# Rajkumar v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2024) 5 ILRA 664
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-05-14
- **Case number:** Application U/S 482. No. 10290 of 2019
- **Bench:** Arun Kumar Singh Deshwal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/rajkumar-v-state-of-u-p-ors-51941
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

A. Criminal Law-Criminal Procedure Code,
1973-Sections 482 & 125-application for
maintenance filed by wife and daughter
which
was
dismissed
for
want
of
prosecution-recall was filed which was
allowed by the court below-The applicant
challenged the impugned order stating
that the same cannot be recalled or
modified in view of the section 362 CrPcThe apex court considered in the case of
Sanjeev kapoor that the proceeding of
section 125 crpc is quasi criminal in nature
and observed that bar of section 362 Crpc
does not apply-Order passed u/s 125 CrPc
may be final or interim, can be recalled or
altered u/s 127 CrPC-a bar of section 362
CrPC is not applicable in such cases.(Para 1
to 17)

The application is rejected. (E-6)
5 All. Rajkumar Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
665
List of Cases cited:

## Text

664 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the accused persons including the applicants
have entered into the house of the informant
and have stated caste based remark and have
assaulted. The present 482 application is
only confined to the allegations under
section 3(1)(r) of the SC/ST Act. The site
plan filed by the learned counsel for the
applicants would indicate that the place of
incident is the house of the informant which
is not a public place or public view. A
perusal of the statement of the informant
under section 161 Cr.P.C. as well as the
F.I.R. would further demonstrate that there
was no member of the public in the house
where the alleged incident is said to have
been taken place. As per the provision of
Section 3(1)(r) of SC/ST Act is quoted
herein below:

"Section
3(1)(r)
intentionally
insults or intimidates with intent to
humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or
a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public
view."

9. One of the essential ingredients for
an offence under section 3(1)(r) of SC/ST
Act is that the offence ought to have been
committed in public view.

10. In the present case, the offence is
not committed in public view nor the
offence has been committed at public place.
In the statement of the informant it has not
been stated that any member of the public
was present and the incident has occurred.
Once the offence has not taken place in
public view the provisions of section 3(1)(r)
of the SC/ST Act would not be attracted and
as such the same cannot be proceeded with.

11. In view of the facts and
circumstances, the present 482 application is
partly allowed. The Criminal proceedings
against the applicants in Case Crime No.
447 of 2017 in respect of offence under
sections 3(1)(r) SC/ST Act is hereby
quashed. However, in respect of other
offences the proceedings may go on and be
brought to its logical conclusion, in
accordance with law.
----------
(2024) 5 ILRA 664
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 14.05.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ARUN KUMAR SINGH
DESHWAL, J.

Application U/S 482. No. 10290 of 2019

Rajkumar ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicant:
Sri R.V. Pandey

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
G.A., Sri Ashutosh Gupta, Sri Ashutosh
Sharma, Sri Gyan Prakash Verma

A. Criminal Law-Criminal Procedure Code,
1973-Sections 482 & 125-application for
maintenance filed by wife and daughter
which
was
dismissed
for
want
of
prosecution-recall was filed which was
allowed by the court below-The applicant
challenged the impugned order stating
that the same cannot be recalled or
modified in view of the section 362 CrPcThe apex court considered in the case of
Sanjeev kapoor that the proceeding of
section 125 crpc is quasi criminal in nature
and observed that bar of section 362 Crpc
does not apply-Order passed u/s 125 CrPc
may be final or interim, can be recalled or
altered u/s 127 CrPC-a bar of section 362
CrPC is not applicable in such cases.(Para 1
to 17)

The application is rejected. (E-6)
5 All. Rajkumar Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
665
List of Cases cited:

1. St. Rep. by D.S.P., S.B.C.I.D., Chennai Vs K.V
Rajendran & ors. CRLA No. 1389 of 2008

2. Sanjeev Kapoor Vs Chandana Kapoor & ors.
(2020) AIR SC 1064

3. Badshah Vs Sou. Urmila Badshah Godse & anr.
(2014) 1 SCC 188.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Arun Kumar Singh
Deshwal, J.)

1. Rejoinder affidavit filed today is
taken on record.

2. Heard learned counsel for the
applicant, learned counsel for opposite party
no.2 and Sri Sunil Kumar Kushwaha,
learned AGA for the State.

3. The present application has been
filed for the following relief:

"It is, therefore, most respectfully
prayed that this Hon'ble Court may
graciously be pleased to allow the present
application and quashed the order and
judgment
dated
25.01.2019
in
recall/restoration application no.164 of
2017 whereby has recall/restore ex-parte
order dated 23.11.2017 passed by the
learned trial court in Case No.336 of 2016
(Smt. Bindu Devi & Others Vs. Rajkumar),
u/s 125 Cr.P.C., pending in the court of the
Chief Judge, Family Court, Azamgarh."

4. Facts giving rise to the present case
are that opposite parties, nos.2 and 3, are the
wife and daughter of the applicant,
respectively.
The
application
for
maintenance u/s 125 Cr.P.C. filed by
opposite parties, nos.2 and 3, was dismissed
for want of prosecution on 23.11.2017.
Against that order, opposite parties, nos.2
and 3 filed a recall application, which was
allowed by the court below by the impugned
order dated 25.01.2019. This impugned
order is under challenge in the present case.

5. Contention of learned counsel for
the applicant is that the impugned order is
erroneous as once an order has been passed
in criminal proceeding dismissing the
application u/s 125 Cr.P.C. for want of
prosecution, then same cannot be recalled or
modified in view of the bar of Section 362
Cr.P.C. In support of his contention, the
counsel of the applicant relied upon the
judgment of the Apex Court in the case of
State Rep. by D.S.P., S.B.C.I.D., Chennai
Vs. K.V. Rajendran and Ors in Criminal
Appeal No.1389 of 2008. In this judgment,
the Apex Court observed that the bar of
section 362 Cr. P.C. also applies to the
inherent power under section 482೦Cr.P.C.

6. Per contra, learned counsel for
opposite parties, nos.2 and 3 as well as
learned AGA have submitted that Section362 Cr.P.C. provides that save as otherwise
provided by the Cr.P.C. or any other law, no
court shall alter or review its judgement or
final order disposing of the case. Therefore,
it is clear that an exception has been
provided in Section-362 Cr.P.C., itself and
that exception has been mentioned in
Section-127 Cr.P.C. which permits the court
to alter or change any order passed u/s 125
Cr.P.C. Therefore, the court below is correct
in recalling the order dated 23.11.2017 and
restoring the case at its original number. In
support of his contention, learned counsel
for opposite party no.2 has relied upon the
judgement of the Apex Court in the case of
Sanjeev Kapoor Vs. Chandana Kapoor &
Others reported in AIR 2020 SC 1064. In
that judgement, the Apex Court observed
that even after passing the order u/s 125
Cr.P.C., Magistrate or the court concerned
666 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
will not become functus officio and it has
jurisdiction to cancel or modify the order
passed u/s 125 Cr.P.C.

7. After hearing the rival contention of
learned counsel for the parties, and on the
perusal of record, it appears that the
application filed by the opposite parties,
nos.2 and 3 against the applicant seeking
maintenance u/s 125 Cr.P.C. was dismissed
for want of prosecution on 23.11.2017 and
on the recall application filed by the
opposite parties, nos.2 and 3, the order dated
23.11.2017 was recalled and matter was
restored to its original place by the
impugned order dated 25.01.2019. In the
impugned order, the court below has
observed that in the proceeding of 125
Cr.P.C., if the case was dismissed for want
of prosecution, the same can be recalled
under Section-126(3) Cr.P.C. where the
court has all power to make such order as the
circumstances require.

8. So far as the bar u/s 362 Cr.P.C. is
concerned, the bar has been imposed to
recall or modify the final order by Section362 Cr.P.C. after signing the same. It is clear
from Section-362 Cr.P.C. that unless
otherwise provided by the code or any other
law, final judgement or order cannot be
recalled or reviewed after signing the same.
For ready reference, Section-362 Cr.P.C. is
being quoted as under:

"362. Court not to alter judgment
- Save as otherwise provided by this Code or
by any other law for the time being in force,
no Court, when it has signed its judgment or
final order disposing of a case, shall alter or
review the same except to correct a clerical
or arithmetical error."

9. From perusal of the above section,
it is clear that if any provision is provided
under Cr.P.C., which permits the recall or
alter the judgement or final order, then the
bar u/s 362 Cr.P.C. will not apply. It is
provided u/s 126(3) Cr.P.C. that the court
dealing with Section-125 Cr.P.C. shall
have power to make such order as may be
just and proper. After that, Section-127
Cr.P.C. provides that the court which has
passed an order for maintenance u/s 125
Cr.P.C. including the order of interim
maintenance has jurisdiction to make such
alteration as required. Sections-125, 126
and 127 Cr.P.C. are being quoted as under:

"125. Order for maintenance of
wives, children and parents.?(1) If any
person having sufficient means neglects or
refuses to maintain?

(a) his wife, unable to maintain
herself, or

(b) his legitimate or illegitimate
minor child, whether married or not,
unable to maintain itself, or

(c) his legitimate or illegitimate
child (not being a married daughter) who
has attained majority, where such child is,
by reason of any physical or mental
abnormality or injury unable to maintain
itself, or

(d) his father or mother, unable
to maintain himself or herself,

a Magistrate of the first class
may, upon proof of such neglect or
refusal, order such person to make a
monthly allowance for the maintenance
of his wife or such child, father or mother,
at such monthly rate, as such Magistrate
thinks fit, and to pay the same to such
person as the Magistrate may from time
to time direct:

Provided that the Magistrate may
order the father of a minor female child
referred to in clause (b) to make such
allowance, until she attains her majority, if
the Magistrate is satisfied that the husband
5 All. Rajkumar Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
667
of such minor female child, if married, is not
possessed of sufficient means:

Provided
further
that
the
Magistrate may, during the pendency of the
proceeding regarding monthly allowance
for the maintenance under this sub-section,
order such person to make a monthly
allowance for the interim maintenance of his
wife or such child, father or mother, and the
expenses of such proceeding which the
Magistrate considers reasonable, and to pay
the same to such person as the Magistrate
may from time to time direct:

Provided also that an application
for the monthly allowance for the interim
maintenance and expenses for proceeding
under the second proviso shall, as far as
possible, be disposed of within sixty days
from the date of the service of notice of the
application to such person.

Explanation.-For the purposes of
this Chapter,?

(a) "minor" means a person who,
under the provisions of the Indian Majority
Act, 1875 (9 of 1875), is deemed not to have
attained his majority;

(b) "wife" includes a woman who
has been divorced by, or has obtained a
divorce from, her husband and has not
remarried.

(2) Any such allowance for the
maintenance or interim maintenance and
expenses for proceeding shall be payable
from the date of the order, or, if so ordered,
from the date of the application for
maintenance or interim maintenance and
expenses of proceeding, as the case may be.

(3) If any person so ordered fails
without sufficient cause to comply with the
order, any such Magistrate may, for every
breach of the order, issue a warrant for
levying the amount due in the manner
provided for levying fines, and may sentence
such person, for the whole or any part of
each
month's
[allowance
for
the
maintenance or the interim maintenance
and expenses of proceeding, as the case may
be,] remaining unpaid after the execution of
the warrant, to imprisonment for a term
which may extend to one month or until
payment if sooner made:

Provided that no warrant shall be
issued for the recovery of any amount due
under this section unless application be
made to the Court to levy such amount
within a period of one year from the date on
which it became due:

Provided further that if such
person offers to maintain his wife on
condition of her living with him, and she
refuses to live with him, such Magistrate
may consider any grounds of refusal stated
by her, and may make an order under this
section notwithstanding such offer, if he is
satisfied that there is just ground for so
doing.

Explanation.-If a husband has
contracted marriage with another woman or
keeps a mistress, it shall be considered to be
just ground for his wife's refusal to live with
him.

(4) No wife shall be entitled to
receive an [allowance for the maintenance
or the interim maintenance and expenses of
proceeding, as the case may be,] from her
husband under this section if she is living in
adultery, or if, without any sufficient reason,
she refuses to live with her husband, or if
they are living separately by mutual consent.

(5) On proof that any wife in
whose favour an order has been made under
this section is living in adultery, or that
without sufficient reason she refuses to live
with her husband, or that they are living
separately
by
mutual
consent,
the
Magistrate shall cancel the order.

126. Procedure.-(1) Proceedings
under Section 125 may be taken against any
person in any district?

(a) where he is, or
668 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(b) where he or his wife resides, or

(c) where he last resided with his
wife, or as the case may be, with the mother
of the illegitimate child.

(2)
All
evidence
in
such
proceedings shall be taken in the presence
of the person against whom an order for
payment of maintenance is proposed to be
made, or, when his personal attendance is
dispensed with, in the presence of his
pleader, and shall be recorded in the
manner prescribed for summons-cases:

Provided that if the Magistrate is
satisfied that the person against whom an
order for payment of maintenance is
proposed to be made is wilfully avoiding
service, or wilfully neglecting to attend the
Court, the Magistrate may proceed to hear
and determine the case ex parte and any
order so made may be set aside for good
cause shown on an application made within
three months from the date thereof subject to
such terms including terms as to payment of
costs to the opposite party as the Magistrate
may think just and proper.

(3) The Court in dealing with
applications under Section 125 shall have
power to make such order as to costs as may
be just.

127. Alteration in allowance.-(1)
On proof of a change in the circumstances
of any person, receiving, under Section 125
a monthly allowance for the maintenance or
interim maintenance, or ordered under the
same section to pay a monthly allowance for
the maintenance, or interim maintenance, to
his wife, child, father or mother, as the case
may be, the Magistrate may make such
alteration, as he thinks fit, in the allowance
for the maintenance or the interim
maintenance, as the case may be.

(2) Where it appears to the
Magistrate that, in consequence of any
decision of a competent civil court, any
order made under Section 125 should be
cancelled or varied, he shall cancel the
order or, as the case may be, vary the same
accordingly.

(3) Where any order has been
made under Section 125 in favour of a
woman who has been divorced by, or has
obtained a divorce from, her husband, the
Magistrate shall, if he is satisfied that?

(a) the woman has, after the date
of such divorce, remarried, cancel such
order as from the date of her remarriage;

(b) the woman has been divorced
by her husband and that she has received,
whether before or after the date of the said
order, the whole of the sum which, under
any customary or personal law applicable to
the parties, was payable on such divorce,
cancel such order,?

(i) in the case where such sum was
paid before such order, from the date on which
such order was made,

(ii) in any other case, from the date
of expiry of the period, if any, for which
maintenance has been actually paid by the
husband to the woman;

(c) the woman has obtained a
divorce from her husband and that she had
voluntarily
surrendered
her
rights
to
[maintenance or interim maintenance, as the
case may be,] after her divorce, cancel the
order from the date thereof.

(4) At the time of making any decree
for the recovery of any maintenance or dowry
by any person, to whom a [monthly allowance
for the maintenance and interim maintenance
or any of them has been ordered] to be paid
under Section 125, the civil court shall take
into account the sum which has been paid to,
or recovered by, such person [as monthly
allowance for the maintenance and interim
maintenance or any of them, as the case may
be, in pursuance of] the said order."

10. From perusal of Sections-125
Cr.P.C., 126 Cr.P.C. and 127 Cr.P.C., it is
5 All. Rajkumar Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
669
clear that Section-125 Cr.P.C. is social
justice legislation which orders for the
maintenance of wives, children and parents
and the legislature has provided in Sections125(5) Cr.P.C., 126 Cr.P.C. as well as
Section-127 Cr.P.C., certain conditions on
fulfilling of which, order passed u/s 125
Cr.P.C. can be recalled or modified.

11. In Section-125 Cr.P.C. using of
expression "as the Magistrate from time to
time direct", the use of expression from time
to time has purpose and meaning. It clearly
contemplates that the order passed u/s
125(1) Cr.P.C., the Magistrate may have to
exercise jurisdiction from time to time. The
above legislative scheme indicates that
Magistrate does not become functus officio
after passing of the order u/s 125 Cr.P.C.

12. The Apex Court in the case of
Badshah Vs. Sou. Urmila Badshah Godse
and another reported in (2014) 1 SCC 188
has considered the interpretation of Section125 Cr.P.C. In paragraph nos.13.3 to 18 of
the
judgement
of
Badshah
(supra),
following guidelines have been laid down:

"13.3.Thirdly, in such cases,
purposive interpretation needs to be given to
the provisions of Section 125 Cr.P.C. While
dealing with the application of a destitute
wife or hapless children or parents under
this provision, the Court is dealing with the
marginalised sections of the society. The
purpose is to achieve "social justice" which
is the constitutional vision, enshrined in the
Preamble of the Constitution of India. The
Preamble to the Constitution of India
clearly signals that we have chosen the
democratic path under the rule of law to
achieve the goal of securing for all its
citizens, justice, liberty, equality and
fraternity.
It
specifically
highlights
achieving their social justice. Therefore, it
becomes the bounden duty of the courts to
advance the cause of the social justice.
While giving interpretation to a particular
provision, the court is supposed to bridge
the gap between the law and society.

14. Of late, in this very direction,
it is emphasised that the courts have to
adopt different approaches in "social justice
adjudication", which is also known as
"social context adjudication" as mere
"adversarial approach" may not be very
appropriate.

There are number of social justice
legislations giving special protection and
benefits to vulnerable groups in the society.
Prof.
Madhava
Menon
describes
it
eloquently:

"It
is,
therefore,
respectfully
submitted that 'social context judging' is
essentially the application of equality
jurisprudence as evolved by Parliament and
the Supreme Court in myriad situations
presented before courts where unequal
parties
are
pitted
in
adversarial
proceedings and where courts are called
upon to dispense equal justice.

Apart from the social-economic
inequalities accentuating the disabilities of
the poor in an unequal fight, the adversarial
process itself operates to the disadvantage
of the weaker party. In such a situation, the
Judge has to be not only sensitive to the
inequalities of parties involved but also
positively inclined to the weaker party if the
imbalance were not to result in miscarriage
of justice. This result is achieved by what we
call social context judging or social justice
adjudication."

15. The provision of maintenance
would definitely fall in this category which
aims at empowering the destitute and
achieving social justice or equality and
dignity of the individual. While dealing with
cases under this provision, drift in the
approach from "adversarial" litigation to
670 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
social context adjudication is the need of the
hour.

16.
The
law
regulates
relationships between people. It prescribes
patterns of behaviour. It reflects the values
of society. The role of the court is to
understand the purpose of law in society and
to help the law achieve its purpose. But the
law of a society is a living organism. It is
based on a given factual and social reality
that is constantly changing. Sometimes
change in law precedes societal change and
is even intended to stimulate it. In most
cases, however, a change in law is the result
of a change in social reality. Indeed, when
social reality changes, the law must change
too. Just as change in social reality is the
law of life, responsiveness to change in
social reality is the life of the law. It can be
said that the history of law is the history of
adapting the law to society's changing
needs. In both constitutional and statutory
interpretation, the court is supposed to
exercise discretion in determining the
proper relationship between the subjective
and objective purposes of the law.

17. Cardozo acknowledges in his
classic "- no system of jus scriptum has been
able to escape the need of it." and he
elaborates:

"It is true that codes and statutes
do not render the Judge superfluous, nor his
work perfunctory and mechanical. There
are gaps to be filled. ? There are hardships
and wrongs to be mitigated if not avoided.
Interpretation is often spoken of as if it were
nothing but the search and the discovery of
a meaning which, however obscure and
latent,
had
nonetheless
a
real
and
ascertainable
pre-existence
in
the
legislator's mind. The process is, indeed,
that at times, but it is often something more.
The ascertainment of intention may be the
least of a Judge's troubles in ascribing
meaning to a statute. ? Says Gray in his
lectures:

"The fact is that the difficulties of
so-called interpretation arise when the
legislature has had no meaning at all; when
the question which is raised on the statute
never occurred to it; when what the Judges
have to do is, not to determine that the
legislature did mean on a point which was
present to its mind, but to guess what it
would have intended on a point not present
to its mind, if the point had been present.""

18. The court as the interpreter of
law is supposed to supply omissions, correct
uncertainties, and harmonise results with
justice through a method of free decision ?
libre
recherch
scientifique
i.e.
"free
scientific research". We are of the opinion
that there is a non-rebuttable presumption
that the legislature while making a provision
like Section 125 Cr.P.C., to fulfil its
constitutional duty in good faith, had always
intended to give relief to the woman
becoming "wife" under such circumstances.
This approach is particularly needed while
deciding the issues relating to gender
justice. We already have examples of
exemplary efforts in this regard.

Journey from Shah Bano to
Shabana Bano guaranteeing maintenance
rights to Muslim women is a classical
example.

13.
Considering
the
legislative
purposes behind Section- 125 Cr.P.C.,
which is quasi-criminal in nature, the Apex
Court considered in the case of Sanjeev
Kapoor (supra) the issue of applicability of
Section-362 Cr.P.C. in the proceeding of
Section-125 Cr.P.C. and observed that bar of
Section-362 Cr.P.C. does not apply to the
order passed u/s 125 Cr.P.C. Paragraphs
nos.25, 26 and 27 of the judgement
mentioned above are being quoted as under:
5 All. Kapil Tomar Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
671

"25. The above legislative scheme
indicates that the Magistrate does not
become functus officio after passing an
order under Section 125 Cr.P.C., as and
when the occasion arises the Magistrate
exercises the jurisdiction from time to time.
By Section 125(5) Cr.P.C., the Magistrate is
expressly empowered to cancel an order
passed under Section 125(1) Cr.P.C. on
fulfilment of certain conditions.

26.Section
127
Cr.P.C.
also
discloses the legislative intendment where
the Magistrate is empowered to alter an
order passed under Section 125 Cr.P.C.
Sub-section (2) of Section 127 Cr.P.C. also
empowers the Magistrate to cancel or vary
an order under Section 125 Cr.P.C. The
legislative scheme as delineated by Sections
125 and 127 Cr.P.C. as noted above clearly
enumerated the circumstances and incidents
provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure
where the court passing a judgment or final
order disposing of the case can alter or
review the same. The embargo as contained
in Section 362 is, thus, clearly relaxed in the
proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C. as
indicated above.

27.The submissions which have
been pressed by the learned counsel for the
appellant were founded only on embargo of
Section 362 and when embargo of Section
362 is expressly relaxed in the proceedings
under Section 125 Cr.P.C., we are not
persuaded to accept the submission of the
counsel for the appellant that the Family
Court was not entitled to set aside and
cancel its order dated 6-5-2017 in the facts
and circumstances of the present case."

14. From the above legal position, it is
clear that the order passed u/s 125 Cr.P.C.
may be final or interim, can be recalled or
altered u/s 127 Cr.P.C. Therefore, it falls in
the category of exceptional cases mentioned
in Section-362 Cr.P.C. Hence, a bar of
Section 362 Cr.P.C. is not applicable in such
cases.

15. The Judgment relied upon by the
applicant's counsel does not apply in the
present case.

16. In view of the above, this Court
does not find any illegality in the
impugned order passed by the Principal
Judge, Family Court, Azamgarh.

17.

Accordingly,
the
present
application is rejected.

18. Considering the fact that
application u/s 125 Cr.P.C. has been
pending since 2016, therefore, Principal
Judge, Family Court, Azamgarh, is
directed to conclude the proceeding u/s
125 Cr.P.C., expeditiously, preferably
within a period of one year, without giving
any unnecessary adjournment to any of the
parties.
----------
(2024) 5 ILRA 671
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 10.05.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE VIKRAM D. CHAUHAN, J.

Application U/S 482. No. 10569 of 2024

Kapil Tomar ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicant:
Sri Ankur Singh Kushwaha, Sri Santosh
Kumar
Upadhyay,
Sri
Vinod
Kumar
Upadhyay

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
G.A., Sri Shekhar Gangal