# Ram Chandra Gupta v. Union of India and others

- **Citation:** (2011) 1 ILRA 91
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2011-01-13
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 23592 of 2006
- **Bench:** Satya Poot Mehrotra, Pankaj Mithal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ram-chandra-gupta-v-union-of-india-and-others-41905
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Appeal Rules 1965-Rule 68 (1), 69 (1)
(c)-claim of interest delay in paymentamount of gratuity withheld during
pendancy of disciplinary proceedingpetitioner retired in Sept. 95-amount
paid July 1996-can not be learned as
inordinate delay-moreover interest not
claimed in original application can not be
allowed to before writ court.

Held: Para 24 & 34

The delay between 25th June, 1998 and
23rd March, 1999 cannot be said to be
inordinate delay having regard to the
facts and circumstances of the case,
particularly the fact that the disciplinary
proceedings came to an end on 25th
June, 1998, and thereafter, time was
taken for finalizing the payment of
gratuity to the petitioner. Therefore, the
payment of interest in respect of the
delayed payment of gratuity has been
rightly denied to the petitioner by the
Tribunal in the impugned Judgment and
Order.
92 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2011
As no relief for payment of interest in
respect of commuted amount of pension
was claimed by the petitioner before the
Tribunal in his Original Application, the
petitioner
cannot
make
such
claim
before this Court in the Writ Petition
directed against the Judgement and
Order of the Tribunal.
Case law discussed:
AIR 2000 SC 1918

## Text

1 All] Ram Chandra Gupta V. Union of India and others
91
as well as the property attached thereto,
therefore, being Trustee, the Sarvarahkar
has had no right to transfer the property.

14. Upon perusal of the contents of
the paragraph 6 of the plaint of suit No.324
of 1987, it appears that it was stated that one
suit for declaration of the sale deed as
unauthorized and to declare the tenure
holder of the land was instituted by Mahant
Bhagwan Das before the Revenue court,
which was pending consideration at that
very time, the present position of the suit is
not disclosed, however, I am of the view
that for declaration of any document as
void, it is only the civil court, who is
competent not the revenue court.

15. After being successful in the suit
the respondents filed the subsequent suit
before the Civil Court for declaration of sale
deed as void. Though the earlier dispute is
still pending before this court in the second
appeal, but the decree passed by the trial
court as well as the appellate court has not
been interfered with till date, therefore,
under the strength of the said decree having
been attained the locus to challenge the sale
deed, the respondents filed the suit, which
cannot be rejected merely on the basis of a
technical plea raised by the petitioners. The
cause of action of the present suit is the
illegal transaction of sale, which is
altogether different to the earlier cause of
action of suit No.324 of 1987, therefore, in
the light of the observations of the
Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of Gurbux Singh v.
Bhooralal (Supra), I am of the considered
opinion that the suit is not barred by Order 2
Rule 2 CPC. Therefore, the writ petition is
dismissed.
---------

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 13.01.2011

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SATYA POOT MEHROTRA, J.
THE HON'BLE PANKAJ MITHAL, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 23592 of 2006

Ram Chandra Gupta

 ...Petitioner
Versus
Union of India and others ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Namwar Singh
Sri Sanjiv Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri K.C. Sinha (A.S.G.I.)
Sri N.P. Shukla
C.S.C.

Civil Services Classification Control of
Appeal Rules 1965-Rule 68 (1), 69 (1)
(c)-claim of interest delay in paymentamount of gratuity withheld during
pendancy of disciplinary proceedingpetitioner retired in Sept. 95-amount
paid July 1996-can not be learned as
inordinate delay-moreover interest not
claimed in original application can not be
allowed to before writ court.

Held: Para 24 & 34

The delay between 25th June, 1998 and
23rd March, 1999 cannot be said to be
inordinate delay having regard to the
facts and circumstances of the case,
particularly the fact that the disciplinary
proceedings came to an end on 25th
June, 1998, and thereafter, time was
taken for finalizing the payment of
gratuity to the petitioner. Therefore, the
payment of interest in respect of the
delayed payment of gratuity has been
rightly denied to the petitioner by the
Tribunal in the impugned Judgment and
Order.
92 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2011
As no relief for payment of interest in
respect of commuted amount of pension
was claimed by the petitioner before the
Tribunal in his Original Application, the
petitioner
cannot
make
such
claim
before this Court in the Writ Petition
directed against the Judgement and
Order of the Tribunal.
Case law discussed:
AIR 2000 SC 1918

(Delivered by Hon'ble Satya Poot Mehrotra, J.)

1. The present Writ Petition has been
filed by the petitioner under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India making the
following prayers:

"a. Issue a writ, order or direction in
the nature of certiorari calling for the
records of the case and quashing the
impugned orders dated 7.12.2004 passed by
Hon'ble Central Administrative Tribunal,
Allahabad Bench, Allahabad (Annexure No.
12 to this writ petition).

b. Issue a writ, order or direction in
the nature of mandamus commanding the
respondents to pay leave encashment along
with interest @ 18% per annum since
30.9.1995 till the date of actual payment.

c.Issue a writ, order or direction in the
nature of mandamus commanding the
respondents to pay interest @ 18% per
annum on C.G.E.I.S (since 30.1.1995 to
August 1996), on security deposits, on the
amount of back wages for suspension
period (i.e. 30.5.1995 to 13.3.1999) and
18% interest per annum on gratuity.

d. Issue a writ, order or direction in
the nature of mandamus commanding the
respondents to calculate the commutation
value on the basis of age factor on
30.9.1995.

e. Issue any other suitable writ, order
or direction, as this Hon'ble Court may
deem fit and proper in the circumstances of
the case;

f. Award cost of this petition to the
petitioner."

2. It appears that the petitioner was
working on the post of Store Superintendent
(Civilian Group 'C' Post) in Ordnance
Depot, Fort, Allahabad. The petitioner was
suspended on 24th June, 1994 by the Order
dated 24th June, 1994 (Annexure 1 to the
Writ Petition) with effect from 20th May,
1994. The suspension of the petitioner was
revoked by the Order dated 6.5.1995
(Annexure 3 to the Writ Petition). On 30th
September, 1995, the petitioner retired from
service
on
attaining
the
age
of
superannuation. During the service period,
disciplinary proceedings were initiated
against the petitioner under Rule 14 of the
Central
Civil
Services
(Classification,
Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 [in short
"the CCS (CC & A) Rules, 1965"] by
issuing a Charge-Sheet by Charge Memo
dated 1st August, 1995. The inquiry was
conducted against the petitioner. The
Inquiry Officer submitted his report that
charge levelled against the petitioner was
not proved. Copy of the Inquiry Report was
forwarded to the petitioner to make any
representation or submission, if he so
wished in writing to the Disciplinary
Authority. The petitioner submitted his
Representation dated 12th January, 1998
wherein he prayed for dropping the charge
against him. The Disciplinary Authority by
the Order dated 25th June, 1998 after
considering the Inquiry Report and relevant
records agreed with the findings of the
Inquiry Officer and held the petitioner 'not
1 All] Ram Chandra Gupta V. Union of India and others
93
guilty' of the charge levelled against the
petitioner.

3. Accordingly, the Disciplinary
Authority ordered that the charge levelled
against the petitioner be dropped. Copy of
the said Order dated 25th June, 1998 has
been filed as Annexure 5 to the Writ
Petition.

4. The petitioner thereafter made a
Representation dated 27th July, 1998, interalia, praying for final settlement of his
retiral dues. Copy of the said Representation
dated 27th July, 1998 has been filed as
Annexure 6 to the Writ Petition.

5. It further transpires from a perusal
of paragraph 14 of the Writ Petition that
various payments in respect of retiral dues
were made to the petitioner in the year
1999. Even though in paragraph 11 of the
Counter Affidavit filed on behalf of the
respondents, there is general denial of the
averments made in paragraph 14 of the Writ
Petition, a perusal of paragraph 16 of the
Counter Affidavit shows that the details
given in paragraph 14 of the Writ Petition
have not been disputed by the respondents.

6. As per the averments made in the
said paragraph 14 of the Writ Petition,
payment of C.G.E.I.S. was made to the
petitioner on 26th July, 1996 while the
payment of leave encashment was made to
the petitioner on 4th April, 2000.

7. In the mean-time, the petitioner
filed an Original Application being Original
Application No. 124 of 2000 before the
Central Administrative Tribunal (in short
"the Tribunal") seeking the following
reliefs:

"i. to issue writ order or direction in
the nature of mandamus commanding the
respondents to pay leave encashment along
with penal interest at the rate of 18% per
annum since 30.9.1995 till the payment is
made.

ii. to issue writ, order or direction in
the nature of mandamus commanding the
respondents to pay penal interest at the rate
of 18% per annum on C.G.E.I.S. (since
30.9.1995 to August, 1996) on security
deposits, on the amount of back wages for
suspension period 30.5.95 to 13.3.99 and
18% per annum penal interest on gratuity.

iii. issue writ, order or direction in the
nature of mandamus commanding the
respondents to calculate the commutation
value on the basis of age factor on
30.9.1995."

8. The Tribunal by its Judgment and
Order dated 7th December, 2004 dismissed
the said Original Application filed by the
petitioner. The petitioner, thereupon, filed
the present Writ Petition seeking the reliefs
as mentioned in the earlier part of this
judgment.

9. We have heard Shri Sanjiv Singh,
learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri
N.P. Shukla, learned counsel for the
respondent nos. 1 to 4, and perused the
record.

10. Shri Sanjiv Singh, learned counsel
for the petitioner submits that the petitioner
was exonerated of the charge levelled
against
him,
and
the
disciplinary
proceedings against the petitioner were
dropped by the Order dated 25th June,
1998, and as such, the withholding of retiral
benefits payable to the petitioner was not
justified, and the petitioner was entitled to
get interest on the delayed payment of
retiral benefits.
94 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2011

11. Shri Sanjiv Singh, learned counsel
for the petitioner submits that the petitioner
would be entitled to payment of such
interest in respect of gratuity, commuted
amount of pension, leave encashment and
C.G.E.I.S.

12. As regards the relief (iii) claimed
in the Original Application filed before the
Tribunal, and the prayer (d) made in the
Writ Petition, Shri Sanjiv Singh, learned
counsel for the petitioner states that the said
relief/prayer is not being pressed by the
petitioner, and therefore, the Writ Petition
may be considered in regard to the claim of
interest in respect of gratuity, commutation
value, leave encashment and C.G.E.I.S.

13. Shri Sanjiv Singh has placed
reliance on the following decisions of
Supreme Court:

(1)Vijay L. Mehrotra Vs. State of U.P.
and Others, 2002 SCC (L & S) 278.

(2) Dr. Uma Agrawal Vs. State of
U.P. and Another, AIR 1999 SC 1212.

14. In reply, Shri N.P. Shukla, learned
counsel for the respondent nos. 1 to 4 has
referred to the provisions contained in Rule
68 (1) and Rule 69 (1) (c) of the Central
Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972 [in
short "the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972"].

15. Shri N.P. Shukla submits that in
view of the provisions contained in sub-rule
(1) of Rule 68, interest in respect of gratuity
is to be paid when the delay in payment was
attributable to administrative lapses.

16. In the present case, the payment of
gratuity was not made in view of the
pendency
of
disciplinary
proceedings
against
the
petitioner,
as
in
such
circumstances, the payment of gratuity was
required to be withheld by the respondent
nos. 1 to 4 in view of the provisions
contained in Rule 69 (1) (c) of the aforesaid
Rules.

Shri Shukla has placed reliance on a
decision of the Supreme Court in R.
Veerabhadram Vs. Government of Andhra
Pradesh, AIR 2000 SC 1918.

We have considered the submissions
made by the learned counsel for the parties.

Rule 68 of the CCS (Pension) Rules,
1972 lays down as under:

"68. Interest on delayed payment of
gratuity

(1) If the payment of gratuity has been
authorized later than the date when its
payment becomes due, and it is clearly
established that the delay in payment was
attributable
to
administrative
lapses,
interest shall be paid at such rate as may be
prescribed and in accordance with the
instructions issued from time to time:

Provided that the delay in payment
was not caused on account of failure on the
part of the Government servant to comply
with the procedure laid down by the
Government for processing his pension
papers.

(2) Every case of delayed payment of
gratuity shall be considered by the
Secretary of the Administrative Ministry or
the Department in respect of its employees
and the employees of its attached and
subordinate offices and where the Secretary
of the Ministry or the Department is
satisfied that the delay in the payment of
gratuity was caused on account of
1 All] Ram Chandra Gupta V. Union of India and others
95
administrative lapse, the Secretary of the
Ministry or the Department shall sanction
payment of interest.

(3) The Administrative Ministry or the
Department
shall
issue
Presidential
sanction for the payment of interest after the
Secretary has sanctioned the payment of
interest under sub-rule (2).

(4) In all cases where the payment of
interest has been sanctioned by the
Secretary of the Administrative Ministry or
the Department, such Ministry or the
Department shall fix the responsibility and
take
disciplinary
action
against
the
Government servant or servants who are
found responsible for the delay in the
payment of gratuity."

Rule 69 of the aforesaid Rules
provides as follows:

" 69. Provisional pension where
departmental or judicial proceedings may
be pending.- (1) (a) In respect of a
Government servant referred to in sub-rule
(4) of Rule 9, the Accounts Officer shall
authorize the provisional pension equal to
the maximum pension which would have
been admissible on the basis of qualifying
service up to the date of retirement of the
Government servant, or if he was under
suspension on the date of retirement up to
the date immediately preceding the date on
which he was placed under suspension.

(b) The provisional pension shall be
authorized by the Accounts Officer during
the period commencing from the date of
retirement up to and including the date on
which, after the conclusion of departmental
or judicial proceedings, final orders are
passed by the competent authority.

(c) No gratuity shall be paid to the
Government servant until the conclusion of
the departmental or judicial proceedings
and issue of final order thereon:

Provided that where departmental
proceedings have been instituted under
Rule 16 of the Central Civil Services
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules,
1965, for imposing any of the penalties
specified in Clauses (i), (ii) and (iv) of Rule
11 of the said Rules, the payment of gratuity
shall be authorized to be paid to the
Government servant:

(2) Payment of provisions pension by
made under sub-rule (2) shall be adjusted
against final retirement benefits sanctioned
to
such
Government
servant
upon
conclusion of such proceedings but no
recovery shall be made where the pension
finally
sanctioned
is
less
than
the
provisional pension or the pension is
reduced or withheld either permanently or
for a specified period."

18. It will thus be noticed that sub-rule
(1) of Rule 68 lays down that if the payment
of gratuity has been authorized later than the
date when its payment becomes due, and it
is clearly established that the delay in
payment was attributable to administrative
lapses, interest shall be paid at such rate as
may be prescribed and in accordance with
the instructions issued from time to time.

19. Thus, this provision lays down
that in case the delay in payment of gratuity
can be attributed to administrative lapses,
interest would be payable on account of the
delay in payment of gratuity.

20. Clause (c) of sub-rule (1) of Rule
69 lays down that no gratuity shall be paid
to the Government servant until the
96 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2011
conclusion of the departmental or judicial
proceedings and issue of final order thereon.
Thus, this rule prohibits the payment of
gratuity to the Government servant until
conclusion of the departmental proceedings
and issue of final order in such departmental
proceedings.

21. Reading the aforesaid two
provisions together, it follows that in case
the payment of gratuity has not been made
on account of pendency of departmental
proceedings, the delay in payment of
gratuity
cannot
be
attributed
to
administrative lapses so as to entitle the
Government servant for payment of interest
in respect of the delayed payment of
gratuity.

22. In the present case, as noted
above, the departmental proceedings were
going on when the petitioner retired on 30th
September,
1995.
The
proceedings
concluded on 25th June, 1998 when the
order was passed by the Disciplinary
Authority dropping the charge against the
petitioner. The payment of gratuity was
thereafter made to the petitioner, as per the
averments made in paragraph 14 of the Writ
Petition, on 23rd March, 1999.

23. In our view, no fault can be
attributed to the respondent nos. 1 to 4 for
the delay in payment of gratuity. The
payment of gratuity could not be made to
the petitioner till the conclusion of the
disciplinary proceedings against him. After
the
conclusion
of
the
disciplinary
proceedings on 25th June, 1998, the
payment of gratuity was made to the
petitioner on 23rd March, 1999.

24. The delay between 25th June,
1998 and 23rd March, 1999 cannot be said
to be inordinate delay having regard to the
facts and circumstances of the case,
particularly the fact that the disciplinary
proceedings came to an end on 25th June,
1998, and thereafter, time was taken for
finalizing the payment of gratuity to the
petitioner. Therefore, the payment of
interest in respect of the delayed payment of
gratuity has been rightly denied to the
petitioner by the Tribunal in the impugned
Judgment and Order.

25. In R. Veerabhadram case (supra),
relied upon by Shri N.P. Shukla, learned
counsel for the respondent nos. 1 to 4, their
Lordships of the Supreme Court held as
follows (paragraph 7 of the said AIR):

"(7) The payment of gratuity was
withheld, in the present case, since the
criminal prosecution was pending against
the appellant when he retired. Rule 52 (c) of
the A.P. Revised Pension Rules, 1980
expressly permits the State to withhold
gratuity during the pendency of any judicial
proceedings against the employee. In the
present case, apart from Rule 52 (c), there
was also an express order of the Tribunal
which was binding on the appellant and the
respondent under which the Tribunal had
directed that death-cum-retirement gratuity
was not to be paid to the appellant till the
judicial proceedings were concluded and
final orders were passed thereon. In view of
this order as well as in view of Rule 52 (c),
it cannot be said that there was any illegal
withholding of gratuity by the respondent in
the case of the appellant. We, therefore, do
not see any reason to order payment of any
interest on the amount of gratuity so
withheld."

(Emphasis supplied)

26. The above decision thus support
the conclusion mentioned above.
1 All] Ram Chandra Gupta V. Union of India and others
97

In Vijay L. Mehrotra case (supra),
there was delay in payment of retiral
benefits. However, the said delay was not
made on account of any disciplinary
proceedings pending against the employee
concerned. There was no reason or
justification given for the delay in payment
of retiral benefits. In the circumstances,
payment of interest was directed by the
Supreme Court.

27. Thus, the facts of Vijay L.
Mehrotra case are distinguishable from
those of the present case where disciplinary
proceedings were pending against the
petitioner, and the same continued for about
3 years after his retirement.

28. In Dr. Uma Agrawal case (supra),
there was delay in payment of retiral
benefits. Their Lordships of the Supreme
Court
referred
to
the
various
Rules/instructions which ought to be
followed in the matter of payment of
pension and other retiral benefits, and held
as under (paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the said
AIR):

"5. We have referred in sufficient
detail to the Rules and instructions which
prescribe the time-schedule for the various
steps to be taken in regard to the payment of
pension and other retiral benefits. This we
have
done
to
remind
the
various
governmental departments of their duties in
initiating various steps at least two years in
advance of the date of retirement. If the
rules/instructions are followed strictly much
of the litigation can be avoided and retired
Government servants will not feel harassed
because after all, grant of pension is not a
bounty but a right of the Government
servant. Government is obliged to follow the
Rules mentioned in the earlier part of this
order in letter and in spirit. Delay in
settlement of retiral benefits is frustrating
and must be avoided at all costs. Such
delays are occurring even in regard to
family pensions for which too there is a
prescribed procedure. This is indeed
unfortunate. In cases where a retired
Government servant claims interest for
delayed payment, the Court can certainly
keep in mind the time-schedule prescribed
in the rules/instructions apart from other
relevant factors applicable to each case.

6. The case before us is a clear
example of departmental delay which is not
excusable.
The
petitioner
retired
on
30.4.1993 and it was only after 12.2.1996
when an interim order was passed in this
writ petition that the respondents woke up
and started work by sending a special
messenger to various places where the
petitioner had worked. Such an exercise
should have started at least in 1991, two
years before retirement. The amounts due to
the petitioner were computed and the
payments were made only during 1997-98.
The petitioner was a cancer patient and was
indeed put to great hardship. Even
assuming that some letters were sent to the
petitioner after her retirement on 30.3.1993
seeking information from her, an allegation
which is denied by the petitioner, that
cannot be an excuse for the lethargy of the
department inasmuch as the rules and
instructions require these actions to be
taken long before retirement. The exercise
which was to be completed long before
retirement was in fact started long after the
petitioner's retirement.

7. Therefore, this is a fit case for
awarding interest to the petitioner. We do
not think that for the purpose of the
computation of interest, the matter should
go back. Instead, on the facts of this case,
we quantify the interest payable at Rs. 1
98 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2011
lakh and direct that the same shall be paid
to the petitioner within two months from
today."

(Emphasis supplied)

29. It will be noticed that the facts of
Dr. Uma Agrawal case (supra) were
different from those of the present case.

30. In Dr. Uma Agrawal case (supra),
there were no departmental proceedings
pending against the petitioner at the time of
her retirement. There was failure on the part
of the authorities in complying with the
various Rules/instructions to be followed in
the matter of payment of pension and other
retiral benefits resulting in delay in making
such payments. In the circumstances, the
payment of interest was directed by the
Supreme Court.

31. In the present case, the delay has
occurred on account of pendency of
departmental proceedings. Thus, the decision
in Dr. Uma Agrawal case (supra) is not
applicable to the facts of the present case.

32. As regards the claim of interest on
commuted amount of pension, it is
noteworthy that no such relief was sought by
the petitioner before the Tribunal. The relief
sought before the Tribunal was that the
respondents be directed to calculate the
commutation value on the basis of age factor
on 30th September, 1995.

33. As noted above, Shri Sanjiv Singh,
learned counsel for the petitioner has stated
that the said relief/prayer is not being pressed
by the petitioner.

34. As no relief for payment of interest
in respect of commuted amount of pension
was claimed by the petitioner before the
Tribunal in his Original Application, the
petitioner cannot make such claim before this
Court in the Writ Petition directed against the
Judgement and Order of the Tribunal.

35. As regards the claim for interest in
respect of payment of leave encashment, the
Tribunal has held that encashment of leave is
a benefit granted under the leave rules, and
the same is not a pensionary benefit, as such,
no interest could be awarded to the petitioner
in regard to the same.

36. We do not find any illegality or
infirmity in the said conclusion drawn by the
Tribunal.

37. As regards the claim of interest in
respect of the payment of C.G.E.I.S., it
appears that even though the relief in this
regard was sought by the petitioner before
the Tribunal in the Original Application, the
same was not pressed during the arguments
before the Tribunal, and therefore, the
Tribunal has not dealt with the said aspect.

38. Even otherwise, it will be noticed
that the payment of C.G.E.I.S. was made to
the petitioner, as per the averments made in
paragraph 14 of the Writ Petition, on 26th
July, 1996 while the petitioner retired from
service on 30th September, 1995. The delay
in payment of C.G.E.I.S. cannot, therefore,
be said to be inordinate on the facts and in
the circumstances of the present case, so as to
entitle the petitioner to payment of interest.

39. In view of the above discussion, we
are of the opinion that the present Writ
Petition lacks merits, and the same is liable to
be dismissed.

40. The Writ Petition is accordingly
dismissed.
1 All] Dr. Vinay Kumar Pandey V. State of U.P. and others
99

41. However, on the facts and in the
circumstances of the case, there will be no
order as to costs.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 21.01.2011

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SUNIL AMBWANI, J.
THE HON'BLE MRS. JAYASHREE TIWARI, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 24627 of 2009

Dr. Vinay Kumar Pandey
 ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. and others ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Shailendra
Sri Seemant Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Sunita Agarwal
Sri B.D. Mandhyan
Sri Satish Mandhyan
C.S.C.

Constitution of India Art. 226 readwith
U.P. State Universities Act 1973-Section
68-In
alternation
Remedy-Petitioner
working
as
coordinator
of
B.Ed
Examination-
serious
allegation
of
corrupt
practices-pursuant
to
preliminary
enquiry
suspendedpetitioner
not
availed
alternative
statutory
remedy-Petition
not
maintainable.

Held: Para 17, 18 & 19

In each case the High Court has to
satisfy itself before entertaining the writ
petition, whether in a given case if any
alternative remedy exists, it is equally
efficient and adequate. The petitioner
must satisfy the Court that the case on
its fact falls within any of the exceptions
detailed as above to grant relief. In the
present case, we do not find that the
petitioner has been able to make out any
exception to circumvent the alternative
remedy, which is efficacious and speedy.

In the above circumstances, it cannot be
said that the order was not passed by
the competent authority, or that the
principle of natural justice were violated.
Further at this stage we are not satisfied
from
the
averments
and
material
produced on record that the order has
been passed in malafide exercise of
powers.

For the aforesaid reasons, we relegate
the petitioner to the statutory remedies
of
filing
representation
before
the
Chancellor under Section 68 of the U.P.
State Universities Act, 1973. If such a
representation is filed, the Chancellor
may consider the same on merits and
decide
the
representation
as
expeditiously as possible. We make it
clear that we have not examined the
merits of the charges. The discussion of
facts in the judgment is only to find out
whether
any
case
of
interference,
without exhausting alternative remedies
has been made out
Case law discussed:
(1985) 1 SCC 260; (2001) 10 SCC 491; (1979)
4 SCC 22; AIR 1965 SC 132; AIR 1955 SC 661;
AIR 1987 SC 2186; AIR 1970 SC 894; AIR
1969 SC 1320; AIR 2003 SC 3032.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Sunil Ambwani, J.)

1. We have heard Shri Shailendra,
learned counsel for the petitioner. Learned
Standing Counsel appears for the State
respondents. Shri B.D. Mandhyan, Sr.
Advocate assisted by Shri Satish Mandhyan
appears for the University.

2. The petitioner is serving as
Professor in the Department of Commerce,
Deen
Dayal
Upadhyay,
Gorakhpur
University, Gorakhpur. He was appointed
as Coordinator of B.Ed. Examination by the
University for the period upto 17.5.2008.