# Ram Chandra v. Board of Revenue and others

- **Citation:** (2011) 3 ILRA 1411
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2011-12-05
- **Bench:** Ritu Raj Awasthi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ram-chandra-v-board-of-revenue-and-others-42038
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

Code of Civil Procedure-Order 47 rule 1scope
of
review-explained-while
exercising power-no authority to inter
into merit of case except on limited
grounds given in statute-however at the
time
of
deciding
reference
non
consideration-of public utility-order not
sustainable-matter
remitted
back
to
decide
fresh
in
light
of
judgment
observation.

Held: Para 10

However, this fact is also to be taken
note of that the Additional Commissioner
while
passing
the
order
dated
15.05.1992
had
not
considered
the
relevant provisions of Section 132 (c)(vi)
of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act and Section 29C of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act,
1953, which are very much necessary for
proper adjudication of the claim of the
petitioner. As such, although, I do not
agree with the finding given in the
impugned order, however, in the interest
of justice I find it necessary that the
1412 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2011
matter requires to be re-considered by
the competent court in accordance with
law,
in
deciding
the claim
of
the
petitioner.
Case law discussed:
1991 (1) Supreme Court cases 170

## Text

3 All] Ram Chandra V. Board of Revenue and others
1411
apology was tendered and thereafter the
contemnors also appeared before the
Magistrate concerned and expressed their
regret
and
tendered
unconditional
apology. Even thereafter the High Court
after convicting contemnors imposed
punishment of simple imprisonment of six
months/three months with a fine of rupees
one thousand to rupees two thousand
each. There the incident took place in
1999 and the High Court decided the
matter in 2004. During very this period
the contemnors had already tendered
unconditional apology therein. In the
present case, contemnor had put in
appearance before this Court for the first
time on 20th July, 2001 but did not show
any repentance to his conduct by filing his
response or affidavit etc. The order-sheet
shows that the matter was adjourned since
his counsel was not present and the Court
was constrained to direct for his personal
appearance. This order was passed on
29th September, 2011 and despite thereto
the contemnor remained absent. On the
next date i.e. 21th November, 2011 when
again this Court directed for his personal
appearance, it
is
only
thereto the
contemnor is present today and has filed
affidavit.

16. In view of the facts and
circumstances, as discussed above, we are
of the view that the contemnor's conduct
show lack of honest repentance and
bonafide
in
tendering
unconditional
apology and, therefore, we are not
satisfied that the same should be accepted
so as to not impose any punishment upon
him and let him go unpunished. Having
held him guilty of committing contempt
but
considering
the
fact
that
the
contemnor is now in advance age of 60
years and the incident is 13 years old, the
ends of justice would meet by imposing
punishment of fine of Rs. 2,000/-.

17. We order accordingly.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 05.12.2011

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE RITU RAJ AWASTHI,J.

Misc. Single No. - 1003 of 1994

Ram Chandra

 ...Petitioner
Versus
Board of Revenue and others

 ...Respondnets

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri S.P. Srivastava

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

Code of Civil Procedure-Order 47 rule 1scope
of
review-explained-while
exercising power-no authority to inter
into merit of case except on limited
grounds given in statute-however at the
time
of
deciding
reference
non
consideration-of public utility-order not
sustainable-matter
remitted
back
to
decide
fresh
in
light
of
judgment
observation.

Held: Para 10

However, this fact is also to be taken
note of that the Additional Commissioner
while
passing
the
order
dated
15.05.1992
had
not
considered
the
relevant provisions of Section 132 (c)(vi)
of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act and Section 29C of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act,
1953, which are very much necessary for
proper adjudication of the claim of the
petitioner. As such, although, I do not
agree with the finding given in the
impugned order, however, in the interest
of justice I find it necessary that the
1412 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2011
matter requires to be re-considered by
the competent court in accordance with
law,
in
deciding
the claim
of
the
petitioner.
Case law discussed:
1991 (1) Supreme Court cases 170

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ritu Raj Awasthi,J. )

1. Heard learned counsel for the
petitioner as well as learned Standing
Counsel.

2. The writ petition has been filed
challenging the order dated 13.01.1994
passed in Review Application moved by
the State, whereby the review was
allowed setting aside the order dated
08.06.1993
and
the
order
dated
15.05.1992
of
the
Additional
Commissioner and remanded the matter
back to the opposite party no.3 for
deciding afresh on merit.

3. The facts of the case in brief are
that the petitioner was allotted patta
with sirdari rights in the year 1969 on a
land
which
was
ear-marked
as
Khalihan. On the basis the patta the
name of the petitioner was entered in
the consolidation proceedings in the
year 1980. Against the order of the
consolidation officer the Gaon Sabha
had
filed
an
appeal
before
the
Settlement Officer Consolidation in the
year 1985. The said appeal was rejected
by the Settlement Officer Consolidation
in the year 1985. It was thereafter that
in the year 1989 the Pradhan of the
village made a complaint against the
allotment of lease to the petitioner and
cancellation
of
the
same.
The
application of Pradhan filed under
Section 198(4) of the U.P.Z.A. Act was
rejected by order dated 18.10.1989 of
the Additional Collector, Barabanki.
Against this order a revision was filed
under Section 333 of the U.P.Z.A. &
L.R. Act before the Commissioner. The
learned
Commissioner
while
considering
the
revision
made
a
reference to the Board of Revenue by
order dated 15.05.1992 with a request to
issue direction for the trial court to
decide the matter afresh, in case it is
required.
The
said
reference
was
rejected by order dated 08.06.1993 on
the ground that the patta was allotted on
12.05.1969 and on that basis the order
was passed by the Consolidation Officer
on 22.02.1980, by which the name of
son-in-law of Ram Prasad was entered
in the consolidation records. The appeal
preferred against the said order by the
Gaon Sabha was also rejected. It
appears that thereafter the State as well
as Gaon Sabha filed the review petition,
which was allowed by the impugned
order.

4. Learned counsel for the
petitioner vehemently submitted that the
order impugned has been passed beyond
the scope of review as it indicates that
while reviewing the order the learned
court below has re-considered the merits
of
the
case.
In
support
of
his
submission, he has relied on a decision
of the Apex Court in the case of Meera
Bhanja (Smt) Versus Nirmala Kumari
Choudhary (Smt), reported in 1995 (1)
Supreme Court Cases 170 wherein it
has
been
held
that
the
review
proceedings are not by way of an appeal
and have to be strictly confined to the
scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1,
C.P.C. The relevant paragraphs of the
said judgment are quoted below:

"8. It is well settled that the review
proceedings are not by way of an appeal
3 All] Ram Chandra V. Board of Revenue and others
1413
and have to be strictly confined to the
scope and ambit of Order 47, Rule 1,
C.P.C. In connection with the limitation
of the powers of the court under Order
47, Rule 1, while dealing with similar
jurisdiction available to the High Court
while seeking to review the orders under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India,
this Court, in the case of Aribam
Tuleshwar Sharma V. Aribam Pishak
Sharma, speaking through Chinnappa
Reddy, J., has made the following
pertinent observations: (SCC p 390,
para 3).

"It is true as observed by this Court
in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab,
there is nothing in Article 226 of the
Constitution to preclude the High Court
from exercising the power of review
which inheres in every Court of plenary
jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of
justice or to correct grave and palpable
errors committed by it. But, there are
definitive limits to the exercise of the
power of review. The power of review
may be exercised on the discovery of
new and important matter or evidence
which, after the exercise
of
due
diligence was not within the knowledge
of the person seeking the review or
could not be produced by him at the
time when the order was made; it may
be exercised where some mistake or
error apparent on the face of the record
is found; it may also be exercised on
any analogous ground. But, it may not
be exercised on the ground that the
decision was erroneous on merits. That
would be the province of a court of
appeal. A power of review is not to be
confused with appellate power which
may enable an appellate court to
correct all manner of errors committed
by the subordinate court."

9. Now it is also to be kept in view
that in the impugned judgment, the
Division Bench of the High Court has
clearly
observed
that
they
were
entertaining the review petition only on
the ground of error apparent on the face
of the record and not on any other
ground. So far as that aspect is
concerned, it has to be kept in view that
an error apparent on the fact of record
must be such an error which must strike
one on mere looking at the record and
would not require any long-drawn
process of reasoning on points where
there may conceivably be two opinions.
We
may
usefully
refer
to
the
observations of this Court in the case of
Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v.
Mallikarjun
Bhavanappa
Tirumale
wherein, K.C. Das Gupta, J., speaking
for the Court has made the following
observations in connection with an
error apparent on the face of the
record:

An
error
which
has
to
be
established by a long-drawn process of
reasoning on points where there may
conceivably be two opinions can hardly
be said to be an error apparent on the
fact of the record. Where an alleged
error is far from self-evident and if it
can be established, it has to be
established, by lengthy and complicated
arguments, such an error cannot be
cured by a writ of certiorari according
to the rule governing the powers of the
superior court to issue such a writ."

5. Learned Standing Counsel on
the other hand while defending the
impugned order submitted that in fact
the public utility land such as Khalihan
could not have been given on patta. The
patta, if any, made in favour of the
1414 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2011
original allottee was void abinitio. In
support of his submission, he has relied
on Section 132 sub-section (c)(vi) of the
U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act, 1950. The
relevant provision is quoted below:

"132. Land in which bhumidhari
rights
shall
not
accrue-
Notwithstanding anything contained in
section 131, but without prejudice to the
provisions of section 19, [Bhumidhari]
rights shall not accrue in-

(a) pasture lands or lands covered
by water and used for the purpose of
growing singhara or other produce or
land in the bed of a river and used for
casual or occasional cultivation;

(b) such tracts of shifting or
unstable
cultivation
as
the
State
Government may specify by notification
in the Gazettee, and

[(c) lands declared by the State
Government by notification in the
official Gazettee to be intended or set
apart for taungya plantation or grove
lands of a [Gaon Sabha] or a local
authority or land acquired or held for a
public purpose and in particular and
without prejudice to the generality of
this clause-

(i) lands set apart for military
encamping grounds,

(ii) lands included within railway
or canal boundaries,

(iii) lands situate within the limits
of any cantonment,

(iv) lands included in sullage farms
or trenching grounds belonging as such
to a local authority,

(v) lands acquired by a town
improvement trust in accordance with a
scheme sanctioned under section 42 of
the U.P. Town Improvement Act, 1919
or by a municipality for a purpose
mentioned in clause (a) or clause (c) of
section 8 of the U.P. Municipalities Act,
1916 and

(vi) lands set apart for public
purposes under the U.P. Consolidation
of Holdings Act, 1953.]

6. It is further submitted that under
Section 29-C of U.P. Consolidation of
Holdings Act, 1953 the land contributed
for public purposes under this Act shall,
with effect from the date on which the
tenure-holder became entitled to enter
into possession of the chaks allotted to
them, vests and be always deemed to
have vested in the Gaon Sabha.

7. The contention of the learned
Standing Counsel is that the land vested
in the Gaon Sabha for the public
purpose could not have been given on
patta to any individual person. His
contention is that this fact was not
considered
in
the
order
dated
15.05.1992
while
rejecting
the
reference, therefore, the matter was
rightly remanded back to the competent
authority to decide afresh on merit.

8.

I
have
considered
the
submissions
made
by
the
parties'
counsel and gone through the record.

9. There is no denial of the fact
that
the
order
impugned
clearly
3 All] Atma Ram Prajapati and others V. State of U.P. and another
1415
indicates that the Board of Revenue
while reviewing its order has made
certain observations on the merits of the
case. There is no dispute, so far about
the legal proposition with regard to the
scope and ambit of review is concerned,
the law in this regard is well settled as
held in the case of Meera Bhanja (Smt)
Vs.
Nirmala
Kumari
Choudhary
(Supra).

10. However, this fact is also to be
taken note of that the Additional
Commissioner while passing the order
dated 15.05.1992 had not considered the
relevant provisions of Section 132
(c)(vi) of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act and
Section 29-C of U.P. Consolidation of
Holdings Act, 1953, which are very
much necessary for proper adjudication
of the claim of the petitioner. As such,
although, I do not agree with the finding
given in the impugned order, however,
in the interest of justice I find it
necessary that the matter requires to be
re-considered by the competent court in
accordance with law, in deciding the
claim of the petitioner.

11. In this view of the matter, the
writ petition is disposed of finally with
the observation that the Collector,
Barabanki, shall pass fresh order under
Section 198(4) of the Z.A. Act after
giving opportunity of hearing to the
parties concerned, in accordance with
law, expeditiously, say within a period
of three months from the date a certified
copy of this order is produced before the
Collector concerned.

12.

With
the
aforesaid
observations,
the
writ
petition
is
disposed of finally.
---------
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 21.11.2011

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE S.C. AGARWAL,J.

Criminal Revision No. - 1147 of 2011

Atma Ram Prajapati and others

 ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. and another ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Sriprakash Dwivedi

Counsel for the Respondnets:
Govt. Advocate
Sri Vipin Chandra Pandey

Code
of
Criminal
Procedure-Section
397/401-Criminal
Revision-against
summoning passed-ignoring compromise
between parties offence under Section
147,323,504,506,498
A-I.P.C.-with
section 3⁄4 D.P. Act -held-pure personal
family dispute settled by mediation
Center of High Court-held-without hope
of success of prosecution-futile exercises
to continue with proceeding-summoning
order quashed.

Held: Para 11

The present dispute between the parties
is of purely personal nature and is a
matrimonial dispute, which has been
mutually and amicably settled by the
parties
with
the
intervention
of
Mediation and Reconciliation Centre of
this Court. After compromise between
the parties, it would be futile to permit
criminal
case
pending
against
the
applicants to continue any further. As
parties have come to terms, it shall be
sheer waste of time of the Court, if the
criminal proceeding pending against the
revisionist is permitted to reach its
logical end without any hope for a result
in favour of the prosecution. In these