# Rajveer Singh & Ors v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 1 ILRA 542
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-01-07
- **Case number:** Writ C No. 30440 of 2024
- **Bench:** Manoj Kumar Gupta, Anish Kumar Gupta
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/rajveer-singh-ors-v-state-of-u-p-ors-52892
- **Pages:** 16

## Headnote

A. Civil Law - Constitution of India,1950Article 226-Land Acquisition Act,1894Section
28A-Re-determination
of
Compensation-Maintainabilty
of
Application based on High court's awardThe petitioners' land was acquired under a
notification dated 30.04.1976 by the New
Okhla Industrial Development Authorirty-
Compensation
was
awarded
on
15.02.1977,
which
the
petitioners'
ancestors accepted without challenging it
under section 18 of the Act,1894- Some
other
land owners
whose land
was
acquired under the same notification,
challenged the award-The reference u/s
18 was initially rejected but was later
enhanced by the High court , based on
this, the petitioners filed an application
u/s 28A of the Act,1894 seeking redetermination of their compensation-Held,
a landowner who did not seek reference
u/s 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,
can
apply
for
re-determination
of
compensation u/s 28A based on an award
passed by the High Court in a First Appeal
,provided the application is filed within
prescribed three month limitation period-
-The court relied on Banwari Vs Haryana
State
Industrial
&
Infrastructure
Development Corp. Ltd where the Apex
Court ruled that if the reference court
denies enhancement but the High Court
grants it on appeal, similarly placed
landowners can file for re-determination
u/s 28A-Hence, the rejection order dated
1 All. Rajveer Singh & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
543
29.07.2022 was set aside-The collector
must re-determine the compensation at
Rs. 28.12 per square yard, as awarded in
First Appeal.(Para 1 to 23)

B.
Section
28A
applies
even
when
compensation is enhanced by a High Court
in an appeal, not just by a reference court-
An appeal is a continuation of the original
proceedings, therefore a High Court's
decision
enhancing
compensation
is
equivalent to an award u/s 28A-The
provision must be read in favor of affected
landowners
to
remove
disparities
in
compensation-Landowners
who
missed
filing a reference u/s 18 can still claim
parity if compensation is later increased
by the High Court.(Para20 to 22)

The writ petition is allowed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

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542 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
stated by the applicants/respondent nos. 4
to 6, they are the sons and heirs of deceased
Damadi and as they had gone frequently
outside the village in connection with their
employment and they have instructed the
case to their counsel and during the
pendency of the case, the counsel also died.
It is further stated that their name was
recorded in the revenue records but when
the petitioner started creating disturbance,
they examined the revenue records and
came to know about the order and
thereafter, the restoration application was
filed and it was also pleaded that delay in
filing the application be condoned. In the
objections filed by the petitioner only three
objections
were
taken
firstly,
that
restoration application is highly belated,
secondly, no application for condonation of
delay under Section 5 of Limitation Act has
been given by the restoration applicants
and
thirdly,
since
the
order
dated
08.06.2017 has been passed in absence of
both the parties, which is apparent from the
record, the Court has no jurisdiction to
recall the said order. The objections filed
by the petitioner are annexed as Annexure
No. 8 to the writ petition.

34. There is no denial of the facts as
stated by the contesting respondents in their
application for restoration and as such in
my view, the courts below have committed
no illegality in recalling the ex-parte order
dated 08.06.2017 and condoning the delay
in filing the restoration application.

35. Consequently, the writ petition
fails and is dismissed. No order as to costs.
----------
(2025) 1 ILRA 542
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 07.01.2025

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MANOJ KUMAR GUPTA, J.
THE HON'BLE ANISH KUMAR GUPTA, J.

Writ C No. 30440 of 2024

Rajveer Singh & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Ajay Mishra, Shri Krishna Mishra

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Kaushalendra Nath Singh, Shivam
Yadav

A. Civil Law - Constitution of India,1950Article 226-Land Acquisition Act,1894Section
28A-Re-determination
of
Compensation-Maintainabilty
of
Application based on High court's awardThe petitioners' land was acquired under a
notification dated 30.04.1976 by the New
Okhla Industrial Development Authorirty-
Compensation
was
awarded
on
15.02.1977,
which
the
petitioners'
ancestors accepted without challenging it
under section 18 of the Act,1894- Some
other
land owners
whose land
was
acquired under the same notification,
challenged the award-The reference u/s
18 was initially rejected but was later
enhanced by the High court , based on
this, the petitioners filed an application
u/s 28A of the Act,1894 seeking redetermination of their compensation-Held,
a landowner who did not seek reference
u/s 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,
can
apply
for
re-determination
of
compensation u/s 28A based on an award
passed by the High Court in a First Appeal
,provided the application is filed within
prescribed three month limitation period-
-The court relied on Banwari Vs Haryana
State
Industrial
&
Infrastructure
Development Corp. Ltd where the Apex
Court ruled that if the reference court
denies enhancement but the High Court
grants it on appeal, similarly placed
landowners can file for re-determination
u/s 28A-Hence, the rejection order dated
1 All. Rajveer Singh & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
543
29.07.2022 was set aside-The collector
must re-determine the compensation at
Rs. 28.12 per square yard, as awarded in
First Appeal.(Para 1 to 23)

B.
Section
28A
applies
even
when
compensation is enhanced by a High Court
in an appeal, not just by a reference court-
An appeal is a continuation of the original
proceedings, therefore a High Court's
decision
enhancing
compensation
is
equivalent to an award u/s 28A-The
provision must be read in favor of affected
landowners
to
remove
disparities
in
compensation-Landowners
who
missed
filing a reference u/s 18 can still claim
parity if compensation is later increased
by the High Court.(Para20 to 22)

The writ petition is allowed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:

1. Pradeep Kumar Vs St. of U.P. & anr., First
appeal no. 522 of 2009

2. UOI & anr. Vs Pradeep Kumari & ors.(1995) 2
SCC 736

3. Satyapal Singh & ors. Vs St. of U.P. &
ors.,WRIT C NO. 38674 OF 2017

4. Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. Rodriguese &
ors. Vs Land Acq. Collr.& ors.(1996) 6 SCC
746

5. Bhagti Vs St. of Har. (1997) 4 SCC 473

6. St. of Ori. & ors.Vs Chitrasen Bhoi(2009) 17
SCC 74

7. Babua Ram Vs St. of U.P. (1995) 2 SCC 689

8. UOI Vs Karnail Singh (1995) 2 SCC 728

9. Banwari & ors. Vs Haryana St. Indusrial &
Infra. Dev. Corp. Ltd. & anr., Civil Appeal
No.13348 of 2024 arising out of SLP © No.
12221 of 2022

10. Ramsinghbhai (Ramsanghbhai) Jerambhai
Vs St. of Guj. & anr.(2018) 16 SCC 445
(Delivered by Hon'ble Anish Kumar
Gupta, J.)

1. Heard Shri Krishna Mishra, learned
counsel for the petitioners, Sri Rajiv Kumar
Gupta, learned Additional Chief Standing
Counsel for the State respondent and Sri
Kaushalendra Nath Singh, learned counsel
appearing on behalf of respondent no. 2Noida.

2. The instant writ petition has been
filed by the petitioners being aggrieved by
the impugned order dated 29.07.2022,
which was served on the petitioners on
05.07.2024, whereby the application filed
by the petitioners under Section 28A of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter
referred as 'the Act, 1894'), has been
rejected, as not maintainable, as the said
application has been filed claiming redetermination of compensation by the
Collector under Section 28A of the Act,
1894 on the basis of judgement and order
dated 18.04.2022 passed by this Court in
First Appeal No. 458 of 1982 (Malkhan vs.
State of U.P.) filed by the land owners, who
are covered by the same notification.

3. The brief facts of the case are that
the ancestors of the petitioners were the
owners of the land in Khasra No. 51 area 07-0 Hectares, Khasra No. 52 area 1-2-0
Hectares, Khasra No. 53 area 0-19-0
Hectares, 54 area 1-7-0 Hectares and
Khasra No. 26/1 area 0-7-0 Hectares
situated at Village Naya Bans, District
Gautam Buddh Nagar. The aforesaid land
of the petitioners was acquired in favour of
the respondent no. 2- New Okhla Industrial
Development Authority vide notification
dated 30.04.1976 issued under Section
4(1)/17 of the Act, 1894. After the
notification the award was declared on
15.02.1977 and the entire compensation in
544 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
terms of the aforesaid award was received
by the grandfather of the petitioner no. 7
herein and also by the ancestors of the
other
petitioners.
Admittedly,
the
petitioners herein did not make any
reference under Section 18 of the Act, 1894.
However, some other land owners whose
land were also acquired by the same
notification, had challenged the said award by
making reference to the court under Section
18 of the Act 1894, which was rejected by the
Additional District Judge, Ghaziabad vide
judgement and decree dated 25.11.1981.
Being aggrieved by the rejection of the
reference under Section 18 of the Act, 1894,
an appeal under Section 54 of the Act, 1894
was filed by the said land owners being First
Appeal No. 458 of 1982 (Malkhan vs. State
of U.P.). The said First Appeal No. 458 of
1982 was decided by this Court vide order
dated
18.04.2022,
relying
upon
the
judgement and order dated 08.07.2019 passed
by this Court in First Appeal No. 593 of
1982, whereby the compensation was
awarded at the rate of Rs. 28.12 per square
yard along with 30% solatium and other
benefits as per the provisions of the Act.

4. In terms of the aforesaid award made
in the First Appeal vide order dated
18.04.2022, the petitioners herein had filed an
application under Section 28A of the Act,
1894 on 23.05.2022. Since, no order was
passed on the said application under Section
28A of the Act, 1894 by the respondents, the
petitioners herein filed Writ C No. 21023 of
2022, which was decided by this Court vide
order dated 09.04.2024, whereby a direction
was issued to the respondent to decide the said
application expeditiously preferably within six
weeks from the date of communication of the
said order.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioners
submits
that
after
the
order
dated
09.04.2024 was communicated to the
respondents, the impugned order dated
29.07.2022 has been served on the
petitioners on 05.07.2024 whereby the
application under Section 28A of the Act,
1894 filed by the petitioners have been
rejected as not maintainable as the same
has been filed on the basis of the decision
passed in the first appeal and not on the
basis of an order passed by the reference
court under Section 18 of the Act, 1894.
Learned counsel for the petitioners submits
that in the instant case the reference filed
by one said Malkhan under Section 18 of
the Act, 1894, being the Land Acquisition
Reference No. 95 of 1977 was rejected by
the Second Additional District Judge vide
judgment and order dated 25.11.1981. He
further submits that the appeal is in
continuation of the suit or the original
proceedings initiated under Section 18 of
the Act, 1894 by Malkhan, therefore, the
said order passed in the first appeal
becomes the award within the meaning of
Section 28A of the Act, 1894, for the
purpose of filing the application under
Section 28A of the Act, 1894 by the
petitioners.
Thus,
the
same
was
maintainable and the impugned order
passed by respondent no. 3 is illegal and is
liable to be quashed.

6. In support of his submissions
learned counsel for the petitioners relied
upon the judgement of the Division Bench
of this Court dated 21.04.2016 in First
Appeal No. 522 of 2009 (Pradeep Kumar
vs. State of U.P. and Another), wherein the
Division Bench of this Court held that the
court as referred under Section 28A of the
Act, 1894 would necessarily include the
First Appellate Court, namely the High
Court as the Appeal under Section 54 of the
Act, 1894 is only a continuation of original
proceedings and the order passed by the
1 All. Rajveer Singh & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
545
Court including the First Appellate court
i.e., the High Court, in the matter of
determination of rate of compensation in
respect of land covered by a particular
notification,
would
be
a
relevant
consideration for determining as to what
would be just compensation for identically
situated tenure-holders, whose land has
been acquired under the same notification.

7. Learned counsel for the petitioners
has further relied upon the judgment of the
Apex Court in Union of India and Another
Vs. Pradeep Kumari and others : (1995) 2
SCC 736, wherein Three Judges' Bench of
the Apex Court has categorically held after
considering
the
objects
and
reasons
underlying the enactment of Section 28A of
the Act, 1894 which is beneficent provision
intended to give equal relief to the inarticulate
poor people, who are not able to take
advantage under Section 18 of the Act, 1894
that right to make application under Section
28A of the Act, 1894 would arise from the
award of the court on the basis of which a
person may make the application seeking redetermination of the compensation. Thus, he
submits that since in the instant case
reference
court
has
declined
the
enhancement of compensation and the
compensation has been first time enhanced
by the High Court in the first appeal vide
judgement and order dated 18.04.2022, the
application filed by the petitioners under
Section 28A of the Act 1894 claiming the
compensation as has been determined by
this Court in First Appeal No. 458 of 1982,
was well within limitation and was
maintainable. Thus, the impugned order
dated 29.07.2022 deserves to be quashed
and
the
petitioners
are
entitled
for
compensation at the rate of Rs. 28.12 per
square yard, as has been determined by this
court in First Appeal No. 458 of 1982, vide
judgment and order dated 18.04.2022.

8. Per contra, learned counsel for the
State as well as for the Development
Authority submits that the provisions of
Section 28A of the Act, 1894 provides for
application under Section 28A of the Act,
1894 to be moved by the similarly situated
persons whose land was acquired by the
same notification to claim parity with the
award passed under Section 18 of the Act,
1894 by the reference court within a period
of three months from the date of such
award by the reference court and such
application under Section 28A of the Act,
1894,
cannot
be
filed
claiming
compensation which was awarded in the
subsequent stages in the First Appeal under
Section 54 of the Act, 1894 or the appeal
preferred before the Supreme Court.

9. In this regard, learned Chief
Standing Counsel has relied upon the
judgement of Division Bench of this Court
dated 21.09.2017 in Writ C No. 38674 of
2017 (Satyapal Singh and 21 Other vs.
State of U.P and 3 Others) wherein it has
been categorically held that the application
under Section 28A of the Act, 1894 seeking
re-determination of the compensation can
be filed only against the award of the
reference court and not by the High Court
in first appeal or the Supreme Court in
further appeal. Learned Additional Chief
Standing Counsel for the State has also
relied upon the judgement of Apex Court in
Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. Rodriguese &
Others vs. Land Acquisition Collector &
Other : 1996 (6) SCC 746, wherein the
Apex Court has held that the period of
limitation for filing the application under
Section 28A of the Act, 1894 would start to
run from the date of the reference court's
order
on
the
basis
whereof
the
redetermination of compensation is sought.
He has further relied upon the judgement of
the Apex Court in Bhagti v. State of
546 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Haryana (1997) 4 SCC 473 and State of
Orissa & Ors. vs. Chitrasen Bhoi, (2009)
17 SCC 74, wherein the Apex Court has
held that the claim can be redetermined on
the basis of award of the reference court
and not by the judgement of the High
Court. Thus, there is no illegality in the
impugned order passed by respondent no.3,
therefore, the application deserves to be
dismissed.

10. Having heard the rival submissions
made by learned counsel for the parties we
have carefully gone through the record of
the
case.
For
determination
of
the
controversy involved in the case it would
be relevant to take note of provisions of
Section 28A of the Act, 1894 and also the
objects and reasons while incorporating the
said provisions, which reads as under:

Section 28A

"28-A. Redetermination of the
amount of compensation on the basis of the
award of the Court.- (1) Where in an
award under this Part, the Court allows to
the applicant any amount of compensation
in excess of the amount awarded by the
Collector under Section 11, the persons
interested in all the other land covered by
the same notification under Section 4, subsection (1) and who are also aggrieved by
the
award
of
the
Collector
may,
notwithstanding that they had not made an
application to the Collector under Section
18, by written application to the Collector
within three months from the date of the
award of the Court require that the amount
of compensation payable to them may be
redetermined on the basis of the amount of
compensation awarded by the Court:

Provided that in computing the
period of three months within which an
application to the Collector shall be made
under this sub-section, the day on which
the award was pronounced and the time
requisite for obtaining a copy of the award
shall be excluded.

(2) The Collector shall, on receipt
of an application under sub-section (1),
conduct an inquiry after giving notice to all
the persons interested and giving them a
reasonable opportunity of being heard and
made an award determining the amount of
compensation payable to the applicants.

(3) Any person who has not
accepted the award under sub-section (2)
may,
by
written
application
to
the
Collector, require that the matter be
referred
by
the
Collector
for
the
determination of the Court and the
provisions of Sections 18 to 28 shall, so far
as may be, apply to such reference as they
apply to a reference under Section 18."

Statement
of
Objects
and
Reasons

"(ix) Considering that the right of
reference to the civil court under Section
18 of the Act is not usually taken advantage
of by inarticulate and poor people and is
usually exercised by the comparatively
affluent landowners and that this causes
considerable inequality in the payment of
compensation for the same or similar
quality of land to different interested
parties, it is proposed to provide an
opportunity to all aggrieved parties whose
land is covered under the same notification
to seek redetermination of compensation,
once anyone of them has obtained orders
for payment of higher compensation from
the reference court under Section 18 of
the Act."

11. Thus, by plain reading of the
aforesaid
objects
and
reasons
and
provisions of Section 28 A of the Act, 1894
it is apparent that the said provisions have
been incorporated in the Act, 1894 to
facilitate inarticulate and poor people, who
1 All. Rajveer Singh & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
547
could not challenge the award before the
reference court under Section 18A of the
Act, 1894 as compared to the other affluent
land owners, which causes inequality in the
payment of compensation for the same or
similar
quality
of
land
to
different
individual parties. Therefore, the provisions
of Section 28A of the Act, 1894 have been
incorporated to provide an opportunity to
all aggrieved parties whose land is covered
under the same notification to seek redetermination of compensation once any of
the land owners had obtained orders for
payment of higher compensation from the
reference court under Section 18 of the Act,
1894.

12. The object of the aforesaid
incorporation of the aforesaid provision of
Section 28A of the Act, 1894 is to remove the
disparity in award of compensation to the
land owners whose land has been acquired by
the same notification between the two
persons, one who had challenged the award
by filing the reference and the persons who
could not file the reference due to poverty or
the less awareness. From the plain reading of
Section 28A of the Act, 1894 it is apparent
that the cause of action for filing the
application under Section 28A of the Act,
1894 would arise on the date when an award
under this part has been made by the court in
excess of the amount awarded by the
Collector under Section 11 of the Act, 1894
and the persons aggrieved is also covered by
the same notification under Section 4 subsection (1) of the Act, 1894 and such persons
had not filed any application for reference
under Section 18 of the Act. Such persons
may file the application under Section 28A of
the Act, 1894 within a period of three months
from the date of award of the court.

13. In the earlier judgements in Babua
Ram v. State of U.P., (1995) 2 SCC 689
and Union of India v. Karnail Singh,
(1995) 2 SCC 728, the Two Judges' Bench
of the Apex Court has held that limitation
for filing the application under Section 28A
of the Act, 1894 would arise from the first
award and not on the basis of the
subsequent awards. However, the aforesaid
view has been overruled by the Three
Judges' Bench of the Apex Court in
Pradeep Kumari (supra) and it has been
categorically held that limitation for filing
the application under Section 28A of the
Act, 1894 would start from the date of the
award with which the parity is being
claimed by the applicant. Thus, there can
be number of awards under Section 18 of
the Act, 1894 by the reference court. The
application under Section 28A of the Act
can be filed on the basis of the latest award
within a period of three months or from the
award with which the applicant is claiming
parity. The aforesaid view taken by the
Three Judges' Bench of the Apex Court still
holds the field and has never been
overruled and has been reiterated by the
Apex Cour in a recent judgement dated
10.12.2024 in Banwari and Other vs.
Haryana
State
Industrial
and
Infrastructure Development Coporation
Ltd. And Another (Civil Appeal No. 13348
of 2024 arising out of SLP © No. 12221 of
2022). The purpose of filing of the
application under Section 28A of the Act,
1894 is that the said application can be
allowed by the Collector relying upon the
award so made by the Court, whereby the
higher compensation has been determined.
Thus, the Collector is not required to
undergo the deep scrutiny about the
entitlement of the compensation but has to
simply rely upon such award made by the
reference court. It is settled position of law
that an appeal is nothing but continuation
of the original suit or the proceedings as
has been categorically held by the Division
548 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Bench of this Court in Pradeep Kumar
(supra) that the Court, as referred under
Section 28A of the Act, 1894 would
necessarily include the First Appellate
Court, namely the High Court, as the
appeal under Section 54 of Act, 1894 is
only
continuation
of
the
original
proceedings. The observations of the
Division Bench of this court in Pradeep
Kumar (supra) are as under:

"35. At the very outset, it may be
recorded that we are not holding that
Section 28A of Act 1894 is attracted in the
facts of the case. What we are recording is
that from a reading of Section 28A of Act
1894 what flows is that even in absence of
exemplars and other evidence, higher
compensation can be allowed to a tenure
holder only on the plea that the 'Court' has
enhanced the compensation for others
whose land was acquired under the same
notification.

36. 'Court' as referred under
Section
28-A
of
Act
1894,
would
necessarily include the first appellate
court, namely, the High Court as the
appeal under Section 54 of Act 1894 is
only
a
continuation
of
original
proceedings. 'Court' has been defined
under Section 3 (d) of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 as follows:-

"3(d) the expression "Court"
means a principal Civil Court of original
jurisdiction,
unless
the
[appropriate
Government] has appointed (as it is hereby
empowered to do) a special judicial officer
within any specified local limits to perform
functions of the Court under this Act;"

37. In our opinion, therefore what
follows is that the orders passed by the
Court including the first appellate court
i.e. High Court, in the matter of
determination of rate of compensation in
respect of land covered by a particular
notification,
would
be
a
relevant
consideration to be taken into account for
determining as to what would be the fair
and just compensation for similarly
situated tenure holders, whose lands has
been
acquired
under
the
same
notifications
or
notifications
issued
thereafter qua the same village/area."

14. In the judgement of Pradeep
Kumari (supra), the Apex Court has also
held as under:

"8. We may, at the outset, state
that having regard to the Statement of
Objects and Reasons, referred to earlier,
the object underlying the enactment of
Section 28-A is to remove inequality in the
payment of compensation for same or
similar quality of land arising on account
of inarticulate and poor people not being
able to take advantage of the right of
reference to the civil court under Section
18 of the Act. This is sought to be achieved
by
providing an opportunity
to
all
aggrieved parties whose land is covered by
the
same
notification
to
seek
redetermination once any of them has
obtained orders for payment of higher
compensation from the reference court
under Section 18 of the Act. Section 28-A
is, therefore, in the nature of a beneficent
provision intended to remove inequality
and to give relief to the inarticulate and
poor people who are not able to take
advantage of right of reference to the civil
court under Section 18 of the Act. In
relation to beneficent legislation, the law is
well-settled that while construing the
provisions of such a legislation the court
should
adopt
a
construction
which
advances the policy of the legislation to
extend
the
benefit
rather
than
a
construction which has the effect of
curtailing the benefit conferred by it. The
1 All. Rajveer Singh & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
549
provisions
of
Section
28-A
should,
therefore, be construed keeping in view the
object underlying the said provision.

9. A perusal of the provisions
contained in sub-section (1) of Section 28A of the Act would show that after an
award is made under Part III whereby the
court allows to the applicant any amount of
compensation in excess of the amount
awarded by the Collector under Section 11,
a right accrues to a person interested in the
other land covered by the same notification
under sub-section (1) of Section 4 who is
also aggrieved by the award of the
Collector but who had not made an
application to the Collector under Section
18, to move an application before the
Collector
for
redetermination
of
the
amount of compensation payable to him on
the basis of the amount of compensation
awarded by the court. This application for
redetermination of the compensation is
required to be made within three months
from the date of the award of the court. The
right to make the application under Section
28-A arises from the award of the court on
the basis of which the person making the
application is seeking redetermination of
the compensation. There is nothing in subsection (1) of Section 28-A to indicate that
this right is confined in respect of the
earliest award that is made by the court
after the coming into force of Section 28-A.
By construing the expression "where in an
award under this Part" in sub-section (1) of
Section 28-A to mean "where in the first
award made by the court under this Part",
the word 'first', which is not found in subsection (1) of Section 28-A, is being read
therein and thereby the amplitude of the
said provision is being curtailed so as to
restrict the benefit conferred by it. In the
matter of construction of a beneficent
provision it is not permissible by judicial
interpretation to read words which are not
there and thereby restrict the scope of the
said provision. (See : Jnan Ranjan Sen
Gupta v. Arun Kumar Bose [(1975) 2 SCC
526, 530] .)

10. It is possible to visualise a
situation where in the first award that is
made by the court after the coming into
force of Section 28-A the enhancement in
the amount of compensation by the said
award is not very significant for the reason
that the person who sought the reference
was not able to produce adequate evidence
in support of his claim and in another
reference where the award was made by
the court subsequently such evidence is
produced before the court and a much
higher amount is awarded as compensation
in the said award. By restricting the benefit
of Section 28-A to the first award that is
made by the court after the coming into
force of Section 28-A the benefit of higher
amount of compensation on the basis of the
subsequent award made by the court would
be denied to the persons invoking Section
28-A and the benefit of the said provision
would be confined to redetermination of
compensation on the basis of lesser amount
of compensation awarded under the first
award that is made after the coming into
force of Section 28-A. There is nothing in
the wordings of Section 28-A to indicate
that the legislature intended to confer such
a limited benefit under Section 28-A.
Similarly, there may be a situation, as in
the present case, where the notification
under Section 4(1) of the Act covers lands
falling in different villages and a number of
references at the instance of persons
having lands in different villages were
pending in the court on the date of coming
into force of Section 28-A and awards in
those references are made by the court on
different dates. A person who is entitled to
apply under Section 28-A belonging to a
particular village may come to know of the
550 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
first award that is made by the court after
the coming into force of Section 28-A in a
reference at the instance of a person
belonging to another village, after the
expiry of the period of three months from
the date of the said award but he may come
to know of the subsequent award that is
made by the court in the reference at the
instance of a person belonging to the same
village before the expiry of the period of
three months from the date of the said
award. This is more likely to happen in the
cases of inarticulate and poor people who
cannot be expected to keep track of all the
references that were pending in court on
the date of coming into force of Section 28A and may not be in a position to know, in
time, about the first award that is made by
the court after the coming into force of
Section 28-A. By holding that the award
referred to in Section 28-A(1) is the first
award made after the coming into force of
Section 28-A, such persons would be
deprived of the benefit extended by Section
28-A. Such a construction would thus result
in perpetuating the inequality in the
payment
of
compensation
which
the
legislature wanted to remove by enacting
Section
28-A. The object
underlying
Section 28-A would be better achieved by
giving the expression "an award" in
Section 28-A its natural meaning as
meaning the award that is made by the
court in Part III of the Act after the coming
into force of Section 28-A. If the said
expression in Section 28-A(1) is thus
construed, a person would be able to seek
redetermination
of
the
amount
of
compensation payable to him provided the
following conditions are satisfied:

(i) An award has been made by
the court under Part III after the coming
into force of Section 28-A;

(ii) By the said award the amount
of compensation in excess of the amount
awarded by the Collector under Section 11
has been allowed to the applicant in that
reference;

(iii) The person moving the
application
under
Section
28-A
is
interested in other land covered by the
same notification under Section 4(1) to
which the said award relates;

(iv) The person moving the
application did not make an application to
the Collector under Section 18;

(v) The application is moved
within three months from the date of the
award
on
the
basis
of
which
the
redetermination of amount of compensation
is sought; and

(vi) Only one application can be
moved
under
Section
28-A
for
redetermination of compensation by an
applicant.

11. Since the cause of action for
moving
the
application
for
redetermination of compensation under
Section 28-A arises from the award on the
basis
of
which
redetermination
of
compensation is sought, the principle that
"once the limitation begins to run, it runs
in its full course until its running is
interdicted by an order of the court" can
have no application because the limitation
for moving the application under Section
28-A will begin to run only from the date
of the award on the basis of which
redetermination
of
compensation
is
sought.

12. We are, therefore, unable to
agree with the view expressed in Babua
Ram [(1995) 2 SCC 689 : JT (1994) 7 SC
377] and Karnail Singh [(1995) 2 SCC 728
: (1995) 1 Scale 21] that application under
Section
28-A
for
redetermination
of
compensation can only be made on the
basis of the first award that is made after
the coming into force of Section 28-A. In
our opinion, the benefit of redetermination
1 All. Rajveer Singh & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
551
of amount of compensation under Section
28-A can be availed of on the basis of any
one of the awards that has been made by
the court after the coming into force of
Section 28-A provided the applicant
seeking
such
benefit
makes
the
application under Section 28-A within the
prescribed period of three months from
the making of the award on the basis of
which redetermination is sought. The first
contention urged by Shri Goswamy in
support of the review petitions is, therefore,
rejected."

15. In the judgement of Satyapal
Singh (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this
Court has held that the application under
Section 28A of the Act, 1894 cannot be
filed
for
re-determination
of
the
compensation on the basis of decree of the
High Court in first appeal or by the
Supreme Court in further appeal, is in the
teeth of the earlier judgements of the Coordinate Bench of this Court in Pradeep
Kumar (supra) and while holding so the
Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in
Satyapal Singh (supra) has not considered
the judgement of Co-ordinate Bench in
Pradeep
Kumari
(supra).
Relevant
observations of the Co-ordinate Bench of
this Court in Satyapal Singh (supra), reads
as under:

"SECOND ISSUE: Whether an
application can be filed under section 28-A
of the Act seeking re-determination of the
compensation on the basis of the award
made by the Reference Court under section
18 of the Act or the decree of the High
Court or the Supreme Court under section
54 of the Act.

Section 28-A of the Act provides
that where in an award under Part-III
(containing Sections 18 to 28-A of the Act),
the Court allows to the applicant any
amount of compensation in excess of the
amount awarded by the Collector under
Section 11, the persons interested in all the
land covered by the same notification
under Section 4(1) of the Act and who are
also aggrieved by the award of the
Collector may, by written application to the
Collector within three months from the date
of the award of the Court, require that the
amount of compensation payable to them
may be redetermined on the basis of the
amount of compensation awarded by the
Court. 'Court' has been defined in Section
3(d) of the Act to mean a Principal Civil
Court of original jurisdiction. It is,
therefore, clear that the award that is
referrable to under Section 28-A(1) of the
Act is the award made by the Reference
Court alone. This is also clear because
Section 28-A of the Act begins with "where
in an award in this Part, the Court allows
to the applicant" and ends with "may be
redetermined on the basis of the amount of
compensation awarded by the Court".

An application under Section 28A of the Act cannot, therefore, be filed for
redetermination of the compensation on the
basis of a decree of the High Court in the
First Appeal filed under Section 54 of the
Act contained in Part VIII or by the
Supreme Court in further Appeal.

This is what has been held by the
Supreme Court in Babua Ram and the
observations are :

"19. The next question is as to
when the period of limitation of three
months begins to run under Section 28-A
and whether successive awards made by
Civil Court at different times in respect of
the land covered by the same Notification
furnish separate causes of action for
making applications under Section 28A. Let
us consider the meaning of the words "an
award under this part" referred to in
Section 28-A(1) which is Part III of the Act.
552 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
The heading to that part begins by
reference to court and its procedure. The
"court" means a principal civil court of
original jurisdiction or a special judicial
officer appointed to perform the functions
of the court under the Act as becomes clear
as is noticed already. What are the matters
to be considered in determining the
compensation on a reference made to it
under Section 18, is detailed in Section 23
while
matters
to
be
neglected
in
determining
such
compensation
are
indicated in Section 24. By operation of
Sub-section (2) of Section 26, the award
made
determining
the
amount
of
compensation shall be deemed to be a
decree while the statement of the grounds
of every such award is deemed to be the
judgment, for the purpose of Code of Civil
Procedure. The above perspectives from
Part III make it clear that the award of the
court is that of the civil court of original
jurisdiction in that part. It is a decree for
the purpose of an appeal under Section 54
which falls in part VIII of the Act
(Miscellaneous). The decree as defined in
Section 2(2) C.P.C. is the decree of the
High Court, which shall be appealable to
the Supreme Court under Articles 132, 133
and 136 read with Order 45 C.P.C, Hence,
the award of the court referred to in Subsection (1) of Section 28-A is only the
award of the civil court of original
jurisdiction
or
of
judicial
officer
performing the functions of such court
under the Act on reference received by it
under Section 18 and an award and decree
pronounced under Section 26 of the Act.
Since, the judgment and decree of the High
Court under Section 54 or of this Court do
not come in Part III of the Act, they stand
excluded from an award envisaged under
sub- section (1) of Section 28-A. The
aggrieved interested person, therefore, is
entitled to the right and remedy of making
an application under Section 28A for
redetermination of compensation for his
acquired land only on the basis of the
award of the civil court or judicial officer
which is a judgment and decree under
Section 26 when such award grants
compensation in excess of the amount
awarded by the Collector under section 11.
When such an application is made in
writing
by
the
aggrieved
person,
notwithstanding the fact of his having
received compensation under Section 31
without protest and of not availing the right
and remedy of the reference under Section
18,
the
redetermination
of
the
compensation under Section 28A(1) is
required to be done."

 (emphasis supplied)

It needs to be stated that in
Pradeep Kumari, the Supreme Court
disagreed only with the view taken in
Babua Ram that the period of limitation for
making an application under Section 28-A
of the Act is not restricted to the earliest
award that is made by the Court after
coming into force of Section 28-A of the
Act.

The view that the award referred
to in Section 28-A(1) of the Act is the
award of the Reference Court was
reiterated by the Supreme Court in Bhagti
and the observations are :

"6. ............... Equally, the right
and remedy of redetermination would be
available only when the reference Court
under Section 18 has enhanced the
compensation in an award and decree
under section 26. Within three months from
the date of the reference court excluding
the time taken under proviso, the applicant
whose land was acquired under the same
notification but who failed to avail the
remedy under Section 18, would be entitled
to avail the right and remedy under Section
28A. The order and judgment of the High
1 All. Rajveer Singh & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
553
Court does not give such right. Thus, this
Court held that Section 28-A does not apply
to an order made by the High Court for
redetermination of the compensation. Thus,
we hold that the question of reference to
the Constitution Bench does not arise. The
claimants are not entitled to make an
application
for
redetermination
of
compensation under Section 28-A(1) after
the judgment of the High Court; nor are the
claimants entitled to avail of that award
which is more beneficial to the claimants,
i.e., the High Court judgment."

(emphasis supplied)

It is, therefore, clear that the
award referred to in section 28-A(1) of the
Act is the award of the Reference Court
and not a decree of the High Court in
First Appeal or a decree of the Supreme
Court in further appeal. It is also clear
that the award of the Reference Court can
be any of the awards and not necessarily
the first award.

THIRD ISSUE: Whether the
time limit for filing the application under
Section 28-A of the Act is three months
from the date of award of the Reference
Court.