# Ram Badal Mishra v. U.O.I

- **Citation:** (2022) 4 ILRA 1065
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022-04-05
- **Case number:** First Appeal From Order No. 273 of 2021
- **Bench:** Manish Mathur
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ram-badal-mishra-v-u-o-i-48370
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

Civil Law - Railway Claims Tribunal Act,
1987 - Section 23--Condonation of delay--
Appeal for--Delay of three years and six months
in filing claim petition--Dismissal of application
for condonation of delay along with claim
1066 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
application- Claim was filed with considerable
delay but the Tribunal was required to have
taken a pragmatic approach -no finding that
delay occasioned in filing claim was deliberate,
wilful or intentional on part of claimantImpugned order set aside.

Appeal allowed. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

4 All. Ram Badal Mishra Vs. U.O.I.
1065
National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Mannat
Johal and Others, 2019 (2) T.A.C. 705
(S.C.) wherein the Apex Court has held as
under:

"13. The aforesaid features equally
apply to the contentions urged on behalf of
the claimants as regards the rate of
interest. The Tribunal had awarded interest
at the rate of 12% p.a. but the same had
been too high a rate in comparison to what
is ordinarily envisaged in these matters.
The High Court, after making a substantial
enhancement
in
the
award
amount,
modified the interest component at a
reasonable rate of 7.5% p.a. and we find no
reason to allow the interest in this matter at
any rate higher than that allowed by High
Court."

10. Learned Tribunal has awarded
rate of interest as 7% per annum but we are
fixing the rate of interest as 7.5% in the
light of the above judgment.

11. In view of the above, the appeal is
partly allowed. Judgment and award passed
by the Tribunal shall stand modified to the
aforesaid extent. The Insurance Company
shall deposit the amount within a period of
8 weeks from today with interest at the rate
of 7.5% from the date of filing of the claim
petition till the amount is deposited. The
amount already deposited be deducted from
the amount to be deposited.

12. In view of the ratio laid down by
Hon'ble Gujarat High Court, in the case of
Smt. Hansagori P. Ladhani vs. The
Oriental
Insurance
Company
Ltd.,
[2007(2) GLH 291] and this High Court in
total amount of interest, accrued on the
principal amount of compensation is to be
apportioned on financial year to financial
year basis and if the interest payable to
claimant for any financial year exceeds
Rs.50,000/-,
insurance
company/owner
is/are entitled to deduct appropriate amount
under the head of 'Tax Deducted at Source'
as provided u/s 194A (3) (ix) of the Income
Tax Act, 1961 and if the amount of interest
does not exceeds Rs.50,000/- in any
financial year, registry of this Tribunal is
directed to allow the claimants to withdraw
the
amount
without
producing
the
certificate from the concerned Income- Tax
Authority. The aforesaid view has been
reiterated by this High Court in Review
Application No.1 of 2020 in First Appeal
From Order No.23 of 2001 (Smt. Sudesna
and others Vs. Hari Singh and another)
and in First Appeal From Order No.2871 of
2016 (Tej Kumari Sharma v. Chola
Mandlam M.S. General Insurance Co.
Ltd.)
decided
on
19.3.2021
while
disbursing the amount.
----------
(2022)04ILR A1065
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 05.04.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MANISH MATHUR, J.

First Appeal From Order No. 273 of 2021

Ram Badal Mishra ...Appellant
Versus
U.O.I. ...Respondent

Counsel for the Appellant:
Pradeep Kumar Singh, Amrita Singh, Manish
Kumar Srivastava

Counsel for the Respondents:
Manendra Nath Rai, Mahendra Kumar Misra

Civil Law - Railway Claims Tribunal Act,
1987 - Section 23--Condonation of delay--
Appeal for--Delay of three years and six months
in filing claim petition--Dismissal of application
for condonation of delay along with claim
1066 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
application- Claim was filed with considerable
delay but the Tribunal was required to have
taken a pragmatic approach -no finding that
delay occasioned in filing claim was deliberate,
wilful or intentional on part of claimantImpugned order set aside.

Appeal allowed. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:

1. Steel Authority of India Ltd. & ors. Vs National
Union
Water
Front
Workers
&
ors.
MANU/SC/0515/2001

2. Prem Singh & ors. Vs Birbal & ors.
MANU/SC/8139/2006

3.
Manoharan
Vs
Sivarajan
&
ors.
MANU/SC/1192/2013

4. State of Bihar & ors. Vs Kameshwar Prasad
Singh & ors. MANU/SC/0358/2000

5. Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & ors. Vs
Katiji & ors. MANU/SC/0460/1987

6. New India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs Shanti Misra
MANU/SC/0547/1975

7. H.H. Brij Indar Singh Vs Lata Kanshi Ram & ors.
MANU/PR/0033/1917

8. Shakuntala Devi Jain Vs Kuntal Kumari & ors.
MANU/SC/0335/1968

9. Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs Nirmala
Devi & ors. MANU/SC/0384/1979

10.
Mata
Din
Vs
A.
Narayanan
MANU/SC/0621/1969

11. St. of Ker. Vs E.K. Kuriyipe & ors.
MANU/SC/0598/1980

12. Milavi Devi Vs Dina Nath MANU/SC/0756/1981

13. O.P. Kathpalia Vs Lakhmir Singh (Dead) & ors.
MANU/SC/0322/1984

14. G. Ramegowda & ors. Vs Special Land
Acquisition Officer, Bangalore MANU/SC/0161/1988
15. The Scheduled Caste Co-operative Land
Owning Society Ltd., Bhatinda Vs U.O.I. (UOI) &
ors. . MANU/SC/0183/1991

16. Binod Bihari Singh Vs U.O.I. (UOI)
MANU/SC/0194/1993

17. Shakambari and Co. Vs U.O.I. (UOI)
MANU/SC/0413/1992

18.
Warlu
Vs
Gangotribai
&
ors.
MANU/SC/0080/1994

19. State of Haryana Vs Chandra Mani & ors.
MANU/SC/0426/1996

20. Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition, Kerala Vs
K.V. Ayisumma MANU/SC/0694/1996

21.
Nand
Kishore
Vs
St.
of
Pun.
MANU/SC/0831/1995

22. N. Balakrishnan Vs M. Krishnamurthy
MANU/SC/0573/1998

23. Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom Vs Bhargavi
Amma
(Dead)
by
LRs.
&
ors.
MANU/SC/7894/2008
(Delivered by Hon'ble Manish Mathur, J.)

(1) Heard Mr. Manish Kumar
Srivastava, learned counsel for appellant
and Mr. Mahendra Kumar Mishra, learned
counsel for respondent.

(2) First Appeal From Order under
Section 23 of the Railway Claims Tribunal
Act, 1987 has been filed against order
dated 30.09.2021 whereby application for
condonation of delay in filing claim has
been dismissed along with the claim
application.

(3) Vide order dated 26.11.2021,
appeal
had
been
admitted
while
summoning the lower court records, which
have been forwarded by the tribunal
concerned.
4 All. Ram Badal Mishra Vs. U.O.I.
1067

(4) Learned counsel for appellant
submits that upon death of Late Ajay
Kumar, on 05.07.2015, the appellant who is
his father and dependent went into shock
and was mentally disturbed for a prolonged
time due to which claim application was
filed with a delay of three years and six
months. It is submitted that in the
application for condonation of delay,
cogent ground had been indicated for filing
the claim application with considerable
delay. It is submitted that the delay in filing
claim application was neither deliberate nor
intentional and occasioned only due to
advice
of
counsel
as
per
which
considerable time was lost in obtaining
police reports and other papers to establish
death of deceased. It is submitted that the
aforesaid factors have been completely
ignored by the Tribunal while rejecting
claim on the ground of delay. It is
submitted that the provisions of Act being
beneficial in nature, the Tribunal should
have leaned towards hearing on merits
instead of rejecting the claim application on
technicalities.

(5) Learned counsel appearing on
behalf of respondent Union of India has
refuted submissions advanced by learned
counsel for appellant with the submission
that no cogent explanation was furnished
by the claimant for filing claim application
after three years and six months. It is
submitted that actually the claim has been
filed after four years, five months and 25
days from the date of alleged accident and
it is only after excluding one year limitation
that the delay comes to three years five
months and 25 days as on the date of filing
of claim application. It is submitted that
such a delay was clearly intentional and
willful particularly since the delay has not
been precisely explained and as such was
rightly rejected by the Tribunal.

(6)

Upon
consideration
of
submissions advanced by learned counsel
for parties and perusal of material available
on record, it is evident that claim
application of the appellant has been
rejected by means of impugned order,
while rejecting application for condonation
of delay on the ground that reason for delay
has been given only in general terms and
has not been explained satisfactorily.

(7)

Considering
the
aforesaid
submissions,
the
following
point
of
determination is being framed:

(i) Whether the Tribunal erred in law
in rejecting the claim application on the
ground of limitation without adverting to
purpose of the Railway Claims Tribunal
Act, 1987?

(8) With regard to aforesaid proposition
regarding condonation of delay, it is apparent
that there was an actual delay of more than four
years in filing claim from the date of alleged
accident but it is also important to bear in mind
that the concept of compensation for accident
arising out of and due to use of Railway in
terms of Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 is
clearly a beneficial legislation. The introduction
and statement of objects and reasons of the Act
of 1987 clearly indicates that the Act has been
introduced to make the Indian Railways
accountable to Indian Citizens in a democratic
setup and to make it more efficient and
accountable. As such, the aspect of condonation
of delay is required to be seen in the context of
a beneficial legislation enacted for the purposes
of awarding compensation to persons who are
injured or die due to an accident arising out of
use of Railway property.

(9) Considering the said fact that the
Act is a beneficial piece of legislation,
normal conditions for condonation of delay
1068 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
in such situations are required to be
relaxed.

(10) Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the
case of Steel Authority of India Ltd. and
others versus National Union Water Front
Workers and others reported in 2001 (19)
Lucknow Civil Decision 1339 has clearly
held as follows:-

"9. ................... It is now well settled that
in interpreting a beneficial legislation enacted
to give effect to directive principles of the
state
policy
which
is
otherwise
constitutionally valid, the consideration of the
Court cannot be divorced from those
objectives. In a case of ambiguity in the
language of a beneficial labour legislation,
the Courts have to resolve the quandary in
favour of conferment of, rather than denial of,
a benefit on the labour by the legislature but
without rewriting and/or doing violence to
the provisions of the enactment".

(11) It is thus clear that while
interpreting a beneficial legislation, an effort
has to be made to give effect to the objective
of the enactment, which in the present case is
consideration of claim for compensation in
view of loss suffered to the life or person of
an individual.

(12) It is also settled proposition of law
as held by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the
case of Prem Singh and Others Versus
Birbal and others reported in (2006) 5 SCC
353 that limitation is statute of repose. It
ordinarily bars remedy but does not
extinguish a right with the only exception to
be found in Section 27 of the Limitation Act
1968 pertaining to institution of suit for
possession of any property.

(13) With regard to the concept of
condonation of delay, Hon'ble the Supreme
Court in the case of Manoharan versus
Sivaranjan and others reported in (2014) 4
Supreme Court Cases 163 has held as
follows:-

"Answer to Point (ii)

8.In State of Bihar v. Kameshwar
Prasad Singh [(2000) 9 SCC 94 : 2000
SCC (L&S) 845], it was held that power to
condone the delay in approaching the court
has been conferred upon the courts to
enable them to do substantial justice to the
parties by disposing the cases on merit. The
relevant paragraphs of the case read as
under: (SCC pp. 102-104, paras 11-13)

"11. Power to condone the delay in
approaching the court has been conferred
upon the courts to enable them to do
substantial justice to parties by disposing
of matters on merits. This Court in
Collector (LA) v. Katiji [(1987) 2 SCC 107
: 1989 SCC (Tax) 172] held that the
expression ''sufficient cause' employed by
the legislature in the Limitation Act is
adequately elastic to enable the courts to
apply the law in a meaningful manner
which subserves the ends of justice--that
being the life-purpose for the existence of
the institution of courts. It was further
observed that a liberal approach is adopted
on principle as it is realised that: (SCC p.
108, para 3)

''1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand
to benefit by lodging an appeal late.

2. Refusing to condone delay can
result in a meritorious matter being thrown
out at the very threshold and cause of
justice being defeated. As against this when
delay is condoned the highest that can
happen is that a cause would be decided on
merits after hearing the parties.

3. "Every day's delay must be
explained" does not mean that a pedantic
approach should be made. Why not every
hour's delay, every second's delay? The
4 All. Ram Badal Mishra Vs. U.O.I.
1069
doctrine must be applied in a rational
common sense pragmatic manner.

4. When substantial justice and
technical considerations are pitted against
each other, cause of substantial justice
deserves to be preferred for the other side
cannot claim to have vested right in
injustice being done because of a nondeliberate delay.

5. There is no presumption that delay
is occasioned deliberately, or on account of
culpable negligence, or on account of mala
fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by
resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious
risk.

6. It must be grasped that judiciary is
respected not on account of its power to
legalise injustice on technical grounds but
because it is capable of removing injustice
and is expected to do so.'

12. After referring to the various
judgments
reported
in
New
India
Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra
[(1975) 2 SCC 840 : (1976) 2 SCR 266] ,
Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi Ram [(191617) 44 IA 218 : (1917) 6 LW 592 : ILR
(1918) 45 Cal 94] , Shakuntala Devi Jain
v. Kuntal Kumari [AIR 1969 SC 575 :
(1969) 1 SCR 1006] , Concord of India
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi
[(1979) 4 SCC 365 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 996
: (1979) 118 ITR 507] ,Lala Mata Dinv.
A. Narayanan[(1969) 2 SCC 770 : (1970)
2 SCR 90] ,State of Keralav. E.K.
Kuriyipe [1981 Supp SCC 72] , Milavi
Devi v.Dina Nath [(1982) 3 SCC 366]
,O.P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh [(1984)
4 SCC 66] , Collector (LA) v. Katiji
[(1987) 2 SCC 107 : 1989 SCC (Tax)
172] , Prabha v.Ram Parkash Kalra
[1987 Supp SCC 339] ,G. Ramegowdav.
Land Acquisition Officer[(1988) 2 SCC
142 : (1988) 3 SCR 198] ,Scheduled
Caste Coop. Land Owning Society Ltd.
v.Union of India [(1991) 1 SCC 174]
,Binod
Bihari
Singhv.Union
of
India[(1993) 1 SCC 572 : AIR 1993 SC
1245] ,Shakambari & Co. v. Union of
India [1993 Supp (1) SCC 487] ,Ram
Kishan v.U.P. SRTC[1994 Supp (2) SCC
507] and Warlu v. Gangotribai [1995
Supp (1) SCC 37] this Court inState of
Haryana v.Chandra Mani [(1996) 3 SCC
132 : (2002) 143 ELT 249] held: (SCC p.
138, para 11)

''11. ... The expression "sufficient
cause" should, therefore, be considered
with
pragmatism
in
justice-oriented
approach
rather
than
the
technical
detection of sufficient cause for explaining
every day's delay. The factors which are
peculiar to and characteristic of the
functioning of the governmental conditions
would be cognizant to and requires
adoption of pragmatic approach in justiceoriented process. The court should decide
the matters on merits unless the case is
hopelessly without merit. No separate
standards to determine the cause laid by
the State vis-à-vis private litigant could be
laid down to prove strict standards of
sufficient
cause.
The
Government
at
appropriate level should constitute legal
cells to examine the cases whether any
legal principles are involved for decision
by the courts or whether cases require
adjustment and should authorise the
officers to take a decision or give
appropriate permission for settlement. In
the event of decision to file appeal needed
prompt action should be pursued by the
officer responsible to file the appeal and he
should be made personally responsible for
lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be
put on the same footing as an individual.
The individual would always be quick in
taking the decision whether he would
pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or
application since he is a person legally
1070 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
injured while State is an impersonal
machinery working through its officers or
servants.'

To the same effect is the judgment of
this Court in Tehsildar (LA) v. K.V.
Ayisumma [(1996) 10 SCC 634 : AIR 1996
SC 2750] .

13. In Nand Kishore v. State of Punjab
[(1995) 6 SCC 614 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 57 :
(1995) 31 ATC 787] this Court under the
peculiar
circumstances
of
the
case
condoned the delay in approaching this
Court
of
about
31
years.
In
N.
Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy [(1998)
7 SCC 123 : (2008) 228 ELT 162] this
Court held that the purpose of the
Limitation Act was not to destroy the
rights. It is founded on public policy fixing
a life span for the legal remedy for the
general welfare. The primary function of a
court is to adjudicate disputes between the
parties and to advance substantial justice.
The time-limit fixed for approaching the
court in different situations is not because
on the expiry of such time a bad cause
would transform into a good cause. The
object of providing legal remedy is to
repair the damage caused by reason of
legal injury. If the explanation given does
not smack mala fides or is not shown to
have been put forth as a part of a dilatory
strategy, the court must show utmost
consideration to the suitor. In this context it
was observed in N. Balakrishnan v. M.
Krishnamurthy [(1998) 7 SCC 123 : (2008)
228 ELT 162] : (SCC p. 127, para 9)

''9. It is axiomatic that condonation of
delay is a matter of discretion of the court.
Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say
that such discretion can be exercised only if
the delay is within a certain limit. Length of
delay is no matter, acceptability of the
explanation
is
the
only
criterion.
Sometimes delay of the shortest range may
be uncondonable due to a want of
acceptable explanation whereas in certain
other cases, delay of a very long range can
be condoned as the explanation thereof is
satisfactory. Once the court accepts the
explanation as sufficient, it is the result of
positive exercise of discretion and normally
the superior court should not disturb such
finding,
much
less
in
revisional
jurisdiction,
unless
the
exercise
of
discretion
was
on
wholly
untenable
grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a
different matter when the first court refuses
to condone the delay. In such cases, the
superior court would be free to consider
the cause shown for the delay afresh and it
is open to such superior court to come to its
own finding even untrammelled by the
conclusion of the lower court."

"In Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom,
Perinadu Village Vs. Bhargavi Amma
(dead) by LRs, (2008) 8 SCC 321, it is
observed that the words sufficient cause for
not making the application within the period
of limitation should be understood and
applied in a reasonable, pragmatic, practical
and liberal manner, depending upon the facts
and circumstances of the each case and also
the type of case. It was held that word
'sufficient cause' occurring in Section 5 of the
Limitation Act should receive a liberal
construction so as to advance substantial
justice.

In K. Subbarayudu and others Vs
Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition)
(2017) 12 SCC 840, Hon'ble Supreme Court
in paragraph 11 has held that the term
"sufficient cause" is to receive liberal
construction so as to advance substantial
justice. When no negligence, inaction or want
of bona fides is attributable to the appellants,
the Court should adopt a justice-oriented
approach in condoning the delay."

(14) Upon applicability of aforesaid
judgment in the present case, it is apparent
4 All. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Munni Devi & Ors.
1071
that the Tribunal has taken a very pedantic
and hidebound view of the application for
condonation of delay. It is no doubt true
that the claim was filed with considerable
delay but the Tribunal was required to have
taken a pragmatic approach to advance the
cause of merit and justice instead of
rejecting the application for condonation of
delay merely on the ground of delay of
three years and six months.

(15) Considering the fact that claim
application was filed in terms of a
beneficial enactment, it was incumbent
upon the Tribunal to have taken a
pragmatic and justice oriented approach in
condoning delay in filing claim application
which related to death of the claimant's son.
The tribunal has not recorded any finding
that delay occasioned in filing the claim
was deliberate, willful or intentional on the
part of claimant. Without recording any
such finding, the Tribunal was not required
to have rejected the claim application. As a
result the point of determination is
answered in the affirmative in favour of
appellant.

(16)

In
view
of
aforesaid
observations, it is apparent that impugned
order dated 30.09.2021 is not in accordance
with law and is therefore set aside. The
appeal succeeds and is allowed. The
application for condonation of delay in
filing claim petition consequently stands
allowed. The matter is remitted to the
Tribunal concerned for consideration afresh
of the claim application on merits.

(17) Office is directed to remit the
lower court record expeditiously for the
said purpose.
----------
(2022)04ILR A1071
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 10.03.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE DR. KAUSHAL JAYENDRA
THAKER, J.

First Appeal From Order No. 568 of 1991

New India Assurance Co. Ltd. ...Appellant
Versus
Smt. Munni Devi & Ors. ...Opp. Parties

Counsel for the Appellant:
Sri S.P. Lal, Sri Rajesh Ji Verma

Counsel for the Opp. Parties:
Sri Siddharth, Sri H.K. Gupta, Sri K.K. Srivastava

Civil Law - Workmen's Compensation Act,
1923 - Section 4A--Accident-Murder during
course
of
employment--Where
dominant
intention of the felonious act is to kill any
person--Such killing is not accidental murder--If
cause of murder or act of murder was not
originally intended and same is caused in
furtherance of any other felonious act, then
such murder is accidental murder--In the
present case, deceased was in employment
when the incident occurred--Deceased died due
to employment injuries.

Appeal dismissed. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:

1. Rita Devi & ors. Vs New India Assurance Co.
Ltd. & ors. MANU/SC/0312/2000

2. Golla Rajanna & ors. Vs The Divisional
Manager & ors. MANU/SC/1515/2016

3. Mackinnon Mackenzie and Co. (P) Ltd. Vs
Ibrahim Mahmmed Issak MANU/SC/0310/1969

4. Regional Director, E.S.I. Corporation & ors. Vs
Francis De Costa & ors. MANU/SC/0117/1997

5. Malikarjuna G. Hiremath Vs The Branch
Manager, The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. & ors.
MANU/SC/0202/2009