# Ram Avtar Sharma v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2022) 9 ILRA 1719
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022-03-07
- **Case number:** Writ C No. 4796 of 2022
- **Bench:** Rajesh Bindal, C.J. Piyush Agrawal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ram-avtar-sharma-v-state-of-u-p-ors-49066
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

Sri Ajay Prakash Paul (State Law Officer),
Ms. Anjali Upadhya

A. Civil Law - Constitution of India,1950Article
226-maintainability
of-Land
acquisition-delay-petition filed after 10
years of passing of impugned order- Order
passed by the Secretary, Department of
Industrial
Development,
in
terms
of
directions issued by this Court vid has
been challenged by filing the present writ
petition after a decade-Hence,Delay not
condoned- even if there is no period
prescribed for filing the writ petition
under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, yet it should be filed within a
reasonable time. Relief to a person, who
puts forward a stale claim can certainly be
refused relief on account of delay and
laches. Anyone who sleeps over his rights
is bound to suffer. (Para 1 to 14)

B. Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of
Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical
doctrine. Where it would be practically
unjust to give a remedy, either because
the party has, by his conduct, done that
which
might
fairly
be
regarded
as
equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by
his conduct and neglect he has, though
perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put
the other party in a situation in which it
would not be reasonable to place him if
the
remedy
were
afterwards
to
be
asserted in either of these cases, lapse of
time and delay are most material. But in
every case, if an argument against relief,
which otherwise would be just, is founded
upon mere delay, that delay of course not
amounting to a bar by any statute of
limitations, the validity of that defence
must be tried upon principles substantially
equitable.
Two
circumstances,
always
important in such cases, are, the length of
the delay and the nature of the acts done
during the interval, which might affect
either party and cause a balance of justice
or injustice in taking the one course or the
other, so far as relates to the remedy.
(Para 7)
The writ petition is dismissed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

9 All. Ram Avtar Sharma Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1719
such applications would be outside Section
42.

(d) Section 9 applications being
applications made to a court and Section 34
applications to set aside arbitral awards are
applications which are within Section 42.

(e) In no circumstances can the
Supreme Court be "court" for the purposes
of Section 2(1)(e), and whether the
Supreme Court does or does not retain
seisin after appointing an Arbitrator,
applications will follow the first application
made before either a High Court having
original jurisdiction in the State or a
Principal Civil court having original
jurisdiction in the district as the case may
be.

(f) Section 42 will apply to
applications
made
after
the
arbitral
proceedings have come to an end provided
they are made under Part-I.

(g) If a first application is made
to a court which is neither a Principal Court
of original jurisdiction in a district or a
High Court exercising original jurisdiction
in a State, such application not being to a
court as defined would be outside Section
42. Also, an application made to a court
without subject matter jurisdiction would
be outside Section 42.

The
reference
is
answered
accordingly."

14. A coordinate Bench of this Court in
case of P.T.C. Techno Private Limited Vs.
Samsung India Electronics Private Limited,
Civil Misc. Arbitration Application No. 01
of 2018, decided on 26.02.2019 held that
Allahabad High Court does not exercise
ordinary original civil jurisdiction, hence the
application under Section 34 was not
maintainable before this Court.

15. The judgment in Atlanta Limited
(Supra) relied on by the the applicants'
counsel is of no help to him as Bombay
High Court exercises ordinary original civil
jurisdiction and, thus, Apex Court held that
in view of Section 2 (1) (e) (i) it was
empowered to entertain the application
under Section 34 being a Court.

16. The said ratio is not applicable in
the present case as Allahabad High Court
does not exercises ordinary original civil
jurisdiction and, thus, would not come
within the ambit of Court as provided under
Section 34 read with Section 2 (1) (e) (i) of
the Act of 1996.

17. The application moved by the
applicants under Section 34 of the Act of
1996 challenging the arbitral award passed
by the sole Arbitrator is only maintainable
before the Principal Civil Court of original
jurisdiction and not this Court.

18. In view of the law laid down by
the Apex Court in case of Atlanta Limited
(Supra) and Associated Contractors
(Supra), the present application under
Section 34 of the Act of 1996 is not
maintainable and same is hereby dismissed
as not maintainable.
----------
(2022) 9 ILRA 1719
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 07.03.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAJESH BINDAL, C.J.
THE HON'BLE PIYUSH AGRAWAL, J.

Writ C No. 4796 of 2022

Ram Avtar Sharma ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors.. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
1720 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Sri Ramesh Chandra (Senior Advocate), Sri
Narayan Dutt Shukla

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Ajay Prakash Paul (State Law Officer),
Ms. Anjali Upadhya

A. Civil Law - Constitution of India,1950Article
226-maintainability
of-Land
acquisition-delay-petition filed after 10
years of passing of impugned order- Order
passed by the Secretary, Department of
Industrial
Development,
in
terms
of
directions issued by this Court vid has
been challenged by filing the present writ
petition after a decade-Hence,Delay not
condoned- even if there is no period
prescribed for filing the writ petition
under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, yet it should be filed within a
reasonable time. Relief to a person, who
puts forward a stale claim can certainly be
refused relief on account of delay and
laches. Anyone who sleeps over his rights
is bound to suffer. (Para 1 to 14)

B. Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of
Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical
doctrine. Where it would be practically
unjust to give a remedy, either because
the party has, by his conduct, done that
which
might
fairly
be
regarded
as
equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by
his conduct and neglect he has, though
perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put
the other party in a situation in which it
would not be reasonable to place him if
the
remedy
were
afterwards
to
be
asserted in either of these cases, lapse of
time and delay are most material. But in
every case, if an argument against relief,
which otherwise would be just, is founded
upon mere delay, that delay of course not
amounting to a bar by any statute of
limitations, the validity of that defence
must be tried upon principles substantially
equitable.
Two
circumstances,
always
important in such cases, are, the length of
the delay and the nature of the acts done
during the interval, which might affect
either party and cause a balance of justice
or injustice in taking the one course or the
other, so far as relates to the remedy.
(Para 7)
The writ petition is dismissed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:

1. Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply &
Sewerage Board & ors. Vs T. T. Murali Babu
(2014) 4 SCC 108

2. P. S. Sadasivasway Vs St. of T.N. (1975) 1
SCC 152

3. New Delhi Municipal Council Vs Pan Singh &
ors. (2007) 9 SCC 278

4. St. of U.K. & anr. Vs Sri Shiv Charan Singh
Bhandari & ors. (2013) 6SLR 629
(Delivered by Hon'ble Rajesh Bindal, C.J.
&
Hon'ble Piyush Agrawal, J.)

ORDER

1. Order dated February 10, 2012
passed by the Secretary, Department of
Industrial
Development,
in
terms
of
directions issued by this Court vide order
dated September 20, 2010 passed in Writ-C
No.55926 of 2010, titled as Ram Avtar
Sharma v. State of U.P. and others, has
been challenged by filing the present writ
petition.

2. In terms of aforesaid directions,
application filed by the petitioner under
Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act')
was to be decided. The writ petition
challenging
the
acquisition
of
land
otherwise was dismissed.

3. After hearing learned Senior
Counsel for the petitioner, we do not find
any case is made out for interference in the
present writ petition, on account of huge
9 All. Ram Avtar Sharma Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1721
delay and laches. The impugned order was
passed by the Secretary of the Department
concerned on February 10, 2012 and the
writ petition has been filed more than a
decade thereafter. As to how the petition,
filed after huge delay, has to be dealt with
has been considered by the Courts on
number of occasions and the opinion
expressed is that these petitions are
required to be dismissed at the threshold.

4. In P. S. Sadasivasway v. State of
Tamil Nadu, (1975) 1 SCC 152, wherein it
has been laid down that a person aggrieved
by an order of promoting a junior over his
head should approach the court at least within
six months or at the most a year of such
promotion. It is not that there is any period of
limitation for the Courts to exercise their
powers under Article 226 nor is it that there
can never be a case where the Courts cannot
interfere in a matter after the passage of a
certain length of time, but it would be a sound
and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts
to refuse to exercise their extraordinary
powers under Article 226 in the case of
persons who do not approach it expeditiously
for the relief.

5. In New Delhi Municipal Council v.
Pan Singh and others, (2007) 9 SCC 278,
the Court has opined that though there is no
period of limitation provided for filing a writ
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India, yet ordinarily a writ petition should
be filed within a reasonable time. In the said
case the respondents had filed the writ
petition after seventeen years and the court,
as stated earlier, took note of the delay and
laches as relevant factors and set aside the
order passed by the High Court which had
exercised the discretionary jurisdiction.

6. In State of Uttaranchal and
another v. Sri Shiv Charan Singh
Bhandari and others 2013 (6) SLR 629,
Hon'ble
the
Supreme
Court,
while
considering the issue regarding delay and
laches observed that even if there is no
period prescribed for filing the writ petition
under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, yet it should be filed within a
reasonable time. Relief to a person, who
puts forward a stale claim can certainly be
refused relief on account of delay and
laches. Anyone who sleeps over his rights
is bound to suffer.

7. In Chennai Metropolitan Water
Supply and Sewerage Board and others
v. T. T. Murali Babu 2014 (4) SCC 108,
Hon'ble the Supreme Court opined as
under:-

"13. First, we shall deal with the
facet of delay. In Maharashtra State Road
Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular
Motor Service, Amravati and others, AIR
1969 SC 329, the Court referred to the
principle that has been stated by Sir Barnes
Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v.
Prosper Armstrong Hurd, Abram Farewall,
and John Kemp, (1874) 5 PC 221, which is
as follows:-

"Now the doctrine of laches in
Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a
technical doctrine. Where it would be
practically unjust to give a remedy, either
because the party has, by his conduct, done
that which might fairly be regarded as
equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his
conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps
not waiving that remedy, yet put the other
party in a situation in which it would not be
reasonable to place him if the remedy were
afterwards to be asserted in either of these
cases, lapse of time and delay are most
material. But in every case, if an argument
against relief, which otherwise would be
1722 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay
of course not amounting to a bar by any
statute of limitations, the validity of that
defence must be tried upon principles
substantially equitable. Two circumstances,
always important in such cases, are, the
length of the delay and the nature of the
acts done during the interval, which might
affect either party and cause a balance of
justice or injustice in taking the one course
or the other, so far as relates to the
remedy."

15. In State of M. P. and others
etc. etc. vs. Nandlal Jaiswal and others etc.
etc., AIR 1987 SC 251, the Court observed
that it is well settled that power of the High
Court to issue an appropriate writ under
Article
226 of
the
Constitution
is
discretionary and the High Court in
exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily
assist the tardy and the indolent or the
acquiescent and the lethargic. It has been
further stated therein that if there is
inordinate delay on the part of the
petitioner in filing a petition and such delay
is not satisfactorily explained, the High
Court may decline to intervene and grant
relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction.
Emphasis was laid on the principle of delay
and laches stating that resort to the
extraordinary remedy under the writ
jurisdiction at a belated stage is likely to
cause confusion and public inconvenience
and bring in injustice.

16. Thus, the doctrine of delay
and laches should not be lightly brushed
aside. A writ court is required to weigh the
explanation offered and the acceptability of
the same. The court should bear in mind
that it is exercising an extraordinary and
equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional
court it has a duty to protect the rights of
the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep
itself alive to the primary principle that
when
an
aggrieved
person,
without
adequate reason, approaches the court at his
own leisure or pleasure, the court would be
under legal obligation to scrutinize whether
the lis at a belated stage should be
entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes
in
the
way
of
equity.
In
certain
circumstances delay and laches may not be
fatal but in most circumstances inordinate
delay would only invite disaster for the
litigant who knocks at the doors of the
court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction
on the part of a litigant "a litigant who has
forgotten
the
basic
norms,
namely,
"procrastination is the greatest thief of
time" and second, law does not permit one
to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does
bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.
... A court is not expected to give
indulgence to such indolent persons- who
compete with `Kumbhakarna' or for that
matter 'Rip Van Winkle'. In our considered
opinion, such delay does not deserve any
indulgence and on the said ground alone
the writ court should have thrown the
petition overboard at the very threshold."

8. In State of Jammu & Kashmir vs.
R. K. Zalpuri and others 2015 (15) SCC
602, Hon'ble the Supreme Court considered
the issue regarding delay and laches in
raising the dispute before the Court. It was
opined that the issue sought to be raised by
the petitioners therein was not required to
be addressed on merits on account of delay
and laches. The relevant paras thereof are
extracted below:-

"27. The grievance agitated by
the respondent did not deserve to be
addressed on merits, for doctrine of delay
and laches had already visited his claim
like the chill of death which does not spare
anyone even the one who fosters the idea
9 All. Ram Avtar Sharma Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1723
and nurtures the attitude that he can sleep
to avoid death and eventually proclaim
"Deo gratias - thanks to God".

28. Another aspect needs to be
stated. A writ court while deciding a writ
petition is required to remain alive to the
nature of the claim and the unexplained
delay on the part of the writ petitioner.
Stale claims are not to be adjudicated
unless non-interference would cause grave
injustice. The present case, need less to
emphasise, did not justify adjudication. It
deserves to be thrown overboard at the very
threshold, for the writ petitioner had
accepted the order of dismissal for half a
decade and cultivated the feeling that he
could freeze time and forever remain in the
realm of constant present."

9. The aforesaid view was followed by
Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Union of
India and others v. Chaman Rana 2018 (5)
SCC 798.

10. Subsequently, a Constitution Bench
of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Senior
Divisional
Manager,
Life
Insurance
Corporation v. Shree Lal Meena (2019) 4
SCC 479, considering the principle of delay
and laches, opined as under:-

"36. We may also find that the
appellant remained silent for years together
and that this Court, taking a particular view
subsequently, in Sheel Kumar Jain v. New
India Assurance Company Limited, (2011)12
SCC 197 would not entitle stale claims to be
raised on this behalf, like that of the
appellant. In fact the appellant slept over the
matter for almost a little over two years even
after the pronouncement of the judgment.

37. Thus, the endeavour of the
appellant, to approach this Court seeking
the relief, as prayed for, is clearly a
misadventure, which is liable to be
rejected, and the appeal is dismissed."

11. Recently, in Bharat Coking Coal
Ltd. And othyers v. Shyam Kishore
Singh (Civil Appeal No.1009 of 2020,
decided on 5.2.2020), the issue regarding
the delay and laches, was considered by
Hon'ble the Supreme Court and a petition
filed belatedly, seeking change in the date
of birth in the service record, was
dismissed.

12. Relying on T.T. Murali Babu'
case (supra) and R.K. Zalpuri'case
(supra), same view has been expressed by
Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Union of
India and others Vs. N. Murugesan and
others (2022) 2 SCC 25 observing:

"We have already dealt with the
principles of law that may have a bearing
on this case. ... there was an unexplained
and studied reluctance to raise the issue ....
Hence, on the principle governing delay,
laches ... Respondent No. 1 ought not to
have been granted any relief by invoking
Article 226 of the Constitution of India."

13. In the case in hand, after hearing
learned counsel for the parties and taking
the above authorities into account, in our
opinion, the petitioner is not entitled to any
relief. It is, however, sought to be
contended that the order dated February 10,
2012
was
communicated
vide
Communication dated December 30, 2021,
which is sought to be relied upon to show
that the order was communicated to the
petitioner quite late in the year 2021.
However, a perusal thereof shows that it is
not addressed to him. It is merely an interdepartmental communication from the Joint
Secretary in the State of U.P. to the Greater
1724 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
NOIDA. In any case, the same cannot be
taken to be a reasonable explanation for
condoning huge delay in filing the present
writ petition. In this case, the direction was
issued by this Court about a decade back.
The petitioner should have been vigilant
and enquired about the status of the
application filed by him before the
competent authority. There is nothing on
record to suggest that he ever made any
representation or enquired about the order
passed on his representation. In any case,
the release of land under Section 48 of the
Act is not a matter of right with the
landowner. It is a power conferred on the
Government.

14. For the reasons mentioned above,
we do not find any merit in the present writ
petition.
The
same
is,
accordingly,
dismissed.
----------
(2022) 9 ILRA 1724
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 20.07.2022

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MANOJ KUMAR GUPTA, J.
THE HON'BLE DR. YOGENDRA KUMAR
SRIVASTAVA, J.

Writ C No. 20091 of 2022

Neha Yadav ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Kartikeya Saran

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

A. Civil Law - Uttar Pradesh Kshettra
Samitis and Zila Parishads Adhiniyam,
1961-Section
11-
The
Uttar
Pradesh
Panchayat Laws (Amendment) Act, 2007Section 9- Section 11(2) of the U.P.
Kshetra Panchayats and Zila Panchayats
Adhiniyam, 1961-Section 11 stipulates
that a member shall be deemed to have
vacated his office from the date on which
notice of his resignation is received in the
office of Kshetra Panchayat-The vacancy
becomes effective from a date envisaged
under the deeming provision engrafted in
the statute-It thus becomes operative by
operation of law from the date notice is
received in the office of the Kshetra
Panchayat-Unlike in case of Pramukh, the
resignation to become effective, in case of
a member, does not require any approval-
the notices of resignation were received in
the
office
of
Kshetra
Panchayat-
Therefore, there is no illegality in the
impugned notification.(Para 1 to 13)
The petition is dismissed. (E-6)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Manoj Kumar
Gupta, J.
&
Hon'ble Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava, J.)

1. The petitioner is Pramukh of Kshetra
Panchayat, Gulavathi, Bulandshahr. She has
preferred the instant petition calling in
question a notification issued from the office
of respondent no.2, Assistant Development
Officer showing two vacancies of members
on account of respondents no. 4 and 5 having
tendered their resignations. The date of
vacancy as per the said chart is 5.04.2022 in
case of respondent no. 5 and 26.04.2022 in
case of respondent no. 4.

2. It is not disputed before us that the
resignation letter of the members namely
respondents no.4 and 5 have been received in
the office of Kshetra Panchayat on respective
dates from which the vacancies have been
made effective.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner
submitted
that
mere
submission
of