# Ram Ayodhaya Prasad v. Presiding Officer Labour Court Ghaziabad & Anr

- **Citation:** (2019) 2 ILRA 1732
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2019-08-30
- **Case number:** Writ C No. 13541 of 2016
- **Bench:** Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ram-ayodhaya-prasad-v-presiding-officer-labour-court-ghaziabad-anr-44663
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

A. Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 - Section
2(k) - services of the workman not
terminated- name continued in the rolls
of the employer, and back wages been
directed to pay; there exist no industrial
dispute; reference rightly rejected.

Held:- In the facts of the present case in the
absence of any real and substantial difference
existing between the parties which could be
said to be connected with the employment or
non-employment, or with regard to discharge,
2 All. Ram Ayodhaya Prasad Vs Presiding Officer Labour Court Ghaziabad & Anr.
1733
dismissal, retrenchment or termination there
could not be said to be any industrial dispute
subsisting, which required adjudication, and
the award passed by the Labour Court which is
sought to be challenged in the present
petition, cannot be faulted with. (Para 24)

Writ Petition rejected (E-9)

List of Cases Cited: -

## Text

1732 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
except a Dakhalnama wherein the land
has been shown to be agricultural land.
The petitioners have brought on record
the minutes of a meeting dated 18th
August, 2008 of the district administration
and the officials of the Saharanpur
Development Authority, presided over by
the District Magistrate. In the said
meeting it was resolved to handover the
surplus land declared under the urban
ceiling to the development authority for
construction
of
residential
accommodation. In the said meeting it
was
resolved
that
the
Saharanpur
Development Authority shall take steps to
obtain permission from the competent
authority for conversion of land use. From
the record it appears that before any
construction started, the petitioners have
obtained an interim order in the petition
on 25th June, 2009. The said interim
order is continuing for the last ten years.
Record shows that neither the State nor
the Saharanpur Development Authority
has taken any step for early hearing of the
matter. A general and vague statement has
been made that the 'development authority
is presently utilizing' the said land for
development of the residential colony,
wherein
EWS
houses
are
being
constructed
under
the
Manyawar
Kanshiram Durbal Warg Awasiya Yojna.
But except bald statement no other
material is on the record to show that any
construction has been made. In any view
of the matter, if the possession has not
been taken in terms of Sections 10(5) and
10(6) of the Act, 1976, the petitioners are
entitled for the benefit under Sections 3
and 4 of the Repeal Act.

45. For all the reasons stated above,
we find that the ceiling proceeding stood
lapsed and the petitioners are entitled for
the land in question which has been
declared surplus. If the claim of the
Saharanpur Development Authority that it
has raised construction over the land in
question is correct, it would be open to
the petitioners to take recourse to such
remedy which is available under the law.

46. With the aforesaid observations
and directions, the writ petition is
allowed.

47. No order as to costs.
----------

(2019)10ILR A 1732

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 30.08.2019

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE DR. YOGENDRA KUMAR
SRIVASTAVA, J.

Writ C No. 13541 of 2016

Ram Ayodhaya Prasad ...Petitioner
Versus
Presiding Officer Labour Court
Ghaziabad & Anr. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Devendra Kumar, Sri Babu Lal Ram

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Chandra Bhan Gupta.

A. Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 - Section
2(k) - services of the workman not
terminated- name continued in the rolls
of the employer, and back wages been
directed to pay; there exist no industrial
dispute; reference rightly rejected.

Held:- In the facts of the present case in the
absence of any real and substantial difference
existing between the parties which could be
said to be connected with the employment or
non-employment, or with regard to discharge,
2 All. Ram Ayodhaya Prasad Vs Presiding Officer Labour Court Ghaziabad & Anr.
1733
dismissal, retrenchment or termination there
could not be said to be any industrial dispute
subsisting, which required adjudication, and
the award passed by the Labour Court which is
sought to be challenged in the present
petition, cannot be faulted with. (Para 24)

Writ Petition rejected (E-9)

List of Cases Cited: -

1. Narendra Kumar Sen & ors. Vs All India
Industrial Disputes (Labour Appellate) Tribunal
& ors., AIR 1953 Bombay 325

2. Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate Vs
Management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate, AIR
1958 SC 353

3. M/s Dharam Pal Prem Chand Vs M/s.
Dharam Pal Prem Chand 4 & J.H. Jadhav Vs
Forbes Gokak Ltd., AIR 1966 SC 182

4. Shambu Nath Goyal Vs Bank Of Baroda,
Jullundur, AIR 1978 SC 1088

5. Beetham Vs Trinidad Cement Ltd, (1960) 1
All ER 274

6. ANZ Grindlays Bank Ltd. Vs UOI & ors.
(2005)12 SCC 738

7. Prabhakar Vs Joint Director, Sericulture
Department, & anr. (2015)15 SCC 1

8. Conway Vs Wade, (1909) A.C.506(House of Lords)

9. Ram Singh Vs J.K. Jute Mills Co.Ltd. & ors.,
2002 (95) FLR 1058

(Delivered by Hon'ble Dr. Yogendra
Kumar Srivastava, J.)

1. Heard Sri Babu Lal Ram holding
brief of Sri Devendra Kumar, learned
counsel for the petitioner and Sri Chandra
Bhan Gupta, learned counsel appearing
for the respondent no. 2.

2. The present petition has been filed
seeking to challenge the award dated
18.08.2015 passed by the Labour Court
(First) U.P. Ghaziabad in Adjudication
Case No. 302/86 and also the order of the
same date passed upon an application
under Section 6-F of the U.P. Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (in short 'U.P.I.D.Act,
1947'), which was registered as Misc.
Case No. 15/96.

3. While considering the reference
which had been made with regard to the
legality/validity of the termination of the
workman (petitioner herein) with effect
from 10.10.1985, the Labour Court, upon
taking notice of the fact that the workman
had joined his duties on 12.9.1996 came
to the conclusion that there did not exist
any dispute regarding which the reference
had been made. Thereafter, considering
the grievance of the workman that he had
not been paid his wages from September,
1985 upto 10.10.1985, the Labour Court
held that the workman was entitled for
being paid wages for the said period and
no other relief was granted.

4. The application under Section 6-F
of the U.P.I.D.Act, 1947 was rejected by
the Labour Court vide order dated
18.08.2015 after taking into consideration
the fact that the workman was continued
to be shown on the rolls of the employer,
and that the workman had not been able to
prove the fact that his conditions of
service were changed during pendency of
the proceedings.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner
made a feeble attempt to assail the award
by raising a grievance with regard to his
alleged termination dated 10.10.1985
relating to which the reference had been
made. However, he did not controvert the
1734 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
fact that the workman had joined his
duties on 12.9.1996 and as a consequence
thereof there existed no dispute with
regard to his termination relating to which
the reference had been made.

6. The learned counsel appearing for
the respondent no. 2-employer submitted
that it was the specific stand of the
employer before the Labour Court that the
services of the workman were never
terminated from 10.10.1985, as stated in
the
reference
order,
and
that
the
management had made an offer to the
workman concerned to report for duty. It
was also pointed out that the name of the
workman was continued to be shown in
the attendance register and he was on rolls
of the factory even after the alleged date
of termination i.e. 10.10.1985, and that
the workman joined his duties on
12.9.1996 and started working. It was
accordingly submitted that workman
having
never
been
terminated
and
subsequently having admittedly joined his
duties there existed no dispute with regard
to
his
termination
which
required
adjudication, and in view of the same the
Labour Court had rightly passed the
award.

7. Heard learned counsel for the
parties and perused the record.

8. The core issue in the present
petition revolves around the interpretation
of the term 'industrial dispute'.

9. The term 'industrial dispute' as
defined under Section 2 (l) of the
U.P.I.D.Act, 1947 which is in similar
terms as the definition contained under
Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 (in short 'I.D.Act, 1947')
essentially
means
any
dispute
or
difference
between
employers
and
employers, or between employers and
workmen, or between workmen and
workmen, which is connected with the
employment or non-employment or the
terms of employment or with the
conditions of labour, of any person.

10. As per Section 2-A of the
I.D.Act, 1947 where any employer
discharges,
dismisses,
retrenches,
or
otherwise terminates the services of an
individual workman, any dispute or
difference between that workman and his
employer connected with, or arising out
of,
such
discharge,
dismissal,
retrenchment or termination is deemed to
be an industrial dispute.

11. The ambit and scope of the
meaning of the term 'industrial dispute'
came up for consideration in the case of
Narendra Kumar Sen and others Vs.
All India Industrial Disputes (Labour
Appellate) Tribunal and others1, and
upon taking into view the definition of the
term under Section 2(k) of the I.D.Act,
1947 it was held that in order that a
controversy
between
workmen
and
employers can become an industrial
dispute, two conditions are necessary:
first, it must be a dispute; and second, it
must be an industrial dispute. The
observations made in the judgment are as
under :-

"(5) Now, in order that a
controversy
between
workmen
&
employers can become an industrial
dispute, two conditions are necessary. It
must be a dispute and it must be an
industrial dispute. There is no difficulty in
understanding what "industrial dispute" is
because it is clearly defined in Section
2(k). A controversy which is connected
2 All. Ram Ayodhaya Prasad Vs Presiding Officer Labour Court Ghaziabad & Anr.
1735
with the employment or non-employment
or the terms of employment or with the
conditions of labour is an industrial
controversy. But it is not enough that it
should be an industrial controversy; it
must be a dispute; and in my opinion it is
not every controversy or every difference
of
opinion
between
workmen
and
employers which is constituted a dispute
or difference within the meaning of
Section 2(k). A workman may have
ideological differences with his employer;
a
workman
may
feel
sympathetic
consideration for an employee in his own
industry or in other industry; a workman
may feel seriously agitated about the
conditions of labour outside our own
country; but It is absurd to suggest that
any of these factors would entitle a
workman to raise an industrial dispute
within the meaning of Section 2(k). The
dispute contemplated by Section 2(k) is a
controversy in which the workman is
directly and substantially interested. It
must also be a grievance felt by the
workman which the employer is in a
position to remedy. Both the conditions
must be present; it must be a grievance of
the workman himself; it must be a
grievance which the employer as an
employer is in a position to remedy or set
right."

12. The test with regard to existence
of an industrial dispute was laid down in
the
aforementioned
judgment
of
Narendra Kumar Sen and others, in the
following terms :-

"7...Therefore, when Section
2(k) speaks of the employment or nonemployment or the terms of employment
or the conditions of labour of any person,
it can only mean the employment or nonemployment or the terms of employment
or the conditions of labour of only those
persons in the employment or nonemployment or the terms of employment
or with the conditions of labour of whom
the workmen themselves are directly and
substantially interested. If the workmen
have no direct or substantial interest in the
employment or non-employment of a
person or in his term of employment or
his conditions of labour, then an industrial
dispute cannot arise with regard to such
person.."

13. The scope and effect of the
definition clause in Section 2(k) of the
I.D.Act, 1947 again fell for consideration
in the case of Workmen of Dimakuchi
Tea
Estate
Vs.
Management
of
Dimakuchi Tea Estate2, and upon
analyzing the definition of the term
'industrial dispute' it was held that in order
to fall within the scope of the definition
under
Section
2(k),
the
following
conditions must be satisfied: (i) there
must be a dispute or difference; (ii) the
dispute or difference must be between
employers and employers, or between
employers and workmen, or between
workmen and workmen; and (iii) the
dispute or difference must be connected
with the employment or non-employment
or the terms of employment or with the
conditions of labour, of any person. The
relevant
observations
made
in
the
judgment are as follows :-

"8....If we analyse the definition
clause, it falls easily and naturally into
three parts: first, there must be a dispute
or difference; second, the dispute or
difference must be between employers
and employers, or between employers and
workmen or between workmen and
workmen; third, the dispute or difference
must be connected with the employment
1736 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
or non-employment or the terms of
employment or with the conditions of
labour, of any person..."

14. In the abovementioned case of
Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate
after referring to 'Maxwell on the
Interpretation of Statutes3' and also
examining the object of the I.D.Act, 1947
and its salient features, it was observed as
follows :

"9...the definition clause must
be read in the context of the subject
matter and scheme of the Act, and
consistently with the objects and other
provisions of the Act. It is well settled
that "the words of a statute, when there is
a doubt about their meaning are to be
understood in the sense in which they best
harmonise with the subject of the
enactment and the object which the
legislature has in view. Their meaning is
found
not
so much
in
a
strictly
grammatical or etymological propriety of
language, nor even in its popular use, as
in the subject or in the occasion on which
they are used, and the object to be
attained."

(Maxwell,
Interpretation
of
Statutes, 9th Edition, p. 55).

10. It is necessary, therefore, to
take the Act as a whole and examine its
salient provisions. The long title shows
that the object of the Act is "to make
provision
for
the
investigation
and
settlement of industrial disputes, and for
certain other purposes." The preamble
states the same object..

........

14..It is obvious that a dispute
between
employers
and
employers,
employers and workmen, or between
workmen and workmen must be a real
dispute
capable
of
settlement
or
adjudication by directing one of the
parties to the dispute to give necessary
relief to the other. It is also obvious that
the parties to the dispute must be directly
or substantially interested therein, so that
if workmen raise a dispute, it must relate
to
the
establishment
or
part
of
establishment
in
which
they
are
employed..."

15. The aforementioned view that
the term 'industrial dispute' as defined
under Section 2(k) of the I.D.Act, 1947
means any dispute or difference between
employers and employers, or between
employers and workmen, or between
workmen
and
workmen
which
is
concerned with the employment or nonemployment or the terms of employment
or with the conditions of labour, of any
person, was reiterated in Workmen of
M/s Dharam Pal Prem Chand Vs. M/s.
Dharam
Pal
Prem
Chand4
and
J.H.Jadhav Vs. Forbes Gokak Ltd5.

16. The meaning of the term
'industrial dispute' as defined under
Section 2(k) of the I.D.Act, 1947 again
came up for consideration in the case of
Shambu Nath Goyal vs Bank Of
Baroda, Jullundur6, wherein it was held
that the the key words in the definition of
the term industrial dispute are 'dispute' or
'difference' and the existence of an
industrial dispute pre-supposes a dispute
or difference between the parties as
contemplated by the definition. The
relevant
observations
made
in
the
judgment are as follows :-

"5.A
bare
perusal
of
the
definition would show that where there is
a dispute or difference between the parties
contemplated by the definition and the
dispute or difference is connected with the
2 All. Ram Ayodhaya Prasad Vs Presiding Officer Labour Court Ghaziabad & Anr.
1737
employment or non-employment or the
terms of employment or with the
conditions of labour of any person there
comes into existence an industrial dispute.
The Act nowhere contemplates that the
dispute would come into existence in any
particular, specific or prescribed manner.
For coming into existence of an industrial
dispute
a
written
demand
is
not
asinequanon, unless of course in the case
of public utility service because Section
22 forbids going on strike without giving
a strike notice..."

17. While discussing the meaning of
the words 'dispute' and 'difference' in
the aforementioned case of Shambu
Nath Goyal (supra) the judgment in the
case of Beetham Vs. Trinidad Cement
Ltd.7,
was
referred
to
and
the
observations made by Lord Denning in
the context of the definition of the term
'trade dispute' under Section 2 (1) of the
Trade Disputes (Arbitration and Inquiry)
Ordinance (Laws of Trinidad and Tobago,
1950) were also extracted and it was
stated as follows :-

"5.....The key words in the
definition
of
industrial
dispute
are
'dispute' or 'difference'. What is the
connotation
of
these
two
words.
InBeethamv.Trinidad Cement Ltd,(1960)
1 All ER 274 at p. 279, Lord Denning
while
examining
the
definition
of
expression 'trade dispute' in Section 2(1)
of Trade Disputes (Arbitration and
Inquiry) Ordinance of Trinidad observed:

"By definition a ''trade dispute'
exists whenever a ''difference' exists; and
a difference can exist long before the
parties became locked in a combat. It is
not necessary that they should have come
to blows. It is sufficient that they should
be sparring for an opening."

6.Thus
the
term
'industrial
dispute' connotes a real and substantial
difference having some element of
persistency and continuity till resolved
and likely if not adjusted to endanger the
industrial peace of the undertaking or the
community. When parties are at variance
and the dispute or difference is connected
with the employment, or non-employment
or the terms of employment or with the
conditions of labour there comes into
existence an industrial dispute. To read
into definition the requirement of written
demand for bringing into existence an
industrial dispute would tantamount to rewriting the section."

18. The definition of the term
'industrial dispute' as under Section 2(k)
of the I.D.Act, 1947 and also the meaning
of the word 'dispute' as defined in the
Black's
Law
Dictionary
and
also
Advance
Law
Lexicon
by
P.
Ramanatha Aiyar, were referred to in
the case of ANZ Grindlays Bank Ltd.
Vs. Union of India and others8, and it
was observed as follows:-

"11...Section 2(k) of the Act
defines "industrial dispute" and it means
any
dispute
or
difference
between
employers and employers, or between
employers and workmen, or between
workmen
and
workmen,
which
is
connected with the employment or nonemployment or the terms of employment
or with the conditions of labour, of any
person. The definition uses the word
"dispute". The dictionary meaning of the
word "dispute" is: to contend any
argument; argue for or against something
asserted or maintained. InBlack's Law
Dictionarythe meaning of the word
"dispute" is: a conflict or controversy,
specially one that has given rise to a
1738 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
particular
lawsuit.
InAdvanced
Law
Lexiconby P. Ramanatha Aiyar the
meaning given is: claim asserted by one
party and denied by the other, be the
claim false or true; the term "dispute" in
its wider sense may mean the wranglings
or quarrels between the parties, one party
asserting and the other denying the
liability. InGujarat State Coop. Land
Development
Bank
Ltd.v.P.R.
Mankad[(1979) 3 SCC 123 : 1979 SCC
(L&S) 225] it was held that the term
"dispute" means a controversy having
both positive and negative aspects. It
postulates the assertion of a claim by one
party and its denial by the other."

19. A similar view was taken in the
case of Prabhakar Vs. Joint Director,
Sericulture Department, and another9,
and after considering the definition of the
term under Section 2(k) and also Section
2-A of the I.D.Act, 1947, it was held that
the term 'industrial dispute' connotes a
real and substantial difference having
some element of persistency which is
likely to endanger the industrial peace.
The relevant observations made in the
judgment are as follows :

"31. Section 2(k) of the IDA
defines 'industrial dispute' and it reads as
under:

"2.(k) 'industrial dispute' means
any
dispute
or
difference
between
employers and employers, or between
employers and workmen, or between
workmen
and
workmen,
which
is
connected with the employment or nonemployment or the terms of employment
or with the conditions of labour, of any
person;"

32. As per Section 2-A dispute
relating
to
discharge,
dismissal,
retrenchment
or
termination
of
an
individual are also deemed as industrial
dispute and, therefore, an individual is
given right to raise these disputes.

33. The term 'industrial dispute'
connotes a real and substantial difference
having some element of persistency, and
likely, if not adjusted, to endanger the
industrial peace of the community. The
expression 'dispute or difference' as used in
the definition, therefore, means a controversy
fairly definite and of real substance, connected
with the employment or non-employment or
with the terms of employment or the
conditions of labour of any person, and is one
in which the contesting parties are directly
interested in maintaining the respective
contentions.

34. To understand the meaning
of the word 'dispute', it would be
appropriate to start with the grammatical
or dictionary meaning of the term:

"'Dispute': to argue about, to
contend for, to oppose by argument, to
call in question - to argue or debate (with,
about or over) - a contest with words; an
argument; a debate; a quarrel;"

35. Black's Law Dictionary, 5th
Edn., p. 424 defines "dispute" as under:

"Dispute.--A
conflict
or
controversy; a conflict of claims or rights;
an assertion of a right, claim, or demand
on one side, met by contrary claims or
allegations on the other. The subject of
litigation; the matter for which a suit is
brought and upon which issue is joined,
and in relation to which jurors are called
and witnesses examined."

36.Thus, a dispute or difference
arises when demand is made by one side
(i.e. workmen) and rejected by the other
side (i.e. the employer) and vice versa.
Hence an "industrial dispute" cannot be
said to exist until and unless the demand
is made by the workmen and it has been
rejected by the employer..."
2 All. Ram Ayodhaya Prasad Vs Presiding Officer Labour Court Ghaziabad & Anr.
1739

20. Reference may also be had to the
judgment in the case of Conway Vs.
Wade10,
wherein
the
words
'contemplation or furtherance of a trade
dispute', fell for consideration in the
context of the Trade Disputes Act, 1906,
in which the expression 'trade dispute' had
been defined under sub-section (3) of
Section 5 as meaning any dispute between
employers and workmen, or between
workmen
and
workmen,
which
is
connected with the employment or nonemployment,
or
the
terms
of
the
employment, or with the conditions of
labour, of any person, and in the context
of the aforementioned definition, it was
observed as follows :-

"'Trade dispute' is a familiar
phrase in earlier Acts of Parliament, and
is defined in this Act. I do not know that
the definition is of much assistance. If this
section is to apply there must be a dispute,
however the subject-matter of it be
defined. A mere personal quarrel or a
grumbling or an agitation will not suffice.
It must be something fairly definite and of
real substance."

21. In a similar set of facts, as in the
present case, in Ram Singh Vs. J.K.Jute
Mills Co.Ltd. and others11, where the
employer, in their written statement, had
categorically stated that they had not
terminated the services of the concerned
workman and the name of the workman
was continuing on the rolls of the
employer, it was held that there was no
necessity of adjudicating whether his
services were terminated or not and
whether the termination is legal and
justified or not. The relevant observations
made in the judgment are as follows :-

"2. The following dispute was
referred
to
the
labour
court
for
adjudication :

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Jh jke flag iq= Jh erbZ] etnwj ,othnkj
f'k¶V&lh] gok?kj dh lsok;sa fnukad 26-9-1990
ls lekIr fd;k tkuk mfpr rFkk oS/kkfud gS\
;fn ugha] rks lacaf/kr Jfed D;k ykHk@{kfriwfrZ
ikus dk vkf/kdkjh gS] rFkk fdl frfFk ,oa fdl
vU; fooj.k lfgr\**

3. The parties have exchanged
their pleadings and adduced evidence
before the labour court. The employer, in
their written statement, have categorically
stated that they have not terminated the
services of the concerned workman and
no order terminating the services of the
concerned workman was passed. The
name of the concerned workman is still
on the rolls of the employer. In this view
of the matter, the concerned workman is
not entitled for any relief.

.......

8....in view of the admitted facts
that
the
employer
themselves
have
admitted that they have not terminated the
services of the concerned workman and
his name is still continuing on the rolls of
the employer, in my opinion, the labour
court has travelled beyond the pleadings
of the parties and arrived at the
conclusion referred to above. Once the
employer have admitted that they have
not terminated the services of the
concerned workman, the labour court
should have stopped there and answered
the reference that since, it is the
employers' own case that they have not
terminated the services of the concerned
workman, therefore, there is no necessity
of adjudicating whether his services were
terminated or not and whether the
termination is legal and justified or not? "
1740 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

22. It is thus seen that the term
'industrial dispute' connotes a real and
substantial
difference
having
some
element of persistency which is likely to
endanger industrial peace. The essence of
an industrial dispute is disagreement. In
order to constitute a dispute there must be
some disagreement between workmen and
employer who stand in some industrial
relationship upon some matter that affects
or arises out of that relationship. It must
be concerned with an industry and the
difference between the parties must be
concerned
in
some
way
with
the
'workmen' as defined in the Act.

23. The expression 'dispute' or
'difference' as used under the statutory
definition of the term 'industrial dispute'
means a controversy which is fairly definite
and of real substance and being connected
with the terms of employment or nonemployment or with the conditions of labour
or dismissal etc., and is one in which the
contesting
parties
are
directly
and
substantially interested in maintaining the
respective contentions. It must be a grievance
felt by the workmen which the employer is in
a position to remedy or set right. The dispute
in order to come within the definition of
'industrial dispute' must be capable of being
made the subject of an award, and therefore,
the claim made by one party to the dispute
must be one which the other party has power
to grant. The key words in the definition of
the term 'industrial dispute' are 'dispute' or
'difference'. The existence of an 'industrial
dispute' thus pre-supposes the existence of a
'dispute' or 'difference' as a condition
precedent.

24. In the facts of the present case in
the absence of any real and substantial
difference existing between the parties
which could be said to be connected with
the employment or non-employment, or
with regard to discharge, dismissal,
retrenchment or termination there could
not be said to be any industrial dispute
subsisting, which required adjudication,
and the award passed by the Labour Court
which is sought to be challenged in the
present petition, cannot be faulted with.

25. The Labour Court having held
that there existed no subsisting industrial
dispute and the workman having not been
able to prove the fact that the employer
had contravened the provisions of Section
6-E
during
the
pendency
of
the
proceedings before the Labour Court, the
rejection of the application under Section
6-F of the U.P.I.D.Act, 1947, also cannot
be held to be improper.

26. No other point was argued by
the counsel for the petitioner.

27. Counsel for the petitioner has not
been able to point out any material error or
illegality in the award of the Labour Court
dated18.08.2015 and also the order of the
same date passed upon an application under
Section 6-F of the U.P.I.D.Act, 1947.

28. The writ petition lacks merit and
is accordingly dismissed.
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(2019)10ILR A 1740

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 31.07.2019

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE DR. YOGENDRA KUMAR
SRIVASTAVA, J.

Writ C No. 38391 of 2016