# Raju Revisionist v. State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2020) 10 ILRA 108
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2020-09-17
- **Case number:** Criminal Revision No. 1139 of 2019
- **Bench:** J.J. Munir
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/raju-revisionist-v-state-of-u-p-anr-45124
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Children) Act, 2015- Section 12(1)- Denial
of bail to juvenile- The third postulate
under Section 12(1) of the Act , where bail
may be denied to a juvenile, somewhere
touches upon the merits of the case in the
totality of circumstances that must
receive consideration. A heinous crime ,
where
the
juvenile's
involvement
is
apparent prima facie, would certainly
work as a set back to the society's
10 All. Raju Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
109
conscience, if the juvenile were permitted
to go free on bail- Merits of the of the
prosecution prima facie- is not altogether
irrelevant under Section 12(1) of the Act.
The gravity of the offence, the prima facie
connection of the minor with the offence
and its impact on the society must enter
judgement while considering a bail plea
advanced on behalf of a child in conflict
with the law - The circumstances here are
such that if the revisionist were to be
released on bail, it would be revolting to
the society's conscience.

The merits of the case would be one of the
relevant factors to be considered by the Court
where the offence committed by the juvenile is
grave and he would be disentitled to be
released on bail if his released would defeat the
ends of justice. (Para 9, 11)

Criminal Revision Rejected. (E-3)

Case law/ Judgements relied upon:-

## Text

108 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
seven months prior to the incident and that
she died of burn injuries within 9 months of
her marriage. There is evidence that it was
the accused-appellant, who put her on fire
and deceased suffered severe burn injuries.
Though the trial court did not frame charge
under section 302 IPC but the specific role
of accused-appellant cannot be ignored. In
case of Kailash Kaur Vs State of Punjab
(1987) 2 SCC 631, the prosecution case
was that the sister-in-law caught hold of the
deceased and the mother-in-law poured
kerosene oil on her and set her on fire. The
Supreme Court observed that "whenever
such cases come before the court and
offence is brought home to the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, it is the duty of
the court to deal with it in most severe and
strict manner and award the maximum
penalty prescribed by the law in order that
it may operate as a deterrent to other
persons from committing such anti- social
crimes. In the present case deceased Saroj
Devi suffered incident of burning only 7
months after her marriage. After suffering
severe burn injuries, deceased struggled for
life for about two months in hospital. It is
also established that she was continuously
being harassed for dowry since after her
marriage and she continued to face this
trauma till the incident. It may also be
noticed that accused-appellant was also
convicted under section 498-A IPC but in
its wisdom the learned trial court did not
choose to award any sentence on that
count. Having regard to the totality of facts
and circumstances of the instant case, it
appears a case of rare category so as to
warrant the maximum sentence i.e. life
imprisonment and thus, we find no good
reasons to interfere with the sentence
awarded to the accused appellant.

68. In view of aforesaid conviction of
accused-appellant Dharam Das for offences
under section 498-A, 304-B IPC and
section 4 D.P. Act is upheld. The sentences
awarded under section 304-B IPC and
section 4 D.P. Act are also upheld.
However, conviction and sentence of
accused-appellant under Section 3 D.P. Act
is set aside. Accused-appellant is stated in
custody and he shall serve out the
remaining sentence.

69. Appeal partly allowed in above
terms.

70. Let the lower court record be
transmitted to the trial Court concerned for
its information and compliance.
----------
(2020)10ILR A108
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 17.09.2020

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.

Criminal Revision No. 1139 of 2019

Raju ...Revisionist
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Revisionist:
Sri Alakh Mishra

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
A.G.A., Sri Ram Nath

Juvenile Justice ( Care and Protection of
Children) Act, 2015- Section 12(1)- Denial
of bail to juvenile- The third postulate
under Section 12(1) of the Act , where bail
may be denied to a juvenile, somewhere
touches upon the merits of the case in the
totality of circumstances that must
receive consideration. A heinous crime ,
where
the
juvenile's
involvement
is
apparent prima facie, would certainly
work as a set back to the society's
10 All. Raju Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
109
conscience, if the juvenile were permitted
to go free on bail- Merits of the of the
prosecution prima facie- is not altogether
irrelevant under Section 12(1) of the Act.
The gravity of the offence, the prima facie
connection of the minor with the offence
and its impact on the society must enter
judgement while considering a bail plea
advanced on behalf of a child in conflict
with the law - The circumstances here are
such that if the revisionist were to be
released on bail, it would be revolting to
the society's conscience.

The merits of the case would be one of the
relevant factors to be considered by the Court
where the offence committed by the juvenile is
grave and he would be disentitled to be
released on bail if his released would defeat the
ends of justice. (Para 9, 11)

Criminal Revision Rejected. (E-3)

Case law/ Judgements relied upon:-

1. Mangesh Rajbhar Vs St. Of U.P & anr., 2018
(2) ACR 1941

2. Om Prakash Vs St. Of Raj. & anr., ( 2012) 5
SCC 201: 2012 (2) ACR 1825

(Delivered by Hon'ble J.J. Munir, J.)

1. This Criminal Revision, under
Section 102 of the Juvenile Justice (Care
and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 is
directed against an order of the learned
Second Additional Sessions Judge/ Special
Judge, SC/ST (PA) Act, Etawah, dated
30.01.2019, dismissing Criminal Appeal
no.1 of 2019, preferred by the revisionist
and affirming an order dated 20.12.2018
passed by the Juvenile Justice Board,
Etawah, refusing the revisionist's bail plea
in Case Crime no.201 of 2018, under
Sections 376, 2(1) IPC, Section 3/4 of the
POCSO Act and Section 3(2)(V) of the
SC/ST (PA) Act, Police Station Bakewar,
District Etawah.

2. Heard Mr. Akash Mishra, learned
counsel for the revisionist and the learned
AGA appearing on behalf of the State. The
name of Mr. Ram Nath, Advocate appears
for opposite party no.2 and is shown in the
cause list. When the matter was called on,
no one has appeared on behalf of the
second opposite party.

3. A First Information Report was
lodged by the second opposite party with
Police Station Bakewar, District Etawah
giving rise to the present crime on 09.03.2018
at 49 minutes past 3 p.m., carrying allegations
to the effect that she is a native of Ram Nagar
Adda, Mauja Karaudhi, Police Station
Bakewar, District Etawah and a member of
the Dohre caste. On 09.03.2018 at about 12
noon while she was conventionally plastering
the interiors of her home with clay, her four
year old daughter strayed into the field
playing along. She was accompanied by other
small children. At that time, another native of
the village, Raju son of Sughar Singh (the
revisionist) took away her minor daughter to
a mustard field. The other children informed
the complainant that her daughter had been
taken away by Raju. The complainant rushed
to the mustard field raising alarm. It is alleged
in the FIR that the complainant saw the
revisionist
ravish
her
daughter.
The
complainant/ opposite party no.2 has said in
the first information that she attempted to
apprehend the revisionist, but he escaped her
clutches and took to his heals. Other natives
of the village also arrived and that with the
assistance of those others, she has come over
to report the matter to the police. In her
statement, under Section 164 Cr.P.C., the
young
prosecutrix
has
supported
the
prosecution.

4. The Juvenile Justice Board by their
order dated 12.12.2018 refused bail to the
revisionist, pending trial. On Appeal, that
110 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
order has been affirmed by the learned
Special Judge, SC/ST (PA) Act, Etawah by
the order impugned.

5. Aggrieved, this Revision has been
preferred.

6. Mr. Akash Mishra, learned
Counsel for the revisionist has apparently
a very difficult task to persuade this
Court that it is a case where the
revisionist ought to be released on bail,
pending trial. This Court does not have
the slightest hesitation to place on record
its appreciation for the most remarkable
manner
in
which
Mr.
Mishra
has
discharged
his
difficult
brief.
His
submission is short but formidable in the
circumstances.
He
candidly
acknowledges
the
fact
that
the
prosecutrix is a child of four years, who
has
spoken
inculpatory
against
the
revisionist
in
her
statement,
under
Section
164
Cr.P.C.
before
the
Magistrate. He submits, however, that
circumstances to place his case in that
exception to Section 12(1) of the Act,
where release on bail of the child in
conflict with law would defeat the ends
of justice, is not at all discernible here.
He points out that the statement of the
young prosecutrix is so unnatural that it
is hard to believe that she could have ever
made it. He has taken this Court through
the statement of the prosecutrix made
before the Magistrate. This Court on a
perusal of the same, read in isolation,
would be inclined to agree with Mr.
Mishra that the statement is most
unnatural. This Court is, indeed, surprised
how a child that young could have come
out with the kind of graphic description,
that
makes
for
the
prosecutrix's
statement, under Section 164 Cr.P.C. in
this case. Read in isolation as said earlier,
it would certainly suggest a different
authorship than one that can be attributed
to the young prosecutrix's mind. But, that
is not the end of the matter.

7. Here, the FIR has been lodged by
the prosecutrix's mother, who has said in
a rather prompt account of the occurrence
that she saw the revisionist ravish the
child. What is more disconcerting here is
the
fact
that
the
medico-legal
examination report records fresh injuries,
indicative of recent forceful penetration
suffered by the child. There is no
alternative explanation about that kind of
an injury. Assuming that someone put
words in the young prosecutrix's mouth
while
the
Magistrate
recorded
her
statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C., the
fact that her mother claims to be an eye
witness to the act in a prompt FIR and the
injuries sustained by the child, as young
as four years, do not leave much scope
prima facie for the revisionist to say that
he is not the one to be blamed.

8. This Court is mindful of the fact, as
pointed out by the learned Counsel for the
revisionist, that in a bail plea under the Act,
Section 12(1) engrafts a rule for bail to
every juvenile, irrespective of his prima
facie involvement in the crime. It is only in
the event, where the juvenile's case prima
facie showing his complicity, falls into one
or
the
other
disentitling
categories,
postulated under Section 12(1) of the Act,
that bail may be denied to a child in
conflict with law. Section 12 of the Act is
quoted in extenso:

"12. Bail of juvenile.--(1) When
any person accused of a bailable or nonbailable offence, and apparently a juvenile,
is arrested or detained or appears or is
brought before a Board, such person shall,
10 All. Raju Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
111
notwithstanding anything contained in the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of
1974) or in any other law for the time being
in force, be released on bail with or without
surety or placed under the supervision of a
Probation Officer or under the care of any
fit institution or fit person but he shall not
be so released if there appear reasonable
grounds for believing that the release is
likely to bring him into association with
any known criminal or expose him to
moral, physical or psychological danger or
that his release would defeat the ends of
justice.

(2) When such person having
been arrested is not released on bail under
sub-section (1) by the officer in charge of
the police station, such officer shall cause
him to be kept only in an observation home
in the prescribed manner until he can be
brought before a Board.

(3) When such person is not
released on bail under sub-section (1) by
the Board it shall, instead of committing
him to prison, make an order sending him
to an observation home or a place of safety
for such period during the pendency of the
inquiry regarding him as may be specified
in the order."

9. This Court is of opinion that it is
not a case where releasing the revisionist
on bail would bring him into association
with any known criminal or would expose
him to moral, physical or psychological
danger. The moot question is, whether
ordering his release on bail would bring his
case within the teeth of the third exception,
which says that it would lead to ends of
justice being defeated. Learned Counsel for
the revisionist at this stage has again made
a very relevant point, where he says that the
revisionist was aged 14 years and 3 months
on the relevant date, that is to say, the date
of occurrence. He was clearly below the
age of 16, where different standards apply
under the amended provisions of the Act.
This Court is of opinion that the third
postulate under Section 12(1) of the Act,
where bail may be denied to a juvenile,
somewhere touches upon the merits of the
case in the totality of circumstances that
must receive consideration. A heinous
crime, where the juvenile's involvement is
apparent prima facie, would certainly work
as a set back to the society's conscience, if
the juvenile were permitted to go free on
bail.

10. I had occasion to consider this
issue in Mangesh Rajbhar vs. State of
U.P. and another, 2018(2) ACR 1941,
where it was held:

"24. This court from what appears
on a furter (sic further) reading of the
judgment in Raja (minor) (supra) did not
construe the last of the three grounds for
the refusal of bail to a juvenile in the
proviso to Section 12(1) of the Act ejusdem
generis; rather, this court in that case
referred to the merits of the case and
related the ground for denying bail to the
juvenile being released on bail "would
defeat the ends of justice" with the merits
of the prosecution case. In other words, this
Court found in the expression "defeat the
ends of justice" a repose for the society to
defend itself from the onslaught of a minor
in conflict with law by certainly making
relevant though not decisive, the inherent
character of the offence committed by the
minor. In this connection paragraph nos. 11,
12 and 13 of the judgment in Raja (minor)
(supra) may be gainfully quoted.

"11. The report of the medical
examination of the victim clearly shows
that the revisionist had forced himself upon
the victim, who was seven years old child
and in the statements under sections 161
112 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Cr.P.C. and 164 Cr.P.C., the child had
clearly deposed about how she was taken
away by the revisionist and later on caught
on the spot by the public and he pretended
to be taking a bath. In the orders impugned,
there is specific mention about the fact that
the revisionist was accused by name by the
victim, who was studying in class II and the
release on bail of the revisionist would
defeat the ends of justice.

12. Having gone through the record
of the case including statement under section
161 Cr.P.C. and the statement under section
164 Cr.P.C. given by the victim and also the
report of the medical examination of the victim,
which shows penetration by force and resultant
injury, I am of the opinion that there is no legal
infirmity in the orders impugned as the release
on bail of the revisionist would indeed defeat
the ends of justice.

13. No doubt, the Juvenile Justice
Act is a beneficial legislation intended for
reform of the juvenile/child in conflict with the
law, but the law also demands that justice
should be done not only to the accused, but also
to the accuser."

25. It is not that this aspect of the
gravity of the offence has been considered
irrelevant to the issue of grant or refusal of bail
to a minor in the past and before the present Act
of 2015 came into force. In a decision of this
Court under the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000
where the interest of the society were placed
seemingly not on a level of playing field with
the juvenile, this Court in construing the
provisions of Section 12 in that Act that were
pari materia to Section 12 of the Act in the
matter of grant of bail to a minor held in the
case of Monu @ Moni @ Rahul @ Rohit v.
State of U.P., 2011 (74) ACC 353 in paragraph
Nos. 14 and 15 of the report as under:

"14. Aforesaid section no where
ordains that bail to a juvenile is a must in all
cases as it can be denied for the reasons"......if
there appears reasonable grounds for believing
that the release is likely to bring him into
association with any known criminal or expose
him to moral, physical or psychological danger
or that his release would defeat the ends of
justice."

15. In the light of above statutory
provision bail prayer of the juvenile revisionist
has to be considered on the surrounding facts
and circumstances. Merely by declaration of
being a juvenile does not entitle a juvenile in
conflict with law to be released on bail as a
matter of right. The Act has a solemn purpose
to achieve betterment of juvenile offenders but it
is not a shelter home for those juvenile
offenders who have got criminal proclivities
and a criminal psychology. It has a reformative
approach but does not completely shun
retributive theory. Legislature has preserved
larger interest of society even in cases of bail to
a juvenile. The Act seeks to achieve moral
physical and psychological betterment of
juvenile offender and therefore if, it is found that
the ends of justice will be defeated or that goal
desired by the legislature can be achieved by
detaining a juvenile offender in a juvenile
home, bail can be denied to him. This is
perceptible from phraseology of section 12
itself. Legislature in its wisdom has therefore
carved out exceptions to the rule of bail to a
juvenile."

26. The Hon'ble Supreme Court
in the case of Om Prakash vs. State of
Rajasthan and another, (2012) 5 SCC
201: 2012 (2) ACR 1825 (SC) has brought
in due concern in matters relating to
juveniles where the offences are heinous
like rape, murder, gang-rape and the like
etc., and, has indicated that in such matters,
the nature and gravity of the offence would
be relevant; the minor cannot get away by
shielding himself behind veil of minority. It
has been held in Om Prakash (supra) by
their Lordships thus:

"3. Juvenile Justice Act was
enacted with a laudable object of providing
10 All. Raju Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
113
a separate forum or a special court for
holding trial of children/juvenile by the
juvenile court as it was felt that children
become delinquent by force of circumstance
and not by choice and hence they need to
be treated with care and sensitivity while
dealing and trying cases involving criminal
offence. But when an accused is alleged to
have committed a heinous offence like rape
and murder or any other grave offence
when he ceased to be a child on attaining
the age of 18 years, but seeks protection of
the
Juvenile
Justice
Act
under
the
ostensible plea of being a minor, should
such an accused be allowed to be tried by a
juvenile court or should he be referred to a
competent court of criminal jurisdiction
where the trial of other adult persons are
held.

23. ...... Similarly, if the conduct
of an accused or the method and manner of
commission of the offence indicates an evil
and a well planned design of the accused
committing the offence which indicates
more towards the matured skill of an
accused than that of an innocent child, then
in the absence of reliable documentary
evidence in support of the age of the
accused, medical evidence indicating that
the accused was a major cannot be allowed
to be ignored taking shelter of the principle
of benevolent legislation like the Juvenile
Justice Act, subverting the course of justice
as statutory protection of the Juvenile
Justice Act is meant for minors who are
innocent law breakers and not accused of
matured mind who uses the plea of minority
as a ploy or shield to protect himself from
the sentence of the offence committed by
him."

27. It seems thus that the
suggestion of the learned counsel for the
revisionist that bail to a juvenile or more
properly called a child in conflict with law
can be denied under the last ground of the
proviso to Section 12 ejusdem generis with
the first two and not with reference to the
gravity of the offence, does not appear to
be tenable. The gravity of the offence is
certainly relevant though not decisive. It is
this relevance amongst other factors where
gravity of the offence committed works and
serves as a guide to grant or refuse bail in
conjunction with other relevant factors to
refuse bail on the last ground mentioned in
the proviso to Section 12 (1) of the Act,
that is to say, on ground that release would
"defeat the ends of justice".

28. Under the Act, as it now
stands there is further guidance much more
than what was available under the Act,
2000 carried in the provisions of Section 15
and 18 above extracted and the definition
of certain terms used in those sections. A
reading of Section 18 of the Act shows that
the case of a child below the age of 16
years, who has committed a heinous crime
as defined in the Act is made a class apart
from cases of petty offence or the serious
offence committed by a child in conflict
with the law/juvenile of any age, and, it is
further provided that various orders that
may be made by the Board as spelt out
under clause (g) of Section 15 depending
on nature of the offences, specifically the
need for supervision or intervention based
on circumstances as brought out in the
social investigation report and past conduct
of the child. Though orders under Section
18 are concerned with final orders to be
made while dealing with the case of a
juvenile, the same certainly can serve as a
guide to the exercise of power to grant bail
to a juvenile under Section 12(1) of the Act
which is to be exercised by the Board in the
first instance.

29. Read in the context of the fine
classification of juveniles based on age visa-vis the nature of the offence committed
by them and reference to a specifically
114 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
needed supervision or intervention, the
circumstances brought out in the social
investigation report and past conduct of the
child which the Board may take into
consideration, while passing final orders
under Section 18 of the Act it is, in the
opinion of this court, a good guide for the
Board while exercising powers to grant bail
to go by the same principles though
embodied in Section 18 of the Act, when
dealing with a case under the last part of
the proviso to Section 12 (1) that authorizes
the Board to deny bail on ground that
release of the juvenile would "defeat the
ends of justice."

30. Thus, it is no ultimate rule
that a juvenile below the age of 16 years
has to be granted bail and can be denied the
privilege only on the first two of the
grounds mentioned in the proviso, that is to
say, likelihood of the juvenile on release
being likely to be brought in association
with any known criminal or in consequence
of being released exposure of the juvenile
to moral, physical or psychological danger.
It can be equally refused on the ground that
releasing a juvenile, that includes a juvenile
below 16 years would "defeat the ends of
justice." In the opinion of this Court the
words
"defeat
the
ends
of
justice"
employed in the proviso to Section 12 of
the Act postulate as one of the relevant
consideration, the nature and gravity of the
offence though not the only consideration
in applying the aforesaid part of the
disentitling legislative edict. Other factors
such as the specific need for supervision or
intervention, circumstances as brought out
in the social investigation report and past
conduct of the child would also be relevant
that are spoken of under Section 18 of the
Act.

31. In this context Section 12 and
18 and also Section15 (Section 15 not
relevant in the case of a child below 16
years) and other relevant provisions all of
which find place in Chapter IV of the Act
are part of an integrated scheme. The power
to grant bail to a juvenile under Section
12(1) cannot be exercised divorced from
the other provisions or as the learned
counsel for the revisionist argues on the
other specific disentitling provisions in the
grounds mentioned in the proviso to
Section 12(1) of the Act. The submission
made based on the rule of ejusdem generis
urged by the learned counsel for the
revisionist is misplaced, in the opinion of
this Court."

11. In the facts of the present case,
this Court does not wish to say that merits
of the prosecution prima facie are decisive
to judge the revisionist's plea for bail.
However, it is not altogether irrelevant
under Section 12(1) of the Act. The gravity
of the offence, the prima facie connection
of the minor with the offence and its impact
on the society must enter judgment while
considering a bail plea advanced on behalf
of a child in conflict with the law. Here, as
said earlier, notwithstanding the fact that
the revisionist is below 15 years, the
offence has been committed prima facie
with determination, exhibition of maturity
and the understanding of its consequences.
The child in conflict with law is a boy
above 14 years, whereas the victim is a four
year old girl. The mother claims to be an
eye witness and the medico-legal evidence
does prima facie strongly support the
prosecution. Other natives of the village are
claimed to have seen the occurrence. Thus
evaluated in its totality, the circumstances
here are such that if the revisionist were to
be released on bail, it would be revolting to
the society's conscience.

12. These remarks or those elsewhere
made may not be ever so slightly construed
10 All. Abhishek Kumar Yadav Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
115
as expressions of opinion on merits of the
charge. It is for the Juvenile Justice Board,
holding trial, to determine independently
irrespective of anything said here, what is
proved by evidence led on behalf of the
prosecution. It would always be the
prosecution's burden to establish the
charges beyond reasonable doubt. What has
been said here is in the context of the bail
plea, and nothing more.

13. In the result, this revision fails and
is dismissed. The Juvenile Justice Board,
Etawah,
considering
the
period
of
detention, shall conclude the trial by the
31st of December, 2020.

14. Let a copy of this order be
communicated to the Juvenile Justice
Board,
Etawah
through
the
learned
Sessions Judge, Etawah by the Joint
Registrar (Compliance).
----------
(2020)10ILR A115
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 21.09.2019

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.

Criminal Revision No. 1221 of 2019

Abhishek Kumar Yadav
 ...Revisionist(In Jail)
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Revisionist:
Sri Anand Prakash Srivastava, Sri Matiur
Rehman Khan, Sri Sugendra Kumar Yadav

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
A.G.A.

Juvenile Justice ( Care and Protection of
Children) Act, 2015- Section 12(1)- Bail of
juvenile- Clause that disentitles a child to
bail, where his release would defeat the
ends of justice - The clause " defeat the
ends of justice"- Is to be associated with
the ground realities of dispensing justice
where the offender is a child in conflict
with law, bearing in mind the object of the
Act - The legislature has been conscious
of the fact that the society too has to be
protected against the depredations of
juvenile offenders. A juvenile offender,
particularly, above the age of 16 years
about whom the Act now makes a
distinction, is sometimes to be tried as an
adult , if he has the ability to understand
the consequences of the offence and is
capable of committing the offence- Where
the statute disentitles a child in conflict
with law to bail on the ground that his
release would lead to ends of justice being
defeated, it requires the Court to take into
consideration different factors. One of
them is certainly the gravity of the
offence. The other is its impact on the
society or locale where it is committed.
The gravity of the offence committed
works and serves as a guide to grant or
refuse bail in conjunction with other
relevant factors to refuse bail on the
ground that release would "defeat the
ends of justice".

The disentitling Clause to Section 12(1) of the
Act has been consciously used by the legislature
to disentitle a juvenile to bail where his offence
is grave and his release would have an adverse
impact on the society.

Parity-
Not
applicable
in
cases
of
juveniles in conflict with law- It must be
remarked that the rule of parity , which
normally applies in cases of bail under
Sections 437 or 439 Cr.P.C, may not be
attracted to the case of a child in
conflict with law, where another child in
conflict in the same crime is granted the
concession of bail, under the Act. This is
for the reason that in the case of bail to
a
juvenile,
in
matters
where
the
entitlement to bail is not on merits but
by virtue of the provisions of Section 12
(1) of the Act, the right is always
personal to the accused.