court would entirely depend on the facts
and circumstances of each case. It is
neither permissible nor proper for the court
to provide a straitjacket formula regulating
the exercise of inherent powers under
Section 482. No precise and inflexible
guidelines can also be provided.

57. Quashing of offence or criminal
proceedings on the ground of settlement
between an offender and victim is not the same
thing as compounding of offence. They are
different and not interchangeable. Strictly
speaking, the power of compounding of
offences given to a court under Section 320 is
materially different from the quashing of
criminal proceedings by the High Court in
exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In
compounding of offences, power of a criminal
court is circumscribed by the provisions
contained in Section 320 and the court is
guided solely and squarely thereby while, on the
other hand, the formation of opinion by the
High Court for quashing a criminal offence or
criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is
guided by the material on record as to whether
the ends of justice would justify such exercise of
power although the ultimate consequence may
be acquittal or dismissal of indictment.

58.
Where
the
High
Court
quashes a criminal proceeding having
regard to the fact that the dispute between
the offender and the victim has been settled
although
the
offences
are
not
compoundable, it does so as in its opinion,
continuation of criminal proceedings will
be an exercise in futility and justice in the
case demands that the dispute between the
parties is put to an end and peace is
restored; securing the ends of justice being
the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes
are acts which have harmful effect on the public
216 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
and consist in wrongdoing that seriously
endangers and threatens the well-being of the
society and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer
only because he and the victim have settled the
dispute amicably or that the victim has been
paid compensation, yet certain crimes have
been made compoundable in law, with or
without the permission of the court. In respect
of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity,
etc., or other offences of mental depravity under
IPC or offences of moral turpitude under
special statutes, like the Prevention of
Corruption Act or the offences committed by
public servants while working in that capacity,
the settlement between the offender and the
victim can have no legal sanction at all.
However,
certain
offences
which
overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil
flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile,
commercial, financial, partnership or such like
transactions or the offences arising out of
matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc.
or the family dispute, where the wrong is
basically to the victim and the offender and the
victim have settled all disputes between them
amicably, irrespective of the fact that such
offences have not been made compoundable,
the High Court may within the framework of its
inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding
or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied
that on the face of such settlement, there is
hardly any likelihood of the offender being
convicted and by not quashing the criminal
proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends
of justice shall be defeated. The above list is
illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will
depend on its own facts and no hard-and-fast
category can be prescribed."

24. In Gian Singh(Supra) the
Hon'ble Supreme Court summed up the
position in para no. 61, as under:-

"61.The position that emerges
from
the
above
discussion
can
be
summarised thus: the power of the High
Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or
FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent
jurisdiction is distinct and different from
the power given to a criminal court for
compounding the offences under Section
320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide
plenitude with no statutory limitation but it
has to be exercised in accord with the
guideline engrafted in such power viz.: (i)
to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to
prevent abuse of the process of any court.
In what cases power to quash the criminal
proceeding or complaint or FIR may be
exercised where the offender and the victim
have settled their dispute would depend on
the facts and circumstances of each case
and no category can be prescribed.
However, before exercise of such power, the
High Court must have due regard to the
nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous
and serious offences of mental depravity or
offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc.
cannot be fittingly quashed even though the
victim or victim's family and the offender
have settled the dispute. Such offences are
not private in nature and have a serious
impact
on
society.
Similarly,
any
compromise between the victim and the
offender in relation to the offences under
special statutes like the Prevention of
Corruption Act or the offences committed
by public servants while working in that
capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis
for
quashing
criminal
proceedings
involving such offences. But the criminal
cases
having
overwhelmingly
and
predominatingly civil flavour stand on a
different footing for the purposes of
quashing, particularly the offences arising
from commercial, financial, mercantile,
civil, partnership or such like transactions
or the offences arising out of matrimony
relating to dowry, etc. or the family
disputes where the wrong is basically
12 All. Rajesh Kumar & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
217
private or personal in nature and the
parties have resolved their entire dispute. In
this category of cases, the High Court may
quash the criminal proceedings if in its view,
because of the compromise between the
offender and the victim, the possibility of
conviction
is
remote
and
bleak
and
continuation of the criminal case would put
the accused to great oppression and prejudice
and extreme injustice would be caused to him
by not quashing the criminal case despite full
and complete settlement and compromise with
the victim. In other words, the High Court
must consider whether it would be unfair or
contrary to the interest of justice to continue
with the criminal proceeding or continuation
of the criminal proceeding would tantamount
to abuse of process of law despite settlement
and compromise between the victim and the
wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of
justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case
is put to an end and if the answer to the above
question(s) is in the affirmative, the High
Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to
quash the criminal proceeding."

25. In "Narinder Singh and Others
Vs.