# Ram Chandra-II v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2014) 2 ILRA 943
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2014-08-22
- **Case number:** Writ Petition No. 1458(S/B) of 2011
- **Bench:** Sanjay Misra, Brijesh Kumar Srivastava-Ii
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ram-chandra-ii-v-state-of-u-p-ors-43048
- **Pages:** 14

## Headnote

Constitution
of
India,
Art.-311(2)-
Dismissal from service-challenged on
ground of violation of principle
of
Natural
Justice-finding
recorded
by
enquiry officer not found in any manner
perverse-dismissal
order
neither
arbitrary
not
could
be
termed
as
disproportionate-warrant
no
interference-petition dismissed.

Held: Para-36
From the perusal of above noted laws and
factual position of the case, it is evident
that the departmental proceeding has
been concluded in a lawful manner and the
petitioner has been provided with an
opportunity
of
being
heard
and
to
participate
in
the
departmental
proceedings. As discussed earlier, charge
nos. 1 and 2 have been found proved
though
the
petitioner
denied
his
involvement with the car in question, but
the finding of the Enquiry Judge was
recorded otherwise based on materials
available on record. Hence, the stand
taken by the petitioner that the rules of
natural justice has been violated while
conducting the enquiry is not at all tenable
in the eyes of law. The order passed by the
State
Government
dated
15.04.2011,
dismissing the petitioner from service,
cannot be faulted with in any manner.

Case Law discussed:
[2013 (31) LCD 762]; (2010) 12 SCC 783;
(2011) 11 SCC 324; (1997) 6 SCC 339; (1993)
2 SCC 56.

## Text

_Characters 0–39,984 of 46,234. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39984 for what follows._

2 All]. Ram Chandra-II Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
943
appellant shall pay the fine, if the same
has not already been paid, within sixty
days from the date of receipt of record by
the learned trial Court, which, shall, in
turn,
pay
a
sum
of
7000/-,
as
compensation to the victim, without
delay. In the event of default in payment
of fine, the appellant shall have to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for three
years.

24. The Office is directed to send
the lower court record along with copy of
the judgment to the learned trial court,
without delay, so as to ensure that it
reaches the learned trial court within
twenty days from today.

25. With the above observations, the
appeal is disposed of, in such a fashion
that it is partly allowed. The conviction is
confirmed but the sentence is modified to
the extent, as stated above.
--------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 22.08.2014

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SANJAY MISRA, J.
THE HON'BLE BRIJESH KUMAR
SRIVASTAVA-II, J.

Writ Petition No. 1458(S/B) of 2011

Ram Chandra-II... Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ... Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri O.P. Srivastava, Sri Virendra Kumar
Dubey

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Manish Kumar

Constitution
of
India,
Art.-311(2)-
Dismissal from service-challenged on
ground of violation of principle
of
Natural
Justice-finding
recorded
by
enquiry officer not found in any manner
perverse-dismissal
order
neither
arbitrary
not
could
be
termed
as
disproportionate-warrant
no
interference-petition dismissed.

Held: Para-36
From the perusal of above noted laws and
factual position of the case, it is evident
that the departmental proceeding has
been concluded in a lawful manner and the
petitioner has been provided with an
opportunity
of
being
heard
and
to
participate
in
the
departmental
proceedings. As discussed earlier, charge
nos. 1 and 2 have been found proved
though
the
petitioner
denied
his
involvement with the car in question, but
the finding of the Enquiry Judge was
recorded otherwise based on materials
available on record. Hence, the stand
taken by the petitioner that the rules of
natural justice has been violated while
conducting the enquiry is not at all tenable
in the eyes of law. The order passed by the
State
Government
dated
15.04.2011,
dismissing the petitioner from service,
cannot be faulted with in any manner.

Case Law discussed:
[2013 (31) LCD 762]; (2010) 12 SCC 783;
(2011) 11 SCC 324; (1997) 6 SCC 339; (1993)
2 SCC 56.

(Delivered by Hon'ble B.K. Srivastava-II, J.)

1. The petitioner was selected by the
Lok Sewa Ayog Uttar Pradesh and he
joined
as
Judicial
Officer
(Munsif
Magistrate) on 06.04.1981. The petitioner
was promoted in the Uttar Pradesh Higher
Judicial Services on 15.05.2001 and
posted as Additional District Judge. In
June, 2009, the petitioner was transferred
as Additional District Judge, Agra where
he resumed his charge on 09.06.2009. The
petitioner was placed under suspension
vide
order
dated
03.08.2009
in
944 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
contemplation of departmental enquiry and
attached with the District and Sessions
Judge, Etah. The petitioner was served with
a charge sheet dated 03.11.2009 on
10.11.2009 in which four charges were
levelled against him. The first charge relates
to demand of a car by the petitioner from a
Police Inspector of Police Station Shahganj,
District Agra and that he travelled in the
said car from Agra to Vrindaban, Mathura,
which was registered in the name of an
accused involved in a murder case. The
second charge relates to furnishing of a false
information by the petitioner to the District
Judge, Agra with ulterior motive as after
taking permission to visit his home at
Allahabad the petitioner visited to another
place i.e. Vrindaban. The third charge
relates to stay of petitioner in a private guest
house after being transferred in Agra
Judgeship in the month of June, 2009 even
though he has been provided residence in
Judges' Compound, Agra. The fourth charge
relates to influence the judicial proceedings
by the petitioner in some cases during his
posting as Judicial Officer in Agra
Judgeship.

2. With respect to the incident
mentioned in charge nos. 1 and 2, the
District Judge, Agra sent a confidential
report
dated
21.07.2009
to
the
Administrative Judge stating therein that
the incident, which was published in the
various news papers, had received wide
publication and pursuant to which on
20.07.2009 an exhaustive report was
prepared after ascertaining the veracity of
the news report and also about the identity
of the said officer after a proper enquiry
conducted by Special Chief Judicial
Magistrate.

3. The Administrative Judge called
the petitioner for probing the matter as to
validate the facts of the confidential report
forwarded by District Judge, Agra.
Further, the Administrative Judge wrote a
letter dated 23.07.2009 to Hon'ble the
Chief Justice regarding the conduct of the
petitioner. The letter dated 23.07.2009
was considered by the Administrative
Committee in its meeting held on
29.07.2009 and in pursuance of the
resolution passed by the Administrative
Committee the petitioner was placed
under
suspension
vide
order
dated
03.08.2009
in
contemplation
of
departmental enquiry and attached with
the District and Sessions Judge, Etah. The
departmental
enquiry
was
instituted
against the petitioner and witnesses were
examined. The petitioner was given
opportunity
to
provide
his
written
submission as well as to cross examine
the witnesses. The petitioner submitted
written statement to the charge sheet on
23.11.2009.

4. The enquiry was proceeded
against the petitioner, who was served
with a copy of the report of the
Administrative Judge. Statement of the
petitioner was taken on record on
12.03.2010 by way of cross-examination
in the enquiry. The petitioner submitted
his written argument before the Enquiry
Judge on 25.03.2010. The petitioner was
supplied copy of the enquiry report dated
18.05.2010.

5. In the enquiry proceedings charge
nos. 1 and 2 were proved against the
petitioner and charge nos. 3 and 4 were
dropped. The petitioner preferred a
representation dated 01.09.2010 against
the said enquiry report and the same was
placed
before
the
Administrative
Committee for consideration along with
enquiry
report.
The
Administrative
2 All]. Ram Chandra-II Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
945
Committee referred the matter to the Full
Court for passing necessary order and the
Full Court recommended the petitioner's
dismissal
from
service.
Hence,
the
petitioner
has
preferred
the
instant
petition with the following reliefs:

"(I) to issue writ order or direction in
the nature of certiorari quashing the
impugned order of dismissal from service
dated
15.04.2011
as
contained
in
Annexure No. 1 to the writ petition with
all consequential service benefits.

(II) to issue writ order or direction in
the nature of mandamus directing and
commanding the opposite parties to treat
the petitioner in continuous service by
giving him all consequential service
benefits as if the impugned order of
dismissal from service contained as
Annexure No. 1 to the writ petition has
never been passed.

(III) to issue any other writ order or
direction which this Hon'ble court may
deem just fit and proper under the
circumstances of the case.

(IV) to allow the cost of the writ
petition."

6. We have heard Sri O.P.
Srivastava,
learned
Senior
Counsel
appearing on behalf of the petitioner,
learned Standing Counsel appearing for
respondent no.1-State and Sri Manish
Kumar appearing for respondent no. 2The High Court.

7. Argument advanced on behalf of
the petitioner is that the impugned order
of dismissal has been passed without
affording an opportunity of hearing to the
petitioner and, hence, the rules of
principles of natural justice has been
violated while conducting the enquiry. On
the other hand, it was contended by
learned counsel for respondents that the
procedure for investigation and related
steps has been followed with due
procedure of law and it is also evident
from the perusal of records itself that the
petitioner has participated in enquiry and
also afforded opportunity of being heard
and there is no illegality in the impugned
order passed as such.

8.

Before
adverting
to
the
submissions made by learned counsel for
the parties, it would be appropriate to
consider the settled proposition of law as
laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court
while considering the various aspects of
disciplinary enquiry.

9. In the matter of Nirmala J. Jhala
Vs. State of Gujarat and another reported
in [2013 (31) LCD 762, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has dealt with disciplinary
enquiry doctrine in following words:

LEGAL ISSUES:

I.
Standard
of
proof
in
a
Departmental Enquiry which is Quasi
Criminal/Quasi Judicial in nature:

A. In M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India
and Ors. AIR 2006 SC 3475, this Court
held:

"...
Disciplinary
proceedings,
however, being quasicriminal in nature,
there should be some evidences to prove
the charge. Although the charges in a
departmental proceedings are not required
to be proved like a criminal trial, i.e.,
beyond all reasonable doubts, we cannot
lose sight of the fact that the Enquiry
Officer performs a quasi-judicial function,
who upon analysing the documents must
arrive at a conclusion that there had been
a preponderance of probability to prove
946 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the charges on the basis of materials on
record. While doing so, he cannot take
into consideration any irrelevant fact. He
cannot refuse to consider the relevant
facts. He cannot shift the burden of proof.
He cannot reject the relevant testimony of
the witnesses only on the basis of
surmises and conjectures. (Emphasis
added)

(See also: Narinder Mohan Arya v.
United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors.
AIR 2006 SC 1748; Roop Singh Negi v.
Punjab National Bank and Ors AIR 2008
SC (Supp) 921; and Krushnakant B.
Parmar v. Union of India and Anr. (2012)
3 SCC 178)

B. In Prahlad Saran Gupta v. Bar
Council of India and Anr. AIR 1997 SC
1338, this Court observed that when the
matter relates to a charge of professional
mis-conduct which is quasi-criminal in
nature,
it
requires
proof
beyond
reasonable doubt. In that case the finding
against the delinquent advocate was that
he retained a sum of Rs. 15,000/- without
sufficient justification from 4-4-1978 till
2-5-1978 and he deposited the amount in
the Court on the latter date, without
disbursing the same to his client. The said
conduct was found by this Court as "not
in consonance with the standards of
professional ethics expected from a senior
member of the profession". On the said
fact-situation, this Court imposed a
punishment of reprimanding the advocate
concerned.

C. In Harish Chandra Tiwari v. Baiju
AIR 2002 SC 548, this Court made a
distinction from the above judgment
stating the facts in the aforesaid decisions
would speak for themselves and the
distinction from the facts of this case was
so glaring that the misconduct of the
Appellant in the present case was of a far
graver
dimension.
Hence,
the
said
decision was not of any help to the
Appellant for mitigation of the quantum
of punishment.

D. In Noor Aga v. State of Punjab
and Anr. AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 852, it was
held that the departmental proceeding
being a quasi judicial one, the principles
of natural justice are required to be
complied with. The Court exercising
power of judicial review are entitled to
consider as to whether while inferring
commission of misconduct on the part of
a delinquent officer relevant piece of
evidence
has
been
taken
into
consideration and irrelevant facts have
been excluded there from. Inference on
facts must be based on evidence which
meet the requirements of legal principles.
(See also: Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab
National Bank and Ors. AIR 2008 SC
(Supp) 921; Union of India and Ors. v.
Naman Singh Sekhawat (2008) 4 SCC 1;
and Vijay Singh v. State of U.P. and Ors.
AIR 2012 SC 2840)

E. In M.S. Bindra v. Union of India
and Ors. AIR 1998 SC 3058, it was held:

While evaluating the materials the
authority should not altogether ignore the
reputation in which the officer was held
till recently. The maxim "Nemo Firut
Repente Turpissimus" (no one becomes
dishonest all on a sudden) is not
unexceptional but still it is salutary
guideline to judge human conduct,
particularly in the field of Administrative
Law. The authorities should not keep the
eyes totally closed towards the overall
estimation in which the delinquent officer
was held in the recent past by those who
were supervising him earlier. To dunk an
officer into the puddle of "doubtful
integrity" it is not enough that the doubt
2 All]. Ram Chandra-II Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
947
fringes on a mere hunch. That doubt
should be of such a nature as would
reasonably
and
consciously
be
entertainable by a reasonable man on the
given material. Mere possibility is hardly
sufficient to assume that it would have
happened. There must be preponderance
of probability for the reasonable man to
entertain doubt regarding that possibility.
Only then there is justification to ram an
officer with the label 'doubtful integrity'.

F. In High Court of Judicature at
Bombay
through
its
Registrar
v.
Udaysingh and Ors. AIR 1997 SC 2286,
this Court held:

The doctrine of `proof beyond doubt'
has no application. Preponderance of
probabilities and some material on record
would be necessary to reach a conclusion
whether or not the delinquent has committed
misconduct.

G. In view of the above, the law on the
issue can be summarised to the effect that
the disciplinary proceedings are not a
criminal trial, and in spite of the fact that the
same are quasi-judicial and quasi-criminal,
doctrine of proof beyond reasonable doubt,
does not apply in such cases, but the
principle of preponderance of probabilities
would apply. The court has to see whether
there is evidence on record to reach the
conclusion
that
the
delinquent
had
committed a misconduct. However, the said
conclusion should be reached on the basis
of test of what a prudent person would have
done. The ratio of the judgment in Prahlad
Saran Gupta (supra) does not apply in this
case as the said case was of professional
misconduct, and not of a delinquency by the
employee."

Scope of Judicial Review:

"(i) It is settled legal proposition that
judicial review is not akin to adjudication
on merit by re-appreciating the evidence
as an Appellate Authority. The only
consideration the Court/Tribunal has in its
judicial review, is to consider whether the
conclusion is based on evidence on record
and supports the finding or whether the
conclusion is based on no evidence. The
adequacy or reliability of the evidence is
not a matter which can be permitted to be
canvassed before the Court in writ
proceedings. (Vide: State of T.N. & Anr
v. S. Subramaniam, AIR 1996 SC 1232;
R.S. Saini v. State of Punjab, (1999) 8
SCC 90; and Government of Andhra
Pradesh & Ors. v. Mohd. Nasrullah Khan,
AIR 2006 SC 1214)

(ii) In Zora Singh v. J.M. Tandon &
Ors., AIR 1971 SC 1537, this Court while
dealing with the issue of scope of judicial
review, held as under:

The principle that if some of the
reasons relied on by a Tribunal for its
conclusion turn out to be extraneous or
otherwise
unsustainable,
its
decision
would be vitiated, applies to cases in
which the conclusion is arrived at not on
assessment of objective facts or evidence,
but on subjective satisfaction. The reason
is that whereas in cases where the
decision
is
based
on
subjective
satisfaction if some of the reasons turn out
to be irrelevant or invalid, it would be
impossible for a superior Court to find out
which of the reasons, relevant or
irrelevant, valid or invalid, had brought
about such satisfaction. But in a case
where the conclusion is based on
objective facts and evidence, such a
difficulty would not arise. If it is found
that there was legal evidence before the
Tribunal, even if some of it was
948 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
irrelevant, a superior Court would not
interfere if the finding can be sustained on
the rest of the evidence. The reason is that
in a writ petition for certiorari the superior
Court does not sit in appeal, but exercises
only
supervisory
jurisdiction,
and
therefore, does not enter into the question
of sufficiency of evidence." (Emphasis
added)

(iii)
The
decisions
referred
to
hereinabove
highlights
clearly,
the
parameter of the Court's power of judicial
review
of
administrative
action
or
decision. An order can be set-aside if it is
based on extraneous grounds, or when
there are no grounds at all for passing it or
when the grounds are such that, no one
can reasonably arrive at the opinion. The
Court does not sit as a Court of Appeal
but, it merely reviews the manner in
which the decision was made. The Court
will not normally exercise its power of
judicial review unless it is found that
formation of belief by the statutory
authority
suffers
from
malafides,
dishonest/corrupt practice. In other words,
the authority must act in good faith.
Neither the question as to whether there
was
sufficient
evidence
before
the
authority can be raised/examined, nor the
question of re-appreciating the evidence
to examine the correctness of the order
under challenge. If there are sufficient
grounds for passing an order, then even if
one of them is found to be correct, and on
its basis the order impugned can be
passed, there is no occasion for the Court
to
interfere.
The
jurisdiction
is
circumscribed and confined to correct
errors of law or procedural error, if any,
resulting in manifest miscarriage of
justice or violation of principles of natural
justice. This apart, even when some defect
is found in the decision- making process,
the Court must exercise its discretionary
power with great caution keeping in mind
the larger public interest and only when it
comes
to
the
conclusion
that
overwhelming public interest requires
interference, the Court should intervene."

10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in
the case of Rajesh Kohli v. High Court of
Jammu and Kashmir and another reported
in (2010) 12 SCC 783 has observed as
under:

"32. Upright and honest judicial
officers are needed not only to bolster the
image of the judiciary in the eyes of the
litigants, but also to sustain the culture of
integrity, virtue and ethics among Judges.
The public's perception of the judiciary
matters just as much as its role in dispute
resolution. The credibility of the entire
judiciary is often undermined by isolated
acts of transgression by a few members of
the Bench, and therefore it is imperative
to maintain a high benchmark of honesty,
accountability and good conduct."

11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in
the case of Arundhati Ashok Walavalkar
v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2011)
11 SCC 324 has observed as under:

"23. We are, however, unable to
accept the aforesaid contention for the
simple reason that we could probably
interfere with the quantum of punishment
only when we find that the punishment
awarded is shocking to the conscience of
the court. This is a case of a judicial
officer who was required to conduct
herself with dignity and manner becoming
of a judicial officer. A judicial officer
must be able to discharge his/her
responsibilities by showing an impeccable
conduct. In the instant case, she not only
2 All]. Ram Chandra-II Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
949
traveled without tickets in a railway
compartment thrice but also complained
against the ticket collectors who accosted
her, misbehaved with the railway officials
and in those circumstances we do not see
how the punishment of compulsory
retirement awarded to her could be said to
be disproportionate to the offence alleged
against her.

24. In a country governed by the rule
of law, nobody is above law, including
judicial officers. In fact, as judicial
officers, they have to present a continuous
aspect of dignity in every conduct. If the
rule of law is to function effectively and
efficiently under the aegis of our
democratic set-up, judges are expected to,
nay, they must nurture an efficient and
enlightened
judiciary
by
presenting
themselves as a role model. Needless to
say, a judge is constantly under public
gaze and society expects higher standards
of conduct and rectitude from a judge.
Judicial office, being an office of public
trust, the society is entitled to expect that
a judge must be a man of high integrity,
honesty
and
ethical
firmness
by
maintaining the most exacting standards
of propriety in every action. Therefore, a
judge's official and personal conduct must
be in tune with the highest standard of
propriety and probity. Obviously, this
standard of conduct is higher than those
deemed acceptable or obvious for others.
Indeed, in the instant case, being a
judicial officer, it was in her best interest
that she carries herself in a decorous and
dignified manner. If she has deliberately
chosen to depart from these high and
exacting standards, she is appropriately
liable for disciplinary action."

12. In the case of High Court of
Judicature at Bombay v. Shirishkumar
RangaRao Patil and another reported in
(1997) 6 SCC 339, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court has observed as under:

"11. It is true that a resolution came
to be passed authorising the Committee
off five Judges to deal with imposition of
punishment on judicial officers. The
question of punishment on judicial
officers. The question, therefore, is :
whether it requires the Chief Justice and
the Committee to initiate disciplinary
proceedings? The "delegation of the
function of the High Court in respect of
punishment of judicial officers" is an
expression
of
width
and
of
wide
amplitude to cover within its ambit the
power to take a decision by the
Committee from the stage of initiation of
disciplinary proceedings, if necessary, till
its logical and , viz., recommendation to
the Government to impose a penalty
proposed
by
the
Committee.
The
recommendation is by the High court, the
controlling authority under Article 235 of
the constitution. Therefore, it is difficult
to accept the contention of Shri Barta that
the delegation is only for imposition of
punishment on judicial officers. In fact,
the High Court has no power to impose
any punishment by itself. The appointing
authority under the Constitution to impose
punishment in accordance with the rules
framed for the purpose. Therefore, the
entire gamut of procedural steps of
disciplinary action is by the High court
which is the controlling authority through
the committee constituted in that behalf
by the Chief justice of the High Court.

14. Therein also, it was further
observed that what is required of a Judge
is "a form of life and conduct for more
sever and restricted than that of ordinary
people" and through unwritten, it has been
950 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
most strictly observed. The Judicial
Officers are at once privileged and
restricted; they
have
to
present
a
continuous aspect of dignity and conduct.
If the rule of law is to efficiently function
under the aegis of our democratic society.
Judges are expected to nurture an
efficient, strong and enlightened judiciary.
To have it that way, the nation has to pay
the price, i.e., to keep them above wants,
provide
infrastructural
facilities
and
services. There was a time when a Judge
enjoyed a high status in society. A
government founded on anything except
liberty and justice cannot stand and no
nation
founded
on
injustice
can
permanently
stand.
Therefore,
dispensation of justice is an essential and
inevitable
feature
in
the
civilized
democratic society. Maintenance of law
and order requires the presence of an
efficient system of administration of
criminal justice. A sense of confidence in
the court is essential to maintain the fabric
of ordered liberty for free people and it is
for the subordinate judiciary by its action
and the High Court by its appropriate
control of subordinate judiciary and its
own self imposed judicial conduct, on and
off the bench, to ensure it. If one forfeits
the confidence in the judiciary of its
people, it can never regain its lost respect
and esteem. The conduct of every judicial
officer,
therefore,
should
be
above
reproach. He should be conscientious,
studious, thorough, courteous, patient,
punctual, just, impartial, fearless of public
clamour, regardless of public praise, and
indifferent to private, political or parties
influences; he should administer justice
according to law, and deal with his
appointment as a public trust; he should
not allow other affairs or his private
interests to interfere with the prompt and
proper performance of his judicial duties,
nor should he administer the office for the
purpose
of
advancing
his
personal
ambitions or increasing his popularity. If
he tips the scales of Justice, its nippling
effect
would
be
disastrous
and
deleterious. Obviously, therefore, this
Court in All India Judges Association
case attempted to ensure better uniform
conditions of service for subordinate
judiciary throughout the country, it
recommended that the Superannuation of
the subordinate judicial officer at the age
of 60 years; and ensured amelioration of
their service conditions by giving diverse
directions. In 2nd All India Judges'
Association case, this Court dealt with the
status of the judicial officer as a class and
held that they are above the personnel
working
in
other
constitutional
functionaries, viz., the Executive and the
Legislative. Directions were issued by this
Court for ensuring due implementation
for their better service conditions. Three
year's minimum service at the Bar was
recommended to be eligible to be a
judicial officer in All India Judges' Assn.
and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
(1995)IILLJ664SC (third case). In All
India Judges' Association v. Union of
India and Ors. (1994)4SCC727 (4th case),
direction
was
issued
to
ensure
accommodation."

13. In the case of Union of India and
others v. K.K. Dhawan reported in
(1993)2 SCC 56, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court has observed as under:

"28. Certainly, therefore, the officer
who exercises judicial or quasi-judicial
powers acts negligently or recklessly or in
order to confer undue favour on a person
is not acting as a Judge. Accordingly, the
contention of the respondent has to be
rejected. It is important to bear in mind
2 All]. Ram Chandra-II Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
951
that in present case, we are not concerned
with the correctness or legality of the
decision of the respondent but the conduct
of the respondent in discharge of his
duties as an officer. The legality of the
orders
with
reference
to
the
nine
assessments may be questioned in appeal
or revision under the Act. But we have no
doubt in our mind that the Government is
not precluded from taking the disciplinary
action for violation of the conduct Rules.
Thus we conclude that the disciplinary
action can be taken in the following cases:

i) Where the officer had acted in a
manner as would reflect on his reputation
for integrity or good faith or devotion to
duty;

ii) if there is prima facie material to
show recklessness or misconduct in the
discharge of his duty;

iii) if he has acted in a manner which
is unbecoming of the government servant;

iv) if he had acted negligently or that
he omitted the prescribed conditions
which are essential for the exercise of the
statutory powers;

v) if he had acted in order to unduly
favour a party;

vi) if he had been actuated by corrupt
motive however, small the bribe may be
because Lord Coke said long ago "though
the bribe may be small, yet the fault is
great."

14. Various other case laws as cited
by respondents' counsel are Thakur Jugal
Kishore Sinha vs. Sitamarhi Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. And others (1967) 3
SCR 163; Union of India and others vs.
A.N. Saxena (1992) 3 SCC 124; All India
Judges Association and others vs. Union
of India and others (1993) 4 SCC 288;
P.C. Joshi vs. State of U.P. and others
(2001) 6 SCC 491; Ramesh Chander
Singh vs. High Court of Allahabad and
others (2007) 4 SCC 247; V.K. Jain vs.
High Court of Delhi and others (2008) 17
SCC 538; R.S.Mishra vs. State of Orissa
and others (2011) 2 SCC 689;Mona
Panwar vs. High Court of Allahabad and
others (2011) 3 SCC 496; C.D. Konek Vs.
High Court of Bombay (2004) 2 Mah LJ

157; these cited cases have got no
bearing to the present case as the factual
position of the present case stands on a
different footing.

15. From perusal of the above
citations, it is clear that while exercising
the writ jurisdiction scope of judicial
review is very limited. Needless to say
that principles of natural justice are
always to be observed. It appears from the
record that a departmental enquiry was
conducted and after completion of the
same the Enquiry Judge submitted report
dated 18.05.2010. Under orders of the
Hon'ble Chief Justice dated 06.07.2010, a
copy of enquiry report was sent to the
District Judge, Etah for being furnished to
the
petitioner
for
his
comments/representation, if he so desires,
within 4 weeks.

16.

The
petitioner
submitted
comments/representation
dated
01.09.2010 to the enquiry report. The
enquiry report dated 18.05.2010 and
comments dated 01.09.2010 of the
petitioner was considered in the meeting
of the Administrative Committee held on
28.10.2010 and the matter was placed
before the Full Court, the details of which
have been discussed in the preceding
paragraphs.

17. In view of the resolution of the
Administrative
Committee
dated
952 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
28.10.2010, the matter of the petitioner
was considered in the meeting of the Full
Court held on 27.11.2010 where it was
resolved that the petitioner be dismissed
from service. Letter dated 06.12.2010 was
sent
to
the
Principal
Secretary,
Appointment Section-4, Government of
U.P., Lucknow for issuance of necessary
order
regarding
dismissal
of
the
petitioner. By the Memorandum dated
15.04.2011 issued by the Government the
petitioner
has
been
dismissed. The
petitioner
preferred
a
representation
before His Excellency, the Governor, on
06.12.2010 for reconsideration of his
dismissal from service which was sent to
the High Court along with letter dated
20.04.2011. Under the order of Hon'ble
Chief Justice the representation of the
petitioner was considered in the meeting
of the Administrative Committed held on
12.07.2011 where it was resolved that
there is no scope for consideration of the
representation dated 06.12.2010.

18. In the departmental enquiry as
many as 13 witnesses were examined.
The petitioner was also examined as
defence witness. Sri V.K. Arya, Station
House Officer of police station Shahganj,
Agra was examined as E.W.3. He has
deposed that car bearing registration
no.U.P35M/1415 had been seized in case
crime no.426 of 2009 under section 302
IPC on the basis of first information
report lodged against Raju son of Jawahar
and others. The owners of the said car
were Bhagwandas and Raju who are full
blooded brothers. The report in this regard
was submitted to the Chief Judicial
Magistrate. It was the self same vehicle
which found mention in the newspaper
reports attended with deposition that the
said vehicle had been released on
13.10.2009 pursuant to the orders of
Addl. District Magistrate (City) Agra.
According to the record maintained at the
police station, vehicle had been seized
and remained as such in the precincts of
the police station and was not given to
anyone for use. He denied that the car in
question was ever given to the petitioner
for use.

19. On a query being put to him, he
handed out copy of the release order of
the vehicle in question. He also deposed
that he had relation with the petitioner
prior to joining police service, but denied
that the car in question was ever given to
the petitioner for his use. He also denied
with respect to demand being made by the
petitioner for arranging a car nor did he
arrange any vehicle for him.

20. Smt. Uma Singh was examined
as E.W.5, who has stated that the first
information report was lodged by her in
which car in question was involved. The
car in question was used in the murder of
her daughter and her grand-daughter. The
car was given to the petitioner for his use
and he travelled in the said car upto
Vrindaban on 19.07.2009. The aforesaid
car was detained by the police in
Vrindaban and in this regard she had
made a complaint addressed to the High
Court.

21. In her cross examination, she
stated
that
in
paragraph-5
of
her
complaint she indicated that the petitioner
had been given the car in question for his
personal use which had been detained by
the police in Vrindaban on 19.07.2009 on
suspicion basis.

22. Smt. Sanju wife of Bhagwandas
was examined as E.W.6, who has deposed
that the car in question was registered in
2 All]. Ram Chandra-II Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
953
the name of her husband Bhagwandas.
The car had been taken away from her
house by the police and was seized. The
car in question along with its key was
with the police. As soon as she came to
know that the car had been illegally used
and detained by police of Mathura, she
moved application for release of the same.

23. In her cross-examination she
stated that when she moved application,
the car was present in the precincts of
police station of Shahganj and its number
plate was intact and it had not suffered
any scratching.

24. Sri Vinod Agarwal was
examined as E.W.9, who has deposed that
he
was
serving
as
Principal
Correspondent in D.L.A. and news item
published in newspaper dated 20.07.2009
was published from news agency. He also
attested the news items published at page7 of the newspapers titled as 'Ajibogarib
Halat Me Bach Nikley Judge Saheb' in
which photo of the car was also
published. He also testified to the title
published
in
the
newspapers
'Hatyabhiyukt
Ki
Gadi
Se
Panch
Ladkiyan Ke Saath Vrindavan Jakar
Ajeebogarib Paristhitiyon Ka Shikar Bane
Judge Saheb Ko Antateh Ubar Liya
Gaya.' He also testified to the title
published in the newspapers 'Thana
Shahganj Police Ki Nadani Ke Chalte
Judge Saheb Ko Thana Jana Pad Gaya
Tha.'

25. In his cross examination, he
stated that he was not told the name of the
Judge. He denied knowledge regarding
the photograph of the car published in the
newspapers was taken while it was in
Vrindaban police station or it was in
Shahganj police station.

26. In connection with first charge it
is necessary to go through observation
made by the Enquiry Judge, which may
be reproduced herein:

In the first instance I would deal with
the evidence of E.W. 1 namely, Sri N.K.
Jain, District Judge Agra. E.W. 1 Distt
Judge N.K. Jain has proved his report and
stuck to the facts as contained in his
report submitted to the High Court. It
would appear from his statement that he
based his confidential report on the
information furnished by the C.J.M. after
enquiry from Police Station Shahganj and
also on the statement made by the
delinquent officer before the Distt Judge
on 20.07.2009 when he was summoned
by the District Judge in his chamber at
4.40 p.m. The District Judge also deposed
that the delinquent officer made the
statement before two judicial officers
namely C.J.M. namely Anil Kumar
Vashishtha Sri Rahul Mishra, the then
Addl. District Judge Agra, Sri Anil
Kumar Vashishtha has been examined
E.W.7 who has propped up in entirety the
statement of E.W. 1 that the officer made
statement before the Distt Judge on
20.07.2009 at 4.40 p.m. that he had
demanded a car for his visit to Vrindavan
and that he had gone to Vrindavan in the
car provided by S.H.O. Shahganj along
with the girls of the family of Shalya
Guest House situated at Tajganj. The
deposition of E.W. 2 Umesh Kumar who
was then C.J.M. Is to the effect that
certain information was sought from him
and after collecting information from P.S.
Shahganj, he furnished the information to
the Distt Judge by means of letter dated
7.9.2010. He also deposed that whatever
he has stated in his letter aforesaid is
based on documentary evidence which are
annexed to his letter aforesaid. It is also
954 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
noteworthy that although the delinquent
officer had conceded that he appeared
before the Administrative Judge but
denied to have given the version as
alleged in the report of the Administrative
Judge. In his deposition, the delinquent
officer stated that he only explained the
circumstances in which he could not
occupy the residence allotted to him and
he did not given statement on the lines as
attributed to him about his visit to
Vrindaban or about demanding car from
S.H.O. Shahganj or also about using the
said car for his visit to Vrindaban
alongwith girls.

In the above conspectus, and regard
being had to the memorandum prepared
by the Distt Judge and also the letter of
the District Judge addressed to the
Administrative Judge and again regard
being
had
to
the
report
of
the
Administrative Judge addressed to Hon.
Chief Justice, and taking into reckoning
the deposition of E.W. 7 namely A.K.
Vashishtha, the conclusion is inescapable
that the delinquent officer was called in
the cambers on 20.07.2009 and he
appeared and made the oral statement
before the Distt Judge in the presence of
Sri A.K. Vashishtha, Special C.J.M. who
is arrayed as E.W.7.

I would also like to dwell upon denial
made by the delinquent officer in his defence
about the statements attributed to him both
by the Distt Judge and the Administrative
Judge in their respective reports. The defence
of the delinquent officer that he did not make
the statement as attributed to him by the
Administrative Judge in his report addressed
to Chief Justice and that the same appears to
have been prepared on the basis of the report
submitted by the Distt Judge and further that
the Administrative Judge mentioned facts in
his report ostensibly labouring under some
confusion confounded by the District Judge,
does not commend to me for acceptance. I
have perused both the reports. The report of
the Administrative Judge mentions certain
facts which are not contained in the report of
the District Judge. The relevant facts which
are not mentioned in the report of the Distt
Judge may be adverted to Para no.2 at page 2
of the report of Administrative Judge being
relevant is excerpted below.

"The officer informed me that his two
sons are studying in Delhi and that his wife
and daughter mostly live at Allahabad. He
belongs to Allahabad and his house at
Allahabad. He wanted to come to Allahabad
on 19th July 2009 to see off his son but
changed his mind and decided to visit
temples at Vrindaban alongwith family
members of the owner of the guest house
with whom he has developed acquaintance.
The Inspector of Shahganj Agra is known to
him from Allahabad and that he requested
him to provide a car. The car was driven by
him. The guest house owner, his minor
daughters in between age group of 6 to 14
and sister in law serving in railway
accompanied him. At Vrindaban he had
parked his car outside the ISKON temple. He
found a photographer taking pictures of the
car. On his return at Agra he enquired from
the Inspector P.S. Shahganj and found that
car is not a case property. It is registered in
the name of person, who is an accused in a
murder case and was brought by the police to
the police station. The officer did not know
the owner of the car and his involvement in
criminal case."

27. The Enquiry Judge also
observed:

" The most intriguing aspect of the
matter is the evidence of E.W. 3 V.K.
2 All]. Ram Chandra-II Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
955
Arya, S.H.O. Shahganj and also the
evidence of E.W. 8 R.K.