# Ram Bahadur alias Laxmi Prasad v. Collector, Hamirpur and others

- **Citation:** (2004) 1 ILRA 221
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2004-03-19
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 29882 of 1995
- **Bench:** Arun Tandon
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ram-bahadur-alias-laxmi-prasad-v-collector-hamirpur-and-others-40325
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

Sri L.S. Srivastava
Sri S.K. Singh
Sri B.R. Singh
S.C.

U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land
Holdings Act, 1960-Ss. 10 (2) and 14Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-S.11-Writ
Petition-Maintainability-Successive Writ
Petition-Abuse of process of CourtPrinciples of Constructive resjudicataApplicability-Writ
petition-held,
not
maintainable-Once petitioner had failed
in his action against original orders
cannot
be
permitted
to
challenge
consequential action-held, barred by
principles of constrictive res-judicata.

Held: Para 20 & 25

It
is
needless
to
point
out
that
dispossession of the petitioner was only
a consequential action on the orders
passed by the Prescribed Authority and
the Commissioner declaring the land of
the petitioner as surplus. Once the
petitioner had failed in his action again
the
original
orders,
he
cannot
be
permitted to challenge the consequential
action taken thereto. As a matter of fact,
the writ petition was only an attempt to
reopen the chapter, which has been
closed with the dismissal of the earlier
writ petition filed by the petitioner by
couching the relief in different words.
The petitioner was not justified in filing
the present writ petition. This writ
petition was barred by the principles of
constructive res judicata as explained by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gurbux Vs.
Bhure Lal AIR 1964 SC 1810; Gurdasji &
Company Vs. State of Maisoor AIR 1975
SC 813; Commissioner of Income Tax Vs.
T.P. Kumaran 1996(10) SCC 561. This
writ petition, as a matter of fact, was
legally not maintainable and deserves to
be dismissed.

Reference is made to the provisions of
Section 14 of the U.P. Consolidation of
Holdings Act, which only provides for an
opportunity to be afforded to the tenure
holder to give his choice before any land
is taken as surplus. The said section does
contemplate that if the choice is not
exercised by the tenure holder, the
authorities, under the U.P. Imposition of
Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, shall
remain silent and would not declare
certain plots of the tenure holders as
surplus. In the facts of the case it is
apparently clear that the petitioner was
afforded opportunity to exercise his
choice, which he deliberately did not do
so and as such the Prescribed Authority
was justified in declaring the chak no. 81
(now plot no. 362) as surplus.

## Text

1 All] Ram Bahadur alias Laxmi Prasad V. Collector, Hamirpur and others 221
31. As about 10 years are shortly
going to expire and the proceedings are
only at the stage just after issue of Notice,
the opposite parties be directed to appear
personally before the Court on 24th
February, 2004. List this case before the
appropriate Bench on 24th February,
2004.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 19.03.2004

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE ARUN TANDON, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 29882 of 1995

Ram Bahadur Alias Laxmi Prasad

 ...Petitioner
Versus
Collector, Hamirpur and others

 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri N.B. Nigam

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri L.S. Srivastava
Sri S.K. Singh
Sri B.R. Singh
S.C.

U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land
Holdings Act, 1960-Ss. 10 (2) and 14Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-S.11-Writ
Petition-Maintainability-Successive Writ
Petition-Abuse of process of CourtPrinciples of Constructive resjudicataApplicability-Writ
petition-held,
not
maintainable-Once petitioner had failed
in his action against original orders
cannot
be
permitted
to
challenge
consequential action-held, barred by
principles of constrictive res-judicata.

Held: Para 20 & 25

It
is
needless
to
point
out
that
dispossession of the petitioner was only
a consequential action on the orders
passed by the Prescribed Authority and
the Commissioner declaring the land of
the petitioner as surplus. Once the
petitioner had failed in his action again
the
original
orders,
he
cannot
be
permitted to challenge the consequential
action taken thereto. As a matter of fact,
the writ petition was only an attempt to
reopen the chapter, which has been
closed with the dismissal of the earlier
writ petition filed by the petitioner by
couching the relief in different words.
The petitioner was not justified in filing
the present writ petition. This writ
petition was barred by the principles of
constructive res judicata as explained by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gurbux Vs.
Bhure Lal AIR 1964 SC 1810; Gurdasji &
Company Vs. State of Maisoor AIR 1975
SC 813; Commissioner of Income Tax Vs.
T.P. Kumaran 1996(10) SCC 561. This
writ petition, as a matter of fact, was
legally not maintainable and deserves to
be dismissed.

Reference is made to the provisions of
Section 14 of the U.P. Consolidation of
Holdings Act, which only provides for an
opportunity to be afforded to the tenure
holder to give his choice before any land
is taken as surplus. The said section does
contemplate that if the choice is not
exercised by the tenure holder, the
authorities, under the U.P. Imposition of
Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, shall
remain silent and would not declare
certain plots of the tenure holders as
surplus. In the facts of the case it is
apparently clear that the petitioner was
afforded opportunity to exercise his
choice, which he deliberately did not do
so and as such the Prescribed Authority
was justified in declaring the chak no. 81
(now plot no. 362) as surplus.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Arun Tandon, J.)

1. Heard Sri N.B. Nigam on behalf
of the petitioner and Sri S.K. Singh
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222 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2004
counsel on behalf of the respondent nos. 5
to 17 as well as standing counsel on
behalf of the respondent nos. 1 to 4.

2. This writ petition is an example of
abuse of process of the court by a person
filing successive writ petitions and
obstructing the allotment of surplus land
to poor persons for whose interest the
U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land
Holdings Act was enacted. This Court is
deeply shocked with the manner in which
successive writ petitions have been filed
before this court and interim orders
obtained time and again.

3. The relevant fact for decision of
the writ petition are that proceedings
under Section 10(2) were initiated against
the petitioner under the U.P. Imposition of
Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 as
early as in the year 1975.

4. The petitioner filed objections.
The objections were considered and the
Prescribed Authority by means of the
order dated 15th June, 1976 declared 22.5
Acres as surplus in terms of irrigated land.
Against the said order of the Prescribed
Authority, the petitioner filed an appeal
before the District Judge, Hamirpur,
being appeal no. 523 of 1976.

5. On 11th November, 1976 the
appeal was allowed and the Appellate
Authority reduced the area of surplus land
to 11.2 Acres in terms of irrigated land.
Against the said order the petitioner filed
writ petition no. 1025 of 1977 (First writ
petition), which was allowed by this
Court on 4th September, 1978 and the
matter was remanded to the District Judge
for reconsideration of the appeal filed by
the petitioner.

6. On remand the District Judge by
means of the order dated 16th December,
1979 allowed the appeal and reduced the
area of the surplus land to 7.82 Acres.
Despite the aforesaid order having been
passed, the petitioner does not claims to
have exercised any choice in respect of
the land to be taken as surplus.

7.

The
Prescribed
Authority,
subsequent to order dated 16th December,
1979, passed an order on 11th March,
1980 directing that Chak No. 81, which
belonged to petitioner be declared surplus.

8. On an application being filed by
the petitioner, the order dated 11th March,
1980 was recalled by the Prescribed
Authority on the ground that the same
was an ex parte order. The Prescribed
Authority, after recalling the order dated
11th March, 1980, passed an order on 26th
February, 1981 and required the Lekhpal
to submit his comment with regards to
choice submitted by the petitioner. From
the said order, which has been enclosed as
Annexure-1 to the writ petition, it is
apparently clear that the petitioner had
already exercised his choice inasmuch as
the order reads as follows:-

,d Ik{kh; vkns'k fnukad 11-3-80 dks fujLr fd;k
tkrk gSA [kkrsnkj ds fodYi ij rglhynkj egksok ls fnukad
27-3-81 rd vk[;k ekaxh tkosA ftl ij [kkrsnkj mlh
fnu viuk Ik{k izLrqr dj ldrk gSA

9. The petitioner had exercised his
choice on 20th March, 1980. It is, thus,
clear that the petitioner had exercised the
choice prior to the passing of the order
dated 26th February, 1981.

10. The Prescribed Authority
thereafter by means of the order dated
18.4.1981, after obtaining the report from
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1 All] Ram Bahadur alias Laxmi Prasad V. Collector, Hamirpur and others 223
the
Tehsildar,
rejected
the
choice
exercised by the petitioner and directed
that Chak No. 81, total area 7.82 Acres
irrigated, be declared as surplus.

11. Against the aforesaid order of
the Prescribed Authority, petitioner (as
stated in paragraph 4 of the writ petition)
had filed appeal no. 12 of 1981. It is
further alleged in the said paragraph that
the said appeal was dismissed by the
District Judge on 24.8.1981. However,
liberty was given to the petitioner to
exercise fresh choice of plot other than
the choice which has been earlier
exercised by the petitioner by means of
application dated 20.3.1980.

12. Against the said order of the
District Judge, the petitioner filed writ
petition no. 14117 of 1981 (Second Writ
Petition) and again succeeded in obtaining
an ex parte order. This writ petition has
been dismissed by this Court on 19th
October, 1984. However, the order
passed by this Court has not been brought
on record. Similarly the order dated
24.8.1981 passed by the District Judge in
appeal has also not been brought on
record.

13. Against the order dated 19th
October, 1984 it is claimed that the
petitioner had filed Special Leave Petition
before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The
number of said Special Leave Petition is
15259 of 1985. It has not been stated as to
when the Special Leave Petition was filed
and dismissed. In the writ petition it has
not been mentioned as to whether the
Special Leave Petition was entertained by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court or not and as
to whether at any point of time any
interim order was granted by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court. The date of dismissal of
the appeal has also been concealed in the
writ petition.

14. From the record it is apparent
that the petitioner in order to install the
proceedings
before
the
Prescribed
Authority made an other application that
possession of land in question be not
taken as special leave petition is pending.
This court is unable to see how this
application could be filed specifically
when there was no interim order in the
special leave petition. Thus, there is
deliberate attempt on the part of the
petitioner to avoid dispossession from the
surplus land on one pretext or other.

15. On the basis of his application,
requiring the Prescribed Authority not to
take possession of the surplus land despite
the writ petition and the special leave
petition
have
been
dismissed,
the
petitioner started second innings of
litigation. He filed appeal before the
Commissioner against the order of the
Prescribed Authority dated 12.4.1988,
whereby the Prescribed Authority has
rejected his application for not to
dispossess the petitioner as specials leave
petition of the petitioner was said to be
pending. There is no provision under the
U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land
Holdings Act under which said appeal
could be filed by the petitioner. The
Commissioner also rejected his appeal on
12th September, 1988

16.

The
said
order
of
the
Commissioner has also not been brought
on record for the reasons best known to
petitioner. Against the said order of the
Commissioner, the petitioner filed a writ
petition no. 12732 of 1989 (Third Writ
Petition) and again succeeded in obtaining
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224 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2004
ex
parte
stay
order,
whereby
his
dispossession was stayed.

17. Surprisingly, after more than 5
years the petitioner got the aforesaid writ
petition no. 12732 of 1989 dismissed as
not pressed.

18. With the dismissal of the writ
petition the entire objections raised by the
petitioner with regard to his dispossession
from
the
land
in
question
stood
adjudicated between the parties before
this Court. Now it is not open to petitioner
to raise any issue with regards to the
surplus land specifically chak no. 81,
which was converted into plot no. 363
(for reference paragraph 13 of the writ
petition) after consolidation.

19. The petitioner, in order to further
install his dispossession, now initiated
third innings and filed the present writ
petition no. 29882 of 1995 (fourth
petition). In this writ petition also the
petitioner obtained an ex parte interim
order whereby his dispossession has been
stayed. The petitioner is enjoining the
benefit of the said interim order for last
more than 9 years. The reliefs prayed for
in this writ petition are as follows:-
"(i) issue a suitable writ, order or
direction in the nature of a writ of
mandamus directing the respondents
not to dispossess the petitioner from the
disputed land otherwise in accordance
with law and not to interfere with the
possession of the petitioner in any way.
(ii) issue any other suitable writ, order
or direction as this Hon'ble Court may
deem
fit
and
proper
in
the
circumstances of the case, and to-
(iii) award cost of the petition to the
petitioner."

20. It is surprising that no order
whatsoever has been challenged in the
writ petition. This Court fail to understand
how the petitioner can ask for writ of
mandamus restraining the respondents
from dispossessing the petitioner from
surplus land once he had himself
withdrawn his earlier writ petition no.
12732 of 1989 referred to above. It is
needless to point out that dispossession of
the petitioner was only a consequential
action on the orders passed by the
Prescribed
Authority
and
the
Commissioner declaring the land of the
petitioner as surplus. Once the petitioner
had failed in his action again the original
orders, he cannot be permitted to
challenge the consequential action taken
thereto. As a matter of fact, the writ
petition was only an attempt to reopen the
chapter, which has been closed with the
dismissal of the earlier writ petition filed
by the petitioner by couching the relief in
different words. The petitioner was not
justified in filing the present writ petition.
This writ petition was barred by the
principles of constructive res judicata as
explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in Gurbux Vs. Bhure Lal AIR 1964 SC
1810; Gurdasji & Company Vs. State
of
Maisoor
AIR
1975
SC
813;
Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. T.P.
Kumaran 1996(10) SCC 561. This writ
petition, as a matter of fact, was legally
not maintainable and deserves to be
dismissed.

21. The petitioner, against the order
of Prescribed Authority dated 23rd April,
1988
whereby
plot
no.
362
was
earmarked as surplus land to be allotted to
the persons entitled to the same, filed an
application dated 20th November, 1990
under Section 27(4) of the Act before the
Commissioner and obtained an ex parte
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1 All] Ram Bahadur alias Laxmi Prasad V. Collector, Hamirpur and others 225
interim order again on 28th November,
1990. The Commissioner has rejected the
application on 30th November, 1995,
against which the petitioner had filed the
writ petition no. 8473 of 1996 (fifth
petition) challenging the allotment of the
surplus land made in favour of respondent
nos. 5 to 17 who were admittedly the
persons entitled to allotment of the
surplus land in accordance with the
provisions of U.P. Imposition of Ceiling
on Land Holdings Act. This writ petition
is not legally maintainable in view of the
earlier writ petition filed by the petitioner,
referred to above, as also in view of the
dismissal of his writ petition no. 29882 of
1995. The allotment of land is only
consequential action. Any infirmity or
illegality in the procedure of allotment, as
alleged by the petitioner, cannot be a
concern of the petitioner as he is neither
an applicant for allotment of the land nor
has any right or interest in the allotment
of the surplus land. It is apparent that the
petitioner has filed this writ petition only
to complicate the issue before this Court
and some how for other prolong the
pendency of the writ petition by getting
writ petition no. 8473 of 1996 connected
with the writ petition no. 29882 of 1995.

22. From the facts, which have been
stated above, it is apparently clear that the
ceiling of the petitioner was declared
finally on 16th December, 1979 and for
last more than 25 years the petitioner, by
series of litigations and writ petitions has
remained in possession over the surplus
land. As already noticed above, the
proceedings initiated by the petitioner
subsequent to dismissal of his special
leave petition by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court,
were
totally
unfounded
and
without authority of law. The petitioner
for last 20 years by initiating uncalled for
proceedings and by filing successive writ
petitions has succeeded in installing the
purpose for which U.P. Imposition of
Ceiling on Land Holdings Act has been
enacted. The conduct of the petitioner is
highly unsatisfactory and disentitles him
to any relief under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.

23. However, contention raised on
behalf
of
the
petitioner
may
be
considered. It is stated by the counsel
appearing on behalf of the petitioner that
here is a lacuna in Section 14 of the U.P.
Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings
Act inasmuch as the said section does
not take into consideration the order
which are passed under Section 12 of the
U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land
Holdings Act after objections are filed by
the tenure holder. The said contention
raised on behalf of the petitioner is totally
misconceived and it is a clear case of
misreading
of
section
14.
Further,
admittedly, the petitioner had filed an
appeal under Section 13 of the U.P.
Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings
Act against the order of the Prescribed
Authority. The ceiling limit of the
petitioner was finally determined under
the
appellate
order.
Section
14
specifically take care of the order passed
under Section 13 and for possession of the
surplus land being taken thereafter. In
such circumstances, the petitioner could
not have raised the issue which has been
submitted on his behest as referred to
above.

24. It is further contended on behalf
of the petitioner that there is no order of
the Prescribed Authority declaring chak
no. 81 (now plot no. 362) as surplus. It is
contended that the order, whereby chak
no. 81 was declared as surplus dated
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226 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2004
11.3.1980 had been recalled by the
Prescribed Authority by means of the
order dated 25.2.1981 and thereafter the
petitioner was permitted to exercise his
fresh choice under order of the District
Judge passed in appeal no. 12 of 1981.
The said contention raised by the
petitioner appears to be attractive on the
face of it. However, in legal scrutiny same
is found hollow. It has not been disputed
by the petitioner that both the District
Judge as well as Prescribed Authority by
means of his order dated 20.3.1980 had
given an option to petitioner to exercise a
fresh choice other than one which had
been exercised by him by means of his
application dated 20.3.1980. The writ
petition is completely silent as to what
was done by the petitioner in that regard.
The petitioner has not informed this Court
as to whether the fresh choice was
exercised by him or not subsequent to the
order
of
the
District
Judge
dated
24.8.1988 and subsequent to the dismissal
of his writ petition as well as the special
leave petition against the same. If the
petitioner himself has not decided to
exercise a fresh choice despite liberty
being granted by the authorities as well as
this Court, the petitioner cannot be
permitted to turn around and seek this
remedy in writ petition. There is no
illegality in taking possession over the
chak no. 81 which was subsequently
converted into plot no. 362. The petitioner
cannot be permitted to approach this
Court for the relief to permit him to
exercise a fresh choice in respect of
surplus land as petitioner has not
exercised his choice despite opportunity
earlier.

25. Reference is made to the
provisions of Section 14 of the U.P.
Consolidation of Holdings Act, which
only provides for an opportunity to be
afforded to the tenure holder to give his
choice before any land is taken as surplus.
The said section does contemplate that if
the choice is not exercised by the tenure
holder, the authorities, under the U.P.
Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings
Act, shall remain silent and would not
declare certain plots of the tenure holders
as surplus. In the facts of the case it is
apparently clear that the petitioner was
afforded opportunity to exercise his
choice, which he deliberately did not do
so and as such the Prescribed Authority
was justified in declaring the chak no. 81
(now plot no. 362) as surplus.

26. From the fact, which have been
stated above, this Court has no doubt that
the petitioner has misused the process of
this Court and he has retained possession,
by filing successive applications and writ
petitions, of the land which was declared
surplus as early in the year 1979.

27. In such circumstances, the
petitioner must necessarily be required to
pay cost for the aforesaid attempt made
by him. This Court feels that Rs. 40,000/-
is fair and sufficient to be fixed as
exemplary cost. The amount of cost
should be deposited by the petitioner with
the District Magistrate, Hamirpur within
one month from today. Failing which the
District Magistrate shall recover the said
amount from the petitioner as arrears of
land revenue and shall report compliance
to this Court. The money so realized
would be transmitted to Legal Aid
Services Authority High Court, Allahabad
for being used as an assistance to poor
litigants.

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1 All] Abdus Salam @ A. Salam V. Ellection Commission of India and another 227
28. With these directions, the writ
petition is dismissed. Interim order, if
any, stands vacated.

29. The copy of this order be issued
to Sri Piyush Shukla, standing counsel,
for being communicated to the District
Magistrate, Hamirpur.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 6.2.2004

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE S.P. SRIVASTAVA, J.
THE HON'BLE UMESHWAR PANDEY, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 4220 of 2004

Abdus Salam @ A. Salam
...Petitioner
Versus
Election
Commission
of
India
and
another

...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri S.G. Hasnain

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri B.N. Singh
S.C.

Representation of Peoples Act, 1951- Ss.
10-A and 11- Natural Justice- Order by
Election Commission disqualifying for 3
years-categorical finding that inspite of
notice
no
explanation
furnished-
Applications by petitioner for removal of
disqualification giving full facts and his
version detail- rejection of applications
caused no prejudice to petitioner- No
personal
hearing
or
opportunity
required- Writ dismissed.

Held- Para 14,15 & 17

We are clearly of the opinion that the
duty to hear does not necessarily mean
affording
of
personal
hearing
or
audience and an aggrieved party may be
heard orally or through the medium of
written representation ensuring that no
prejudice is caused.

Considering
the
peculiar
facts
and
circumstances of the present case, we
are clearly of the view that the impugned
order cannot be held to be vitiated in law
on account of its having been passed in
violation of principles of natural justice,
as claimed and further that an effective
opportunity had been afforded to the
petitioner.

It should not be lost sight of that for
considering the question of violation of
principles of natural justice, all that has
to be seen is, as to whether the
concerned authority had acted in a fair
manner.
There
is
nothing
rigid
or
mechanical
about
the
principles
of
natural justice. Whenever, there is a
reference to the rules of natural justice,
it
signifies
that
the
principle
and
procedure which are to be applied have
to be such which in any particular set of
circumstances, are right, just and fair.
Case Law discussed:
AIR 1966 SC 671
AIR 1967 SC 1398
1994 Supp.(2) SCC 463
1957 SCR 1151: AIR 1957 SC 648

(Delivered by Hon'ble S.P. Srivastava, J.)

1. Heard the learned counsel for the
petitioner.

2. The learned standing counsel
representing the respondents who has put
in appearance at this stage on advance
notice has also been heard.

3. The petitioner is aggrieved by the
order of the Election Tribunal dated
7.1.2003
whereby
exercising
the
jurisdiction as envisaged under Section
10-A of the Representation of the People
Act, 1951 the petitioner was disqualified
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