# Rajvir Singh v. Randhir Singh

- **Citation:** (2024) 10 ILRA 574
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-10-22
- **Case number:** Second Appeal No. 439 of 2009
- **Bench:** Kshitij Shailendra
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/rajvir-singh-v-randhir-singh-51062
- **Pages:** 18

## Headnote

A.K.
Mehrotra,
Nishant
Mehrotra,
Pranjal
Mehrotra, Swetashwa Agarwal

A. Civil Law - Registration Act, 1908 -
Section 58 - Indian Evidence Act, 1872 -
Sections 68, 91 & 92 - Sale deed -
Registered
Document
-
Registered
document
carries
with
it
strong
presumption about its execution and
contents, however the presumption is
rebuttable.
In
order
to
rebut
such
presumption,
the
parties
seeking
to
dislodge the validity of the transaction
covered by registered document has to
lead a strong evidence. Initial burden to
establish
undue
execution
of
the
document
is
upon
a
person,
who
challenges the same and it is only after
the said initial burden is discharged, onus
would shift upon the other side, which
would be seen during the course of
evaluation of evidence (Para 31)
10 All. Rajvir Singh Vs. Randhir Singh
575
B. Transfer of Property Act,1882 - Section
54 - Suit for Cancellation of Sale Deed -
Allegation of fraud - Burden of proof -
Limitation - Limitation Act, 1963 - Section
17 - Registration Act, 1908 - Section 58 -
Presumption under Registration Act. Suit
for cancellation of sale deed filed after
three years and four months of its
execution held to be barred by limitation,
as the plaintiff's plea of discovering the
alleged
fraud
belatedly
was
unsubstantiated.
Trial
court
rightly
disbelieved the plaintiff's version that he
lost consciousness after consuming cold
drink. Comparison of signatures and the
endorsement
by
the
Sub-Registrar,
confirming
receipt
of
full
sale
consideration and due understanding by
the
executant,
attracted
a
strong
presumption u/s 58, 59, and 60 of the
Registration
Act,
1908,
further
corroborated by oral testimony and the
recitals in the deed. Sale deed, recording
advance payment of full consideration,
amounted to a concluded sale u/s 54 of
the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, leaving
no infirmity in the transaction. In absence
of credible proof of delayed knowledge of
the sale, S. 17 of the Limitation Act, 1963
was held inapplicable (Para 32)

Dismissed. (E-5)

List of Cases cited:

(1) Chacko & anr.Vs Mahadevan, 2008 ACJ 13

(2) Karan Singh (dead) Through LRs Vs Deputy
Director of Consolidation, Aligarh & ors., 2003
(94) RD 382

(3) Devendra Singh & ors. Vs Deputy Director of
Consolidation, Aligarh & anr., 2003 (94) RD 70

(4) Kewal Krishna Vs Rajesh Kumar & ors. etc.,
2022 SCCR 154

 (5) Ved Singh Vs Vinood Kumar, 1996 ALJ 1888

(6) Ishwar Dass Jain (Dead) Through Lrs Vs
Sohan Lal (Dead) by LRs, 2000(1) SCC 434

(7) Iqbal Ahmad Vs Smt. Naimul, 2004 SCC
OnLine All 117

(8) Jeet Kaur Vs Mishri Lal, 2023 SCC OnLine All
2704

(9) Dhiraj Singh Vs Sripal Singh & anr., 2009
SCC OnLine All 1208

(10) R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder Vs Arulmigu
Viswesaraswami & V.P. Temple & ors., 2003 (8)
SCC 752

(11)
M.
Siddiq
(Dead)
Through
Legal
Representatives (Ram Janmabhumi Temple
Case) Vs Mahant Suresh Das & anr., 2020 (1)
SCC 1

## Text

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574 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
living apart for a considerable period of
time, but this is not the only test of
irretrievable break down of marriage.
Divorce is found on fault theory. Husband
applied for divorce on the ground of cruelty
and desertion. He has not been able to
prove either of these grounds. We have
already discussed that the basic element of
desertion is animus deserendi which has
not been proved in this case. With regard to
cruelty, it is seen that the respondent/wife
has pointed out that she is willing to live
with
her
husband,
whereas
the
appellant/husband has not proved the
instances of cruelty or desertion against his
wife supported by consistent and coherent
evidence of witnesses and has deposed that
he can not live with the respondent at any
cost. The husband has not been able to
substantiate his allegations of cruelty
against his wife. The wife is willing to live
with him but it is he who does not want to
live with her, therefore, in the facts of this
case, plea of irretrievable break down of
marriage cannot be accepted.

E. Conclusion

(39) Looking to the evidence on
record, the only conclusion that we can
arrive at is, that there is no ground made
out by the appellant in terms of Section 13
(1)(i-a) and Section 13(1)(i-b) for seeking a
decree of dissolution of marriage. The
judgment of the trial Court has considered
all the evidence to which we have made a
reference and has correctly arrived at its
finding, rejecting both grounds for seeking
divorce. We are in complete agreement
with the findings of fact arrived at by the
Trial Court, which are in consonance with
the evidence on record. There is no
perversity or illegality in any of the
findings arrived at by the trial Court in
passing the impugned judgment. The point
for determination formulated by us is
answered in the negative.

(40) For the reasons stated above,
we hereby dismiss the present appeal with
no order as to costs.
----------
(2024) 10 ILRA 574
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 22.10.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE KSHITIJ SHAILENDRA, J.

Second Appeal No. 439 of 2009

Rajvir Singh ...Appellant
Versus
Randhir Singh ...Respondent

Counsel for the Appellant:
M.K.
Gupta,
M.K.
Upadhyay,
Pradeep
K
Bhardwaj, R.D. Tiwari, Satendra Kumar Singh,
Shashwat Kishore Chaturve, Suresh Chandra
Varma

Counsel for the Respondent:
A.K.
Mehrotra,
Nishant
Mehrotra,
Pranjal
Mehrotra, Swetashwa Agarwal

A. Civil Law - Registration Act, 1908 -
Section 58 - Indian Evidence Act, 1872 -
Sections 68, 91 & 92 - Sale deed -
Registered
Document
-
Registered
document
carries
with
it
strong
presumption about its execution and
contents, however the presumption is
rebuttable.
In
order
to
rebut
such
presumption,
the
parties
seeking
to
dislodge the validity of the transaction
covered by registered document has to
lead a strong evidence. Initial burden to
establish
undue
execution
of
the
document
is
upon
a
person,
who
challenges the same and it is only after
the said initial burden is discharged, onus
would shift upon the other side, which
would be seen during the course of
evaluation of evidence (Para 31)
10 All. Rajvir Singh Vs. Randhir Singh
575
B. Transfer of Property Act,1882 - Section
54 - Suit for Cancellation of Sale Deed -
Allegation of fraud - Burden of proof -
Limitation - Limitation Act, 1963 - Section
17 - Registration Act, 1908 - Section 58 -
Presumption under Registration Act. Suit
for cancellation of sale deed filed after
three years and four months of its
execution held to be barred by limitation,
as the plaintiff's plea of discovering the
alleged
fraud
belatedly
was
unsubstantiated.
Trial
court
rightly
disbelieved the plaintiff's version that he
lost consciousness after consuming cold
drink. Comparison of signatures and the
endorsement
by
the
Sub-Registrar,
confirming
receipt
of
full
sale
consideration and due understanding by
the
executant,
attracted
a
strong
presumption u/s 58, 59, and 60 of the
Registration
Act,
1908,
further
corroborated by oral testimony and the
recitals in the deed. Sale deed, recording
advance payment of full consideration,
amounted to a concluded sale u/s 54 of
the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, leaving
no infirmity in the transaction. In absence
of credible proof of delayed knowledge of
the sale, S. 17 of the Limitation Act, 1963
was held inapplicable (Para 32)

Dismissed. (E-5)

List of Cases cited:

(1) Chacko & anr.Vs Mahadevan, 2008 ACJ 13

(2) Karan Singh (dead) Through LRs Vs Deputy
Director of Consolidation, Aligarh & ors., 2003
(94) RD 382

(3) Devendra Singh & ors. Vs Deputy Director of
Consolidation, Aligarh & anr., 2003 (94) RD 70

(4) Kewal Krishna Vs Rajesh Kumar & ors. etc.,
2022 SCCR 154

 (5) Ved Singh Vs Vinood Kumar, 1996 ALJ 1888

(6) Ishwar Dass Jain (Dead) Through Lrs Vs
Sohan Lal (Dead) by LRs, 2000(1) SCC 434

(7) Iqbal Ahmad Vs Smt. Naimul, 2004 SCC
OnLine All 117

(8) Jeet Kaur Vs Mishri Lal, 2023 SCC OnLine All
2704

(9) Dhiraj Singh Vs Sripal Singh & anr., 2009
SCC OnLine All 1208

(10) R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder Vs Arulmigu
Viswesaraswami & V.P. Temple & ors., 2003 (8)
SCC 752

(11)
M.
Siddiq
(Dead)
Through
Legal
Representatives (Ram Janmabhumi Temple
Case) Vs Mahant Suresh Das & anr., 2020 (1)
SCC 1

(Delivered by Hon'ble Kshitij Shailendra, J.)

THE APPEAL

1. This is plaintiff's second appeal
assailing concurrent judgments, whereby
his suit for cancellation of registered sale
deed dated 24.03.2004 has been dismissed
and civil appeal arising therefrom has also
failed.

PLAINT CASE

2. The plaintiff and defendant, who
are real brothers, were owners to the extent
of 1/3rd share each in agricultural land
covered by Gata No. 1231/1 measuring
0.6930
hectares
situated
at
Village
Sikandrabad Dehat, Pargana and Tehsil
Sikandrabad,
District
Bulandshahr.
Remaining 1/3rd share was that of third
brother, namely, Jai Singh. When, on
01.08.2007, plaintiff felt need of Khatauni,
on obtaining copy thereof, he came to
know that his name was expunged from the
records and in its place, the defendant's
name was recorded. Certified copy of the
sale deed was applied for and obtained on
01.08.2007 itself, on perusal whereof the
576 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
plaintiff came to know about execution of a
sale deed dated 24.03.2004. As regards the
date, it is stated that on 24.03.2004, the
plaintiff, on account of some personal
work, had gone to Sikandrabad where he
met his elder brother (defendant) alongwith
Jogendra Singh and Veeru. The defendant
offered the plaintiff with Coca-cola and
having drunken the same, the plaintiff fell
in the state of inebriation and tipsiness and
his brain stopped working. He gained
consciousness on the next day and did not
remember anything about 24.03.2004. The
sale deed was alleged to have been
executed as a result of deceit and alleging
that the defendant did not pay sum of Rs.
2,00,000/- (rupees two lacs) as alleged sale
consideration; sale deed was got executed
in the state of plaintiff being under
intoxication; it was not as per his free will;
witness Veeru is related to the defendant
and the other witness too being under
influence of the defendant, all had
colluded; plaintiff being an issueless
person, had executed a registered Will
dated 16.12.2003 in favour of defendant's
sons and, therefore, there was no occasion
for executing the sale deed.

DEFENSE IN WRITTEN
STATEMENT

3. The written statement admitted
the shares as described in the plaint, but the
sale deed was defended as having been duly
executed without any coercion and after
making payment of Rs.2,00,000/- (rupees
two lacs) as sale consideration. The incident
of 24.03.2004 as described by the plaintiff,
particularly the plea of intoxication etc., was
denied, and it was alleged that the plaintiff
had taken loan towards business of truck and
he being in need of money, sold the property
to the defendant, discharged his financial
liability and also got him medically treated.
TRIAL PROCEEDINGS AND
THE DECISION

4. The plaintiff appeared as PW-1
with no other witness, whereas Jogendra
Singh and Veeru, witnesses to the disputed
sale deed, appeared as DW-2 and DW-3
with the defendant as DW-1. The trial
court,
after
discussing
oral
and
documentary evidence, dismissed the suit
with cost by judgment and order dated
30.05.2008. It discussed oral testimony of
PW-1 that he was working in P.A.C. and
left the job in 1969 and was also engaged in
truck
business.
As
regards
plea
of
intoxication, the trial court observed that if
the incident as alleged was correct, the
plaintiff, under natural circumstances, would
have asked his defendant-brother about the
incident as, according to him, he gained his
consciousness next day. The offer of CocaCola was shown to have been made at the
shop of one Ghanshyam from whom also no
enquiry was made and the plaint was silent
about it. The trial court also recorded that the
plaintiff had signed the sale deed on
24.03.2004 and, therefore, if, according to
him, after intake of Coca-cola his condition
had become so pity that he was not even able
to move properly and that he was not in his
senses in the office of Sub-Registrar, it was
wholly unnatural that he could put his
signatures on the sale deed. The trial court
compared the signatures of the plaintiff on the
order sheet, plaint as well as in the sale deed
and found the same as normal. It also
observed that initially the plaintiff executed a
Will dated 05.08.1997 in favour of sons of his
another brother Jai Singh and after a period of
six years, he executed another Will dated
16.12.2003 in favour of sons of defendantRandhir Singh and had admitted in his
statement that some time ago he had executed
a sale deed in favour of one Poonam Sharma
and also instituted suit for its cancellation.
10 All. Rajvir Singh Vs. Randhir Singh
577
THE FIRST APPELLATE
COURT'S JUDGMENT

5. Affirming the trial court's
judgment,
the
first
appellate
court
dismissed the Civil Appeal No. 173 of 2008
on 07.02.2009. It also analysed the truth in
the plaintiff's version in relation to the
incident dated 24.03.2004 i.e. intoxication
through cold drink resulting into fraudulent
execution of sale deed and recorded various
findings inter-alia that Ghanshyam on
whose shop cold drink was allegedly given
to the plaintiff, being the most important
witness, had not been produced.

LEARNED COUNSEL HEARD

6. Heard Mr. Shashi Nandan,
learned Senior Advocate assisted by Ms.
Shreya Gupta for the plaintiff-appellant and
Mr. Ashish Kumar Singh, leaned Advocate
holding brief of Mr. Swetashwa Agarwal
assisted by Mr. Raghav Arora for the
defendant respondent.

ADMISSION ORDER IN THE
INSTANT APPEAL

7. This second appeal was
admitted by order dated 22.05.2009 on two
questions of law. Later on, by another order
dated 17.07.2019, another question of law
was framed and, consequently, the second
appeal was heard on the following three
questions of law:

"(a) Whether, both the
courts below have erred in applying
the provisions of Section 54 of the
Transfer of Property Act to the
present case inasmuch as the sale
deed itself clearly recorded that the
entire sale consideration has been
paid in advance and there was no
question of any payment or part
payment of sale consideration after
registration of sale deed?
(b) Whether, the sale deed
dated 24.03.2004 is a result of
fraud and undue influence and view
of the courts below to the contrary
is not sustainable in law?
(c) Whether the trial court
was justified in its finding that the
suit is barred by limitation despite
the fact that the suit was based on
the allegation of fraud committed
by the defendant and thus the
provisions of Section 17 of the
Limitation Act would apply?"

CONTENTION OF APPELLANT

8. Shri Shashi Nandan, learned
Senior Advocate has vehemently argued
that the plaintiff came to know about
fraudulent execution of sale deed in
August, 2007 and instituted the suit in
question. According to him, there was
sufficient evidence on record to establish
the plaint case. He emphasised that though
the payment of sale consideration of
Rs.2,00,000/- (rupees two lac) was alleged
in relation to the disputed sale deed, the
defence witness namely, Jogendra Singh
(DW-2) and Veeru (DW-3) themselves
dislodged the transaction of sale. By
referring to statement of DW-1 (defendantrespondent), he submits that transaction of
sale was finalized by Jogendra Singh, DW2 and Veeru, DW-3, whereas DW-2,
Jogendra Singh, in his cross-examination,
stated that when he alongwith defendant
reached the chamber of Qatib, the sale deed
had been written to some extent; sale
consideration had not been paid in front of
him nor was any reference of the same ever
made; sale deed was not recited to the
plaintiff by the Qatib before him nor did the
578 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
plaintiff read it; he never discussed about
sale deed with the plaintiff; no amount was
paid before him and he had not seen the
sale deed. As regards DW-3, Veeru, he
stated in his cross-examination that he had
brought
money
with
him
on
the
information given by Sukhvir, i.e. son of
the defendant, no sale consideration was
paid before him and Sukhvir had told him
that transaction of sale had been finalized
for a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- (rupees two
lacs). By referring to statement of DW-1
(defendant), it was emphasised that he
himself being the purchaser expressed his
ignorance as to for how much amount the
sale
had
been
finalised;
the
sale
consideration was given by his son Sukhvir
in his hand, thereafter he gave the amount
to the Qatib and Qatib might have given the
same to the plaintiff. Regarding the
defendant's financial standing, that portion
of his cross-examination was read out to
the Court where he stated that he and his
sons were not engaged in any business;
agricultural activity was the only source for
his livelihood; there was no bank account
in the name of the defendant, his son or his
wife; he had never served anywhere; he had
frail legs and used to walk with mobility
aid.

9. By referring to the averments
contained in the plaint and written
statement, it was submitted that the
plaintiff-appellant had duly proved the
factum
of
non-tendering
of
sale
consideration and maintained consistency
in his stand in his examination-in-chief as
well as cross-examination, whereas the
defendant-respondent remained completely
aloof as regards the amount demanded by
the plaintiff as sale consideration and also
the date on which agreement regarding
execution of sale deed had been reached
and, further, about the exact amount handed
over to the defendant by his son and,
thereafter, by the defendant to the deed
writer and whether or not the deed writer
had actually handed over that money to the
plaintiff. Further submission is that after
denial of execution (in fit state of mind)
and payment of sale consideration by the
plaintiff-appellant, and its affirmance by
the witnesses of the defendant-respondent,
the presumption under Section 60 of the
Registration Act, 1908 lost its force. The
burden was squarely upon the defendant to
prove the due execution (in fit state of
mind) as well as payment of sale
consideration. This burden the defendant
not only failed to discharge, in fact, in
attempting to do so, he and his own
witnesses ended up admitting non-payment
of sale consideration, thereby giving a fatal
blow to the defence set up by the
defendant. The courts below erred in
discarding
the
aforementioned
overwhelming
evidence
on
record
sufficiently proving that the sale deed in
question was executed without payment of
any sale consideration and is void. They
misread the statement of the defence
witnesses. They also erred in discarding the
statement of the DW-2 on the ground of
inconsistency in between his examinationin-chief and cross-examination, without
appreciating that the very purpose of cross-
examination is to cull out the true facts of
the case. The courts below could not have
treated the unequivocal testimony of DW-2
as unreliable and discarded it, despite the
fact that the defendant himself had pleaded
in his written statement that DW-2 is a
reliable and uninfluenced witness. Further,
the statement of DW-2 corroborated not
just the plaint case but the admissions made
by the defendant in his cross examination.
It is a widely accepted doctrine that
witnesses may lie, but the circumstances do
not. In the case at hand, the fact that the
10 All. Rajvir Singh Vs. Randhir Singh
579
plaintiff-appellant had already executed a
will in favour of his 3 nephews (all sons of
the defendant herein) to the exclusion of
the defendant, at the time when the sale
deed in question was executed, is an
important
circumstance
indicating
the
actual intention of the appellant. The
plaintiff-appellant
acquired
knowledge
about execution of the sale deed for the
first time on 01.08.2007 when he obtained
copy of Khatauni, which was also brought
on record and, therefore, suit filed within
three years from the date of knowledge was
well within limitation. In support of his
submission, the plaintiff-appellant has
placed
reliance
upon
the
following
authorities:

(1) Chacko and another
vs. Mahadevan, 2008 ACJ 13

(2) Karan Singh (dead)
Through LRs vs. Deputy Director
of Consolidation, Aligarh and
others, 2003 (94) RD 382
(3) Devendra Singh and
others vs. Deputy Director of
Consolidation,
Aligarh
and
another, 2003 (94) RD 70
(4) Kewal Krishna vs.
Rajesh Kumar and others etc.,
2022 SCCR 154
(5) Ved Singh vs. Vinood
Kumar, 1996 ALJ 1888

CONTENTION OF
RESPONDENT

10. Per contra, Shri Ashish Kumar
Singh, learned for the respondents submits
that the very foundation of the suit was
alleged inebriation of the plaintiff and if
record establishes that the said statement
was wholly false and was made just for the
purposes
of
creating
grounds
for
cancellation of sale deed, the entire plaint
case would fall to earth. He submits that the
plaintiff did not specifically plead in the
plaint as to for what purpose he required
Khatauni on 01.08.2007, i.e. more than
three years after execution of disputed sale
deed; the plaintiff on the same day
allegedly obtained Khatauni and same day
went to the Registry office, applied for
certified copy of the sale deed and got it on
the same day, i.e. 01.08.2007 and also
failed to establish as to for what purpose he
had gone to Sikandrabad on 24.03.2004.
Shri Singh emphasised upon paragraph 6 of
the plaint where the plaintiff-appellant
stated that he had fallen into drunken state
after he was given Coca-Cola, his brain
stopped working when the sale deed was
got executed on 24.03.2004, the plaintiff
gained consciousness on the next day when
he
had
forgotten
everything
about
24.03.2004.
He
further
submits
that
Ghanshyam on whose shop the incident of
drinking Coca-Cola was alleged, was never
produced by the plaintiff and, therefore,
once he withheld the best evidence, adverse
inference would be drawn against him.
Further argument is that once the two
courts have recorded the finding that the
plaintiff signed the sale deed in the
Registry office and there was no infirmity
in the health of the plaintiff by the time he
had signed the sale deed, but he expressed
his ignorance taking a plea of drunkenness
and void state of mind and got back to his
senses on the next day, but did not inquire
anything either from Ghanshyam or even
from his real brother, the entire story was
cooked up by him after more than three
years just to create a cause of action for
filing suit. Further submission is that the
plaintiff
was
in
habit
of
executing
documents and initially he executed a Will
dated 05.08.1997 in favour of sons of his
another brother Jai Singh and six years
580 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
thereafter he executed another Will dated
16.12.2003 in favour of sons of the
defendant and he also sold some of his
property to one Poonam Sharma by
executing a registered sale deed and,
thereafter, challenged the same before the
civil court, which shows that he was a
person of dishonest intention.

11. As regards sale consideration,
submission is that sale deed itself contains
recital of payment of sale consideration of
Rs. 2,00,000/- (rupees two lac) in advance
and Sub-Registrar endorsed that the sale
deed was read out to the plaintiff-Rajvir
Singh, who had understood its execution
and also accepted the receipt of entire sale
consideration,
the
Sub-Registrar's
endorsement on the sale deed would carry a
strong presumption as per Sections 58, 59
and 60 of the Registration Act, 1908 and
there is nothing on record that the said
strong presumption was rebutted by any
cogent evidence. He also submits that as
per Section 91 of the Indian Evidence Act,
1972, the oral testimony of DW-2 Jogendra
Singh and DW-3 Veeru would not be of
much significance, inasmuch as, it pertains
to a document, i.e., sale deed that would be
read as it is and oral evidence would
remain excluded. He also submits that suit
was barred by limitation as it was filed
after more than three years from the date of
execution of sale deed about which the
plaintiff had knowledge since beginning,
but in order to bring the suit within the
period of limitation, a false story of
acquiring knowledge on 01.08.2007 was
cooked up in the plaint, but the same could
not be established and, therefore, the
plaintiff has no case. Shri Singh further
submits that as per Section 14 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 state of mind of a
person has significant value and once in the
present case, unconscious state of mind was
not proved by the plaintiff, it would be a
case where the sale deed would be
presumed to have been executed under
conscious state of mind with free will and
without any other infirmity. Learned
counsel for the respondent has placed
reliance upon the following authorities:

(1)
Ishwar
Dass
Jain
(Dead) Through Lrs vs. Sohan
Lal (Dead) by LRs, 2000(1) SCC
434
(2) Iqbal Ahmad vs. Smt.
Naimul, 2004 SCC OnLine All 117
(3) Jeet Kaur vs. Mishri
Lal, 2023 SCC OnLine All 2704
(4)
Dhiraj
Singh
vs.
Sripal Singh and another, 2009
SCC
OnLine
All
1208

CONTENTION OF APPELLANT
IN REJOINDER

12. In rejoinder, Shri Shashi
Nandan submits that provisions of Section
91 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 or
those attaching presumption to a registered
instrument as per Registration Act, 1908
would be applicable only when the
executant of the instrument is under
conscious state of mind. Contention is that
once the plaintiff was not under normal
condition on the date of execution of sale
deed, no presumption would be attached to
its validity and once the witnesses to the
sale deed themselves could not establish
the transaction of sale and even defendant
(DW-1) did not specifically prove payment
of sale consideration to the plaintiff, the
sale deed was bound to be cancelled.

ANALYSIS OF RIVAL
CONTENTIONS, FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSION
10 All. Rajvir Singh Vs. Randhir Singh
581
13. Having heard the learned
counsel for the parties, this Court finds that
sale deed was executed on 24.03.2004 and
the suit was filed in August, 2007, i.e. after
a period of three years and four months.
The plaintiff-appellant alleged acquisition
of
knowledge
about
sale
deed
on
01.08.2007. Then he came up with a plea
that more than three years ago on
24.03.2004, he had gone to Sikandrabad at
about 10.00 a.m. for some personal work
where he found defendant along with
Jogendra Singh and Veeru, where the
defendant offered him with Coca-Cola and
after drinking the same, his brain stopped
working and sale deed was got executed.
He
further
stated
that
he
gained
consciousness on the next day in the village
but forgot everything about 24.03.2004.
The courts below have analysed the
plaintiff's case as regards his state of mind
in the light of plaint version and oral
testimony of the witnesses. They have
recorded clear findings that once the
plaintiff signed the sale deed, which
signatures appeared to be normal when
compared to his signatures on the plaint
and order sheet, his contention that he
went out of brain immediately after
drinking
cold
drink
was
highly
suspicious. Then it has come on record
that the plaintiff alleged as if upto signing
of the sale deed he was in all his senses,
but
immediately
after
putting
his
signatures in the Sub-Registrar office on
the sale deed, he went out of brain. Nonproduction of Ghanshyam on whose shop
the cold drink was alleged to have been
offered, though it was not stated in the
plaint, but came in evidence, was also
held to be fatal to the plaintiff's case. The
courts also discussed that the plaintiff
was aware that he entered into Registry
office and has not denied his signatures
on the sale deed, but tried to explain the
circumstances under which the deed was
got executed.

14. It would be worthwhile to
refer few significant portions of the cross
examination of the PW-1. The same are
extracted as under:-

"------------1&8&2007
dks
eq>s
[krkSuh dh t:jr iM+h D;ksafd eq>s xkjaVh nsuh FkhA
xkjaVh ?ku';ke iafMr th fuxzkeiqj dh nsuh FkhA
;g xkjaVh PNB fldanjkckn ls iafMr dks yksu
ysuk Fkk] rc nsuh FkhA fQj eSaus xkjaVh ugha nhA ---
-------
--------vkt ?ku';ke nkl esjh xokgh ds
fy, ugha vk,-------
eSa vdsys vk;k Fkk] ?ku';ke nkl dh
nqdku] tks jftLVah n¶rj ds ikl gS ij igq¡pkA
?ku';ke nkl dh [kkn dh nqdku gSA ;g ogh
?ku';ke nkl gSa ftudh eSa xkjaVh nsuk pkgrk FkkA
eSa ?ku';kenkl dh 6&7 o"kZ ls tkurk gw¡A --------
--
------ 1-8-2007 ls igys eSa j.k/khj vius
cM+s HkkbZ ds lkFk gh jgrk FkkA j.k/khj Hkh esjh
[kkus&ihus dh O;oLFkk djus FksA j.k/khj ls dksbZ jaft'k
fdlh fdLe dh esjh ugha gSA------------
-------- eq>s 24&3&04 dks D;k gqvk eq>s ekywe
ugha gSA blfy, eSaus izfroknhx.k ls dqN ugha iwNkA
eSaus ?ku';ke nkl th ls Hkh dqN ugha iwNk ftudh
nqdku ij okD;k gqvk FkkA 1&8&07 dks gh eq>s bu
lc ckrksa dk irk] [krkSuh dh udy ysus ij pykA
1&8&07 ls iwoZ cSukek dh ckr eq>s irk pyh] cocacola fiykuk ;kn gSA------------
---------ihus ds ikap pkj feuV ckn gh u'kk gks
x;k FkkA eSa csgks'k ugha gqvk Fkk] dsoy u'kk gks x;k
FkkA eSa pyus fQjus dh fLFkfr esa ugha jgk] eq>s idM+
dj ys x;sA eq>s ;g irk gS fd eq>s ;g yksx jftLVah
n¶rj ys x;sA jftLVah n¶rj esa fdlh cSukek fy[kus
okys ds ikl ys x;s gksaxsA eq>s ugha ekywe fd cSukek
fy[kus okys ds ikl fdruh nsj jgsA mlds ckn eq>s
dksbZ gks'k ugha jgk] eq>s vxys fnu xk¡o esa gks'k vk;kA
;s yksx eq>s xk¡o esa ftl fnu dksdk dksyk fiyk;k Fkk
mlh fnu ys x;sA-----------"

15. PW-1 in his cross-examination
stated that he required Khatauni on
01.08.2007 for the purposes of giving
582 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
guarantee of Ghanshyam Pandit as he
intended to take a loan from Punjab
National Bank, Sikandrabad, however,
guarantee was not given. He is the same
Ghanshyam on whose shop the allegation
of
offering
Coca
Cola
was
made.
Admittedly, Ghanshyam was not produced
as a witness though he appears to be very
familiar to the plaintiff and, therefore, there
was
some
understanding
of
giving
guarantee by the plaintiff in relation to
transaction of loan in between Ghanshyam
and Punjab National Bank. It has also come
on record that plaintiff had executed a Will
dated 16.12.2003 in favour of his nephew.
The said Will was also brought on record
and witnesses to the said Will are Raju, son
of same Ghanshyam and Jogendra Singh
(DW-2). Therefore, affinity of plaintiff with
Ghanshyam and also Jogendra Singh is a
fact established on record. It is not the case
of the plaintiff that Will dated 16.12.2003
was
also
a
fraudulent
transaction.
Therefore, the plaintiff appears to be in
habit of executing registered documents in
favour of his own family members and the
same are witnessed by same persons and
also those who always joined the scene and
transaction qua execution of registered
documents. As regards sale deed executed
by the plaintiff in favour of one Poonam
Sharma, it was dated 11.07.2002 and,
immediately thereafter, he filed Original
Suit No. 260 of 2002 against State of U.P.,
S.D.M., Police Inspector, vendee Poonam
Sharma and also the respondent Randhir
Singh claiming a decree for cancellation of
the sale deed with the allegation that it had
been executed under coercion. Later on, he
entered into a compromise with the vendee
and recognised the disputed sale deed as a
valid one. Accordingly, the suit was
disposed of in terms of compromise by
order dated 19.03.2005 by the civil court.
DW-1 stated in his cross-examination about
institution of suit against Poonam Sharma
and compromise entered with her. All these
circumstances reflect that plaintiff was not
a person unknown with execution of
registered documents.

16. In the aforesaid light, if plaint
of the suit giving rise to the instant appeal
is again perused, in paragraph 7 (र) he
stated about exercise of undue influence by
the defendant as regards execution of sale
deed. The entire plaint as well as oral
testimony of DW-1 reflect that he was not
consistent in his stand as undue influence is
separate from getting the sale deed
executed under state of intoxication. There
are different modes of proof of these
parameters recognised by the Indian
Contract Act, 1872 and, hence, the
plaintiff's stand not being clear and, even
otherwise, not proved by cogent oral and
documentary evidence, this Court is not in
a position to upset the findings of fact
recorded
by
both
the
courts
below
dislodging the plaintiff's case and attaching
validity to the sale deed.

17. As far as the statement of
appellant
that
payment
of
sale
consideration could not be proved, this
Court is not in a position to accept the
same. First reason is that payment of sale
consideration is mentioned in the sale deed
itself that it was paid in advance. It is not
the case of the defendant that the amount
either in part or full was paid before the
Sub-Registrar. The endorsement of SubRegistrar is also to the same effect that
Rs.2,00,000/- (rupees two lac) was paid
earlier. The said endorsement as regards
due understanding of the plaintiff about
execution of sale deed and acceptance of
Rs. 2,00,000/- (rupees two lac) in advance,
in itself, is sufficient to prove payment of
sale consideration unless rebutted by
10 All. Rajvir Singh Vs. Randhir Singh
583
cogent evidence. As regards payment of
sale consideration, DW-1, in his crossexamination, stated as under:-

"--------fodz; /ku esjs csVs
lq[kohj us esjs gkFk esa fn;k FkkA fQj eSaus
vius gkFk ls #i;s dkfrc dks ns fn;s FksA
dkfrc us oknh dks ns fn;s gksaxsA yM+ds
lq[kohj us eq>s nks yk[k #i;s idM+k;s Fks]
fdUrq eSaus fxus ugha FksA---------
------------pw¡fd oknh us igys iSlk
ek¡xk Fkk] blfy, ns fn;k x;k FkkA dkfrc
dks eSaus cSukek fy[kus ds lEcU/k esa lc ckrsa
tqckuh gh crk nh Fkh] dksbZ bUr[kkc ugha
fn;k FkkA dkfrc us cSukek fy[kus ds ckn
vU; dksbZ dk;Zokgh ugha dh FkhA og cSukek
fy[krs gh lc&jftLVah dk;kZy; es cSukes
dks ys x;k FkkA cSukek ogk¡ tkdj ckcw dks
ns fn;k FkkA jftLVakj us iSlk feyus dh
ckcr iwNk FkkA------------------"

18. As regards plaintiff's version
regarding coca-cola, DW-1, in his crossexamination, stated as under:-

"--------------eSa oknh dks dksdk
dksyk ugha fiyk;k Fkk cfYd oknh us Lo;a
ge lcdks cSukes ds ckn dksdk dksyk
fiyk;k Fkk vkSj cQhZ f[kykbZ FkhA pw¡fd eSaus
cSukek djkus ds ckn Hkh dksdk dksyk fiykus
ls euk dj fn;k Fkk rc oknh us lcdks
dksdk dksyk fiyk;k FkkA ;g dguk xyr gS
fd eSaus oknh dks dksdk dksyk esa u'khyk
inkFkZ feykdj cSukek fy[kk fy;k gksA ;g
dguk xyr gS fd cSukek u'ks dh gkyr esa
djk;k gks ;g dguk Hkh xyr gS fd oknh
dks dksbZ izfrQy vnk u fd;k x;k gksA---------
---"

19. Even if oral testimony of DWs
is thoroughly analysed, it is found that DW2 Jogendra Singh was never a witness to
the payment of sale consideration and,
therefore, if he stated ignorance about the
same, it cannot go against the defendant.
Similar is the position of DW-3, Veeru.
Contrarily, from the statement of DW-3, it
is found that on information received by
him from Sukhvir, son of defendant, that
sale deed was to be executed and he should
bring Rs.10,000/- (rupees ten thousand),
Veeru came to Registry office with
Rs.10,000/- (rupees ten thousand), which
was given by him to Sukhvir. Some
relevant portion of cross examination of
DW-3-Veeru is extracted as under:-

"------------fookfnr cSukes okys
fnu eSa [kqn gh lqcg ds le; vk x;k FkkA
eq>s cqyk;k Hkh Fkk vkSj eSa iSls Hkh yk;k FkkA--
-----------
---------------eSaus lq[kohj ls iwNk Fkk fd
eq>s fdlfy, tkuk gS rks mlus crk;k Fkk
fd gekjk jktohj flag ls tehu dk lkSnk
gks x;k gSA mlh ds crkus ij eq>s cSukes ds
lkSns dh tkudkjh gqbZ FkhA lq[kohj
us eq>s crk;k fd esjh cSukes ij
xokgh gksuh gSA--------------------
----------------lq[kohj us eq>s
crk;k Fkk fd cSukes dk lkSnk nks yk[k #i;s
esa gks x;k gSA eq>ls Hkh nl gtkj #i;s
ykus ds fy, lq[kohj us dgk FkkA---------------
---------------esjs
lkeus
oknh
dks
izfrQy dh dksbZ vnk;xh ugha gqbZ FkhA eq>s
;g tkudkjh gS fd dkfrc dks cSukek
fy[kus gsrq fgnk;r oknh us nh FkhA---------
-----"

20. Though DW-1 stated in his
cross-examination that deal was done by
Jogendra Singh and Veeru, but contrary
statements were made by DW-2 and DW-3
as regards the transaction, however the
statements of DW-1, DW-2 and DW-3,
when read together and as a whole, the
same would not lead to an inevitable
conclusion that either the transaction of
sale was not agreed upon or that it was not
done at all. Once a registered sale deed is
there
and
even
payment
of
sale
consideration of Rs.2,00,000/- (rupees two
lacs) was alleged by DW-3 in the manner
that Sukhvir had handed over the said
584 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
amount to the defendant which amount was
given by the defendant to Qatib and Qatib
might have given the same to the plaintiff,
there is nothing unnatural in the said chain
of events. It is not necessary that whenever
a sale deed is executed, sale consideration
is directly paid by the vendee to the vendor.
It is a matter of common experience that
when many persons join together to
execute a sale deed, like, vendor, vendee,
witnesses,
other
family
members,
middlemen, friends and deed writer etc.,
money can go through various hands from
vendee to vendor and this is exactly what
the DWs had stated. Therefore, nothing
conclusive is found in the oral testimony of
DWs that the amount was not paid.
Payment is, therefore, established and
stands corroborated by the endorsement of
Sub-Registrar, recitals contained in the sale
deed and oral testimony of witnesses.

21. In the instant case, significance
of the provisions of Section 91 and 68 of
the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and Sections
58, 59 and 60 of the Registration Act, 1908
cannot be ignored. For a ready reference,
these provisions are quoted herein below:

Indian Evidence Act, 1872
"91. Evidence of terms of
contracts,
grants
and
other
dispositions of property reduced
to form of document- When the
terms of a contract, or of a grant, or
of any other disposition of property,
have been reduced to the form of a
document, and in all cases in which
any matter is required by law to be
reduced to the form of a document,
no evidence shall be given in proof
of the terms of such contract, grant
or other disposition of property, or
of
such
matter,
except
the
document
itself,
or
secondary
evidence of its contents in cases in
which
secondary
evidence
is
admissible under the provisions
hereinbefore contained.
68. Proof of execution of
document required by law to be
attested.
If a document is required
by law to be attested, it shall not be
used as evidence until one attesting
witness at least has been called for
the
purpose
of
proving
its
execution, if there be an attesting
witness alive, and subject to the
process of the Court and capable of
giving evidence:
Provided that it shall not be
necessary to call an attesting
witness in proof of the execution of
any document, not being a Will,
which has been registered in
accordance with the provisions of
the Indian Registration Act, 1908
(XVI of 1908), unless its execution
by the person by whom it purports
to
have
been
executed
is
specifically denied.
Registration Act, 1908

58.
Particulars
to
be
endorsed on documents admitted
to registration.-(1) On every
document admitted to registration
and true copy thereof, other than a
copy of a decree or order, or a copy,
sent to a Registering Officer under
section 89, there shall be endorsed,
from time to time, the following
particulars, namely:-
(a)
the
signature
and
addition of every person admitting
the execution of the document, and
if such execution has been admitted
by the representative, assign or
agent of any person, the signature
10 All. Rajvir Singh Vs. Randhir Singh
585
and addition of such representative,
assign or agent;
(b)
the
signature
and
addition of every person examined
in reference to such document
under any of the provisions of this
Act; and
(c) any payment of money
or delivery of goods made in the
presence of the Registering Officer
in reference to the execution of the
document, and any admission of
receipt of consideration, in whole
or in part, made in his presence in
reference to such execution.
(2) If any person admitting
the execution of a document
refuses to endorse the same, the
Registering
Officer
shall
nevertheless register it, but shall at
the same time endorse a note of
such refusal.
59. Endorsements to be
dated and signed by Registering
Officer.-The Registering Officer
shall affix the date and his
signature to all endorsements made
under sections 52 and 58, relating
to the same document and made in
his presence on the same day.
60.
Certificate
of
registration.-(1) After such of the
provisions of sections 34, 35, 58
and 59 as apply to any document
presented for registration have been
complied with, the Registering
Officer shall endorse thereon and
on the true copies thereof, a
certificate containing the word
"registered", together with the
number and page of the appropriate
book in which the document or its
true copy is to be scanned or kept.
(2) Such certificate shall be
signed, sealed and dated by the
Registering Officer, and shall then
be admissible for the purpose of
proving that the document has been
duly registered in manner provided
by this Act, and that the facts
mentioned in the endorsements
referred to in section 59, have
occurred as therein mentioned.

22. Section 58 of Registration Act,
1908 speaks about the procedure on
admitting a document for registration
which has a presumptive value. Section 58
of the Act, 1908 is to be read with Section
68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
alongwith its proviso and Sections 91 and
92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. A
perusal of the Section 68 and its proviso
goes to show that in order to prove the
execution and registration of the sale deed
which is not a will no further evidence is
required and that relaxation by the statute
has been given in view of Sections 91 and
92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 which
is an evidence of disposition as well. The
said provisions prohibit that no evidence
shall be given in proof of the terms of the
such contract grant or disposition of the
property.

23. Plea of intoxication as alleged
by the plaintiff was thoroughly examined
and the Trial Court recorded a finding that
in case the said incident took place on
24.03.2004, the plaintiff could have asked
about the incident from the defendant but
the plaint is silent. The Trial Court further
considered the statement of DW-1 and his
relation with Ghanshyam on whose shop
the said alleged incident took place.