# Rakshpal & Anr v. State of U.P

- **Citation:** (2025) 2 ILRA 373
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-02-13
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 2806 of 1983
- **Bench:** Vivek Kumar Birla, Syed Qamar Hasan Rizvi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/rakshpal-anr-v-state-of-u-p-53143
- **Pages:** 15

## Headnote

Criminal Law -Indian Penal Code-Section
394, 397 & 460-Clear eyewitness account in
the
present
case-PW-1
and
PW-3
being
immediate
family
members
are
natural
eyewitnesses of the occurrence-specific St.ment
in respect of presence of surviving accused with
country made pistol in his hand has also been
made-firearm injury caused to the deceased.

Appeal dismissed. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

_Characters 0–39,696 of 51,435. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39696 for what follows._

2 All. Rakshpal & Anr. Vs. State of U.P.
373
them have supported the prosecution case.
Therefore, the facts of the present case are
in no manner similar to the facts of the
cases of Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh and
Bhanwar Singh (Supra) cited by the
learned Counsel for the applicant.

17. The learned Counsel for the
applicant could not point out any major
discrepancies in the statements of the
prosecution witnesses. Occurrence of some
minor discrepancies in the statements of
witnesses is natural and it would not give
any benefit to the applicant. There is no
allegation that the prosecution is causing
undue delay in trial.

18. The applicant's father co-accused
Komal Singh has been granted bail by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court keeping in view
the fact that he is a septuagenarian whereas
the applicant is merely 42 years of age and
this fact distinguishes the case of Komal
Singh from the case of the applicant.

19.
In
view
of
the
aforesaid
discussion, I am of the considered view that
the peculiar facts of the present case noted
above do not warrant exercise of discretion
of this Court in favour of the applicant by
enlarging him on bail. The second bail of
the applicant is accordingly rejected.
----------
(2025) 2 ILRA 373
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 13.02.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE VIVEK KUMAR BIRLA, J.
THE HON'BLE SYED QAMAR HASAN RIZVI, J.

Criminal Appeal No. 2806 of 1983

Rakshpal & Anr. ...Appellants
Versus
State of U.P. ...Opposite Party

Counsel for the Appellants:
Sri Kundan Singh, Sri A.K. Dikshit, Sri
Harish Chandra Tiwari (A.C.)

Counsel for the Opposite Party:
D.G.A., A.G.A, Sri Sudhir Mehrotra

Criminal Law -Indian Penal Code-Section
394, 397 & 460-Clear eyewitness account in
the
present
case-PW-1
and
PW-3
being
immediate
family
members
are
natural
eyewitnesses of the occurrence-specific St.ment
in respect of presence of surviving accused with
country made pistol in his hand has also been
made-firearm injury caused to the deceased.

Appeal dismissed. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:

1. Krishna Mochi & ors. Vs St. of Bihar,(2002) 6
SCC 81,

2. Masalti Vs St. of U.P., AIR 1965 SC 202

3. Darya Singh Vs St. of Pun., AIR 1965 SC 328

4. Appabhai & anr.Vs St. of Gu., AIR 1988 SC 696

5. St. of A.P. Vs S. Rayappa & ors., (2006) 4 SCC 512

6. Satbir Singh & ors.Vs St. of U.P., (2009) 13
SCC 790

7. Jayabalan Vs U.T. of Pondicherry, 2010 (68)
ACC 308 (SC)

8. Dharnidhar Vs St. of U.P., (2010) 7 SCC 759

9. Baban Shankar Daphal & ors. Vs The St. of
Mah., 2025 SCC Online SC 137

10. Shahaja @ Shahajan Ismail Mohd. Vs St. of
Mah., (2023) 12 SCC 558

11. Pahalwan Singh & ors.Vs St. of U.P., 2020
(6) ALJ 166

12. Kaptan Singh Vs St. of U.P., 2020 (1) ADJ
106 (DB)
374 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
13. Neeraj Sharma Vs St. of Chhattisgarh,
(2024) 3 SCC 125

(Delivered by Hon'ble Vivek Kumar Birla, J.)

1. This criminal appeal has been
preferred assailing the judgement and order
dated 15.11.1983 passed by Additional
Sessions Judge, Etah, in Sessions Trial No.
242 of 1983 convicting and sentencing the
appellants under section 394 IPC read with
section 397 IPC to undergo seven years
rigorous imprisonment and under section
460 IPC to undergo sentence of life
imprisonment directing all the sentences to
run concurrently.

2. By the order dated 18.11.1983 both
the appellants were released on bail. As per
the office report dated 10.5.2024 based on
the report submitted by the Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Etah, the appellant no. 2Jagdish, son of Jaerath Singh has died,
therefore, appeal in respect of appellant no.
2 stood abated. The appeal now survives
only on behalf of appellant no. 1-Rakshpal,
son of Raghuvir Singh.

3. It is pertinent to mention here that
co-accused Rameshwar and Menhdi had
approached this Court by filing Criminal
Appeal No. 2958 of 1983 (Rameshwar and
another vs. State of UP). During pendency
of appeal appellant no.2 Menhdi therein
died, therefore, appeal on his behalf stood
abated. In respect of the appellant no.1Rameshwar therein the appeal was partly
allowed by a Co-ordinate Bench of this
Court vide order dated 28.3.2024. In the
said judgement, brief prosecution story
has
been
appropriately
narrated
in
paragraph 6 of the said judgement,
therefore, there is no need to reiterate the
same. Paragraph 6 of the said judgement is
quoted as under:

"6. The prosecution case is in
brief is that in the intervening night of
25/26.7.1982, at about midnight, an armed
robbery took place at the house of
complainant, Shiv Raj Singh in village,
Nagla Himmat hamlet of Raya, within the
circle of Police Station Jaithara, district
Etah, in which Johari, the brother of the
complainant was gunned down and Ram
Chandra, the father of Shiv Raj Singh, was
inflicted Lathi injuries at the hands of the
hooligans.
On
the
fateful
night,
complainant, Shiv Raj Singh, alongwith his
nephews, Arjun Singh and Ram Kumar,
was sleeping under a thatch on north-
eastern corner of the courtyard. Deceased,
Johari, was sleeping on the roof in a
thatch. J?i Singh and Shri Ram, the
brothers of the complainant, were sleeping
in another thatch in the west of the
courtyard. Complainant's father, Ram
Chandra and mother were sleeping in
another thatch in front of the chaupal in
west-south corner of the house. Ladies and
the children were sleeping in a Dehliz, of
which the main door of the house in east
and another door connecting it in the west
towards the court-yard. A burning Lantern
was hanging on an iron rod embedded in
the northern wall of the staircase from
which sufficient light was spreading in the
entire house. At about mid night, some
miscreants entered the house scaling
through the roof from the western side. The
complainant and other family members
woke up on hearing some sound and they
noticed and recognised appellant no.1,
Rameshwar, armed with a S. B. B.L. gun,
appellant no.2 Mehndi armed with a Lathi
and co-accused, Jagdish and Rakshpal,
armed with pistols in the house. Appellant
no.1, Rameshwer, and Mehndi surrounded
the house inmates and warned them not to
run otherwise they would be shot-dead,
while accused Rakshpal and Jagdish looted
2 All. Rakshpal & Anr. Vs. State of U.P.
375
the house hold articles, from different
apartments of the house. When the
hoodlums were about to decamp with the
looted property, Johari, the brother of the
complainant, and Ram Chandra, father of
Shiv Raj Singh, complainant, tried to run
raising an alarm, on which Rameshwar
fired shots at Johari, which hit on his legs
and he fell down in the Dehliz (room).
Accused Menhdi assaulted Ram Chandra
with Lathi. The shrieks and cries of the
house-inmates and the sound of the fires
attracted Ram Dularey and Ram Dayal,
gun-licencees, who arrived there with their
guns and torches, and Dalpat Singh and
Ram Nath with Lathis flashing their
torches. It is said that they witnessed the
entire occurrence from northern side of the
Cattle Gher of the complainant standing
near a tree and Burji(a place for stocking
straw for the cattle). On the challenge of
the witnesses and the fires made by the
gun-licencees, the ruffians decamped with
the looted booty, coming outside the house
from the eastern door and then went away
in the south. Afterwards the house inmates
went inside the Dehliz and found Johari
lying wounded who also disclosed that
Rameshwar made a fire at him. After some
times Johari succumbed to his injuries at
the same place. It is alleged that the house
inmates and the witnesses saw and
recognized fully the accused in the light of
the burning lantern in the courtyard and
the torches of the witnesses while fleeing."

4. On the basis of written report of the
complainant, a first information report was
lodged against four accused persons namely,
Rameshwar, Menhdi, Rakshpal and Jagdish
being Case Crime No. 91 of 1982 under
Sections 302, 302/34 and 397/394 IPC.
Accused Rameshwar has been charged under
Sections 397 read with Section 394 and 302
IPC while accused Menhdi, Rakshpal
(appellant no. 1 herein) and Jagdish
(appellant no. 2, now dead) have been
charged under Sections 397 read with Section
394 IPC and 302 read with Section 34 IPC.

5. In order to establish the prosecution
case, PW-1 Shiv Raj Singh, PW-2 Ram Nath
and PW-3 Ram Chandra as eyewitnesses of
the occurrence and PW-4 Dr. V.K. Sharma
who conducted the post-mortem, PW-5
Constable Ravindra Pal who brought the
dead body for post-mortem, PW-6 Head
Constable Jai Chandra who prepared chik
FIR and registered the case in the GD, PW-7
S.I. Sri Ram Sewak Dubey who investigated
the case and PW-8 Dr. Lajja Ram, Medical
Officer, PHC Jaithare who examined the
injured Ram Chandra as formal witness, were
examined and certain documents were
exhibited before the Court concerned. In
addition to this, the prosecution produced
certain documents, which were exhibited
during the trial as under:

(i) Written report as Ext. Ka-1, (ii)
Recovery Memo and supurdginama of lantern
as Ext. Ka-2, (iii) Recovery Memo and
supurdginama of torch as Ext. Ka-3, (iv) Injury
report as Ext. Ka-4 and 5, (v) Post-mortem
report as Ext. Ka-6, (vi) FIR as Ext. Ka-7, (vii)
Panchayatname as Ext. Ka-9, (viii) Recovery
memo of blood-stained and plain earth as Ext.
Ka-15, (ix) Recovery memo of blood-stained
shoes as as Ext. Ka-16, (x) Empty cartridge as
Ext. Ka-17, (xi) Recovery Memo and
supurdginama of torch and cartridge as Ext. Ka18, (xii) Recovery Memo and supurdginama of
torch and cartridge as Ext. Ka-19, (xiii) Search
memo of house as Ext. Ka-20 (xiv) Recovery
Memo and supurdginama of torch as Ext. Ka21, (xv) Site plan with index as Ext. Ka-22,
(xvi) Charge-sheet 'Mool' as Ext. Ka-27.

6. We have heard Sri Harish Chandra
Tiwari, learned Amicus Curiae for the
376 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
appellants and Sri Ghanshyam Kumar,
learned AGA for the State respondents.

7. Sri Harish Chandra Tiwari, learned
Amicus Curiae submitted that all the
witnesses are interested witnesses and out
of
three
prosecution
witnesses,
two
witnesses, namely, PW-1 is real brother
and PW-2 is the father of the deceased,
hence no reliance could have been placed
on their testimony; there was a complete
defective investigation in the present case
and sought to submit that the offence could
not have been committed in the manner as
shown in the site plan. He sought to argue
that it was not possible to cause firearm
injury to the deceased from the direction
showing presence of accused persons as
shown in the site plan; he had drawn our
attention to the site plan in support of his
argument. He further submits that the role
of causing fire has been assigned to the coaccused Rameshwar and it is not proved
that appellant has caused injury or death of
deceased Johari who died because of sole
firearm injury. He further submits that the
Investigating
Officer
has
deliberately
shown place of dead body in Dehliz so as to
make out the offence and charges levelled
against accused persons whereas no such
incident had taken place and the spot of
occurrence has wrongly been shown in the
site plan. He further submits that the
appellant
Rakshpal
has
been
falsely
implicated simply because one Suresh
known to him had lodged one complaint
against inspector Ramcharan, P.S. Jatra
wherein he was one of the witnesses
although his statement was not recorded in
the aforesaid complaint. He next submits
that the reason that the appellant Rakshpal
was absconding by itself is not sufficient to
raise presumption against him that he has
committed
any
offence.
Submission,
therefore, is that no offence is proved
against the appellant Rakshpal and the
judgement of the trial court is liable to be
set aside and the surviving appellant
Rakshpal is liable to be acquitted of all the
charges. He, lastly submitted that no charge
was framed under Section 460 IPC and
therefore, the accused Rakshpal could not
have been convicted with the aid of said
Section; hence, conviction of the surviving
appellant Rakshpal is liable to be set aside.

8. Sri Ghanshyam Kumar, learned
AGA appearing for the State respondents
has contended that the incident had taken
place during mid-night of 25/26.7.1982 and
first information report was promptly
lodged at 5:30 AM on the same night and
as the distance of the police station from
the place of occurrence is about 5
kilometer;
there
is direct eyewitness
account by natural eyewitnesses; the minor
shortcomings or defects in the investigation
itself are not sufficient to acquit the
surviving appellant Rakshpal; there is no
allegation that there was any enmity
between the accused persons and the
deceased and his family members, who
were also eyewitnesses, or with even any
other witnesse in the present case; all the
accused persons including the present
appellant Rakshpal were present on the
spot and their presence was proved by the
eyewitness account of natural eyewitnesses
present on the spot being family members
and occurrence having taken place during
mid-night and it is also proved that the
accused Rakshpal, altogether other accused
(now dead) was carrying deadly firearm in
his hand. Submission, therefore, is that the
charges levelled against the accused
persons have been proved on correct
appreciation of evidence by the trial court
and all the accused persons were rightly
convicted with the aid of Section 460 IPC,
which clearly provides that every person
2 All. Rakshpal & Anr. Vs. State of U.P.
377
jointly concerned in committing such
lurking house-trespass by night or housebreaking by night, shall be punished with
imprisonment
for
life,
or
with
imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to ten years, and
shall also be liable for fine. He submits that
the Court has power to do so in view of
provisions of Section 222 CrPC. He further
pointed out that the Co-ordinate Bench has
upheld the conviction of co-accused
Rameshwar while upholding the judgement
of the trial Court after hearing Sri Harish
Chandra Tiwari, who was also Amicus
Curiae in the aforesaid appeal and the
learned AGA appearing in the aforesaid
appeal at length. He pointed out that in the
connected appeal, the Court has clearly
held that there does not appear to be any
major, legal or actual error found in the
judgement of the trial court and minor and
ignorable discrepancy in the prosecution
case/evidence pointed out by the learned
Amicus Curiae appearing for the appellant
could not be made a ground for acquitting
the appellant no. 1, however, as the
appellant Rameshwar was languishing in
jail since 15.11.1983 after confirming
conviction of the appellant, his sentence
was reduced to period already undergone
from the sentence to life awarded to him by
the Court below under Section 460 IPC and
the sentence for seven years under Sections
394, 397 IPC and the judgement and order
of the trial Court was modified to that
extent. He, therefore, submits that present
criminal appeal is devoid of merit and no
interference is warranted in the judgement
and order of the trial Court.

9. We have considered the rival
submissions and perused the paper book.

10. Before proceeding further, it
would be appropriate to refer to various
relevant judgements of Hon'ble Apex
Court as well as of this Court.

11. In Krishna Mochi and others vs.
State of Bihar, (2002) 6 SCC 81, the
Hon'ble Apex Court laid emphasis on
realistic approach to be adopted by the
criminal courts while appreciating evidence
in criminal trial, paragraph 32 whereof is
quoted as under:

"32. The court while appreciating the
evidence should not lose sight of these realities of
life and cannot afford to take an unrealistic
approach by sitting in an ivory tower. I find that
in recent times the tendency to acquit an accused
easily is galloping fast. It is very easy to pass an
order of acquittal on the basis of minor points
raised in the case by a short judgment so as to
achieve the yardstick of disposal. Some
discrepancy is bound to be there in each and
every case which should not weigh with the court
so long it does not materially affect the
prosecution case. In case discrepancies pointed
out are in the realm of pebbles, the court should
tread upon it, but if the same are boulders, the
court should not make an attempt to jump over
the same. These days when crime is looming
large and humanity is suffering and the society is
so
much
affected
thereby,
duties
and
responsibilities of the courts have become much
more. Now the maxim "let hundred guilty
persons be acquitted, but not a single innocent be
convicted" is, in practice, changing the world
over and courts have been compelled to accept
that "society suffers by wrong convictions and it
equally suffers by wrong acquittals". I find that
this Court in recent times has conscientiously
taken notice of these facts from time to
time........."

 (Emphasis supplied)

12. In Masalti vs. State of U.P., AIR
1965 SC 202, Hon'ble Apex Court in
paragraph 14 observed as under:
378 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

"14. But it would, we think, be
unreasonable to contend that evidence
given by witnesses should be discarded
only on the ground that it is evidence of
partisan or interested witnesses. ... The
mechanical rejection of such evidence on
the sole ground that it is partisan would
invariably lead to failure of justice."

 (Emphasis supplied)

13. In Darya Singh vs. State of
Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 328, the Hon'ble
Apex Court has also taken the view that
related witness does not necessarily mean
or is equivalent to an interested witness. A
witness may be called interested only when
he or she derives some benefit from the
result of litigation; a decree in a civil case,
or in seeing a person punished in a criminal
trial, paragraph 6 whereof is quoted as
under:

"6. On principle, however, it is
difficult to accept the plea that if a witness
is shown to be a relative of the deceased
and it is also shown that he shared the
hostility of the victim towards the assailant,
his evidence can never be accepted unless
it is corroborated on material particulars."

14. In Appabhai and another vs.
State of Gujarat, AIR 1988 SC 696, the
Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph 11
observed as under:

"11.........Experience reminds us
that
civilized
people
are
generally
insensitive when a crime is committed even
in their presence. They withdraw both from
the victim and the vigilante. They keep
themselves away from the Court unless it is
inevitable. They think that crime like civil
dispute is between two individuals or
parties and they should not involve
themselves. This kind of apathy of the
general public is indeed unfortunate, but it
is there everywhere whether in village life,
towns or cities. One cannot ignore this
handicap with which the investigating
agency has to discharge its duties. The
court, therefore, instead of doubting the
prosecution case for want of independent
witness must consider the broad spectrum
of the prosecution version and then search
for the nugget of truth with due regard to
probability if any, suggested by the
accused. The Court, however, must bear in
mind that witnesses to a serious crime may
not react in a normal manner. Nor do they
react uniformly. The horror stricken
witnesses at a dastardly crime or an act of
egregious nature may react differently.
Their, course of conduct may not be of
ordinary type in the normal circumstances.
The Court, therefore, cannot reject their
evidence merely because they have behaved
or reacted in an unusual manner....."

 (Emphasis supplied)

15. Similar view has been taken in
State of A.P. vs. S. Rayappa and others,
(2006) 4 SCC 512 wherein it has been
observed that it is now almost a fashion
that public is reluctant to appear and depose
before the court especially in criminal cases
and the cases for that reason itself are
dragged for years and years, paragraph 6
whereof is quoted as under:

"6......by now, it is a wellestablished principle of law that testimony
of a witness otherwise inspiring confidence
cannot be discarded on the ground that he
being a relation of the deceased is an
interested witness. A close relative who is a
very natural witness cannot be termed as
interested witness. The term interested
postulates that the person concerned must
have some direct interest in seeing the
accused person being convicted somehow
2 All. Rakshpal & Anr. Vs. State of U.P.
379
or the other either because of animosity or
some other reasons."

(Emphasis supplied)

16.
In Pulicherla
Nagaraju
@
Nagaraja Reddy v. State of AP, (2006) 11
SCC 444, the Hon'ble Apex Court in
paragraph 16 has held as under:

"16. In this case, we find that the
trial court had rejected the evidence of
PW1 and PW2 merely because they were
interested witnesses being the brother and
father of the deceased. But it is well settled
that evidence of a witness cannot be
discarded merely on the ground that he is
either partisan or interested or closely
related to the deceased, if it is otherwise,
found to be trustworthy and credible. It
only requires scrutiny with more care and
caution, so that neither the guilty escape
nor the innocent wrongly convicted. If on
such careful scrutiny, the evidence is
found to be reliable and probable, it can
be acted upon. If it is found to be
improbable or suspicious, it ought to be
rejected. Where the witness has a motive
to falsely implicate the accused, his
testimony should have corroboration in
regard to material particulars before it is
accepted."

 (Emphasis supplied)

17. In Satbir Singh and others vs.
State of U.P., (2009) 13 SCC 790, the
Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph 26 held
as under:

"26. It is now a well-settled
principle of law that only because the
witnesses are not independent ones may not
by itself be a ground to discard the
prosecution case. If the prosecution case
has been supported by the witnesses and no
cogent reason has been shown to discredit
their statements, a judgment of conviction
can certainly be based thereupon ......"

(Emphasis supplied)

18.
In
Jayabalan
vs.
U.T.
of
Pondicherry, 2010 (68) ACC 308 (SC),
the Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph 21
held as under:

"21. We are of the considered
view that in cases where the court is called
upon to deal with the evidence of the
interested witnesses, the approach of the
court, while appreciating the evidence of
such witnesses must not be pedantic. The
court must be cautious in appreciating and
accepting the evidence given by the
interested witnesses but the court must not
be suspicious of such evidence. The
primary endeavour of the court must be to
look for consistency. The evidence of a
witness cannot be ignored or thrown out
solely because it comes from the mouth of a
person who is closely related to the victim."

 (Emphasis supplied)

19. In Dharnidhar vs. State of U.P.,
(2010) 7 SCC 759, the Hon'ble Apex Court
held that there is no hard and fast rule that
family
members
can
never
be
true
witnesses to the occurrence and that they
will always depose falsely before the Court.
It will always depend upon the facts and
circumstances of a given case, paragraphs
12 and 13 whereof is quoted as under:

"12. There is no hard and fast
rule that family members can never be true
witnesses to the occurrence and that they
will always depose falsely before the Court.
It will always depend upon the facts and
circumstances of a given case. In the case
of Jayabalan v. U.T. of Pondicherry
[(2010)1 SCC 199], this Court had
occasion to consider whether the evidence
380 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
of interested witnesses can be relied upon.
The Court took the view that a pedantic
approach cannot be applied while dealing
with the evidence of an interested witness.
Such evidence cannot be ignored or thrown
out solely because it comes from a person
closely related to the victim. The Court
held as under:

" 23. We are of the considered
view that in cases where the court is called
upon to deal with the evidence of the
interested witnesses, the approach of the
court, while appreciating the evidence of
such witnesses must not be pedantic. The
court must be cautious in appreciating and
accepting the evidence given by the
interested witnesses but the court must not
be suspicious of such evidence. The
primary endeavour of the court must be to
look for consistency. The evidence of a
witness cannot be ignored or thrown out
solely because it comes from the mouth of a
person who is closely related to the victim.
 ........

13. Similar view was taken by this
Court in Ram Bharosey v. State of U.P.
[AIR 2010 SC 917], where the Court stated
the dictum of law that a close relative of the
deceased does not, per se, become an
interested witness. An interested witness is
one who is interested in securing the
conviction of a person out of vengeance or
enmity or due to disputes and deposes
before the Court only with that intention
and not to further the cause of justice. The
law relating to appreciation of evidence of
an interested witness is well settled,
according to which, the version of an
interested witness cannot be thrown over-
board, but has to be examined carefully
before accepting the same.

14. In the light of the above
judgments, it is clear that the statements of
the alleged interested witnesses can be
safely relied upon by the Court in support
of the prosecution's story. But this needs to
be done with care and to ensure that the
administration of criminal justice is not
undermined by the persons, who are closely
related to the deceased. When their
statements find corroboration by other
witnesses,
expert
evidence
and
the
circumstances of the case clearly depict
completion of the chain of evidence
pointing out to the guilt of the accused,
then we see no reason why the statement of
so called `interested witnesses' cannot be
relied upon by the Court."

 (Emphasis supplied)

20. In a very recent judgement
rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in Baban
Shankar Daphal and others vs. The State
of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC Online SC 137
in respect of testimony of witness which
should not be discarded merely because of
relation with victim, the Hon'ble Apex
Court has, in paragraphs 27 and 28, held as
under:

"27. One of the contentions of the
learned counsel for the appellants is that
the eyewitnesses to the incident were all
closely related to the deceased and for
prudence the prosecution ought to have
examined
some
other
independent
eyewitness as well who were present at the
time of the unfortunate incident. This was
also the view taken by the Trial Court, but
the High Court has correctly rejected such
an approach and held that merely because
there
were
some
more
independent
witnesses also, who had reached the place
of incident, the evidence of the relatives
cannot be disbelieved. The law nowhere
states that the evidence of the interested
witness should be discarded altogether.
The law only warrants that their evidence
should be scrutinized with care and
caution. It has been held by this Court in
2 All. Rakshpal & Anr. Vs. State of U.P.
381
the catena of judgments that merely if a
witness is a relative, their testimony cannot
be discarded on that ground alone.

28.
In
criminal
cases,
the
credibility of witnesses, particularly those
who are close relatives of the victim, is
often scrutinized. However, being a relative
does not automatically render a witness
"interested"
or
biased.
The
term
"interested" refers to witnesses who have a
personal stake in the outcome, such as a
desire for revenge or to falsely implicate
the accused due to enmity or personal gain.
A "related" witness, on the other hand, is
someone who may be naturally present at
the scene of the crime, and their testimony
should not be dismissed simply because of
their relationship to the victim. Courts must
assess the reliability, consistency, and
coherence of their statements rather than
labelling them as untrustworthy.

 (Emphasis supplied)

21. In a recent judgement rendered by
Hon'ble Apex Court in Shahaja @
Shahajan Ismail Mohd. vs. State of
Maharashtra, (2023) 12 SCC 558 has
observed that the appreciation of ocular
evidence is a hard task and has summed up
the
judicially
evolved
principles
for
appreciation of ocular evidence in a
criminal case, paragraphs 29 and 30
whereof is quoted as under:

"29. The appreciation of ocular
evidence is a hard task. There is no fixed or
straight-jacket formula for appreciation of
the ocular evidence. The judicially evolved
principles for appreciation of ocular
evidence in a criminal case can be
enumerated as under:

29.1
While
appreciating
the
evidence of a witness, the approach must
be whether the evidence of the witness read
as a whole appears to have a ring of truth.
Once that impression is formed, it is
undoubtedly necessary for the Court to
scrutinize the evidence more particularly
keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks
and infirmities pointed out in the evidence
as a whole and evaluate them to find out
whether it is against the general tenor of
the evidence given by the witness and
whether the earlier evaluation of the
evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy
of belief.

29.2. If the Court before whom
the witness gives evidence had the
opportunity to form the opinion about the
general tenor of evidence given by the
witness, the appellate court which had not
this benefit will have to attach due weight
to the appreciation of evidence by the trial
court and unless there are reasons weighty
and formidable it would not be proper to
reject the evidence on the ground of minor
variations or infirmities in the matter of
trivial details.

29.3
When
eye-witness
is
examined at length it is quite possible for
him to make some discrepancies. But courts
should bear in mind that it is only when
discrepancies in the evidence of a witness
are so incompatible with the credibility of
his version that the court is justified in
jettisoning his evidence.

29.4. Minor discrepancies on
trivial matters not touching the core of
the case, hyper technical approach by
taking sentences torn out of context here
or there from the evidence, attaching
importance to some technical error
committed by the investigating officer
not going to the root of the matter would
not ordinarily permit rejection of the
evidence as a whole.

29.5. Too serious a view to be
adopted on mere variations falling in the
narration of an incident (either as between
the evidence of two witnesses or as between
382 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
two statements of the same witness) is an
unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny.

29.6. By and large a witness
cannot
be
expected
to
possess
a
photographic memory and to recall the
details of an incident. It is not as if a video
tape is replayed on the mental screen.

29.7. Ordinarily it so happens
that a witness is overtaken by events. The
witness could not have anticipated the
occurrence which so often has an element
of surprise. The mental faculties therefore
cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb
the details.

29.8. The powers of observation
differ from person to person. What one may
notice, another may not. An object or
movement might emboss its image on one
person's mind whereas it might go
unnoticed on the part of another.

29.9. By and large people cannot
accurately recall a conversation and
reproduce the very words used by them or
heard by them. They can only recall the
main purport of the conversation. It is
unrealistic to expect a witness to be a
human tape recorder.

29.10. In regard to exact time of
an incident, or the time duration of an
occurrence, usually, people make their
estimates by guess work on the spur of the
moment at the time of interrogation. And
one cannot expect people to make very
precise or reliable estimates in such
matters. Again, it depends on the timesense of individuals which varies from
person to person.

29.11.
Ordinarily
a
witness
cannot be expected to recall accurately the
sequence of events which take place in
rapid succession or in a short time span. A
witness is liable to get confused, or mixed
up when interrogated later on.

29.12. A witness, though wholly
truthful, is liable to be overawed by the
court atmosphere and the piercing cross
examination by counsel and out of
nervousness mix up facts, get confused
regarding sequence of events, or fill up
details from imagination on the spur of the
moment. The sub- conscious mind of the
witness sometimes so operates on account
of the fear of looking foolish or being
disbelieved though the witness is giving a
truthful
and
honest
account
of
the
occurrence witnessed by him.

29.13. A former statement though
seemingly inconsistent with the evidence
need not necessarily be sufficient to amount
to
contradiction.
Unless
the
former
statement has the potency to discredit the
later statement, even if the later statement
is at variance with the former to some
extent it would not be helpful to contradict
that witness.
[See Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v.
State of Gujarat, 1983 Cri LJ 1096 : AIR
1983 SC 753, Leela Ram v. State of
Haryana,
AIR
1999
SC
3717,
and
Tahsildar Singh v. State of UP, AIR 1959
SC 1012]

30. To put it simply, in assessing
the value of the evidence of the eye-
witnesses, two principal considerations are
whether, in the circumstances of the case, it
is possible to believe their presence at the
scene of occurrence or in such situations as
would make it possible for them to witness
the facts deposed to by them and secondly,
whether there is anything inherently
improbable or unreliable in their evidence.
In respect of both these considerations, the
circumstances either elicited from those
witnesses themselves or established by
other evidence tending to improbabilise
their presence or to discredit the veracity of
their statements, will have a bearing upon
the value which a Court would attach to
their evidence. Although in cases where the
plea of the accused is a mere denial, yet the
2 All. Rakshpal & Anr. Vs. State of U.P.
383
evidence of the prosecution witnesses has
to be examined on its own merits, where the
accused raise a definite plea or puts
forward
a
positive
case
which
is
inconsistent with that of the prosecution,
the nature of such plea or case and the
probabilities in respect of it will also have
to be taken into account while assessing the
value of the prosecution evidence."

 (Emphasis supplied)

22. Paragraph 48 of Pahalwan Singh
and others vs. State of U.P., 2020 (6) ALJ
166 is quoted under:

"48.
Thus,
in
view
of
aforementioned decisions of the Supreme
Court, it is now a settled position of law
that the statements of the interested
witnesses can be safely relied upon by the
court in support of the prosecution story.
But this needs to be done with care and to
ensure that the administration of criminal
justice is not undermined by the persons
who are closely related to the deceased.
When their statements find corroboration
by other evidence, expert evidence and the
circumstances of the case clearly depict
completion of the chain of evidence
pointing out to the guilt of the accused,
then there is no reason as to why the
statement of so-called 'interested witnesses'
cannot be relied upon by the Court. It
would be hard to believe that the close
relatives shall leave the real culprit and
shall implicate innocent persons falsely
simply because they have enmity with the
accused persons.

 (Emphasis supplied)

23. Insofar as the testimony of injured
witness is concerned, this Court in Kaptan
Singh vs. State of UP, 2020 (1) ADJ 106
(DB) has, in paragraph 20, observed as
under:

"20.
Close
scrutiny
of
the
evidence shows that the statements of (PW1) Vimla Devi and (PW-2) Ram Singar
Pandey are clear, cogent and credible.
Theyhave
been
subjected
to
crossexamination, but they remained stick to the
prosecution version and no such fact,
contradiction
or
inconsistency
could
emerge, so as to create any doubt about
their testimony. Keeping in view the fact
that after incident, deceased as well as
injured were taken to hospital and were
admitted there and that on the same night
deceased Ram Niwas Rao has succumbed
to injuries, it is apparent that the first
information report of the incident was
lodged without any undue delay. Version of
(PW-1) Vimla Devi finds corroboration
from testimony of (PW-2) Ram Singar
Pandey and is fully consistent with medical
evidence. It is also to be kept in mind that
(PW-2) Ram Singar Pandey has himself
sustained injuries in the same incident. In
Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009)
9SCC 719, the Supreme Court reiterated
the special evidentiary status accorded to
the testimony of an injured accused. The
fact that the witness sustained injuries at
the time and place of occurrence, lends
support to his testimony that he was present
during the occurrence. In case, the injured
witness is subjected to lengthy crossexamination and nothing can be elicited to
discard his testimony, it should be relied
upon. Similar view was expressed in the
case of Krishan v. State of Haryana, (2006)
12 SCC 459. Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Criminal Appeal Nos. 513-514 of 2014
Baleshwar Mahto and another v. State of
Bihar and another, decided on 9.1.2017,
has reiterated the law as under :

''28. The question of the weight to
be attached to the evidence of a witness
that was himself injured in the course of the
occurrence has been extensively discussed
384 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
by this Court. Where a witness to the
occurrence has himself been injured in the
incident, the testimony of such a witness is
generally considered to be very reliable, as
he is a witness that comes with a built-in
guarantee of his presence at the scene of
the crime and is unlikely to spare his actual
assailant(s) in order to falsely implicate
someone.

''Convincing evidence is required
to discredit an injured witness.'' [Vide
Ramlagan Singh v. State of Bihar [(1973) 3
SCC 881:1973 SCC (Cri) 563:AIR 1972 SC
2593], Malkhan Singh v. State of U.P.
[(1975) 3 SCC 311 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 919 :
AIR 1975 SC 12], Machhi Singh v. State of
Punjab [(1983) 3 SCC 470 : 1983 SCC
(Cri) 681], Appabhai v. State of Gujarat
[1988 Supp SCC 241 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 559
: AIR 1988 SC 696], Bonkya v. State of
Maharashtra [(1995) 6 SCC 447 : 1995
SCC (Cri) 1113], Bhag Singh [(1997) 7
SCC 712 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 1163], Mohar v.
State of U.P. [(2002) 7 SCC 606 : 2003
SCC (Cri) 121] (SCC p. 606b-c), Dinesh
Kumar v. State of Rajasthan [(2008) 8 SCC
270 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 472], Vishnu v.
State of Rajasthan [(2009) 10 SCC 477 :
(2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 302], Annareddy
Sambasiva Reddy v. State of A.P. [(2009)
12 SCC 546 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 630] and
Balraje v. State of Maharashtra [(2010) 6
SCC 673 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 211] 29.
While deciding this issue, a similar view
was taken in Jarnail Singh v. State of
Punjab [(2009) 9 SCC 719 : (2010) 1 SCC
(Cri) 107], where this Court reiterated the
special evidentiary status accorded to the
testimony of an injured accused and relying
on its earlier judgments held as under:
(SCC pp. 726-27, paras 28-29)

''28. Darshan Singh (PW 4) was
an injured witness. He had been examined
by the doctor. His testimony could not be
brushed aside lightly. He had given full
details of the incident as he was present at
the time when the assailants reached the
tubewell. In Shivalingappa Kallayanappa
v.