# Ram Das & Ors v. Addl. Commissioner & Ors

- **Citation:** (2019) 2 ILRA 1687
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2019-08-28
- **Case number:** Writ C No. 17180 of 1996
- **Bench:** Yashwant Varma
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ram-das-ors-v-addl-commissioner-ors-44656
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

Holding Act, 1960 - S. 27(4) - Settlement
of surplus land - Jurisdiction of Additional
Commissioner while cancelling settlement
of
surplus
land
-
The
moment
an
authorization is made u/s 13(3) of UP
Land Revenue Act, 1901, the statutory
fiction comes into play and Additional
Commissioner
would
consequently
be
empowered to exercise power u/ 27(4) of
the Act, 1960 - Principle articulated by Full
Bench in Brahm Singh case clearly set the
controversy rest. (Para 24)

B. UP Land Revenue Act, 1901 - Section
13(4) - Meaning of expression 'for the time
being in force' - It would necessarily
include any subsequent legislation that
may be in force at a time when an order is
made u/s 13(3) - Legislature is intended to
apply subsection (3) and (4) of S. 13 to the
statutes that may come into force even
after 1901. (Para 20)

Held:-
1688 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

## Text

2 All. Ram Das & Ors. Vs Addl. Commissioner & Ors.
1687

39. Clause K of the Sugar
Factories Standing Orders, referred to
above, provides a lien of a seasonal
workman in the succeeding crushing
season if he has worked in the previous
full crushing season or in the whole
second half of that crushing season. The
burden of proof in this regard is clearly
on the workman in order to establish his
entitlement to be re-engaged during the
succeeding crushing season. In the
present case no evidence having been
led by the respondent workman to
discharge the burden of proof in this
regard, the finding returned by the
Labour Court cannot be supported.

40. The Labour Court has also
misdirected itself in proceeding to draw
an adverse inference against the petitioner
despite the necessary evidence having
been placed on its behalf, and coming to
the conclusion that the respondentworkman had worked as a seasonal
workman on the post of 'Cane Weighment
Clerk' in the petitioner establishment and
was entitled to the benefits under the
Sugar
Factories
Standing
Orders.
Accordingly, the inference drawn by the
Labour Court that the services of the
respondent-workman had been terminated
without following the due procedure and
that he was entitled to reinstatement with
continuity of service and full back wages
and other consequential benefits, is
patently
erroneous
and
cannot
be
sustained.

41. The award of the Labour Court
is thus legally unsustainable and the same
is set aside.

42. The writ petition is allowed in
the aforementioned terms.
----------
(2019)10ILR A 1687

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 28.08.2019

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE YASHWANT VARMA, J.

Writ C No. 17180 of 1996
Connected with
Writ C No. 13050 of 1996

Ram Das & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
Addl. Commissioner & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri S.D.N. Singh, Sri S.O.H. Singh, Sri
Sushil Jaiswal, Sri V.D. Ojha.

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

A. UP Imposition of Ceiling on Land
Holding Act, 1960 - S. 27(4) - Settlement
of surplus land - Jurisdiction of Additional
Commissioner while cancelling settlement
of
surplus
land
-
The
moment
an
authorization is made u/s 13(3) of UP
Land Revenue Act, 1901, the statutory
fiction comes into play and Additional
Commissioner
would
consequently
be
empowered to exercise power u/ 27(4) of
the Act, 1960 - Principle articulated by Full
Bench in Brahm Singh case clearly set the
controversy rest. (Para 24)

B. UP Land Revenue Act, 1901 - Section
13(4) - Meaning of expression 'for the time
being in force' - It would necessarily
include any subsequent legislation that
may be in force at a time when an order is
made u/s 13(3) - Legislature is intended to
apply subsection (3) and (4) of S. 13 to the
statutes that may come into force even
after 1901. (Para 20)

Held:-
1688 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
20. Viewed in the light of the principles enunciated
in the decisions noted above, it is manifest that
the expression "every other law for the time being
applicable" cannot be interpreted as freezing in
time only such enactments which were in
existence in 1901. The words "for the time being"
would
necessarily
include
any
subsequent
legislations that may be in force at a time when an
order is made by either by the State Government
or the Commissioner under Section 13(3). Regard
must also be had to the fact that subsection (4) of
Section 13 is not placed in the statute as a
transitory or temporary provision. This is also
clearly indicative of the intent of the legislature to
expand the applicability of subsections (3) and (4)
of Section 13 to statutes that may come into force
even after 1901.

C. UP Imposition of Ceiling on Land
Holding Act, 1960 - Section 27(4) -
Scope of expression 'Commissioner' -
Whether
expression
Commissioner
include Additional Commissioner - An
Additional Commissioner empowered by
S. 13(3) would be entitled to exercise all
powers and discharge any duties of a
Commissioner - Hierarchal dichotomy, if
any existing, vanishes and swept aside.
(Para 21)

D. Validity of settlement - Charge of
settlements
being
an
outcome
of
nepotism is well founded - None of
petitioners were landless labourer -
Settlement in favour of such person
deprive needy and eligible persons -
Held, Such a settlement is a fraud on
statute. (Para 25)

Writ petitions dismissed (E-1)

Case relied on :-
1. Brahm Singh Vs Board of Revenue & ors.
(2008) 5 ADJ 331.
2. Devkumarsinghji Vs St. of M.P. AIR 1967
MP 268.
3. Municipal Corp. of Delhi (MCD) Vs Prem
Chand Gupta & anr. (2000) 10 SCC 115.
4. Yakub Abdul Razak Memon Vs St. of Mah.
(2013) 13 SCC 1.
(Delivered by Hon'ble Yashwant Varma, J.)

1. Heard Sri V.D. Ojha learned
Senior Counsel in support of the writ
petitions and Sri Sanjay Goswami learned
Additional Chief Standing Counsel on
behalf of the State respondents.

2. Both these writ petitions assail the
order dated 29 March 1996 pursuant to
which a settlement of surplus land made
in favour of the petitioners under Section
27 of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on
Land Holdings Act, 1960 ["the 1960
Act"] has come to be cancelled. They are
with the consent of parties taken up for
disposal together.

3. The Court for the purposes of
disposal deems it sufficient to notice the
essential facts pertaining to Writ-C No.
17180 of 1996. The petitioners claim to
be landless labourers. In proceedings
initiated
under
the
1960
Act,
the
agricultural land of one Smt. Girja
Kumari was declared surplus and came to
vest in the State of U.P. The aforesaid
land is stated to have been settled in
favour of the petitioners on 19 November
1990 by the Sub Divisional Officer in
accordance with the provisions made in
Section 27 of the 1960 Act. The details of
the leases as granted are set-forth in
paragraph-8 of the writ petition. It
transpires from the record that on 25
August
1993
the
Naib
Tehsildar
concerned forwarded a note to the
Commissioner Jhansi division raising
issues with respect to the validity of the
settlement
made
in
favour
of
the
petitioners. Upon receipt of that note, the
Commissioner by an order dated 25
August 1993 drew proceedings and
transferred them for adjudication to the
Additional Commissioner. Pursuant to
2 All. Ram Das & Ors. Vs Addl. Commissioner & Ors.
1689
notices issued, the petitioners entered
appearance
and
filed
their
written
statements. The objection taken by the
State respondents to the validity of the
settlement made was that the petitioners
were unlawfully allotted land even though
they were not residents of the concerned
village. It was asserted that the petitioner
No. 1 was not a landless laborer but a
priest of a temple. Insofar as the petitioner
No. 2 is concerned, it was stated that he
was a jeweller also not residing in the
village in question. A similar objection
was taken in respect of the petitioner No.
3. In the counter affidavit filed in these
proceedings it was averred that none of
the petitioners were residents of village
Tinduhi. In paragraph-3 details have been
given of the land held by the petitioners in
different villages. It was essentially
asserted that the petitioners were neither
landless labourers nor members of the
Gram Sabha of Tinduhi and consequently
they were ineligible to have been allotted
the land under Section 27 of the 1960 Act.
It was also alleged that the petitioner Nos.
3 and 4 were the cousins of the then Gram
Pradhan and that the settlement made in
their favour was clearly illegal and in
abuse of the process of law. The
respondents
asserted
that
despite
numerous landless labourers belonging to
the Scheduled Castes being available and
eligible for allotment, their claims were
overlooked and the land settled in favour
of the petitioners illegally and as an
outcome of the nexus between them and
the
erstwhile
Gram
Pradhan.
The
impugned order further records that the
petitioner Nos. 3 and 4 in their statements
recorded before the respondents on 20
April 1991 had admitted to being
residents of village Pachpahra. Taking
into consideration the aforesaid glaring
facts, the Additional Commissioner by the
impugned order proceeded to annul the
leases granted in favour of the petitioners.
When the Court entertained the writ
petition on 22 July 1996, interim
protection was accorded to the petitioners
with a learned Judge providing that if the
petitioners are in possession, they shall
remain as such over the land in dispute.
Pursuant to that interim order, the
petitioners are stated to have continued to
occupy the land in question.

4. Sri V.D. Ojha, learned Senior
Counsel, apart from assailing the order on
merits
has
principally
raised
a
jurisdictional question with respect to the
Additional
Commissioner
exercising
powers under Section 27 of the 1960 Act.
According to Sri Ojha the power to cancel
a settlement as comprised in Section 27(4)
of the 1960 Act stands vested in the
"Commissioner" and that consequently
the Additional Commissioner has acted
clearly without jurisdiction in passing the
order impugned. Sri Ojha would contend
that the expression "Commissioner" does
not include an Additional Commissioner
nor does the 1960 Act empower the
Commissioner to delegate the functions
entrusted to him under Section 27(4). In
view of the above, it was his submission
that the impugned order deserved to be
set-aside on this short ground alone.
Assailing the order on merits Sri Ojha has
referred to the entries appearing in the
Voters List, Ration Card as well as the
statement of the Lekhpal to submit that
the
allegations
levelled
against
the
petitioners were clearly not established.
Sri Ojha contends that the entries
appearing in the Voters List as well as the
Ration Cards held by the petitioners
clearly
established
that
they
were
residents of village Tinduhi. It is his
submission that the objections which were
1690 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
taken by the respondents were wholly
untenable and that the order impugned is
consequently liable to be set aside.

5. Refuting those submissions Sri
Goswami, the learned Additional Chief
Standing Counsel, contends that the
details set forth in paragraph-3 of the
counter affidavit clearly established that
the settlement made in favour of the
petitioners was an outcome of nepotism
and the illegal acts of commission of the
erstwhile Pradhan who had a personal
interest in the allotments made in favour
of the petitioner nos. 3 and 4. Sri
Goswami highlighted the fact that the
Additional Commissioner had found that
the petitioners had fraudulently managed
to have their names inserted in the Voters
List and obtained Ration Cards by
furnishing false information. He also
referred to the admission of the petitioner
Nos. 3 and 4 themselves as noticed in the
impugned order to the effect that they
were not residents of village Tinduhi. Sri
Goswami contended that Section 27 is to
be viewed as a measure of social
amelioration aimed at uplifting the status
of landless labourers and members of the
Scheduled Castes designed to empower
them to eke out a living and find means of
sustenance. According to Sri Goswami
those objectives have been belied by
virtue of the wholly illegal settlements
made in favour of the petitioners.

6. Addressing the Court on the
question of jurisdiction Sri Goswami
contends that while the provisions of the
1960 Act do not define the word
"Commissioner",
an
Additional
Commissioner is entitled to exercise the
powers enshrined in Section 27(4) by
virtue of subsections (3) and (4) of
Section 13 of the U.P. Land Revenue
Act, 1901 ["the 1901 Act"] and in any
case in light of the order passed by the
Commissioner assigning the matters for
disposal to the Additional Commissioner.
Sri Goswami has also placed reliance
upon the decision rendered by a Full
Bench of the Court in Brahm Singh v.
Board of Revenue And Others1 in
support of his submission that an
Additional Commissioner is sufficiently
empowered in law to exercise the powers
enshrined in Section 27(4) of the 1960
Act. It is these rival submissions that fall
for determination.

7. This Court in its order of 25 July
2019 noted the issue of jurisdiction which
was principally raised in the following
terms: -

"The
principal
submission
which has been addressed by Sri V.D.
Ojha, learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioners, is that exercise of powers by
the Additional Commissioner purportedly
invoking Section 27(4) of the Act is
without jurisdiction.

The Court notes that the 1960
Act does not define the expression
'Commissioner' as employed in Section
27(4). However Section 3(21) of that Act
provides that words and expressions not
defined in the 1960 Act would draw
meaning as prescribed to those words and
expressions under the Uttar Pradesh
Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms
Act, 1950. When the Court travels to the
U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act 1950, it notes that
Section 3(27) of the 1950 Act refers to
meanings of words and expressions as
used in the United Provinces Land
Revenue Act 1901. Under Section 13(3) of
the 1901 Act although the Additional
Commissioner is empowered to exercise
powers vested in a Commissioner, that
2 All. Ram Das & Ors. Vs Addl. Commissioner & Ors.
1691
exercise
is
subject
to
an
express
authorisation made either by the State
Government or by the Commissioner. The
issue which would therefore, arise would
be whether in the present case the
Additional
Commissioner
had
been
sufficiently empowered to exercise powers
comprised in Section 27(4) of the 1960
Act by virtue of an order made under
Section 13(3) of the 1901 Act.

Learned Standing Counsel may
in this connection place the relevant
record for the perusal of the Court on the
next date of listing.

List again for final disposal on
13 August 2019."

8. As noted in that order, the 1960
Act
does
not
define
the
word
"Commissioner". Section 3(21) of that
Act however states that the words and
expressions not defined therein but used
in
the
Uttar
Pradesh
Zamindari
Abolition And Land Reforms Act, 1950
["the 1950 Act"] shall have the meaning
assigned to them in that Act. The Court
had noted that even the 1950 Act does not
place any definition of the expression
"Commissioner". Section 3(27) of the
1950 Act, however, makes the following
provision:-

"words and expressions, underproprietor,
sub-proprietor,
revenue,
mahal, Assistant Collector, Assistant
Collector in-charge of sub- division,
Commissioner, Board, Tahsildar and
minor, not defined in this Act and used in
the United Provinces Land Revenue Act,
1901, shall have the meaning assigned to
them in that Act;"

9. When the Court proceeds to
review the provisions of the 1901 Act, it
is faced with an identical absence of a
specific provision defining the expression
"Commissioner".
However
the
State
respondents place reliance upon Section
13 of the 1901 Act to contend that by
virtue of the provisions made therein, an
Additional Commissioner is entitled to
exercise all powers and discharge duties
of a Commissioner pursuant to orders
made in that behalf either by the State
Government
or
the
Commissioner
himself. Section 13 of the 1901 Act reads
thus: -

"13.
Appointment,
powers
and duties of Additional Commissioner.
- (1) The [State Government] may appoint
Additional Commissioner in a division, or
in two or more divisions combined.

(2)
An
Additional
Commissioner shall hold his office during
the pleasure of the [State Government].

(3)
An
Additional
Commissioner shall exercise such powers
and
discharge
such
duties
of
a
Commissioner in such cases or classes of
cases as the [State Government] or in the
absence of orders from the [State
Government],
the
Commissioner
concerned, may direct.

(4) The Act and every other law
for the time being applicable to a
Commissioner
shall
apply
to
the
Additional
Commissioner,
when
exercising any powers or discharging any
duties under sub-section (3), as if he were
the Commissioner of the division."

10. Upon a review of the statutory
position as existing, it is apparent that
none of them define the expression
"Commissioner". Even Section 13, as is
plainly
evident,
is
not
a
defining
provision. As is discernable from a
reading of subsection (3) of Section 13, an
Additional
Commissioner
may
be
1692 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
empowered either by an order of the State
Government or the Commissioner himself
to exercise the powers and discharge
duties of a Commissioner in such cases or
classes of cases as may be directed. While
the impact and scope of this provision
would clearly have relevancy to the issue
at hand, it may only be noted that it does
not state or expound the meaning of the
word "Commissioner".

11. Section 27(4) on its plain terms
empowers the Commissioner either of his
own motion or on the application of an
aggrieved person to enquire into the
question whether a settlement made is
irregular. Subsection (4) reads thus: -

"27(4). The Commissioner may
of his own motion and shall, on the
application of any aggrieved person,
enquire into such settlement and if he is
satisfied that the settlement is irregular he
may after notice to the person in whose
favour such settlement is made to show
cause-

(i) cancel the settlement and the
lease,
if
any
and
thereupon,
notwithstanding anything contained in
any other law or in any instrument, the
rights, title and interest of the person in
whose favour such settlement was made
or lease executed or any person claiming
through him in such land shall cease, and
such land shall revert to the State
Government; and

(ii) direct that every person
holing or retaining possession thereof
may be evicted, and may for that purpose
use or cause to be used such force as may
be necessary."

12. The seminal question which,
therefore, arises for consideration is
whether the expression "Commissioner"
as used in subsection (4) would include an
Additional Commissioner. While the
Court dwells on the provisions as
contained in the 1960 Act, it would also
be pertinent to note the following aspect.
Significantly, although the 1960 Act
makes a specific provision for the
Collector delegating his powers to an
Assistant Collector in terms of Section 43
of that Act, no similar provision is made
with respect to a Commissioner of the
Division.

13. As noticed hereinabove in the
proceedings that were drawn against the
petitioners, the Commissioner by his
order of 25 August 1993 transferred the
matter for adjudication to the concerned
Additional Commissioner. Although the
Commissioner chose to employ the word
"transfer" in his orders, it essentially
appears to have been an assignment of the
matters for disposal by the Additional
Commissioner. Subsection (3) of Section
13
of
the
1901
Act,
as
noticed
hereinabove, is clearly not a definition
clause. It only confers a power on the
State Government or the Commissioner to
authorise an Additional Commissioner to
exercise the powers and duties of a
Commissioner. It clearly appears to be a
provision for conferment of power as
distinct from a defining provision as was
contended on behalf of the respondents.

14. Although this provision also
uses the expression "...in such cases or
classes of cases" that may not impact the
order of assignment made by the
Commissioner when one bears in mind
the provisions of Section 13 of the
General Clauses Act, 1872 which clearly
provide that words in the singular would
also include the plural and vice versa.
2 All. Ram Das & Ors. Vs Addl. Commissioner & Ors.
1693

15. In the considered view of this
Court, it is the provisions made in
subsection (4) of Section 13 that are of
greater
import
and
significance.
Subsection (4) provides that the 1901 Act
and "...every other law for the time being
applicable...." to a Commissioner would
also apply to an Additional Commissioner
exercising powers and discharging duties
in accordance with subsection (3) as if he
were the Commissioner of the Division. It
is thus manifest that on an Additional
Commissioner
being
empowered
to
discharge duties and exercising powers by
virtue of an order made either by the State
Government or the Commissioner under
subsection (3) it is liable to be viewed as
being a discharge of duties or exercise of
powers by the Commissioner of the
Division himself.

16. The ancillary issue which
immediately springs up is by virtue of
subsection (4) employing the phrase "....
every other law for the time being
applicable...". The U.P. Land Revenue
Act was indubitably promulgated in 1901.
The Ceiling Act came to be enacted in
1960. The question, which consequently
arises, is whether the 1960 Act would fall
within the ambit of the expression "every
other law for the time being applicable".
This since if that phrase is interpreted
literally, it would be likely to be perceived
as being confined to a law which was in
existence in 1901 when the Land Revenue
Act came to be promulgated.

17. In Devkumarsinghji v. State of
Madhya Pradesh2, a Division Bench of
the Madhya Pradesh High Court was
called upon to interpret the expression
"any other enactment for the time being in
force". The question was answered by the
Division Bench as under: -

"9.
The
power
of
the
State
Legislature to impose a tax for general
revenue is not taken away by the
empowerment by it to the municipal
corporations to impose a tax on lands and
buildings. Nor is the State Legislature
precluded by sub-section (4) of Section
132 of the 1956-Act from imposing a tax
on
lands
and
buildings
after
the
corporation has exercised its power under
Section 132(1)(a) of imposing a tax on
lands and buildings. In our opinion, the
construction put on sub-section (4) of the
Section 132 by Shri Chitale is a forced
and unnatural construction. That subsection no doubt provides that the
"imposition of any tax under this section
shall be subject to the provisions of any
other enactment for the time being in
force".
The
expression
"any
other
enactment for the time being in force"
does not mean an enactment which was
already
in
force
at
the
time
the
corporation imposed a tax under Section
132(1)(a); but means any legislation
enacted whether before or after the
imposition of the tax by the corporation.
The general sense of the phrase "for the
time being" is that of time indefinite, and
refers to indefinite state of facts which
will arise in future and which may vary
from time to time. See Ellison v. Thomas,
(1862) 31 LJ Ch 867. If with this
construction sub-section (4) of Section
132 is read along with Section 4(3) of the
impugned Act, then it is plain that the lax
imposed by the Corporation on lands and
buildings and the tax imposed by the
impugned Act can validity co-exist. "
(emphasis supplied)

18.

The
Supreme
Court
in
Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD)
v. Prem Chand Gupta And Another3
had an occasion to rule on the meaning of
1694 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the expression "for the time being in
force". The question that arose before it
was whether the service conditions of the
employee would be governed by the 1949
Rules which stood incorporated by
reference in the service regulations or the
1959 Rules which had repealed and
replaced the earlier Rules. Referring to
the expression "for the time being in
force" as employed therein, it was argued
that the service conditions would be
governed only by those rules which were
in force when the 1959 Regulations were
promulgated and not any latter rules.
Answering that issue the Supreme Court
held as under: -

"13. In this connection, one
submission of learned counsel for the
respondent workman may be noted. He
submitted that as laid down by Regulation
4(1), the rules for the time being in force
as mentioned therein would refer to only
those rules which were in force when the
Service
Regulations
of
1959
were
promulgated and not any latter rules. It is
difficult to countenance this submission.
Rules for the time being in force will have
a nexus with the regulation of condition
of service of the municipal officers at the
relevant time as expressly mentioned in
Regulation 4(1). Therefore, whenever the
question of regulation of conditions of
service of the municipal officers comes up
for consideration, the relevant rules in
force at that time have to be looked into.
This is the clear thrust of Regulation 4(1).
Its
scope
and
ambit
cannot
be
circumscribed and frozen only to the point
of time in the year 1959, when the Service
Regulations were promulgated. If such
was the intention of the framers of the
Regulation, Regulation 4(1) would have
employed
a
different
phraseology,
namely, "rules at present in force" instead
of the phraseology "rules for the time
being in force". The phraseology "rules
for the time being in force" would
necessarily mean rules in force from time
to time and not rules in force only at a
fixed point of time in 1959 as tried to be
suggested by learned counsel for the
respondent workman.

14. As a result of the aforesaid
discussion, it must be held that the
termination of the respondent workman
from service on 29.4.1966 was not
violative of the amended Rule 5 of the
latter Rules of 1965 which only applied in
his case. Therefore, there was no
obligation, on the part of the appellant
Corporation
to
simultaneously
offer
requisite compensation to the respondent
workman as a condition precedent to such
termination and such compensation could
be offered to him within reasonable time
later on. The termination had to be treated
to have come into force forthwith when
the order of termination was passed and
served on the respondent workman. Nonpayment of requisite compensation as per
the said rule even later on did not attract
any invalidating consequences. The first
point of determination, therefore, is held
in the negative in favour of the appellant
and against the respondent workman. "
(emphasis supplied)

19. In Yakub Abdul Razak
Memon v. State of Maharashtra4 three
learned Judges of the Supreme Court were
called upon to resolve a contended
conflict between the provisions made in
TADA and the Juvenile Justice Act.
Dealing with that question the Supreme
Court held thus: -

"1554. Section 1(4) of the JJ
Act was added by amendment with effect
from 22-8-2006. In fact, this provision
2 All. Ram Das & Ors. Vs Addl. Commissioner & Ors.
1695
gives the overriding effect to this Act over
other statutes. However, it reads that the
Act would override "anything contained
in any other law for the time being in
force". The question does arise as to
whether the statutory provisions of the JJ
Act would have an overriding effect over
the provisions of TADA which left long
back and was admittedly not in force on
22-8-2006. Thus, the question does arise
as what is the meaning of the law for the
time being in force. This Court has
interpreted this phrase to include the law
in
existence
on
the
date
of
commencement
of
the
Act
having
overriding effect and the law which may
be enacted in future during the life of the
Act having overriding effect. (Vide
Thyssen Stahlunion GmbH v. SAIL
[(1999) 9 SCC 334: AIR 1999 SC 3923]
and MCD v. Prem Chand Gupta [(2000)
10
SCC
115:
2000
SCC
(L&S)
404]."(emphasis supplied)

20. Viewed in the light of the
principles enunciated in the decisions
noted above, it is manifest that the
expression "every other law for the time
being applicable" cannot be interpreted as
freezing in time only such enactments
which were in existence in 1901. The
words "for the time being" would
necessarily
include
any
subsequent
legislations that may be in force at a time
when an order is made by either by the
State Government or the Commissioner
under Section 13(3). Regard must also be
had to the fact that subsection (4) of
Section 13 is not placed in the statute as a
transitory or temporary provision. This is
also clearly indicative of the intent of the
legislature to expand the applicability of
subsections (3) and (4) of Section 13 to
statutes that may come into force even
after 1901.

21. The 1960 Act undisputedly is a
law that is applicable to a Commissioner.
It is therefore, evident that the provisions
of subsection (4) of Section 13 would
stand attracted and consequently an
Additional Commissioner empowered by
an order made under Section 13(3) would
be entitled to exercise all powers and
discharge any duties of a Commissioner
as
enjoined
"as
if
he
were
the
Commissioner of the division". By virtue
of the fiction introduced by subsection (4)
such exercise of powers or duties would
be entitled to be understood and viewed
as actions initiated and decisions taken by
the Commissioner himself. On an order
being made under Section 13(3), the
Additional Commissioner steps into the
shoes and dons the robes of the
Commissioner himself. Once an order
under Section 13 (3) comes to be made
empowering
the
Additional
Commissioner to discharge all duties of a
Commissioner, the hierarchal dichotomy,
if any existing, vanishes and is swept
aside in light of the provisions made in
Section 13 (4).

22. In light of the interpretation
accorded to Section 13 above, it is evident
that the absence of a provision for
delegation of powers akin to Section 43 of
the
1960
Act
in
respect
of
a
Commissioner would neither stand in the
way nor be of any significance.

23. A similar question fell for
determination before the Full Bench of
this Court in Brahm Singh. The question
which arose was whether the word
"Collector" as employed in Section 198
(4) of the 1950 Act would include an
Additional
Collector.
Coincidentally,
Section 198 (4) of the 1950 Act
empowers a Collector to cancel a
1696 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
settlement of land made by way of a
lease. The Full Bench, as in this case, fell
back to the provisions made in the 1901
Act. Section 14A of the 1901 Act, it
becomes apposite to note is pari materia
to Section 13 which this Court has
considered. Noticing the provisions made
in Section 14A, the Full Bench held: -

16.The aforesaid sub-section (4)
was inserted in 1950 Act by Section 3 of
the U.P. Act No. 34 of 1974, from a
perusal whereof it is evident that the
''Collector' for the purposes of 1950 Act is
an officer appointed as ''Collector' under
1901 Act and also includes the ''Assistant
Collector' of the first class empowered by
the State Government by notification in
the Gazette to discharge all or any of the
functions of a ''Collector' under 1950 Act.
Thus, the Act by itself does not confine
the term ''Collector' only to those officers,
who are appointed under sub-Section 14
of 1901 Act, rather it expands the
definition of ''Collector' as an officer
appointed as ''Collector', under 1901 Act.
It does not confine the word ''Collector'
for the purposes of 1950 Act to an officer
appointed under Section 14 of 1901 Act
but it would also include a person
appointed under Section 14-A as well by
virtue of declaration made under subSection (4) thereof, if we read sub-section
(4) of Section 3 of 1950 Act together with
sub-section (4) of Section 14-A the
expression ''Collector' used in 1950 Act
shall have and shall be deemed always to
be the ''collector' appointed under Section
14 of the Act and will include ''Additional
Collector' appointed under Section 14-A
when it exercises power and discharges
duty of a ''Collector' under sub-section (3)
of Section 14-A because of sub-section
(4) of Section 14-A, which provides that
the
Additional
Collector
while
discharging the powers and duties of a
''Collector' under 1901 Act or under any
other law, for the time being applicable to
the Collector, as if he were the Collector
of the district. Therefore, there is no
intention of the legislature to confine the
term ''Collector' for the purpose of 1950
Act to an officer appointed under Section
14 of 1901 Act, but it would also include
a person appointed under Section 14-A as
well by virtue of the declaration made
under sub-section (4) thereof.

18.From the provisions of the
two Acts, referred to above, it is evident
that the power under Section 198(4) of
1950 Act can be exercised by a ''Collector'
appointed under 1901 Act. From a plain
reading one may refer to only Section 14
of 1901 Act but that would amount to
ignore the legislature's intention and not
to give effect to the legislative declaration
under sub-section (4) of Section 14-A of
1950 Act. To ascertain and to give full
meaning, as per legislative intent, one has
to read sub-section (4) of Section 3 of
1950 Act together with Section 14 and
Section 14-A of 1901 Act. It is true that in
finding out the meaning of the word
''Collector' used in the Act, the ordinary
meaning given in the definition clause is
to be construed, but it is not inflexible and
there may be sections in the Act where the
meaning have to be departed from on
account of the subject or context in which
the word had been used. That is why, the
definition clause starts with the sentence
that unless there is anything repugnant in
the subject or context ''Collector' means
an officer appointed as ''Collector' under
the provisions of 1901 Act. Therefore,
because of this qualification, while giving
correct meaning of definition of the word
''Collector' used in the Act, one has not
only to look at the word but also to the
context, the collocation and the object of
2 All. Chandra Bhal Mishra Vs State of U.P. & Ors.
1697
such words relating to such matter and
thereafter
to
interpret
the
meaning
intended to be conveyed by the use of the
words under the circumstances.

24. The principles articulated by the
Court in Brahm Singh clearly set the
controversy to rest and beyond the pale of
dispute. Once it is recognised that an
Additional
Commissioner
stands
duly
authorised by virtue of an order made by the
Commissioner under Section 13 (3) of the
1901 Act, he, for all intents and purposes,
must be recognised as having donned the
mantle of the Commissioner himself and the
powers so exercised and decisions rendered
are entitled in law to be viewed as those
made by the Commissioner. The, fiction,
statutorily introduced, as evident from the
use of the phrase "...as if he were the
Commissioner of the division" must be given
full effect. The moment an authorisation is
made under Section 13 (3), the statutory
fiction comes into play and the Additional
Commissioner
would
consequently
be
entitled to be viewed as being sufficiently
empowered to exercise the powers enshrined
in Section 27 (4) of the 1960 Act.

25. Turning to the merits of the case,
the Court notes that the allegations setforth in paragraph-3 of the counter
affidavit were clearly serious and strike at
the root of the validity of the settlements
made in favour of the petitioners. All the
petitioners were neither the residents of
the concerned village nor were they
landless labourers eligible under Section
27 of the 1960 Act. The charge of the
settlements being an outcome of nepotism
as raised by the State respondents is
clearly well founded. It is manifest that
the settlements were made illegally thus
depriving various other needy and eligible
persons existing in the village of the fruits
of Section 27. The settlements made in
favour of the petitioners was clearly a fraud
on statute. The defense of the petitioners
based on the entries appearing in the Voters
List and Ration Cards, even if assumed to
be correct, could not have saved the
settlements made in light of the copious
evidence gathered by the respondents which
established that none of them were landless
labourers. The counter affidavit has also
brought on record the revenue records
which established that they were not
residents of the village concerned. This
evidence clearly overshadows the entries
stated to appear in the Voters List and
Ration Cards. The Court is constrained to
note that the findings recorded by the
respondents with respect to the vocation of
respective petitioners was not seriously
assailed either in the writ petition or by
learned
Senior
Counsel
in his
oral
submissions. On merits, therefore, the Court
finds itself unable to sustain the settlements
made in favour of the petitioners.

26. The writ petitions consequently
fail and are dismissed.
----------

(2019)10ILR A 1697

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 23.07.2019

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE DR. YOGENDRA KUMAR
SRIVASTAVA, J.

Writ C No. 23708 of 2019

Chandra Bhal Mishra ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner: