# Ram Giri v. Raghuvir Singh & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 8 ILRA 513
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-08-14
- **Case number:** Second Appeal No. 433 of 2022
- **Bench:** Chandra Kumar Rai
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ram-giri-v-raghuvir-singh-ors-53728
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

Mr. Rishikesh Tripathi

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Whether the decree for specific performance of
the agreement was rightly granted by the trial
and
appellate
courts,
considering
the
defendant's claim that the agreement was a
loan security, the alleged hardship due to
undervaluation of land, and the plaintiff's
readiness and willingness under Section 16(c)
and Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963

HEADNOTES
Civil Law - Civil Procedure Code, 1908 -
order 41, rules 31, - Specific Relief Act,
1963 - Sections 16(c) and 20 - Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 92 - Second
Appeal - preferred by the Defendant-appellants
- assailing the judgment and decree passed by
trial court as well as first appellate court
granting relief of specific performance of
contract - Suit for specific performance of an
agreement to sell of agricultural land - for
consideration of Two lacs sixty thousand rupees
Rs. 2,60,000 - Agreement was executed - two
lacs forty eight thousand was paid as earnest
money and only twelve thousand rupees to be
paid at sale deed execution - Defendant later
claimed that the agreement was only a security
for a loan of two lacs rupees and not a genuine
sale - Plaintiff filed Original Suit for specific
performance - Trial Court decreed the suit in
favour of plaintiff, finding the agreement valid
and plaintiff ready and willing to perform - Civil
Appeal - First Appellate court dismissed the
appeal, affirming trial court's decision - second
appeal - during pendency of second appeal and
in absence of any interim order, the Execution
Court executed the sale deed and delivered the
possession of land to the plaintiff - court finds
that, the defendant argued that the decree was
wrongly granted as the agreement was denied,
the suit was delayed, and the land was
undervalued,
causing
hardship
-
further,
514 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
contended that the discretionary nature of
specific performance under Section 20 of the
Specific Relief Act was not properly applied and
relied on Supreme Court rulings to support his
claim that comparative hardship and the true
intent of the agreement should have been
considered before granting the decree - Court
held that, in light of the law under Section 16(c)
of the Specific Relief Act, the findings of valid
execution,
timely
filing,
and
continuous
readiness and willingness by the plaintiff were
well-supported by evidence - further reiterated
that there is no straitjacket formula for deciding
the suit/appeal relating to specific performance
of contract rather same will depend upon the
facts and concurrent findings of both courts
below warranted no interference - Accordingly,
second appeal dismissed at the admission stage.
(Para - 14, 15, 16)

Appeal Dismissed. (E-11 )

CASE LAW CITED
V. Muthusami (Dead) by LRs. v. Angammal &
Ors., AIR 2002 SC 1279 - Shamsher Singh &
Ors. v. Rajinder Kumar & Ors., AIR 2014 SC
2253 - Madhukar Nivrutti Jagtap & Ors. v.
Pramilabai
Chandulal
Parandekar
(Dead)
through LRs. & Ors., AIR 2019 SC 4252
LIST OF ACTS
Specific Relief Act, 1963 - Indian Evidence Act,
1872 - Civil Procedure Code, 1908.

LIST OF KEYWORDS
Specific performance, agreement to sell, earnest
money, readiness and willingness, loan security,
comparative hardship, execution of sale deed,
limitation, discretionary relief, second appeal,
concurrent findings

CASE ARISING FROM
Judgement and decree dated 07.02.2011 -
passed in Original Suit No. 602 of 2005
(Raghuveer Singh v. Ramgiri) and order dated
18.02.2022 passed in Civil Appeal No. 46 of
2011 passed by learned Additional District
Judge, Court No.13, Agra.
APPEARANCE OF PARTIES
Counsel for Appellant(s): Mr. B. Malik assisted
by Mr. Amit Malik.
Counsel
for
Respondent(s):
Mr.
Rishikesh
Tripathi.

## Text

8 All. Ram Giri Vs. Raghuvir Singh & Ors.
513

14. Section 16(c) of the Act
mandates the plaintiff to aver in the plaint
and establish as the fact by evidence
aliunde that he has always been ready and
willing to perform his part of the contract.
On considering almost identical fact
situation it was held by this Court in
Surya Narain Upadhyaya v. Ram Roop
Pandey and Ors., AIR (1994) SC 105 that
the plaintiff had substantiated his plea."

19. In view of ratio of law laid down
by Hon'ble Apex Court on the scope of
Section 16(c) of Specific Relief Act, 1963,
there is no illegality in the judgment of first
appellate Court granting relief of specific
performance of contract in the instant
matter.

20. The substantial question of law as
quoted
above
and
framed
in
the
memorandum of second appeal are not
involved in this second appeal, as such,
second appeal is liable to be dismissed at
admission stage.

21. Considering the entire facts and
circumstances of the case, no interference
is required against the judgement and
decree
dated
10.2.2025
passed
by
Additional District Judge Court No.9
Saharanpur in civil appeal No. 95 of 2022.

22. The second appeal is dismissed at
admission stage.
----------
(2025) 8 ILRA 513
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 14.08.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE CHANDRA KUMAR RAI, J.

Second Appeal No. 433 of 2022
Ram Giri ...Appellant
Versus
Raghuvir Singh & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:
Mr. B. Malik, Mr. Amit Malik

Counsel for the Respondents:
Mr. Rishikesh Tripathi

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Whether the decree for specific performance of
the agreement was rightly granted by the trial
and
appellate
courts,
considering
the
defendant's claim that the agreement was a
loan security, the alleged hardship due to
undervaluation of land, and the plaintiff's
readiness and willingness under Section 16(c)
and Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963

HEADNOTES
Civil Law - Civil Procedure Code, 1908 -
order 41, rules 31, - Specific Relief Act,
1963 - Sections 16(c) and 20 - Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 92 - Second
Appeal - preferred by the Defendant-appellants
- assailing the judgment and decree passed by
trial court as well as first appellate court
granting relief of specific performance of
contract - Suit for specific performance of an
agreement to sell of agricultural land - for
consideration of Two lacs sixty thousand rupees
Rs. 2,60,000 - Agreement was executed - two
lacs forty eight thousand was paid as earnest
money and only twelve thousand rupees to be
paid at sale deed execution - Defendant later
claimed that the agreement was only a security
for a loan of two lacs rupees and not a genuine
sale - Plaintiff filed Original Suit for specific
performance - Trial Court decreed the suit in
favour of plaintiff, finding the agreement valid
and plaintiff ready and willing to perform - Civil
Appeal - First Appellate court dismissed the
appeal, affirming trial court's decision - second
appeal - during pendency of second appeal and
in absence of any interim order, the Execution
Court executed the sale deed and delivered the
possession of land to the plaintiff - court finds
that, the defendant argued that the decree was
wrongly granted as the agreement was denied,
the suit was delayed, and the land was
undervalued,
causing
hardship
-
further,
514 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
contended that the discretionary nature of
specific performance under Section 20 of the
Specific Relief Act was not properly applied and
relied on Supreme Court rulings to support his
claim that comparative hardship and the true
intent of the agreement should have been
considered before granting the decree - Court
held that, in light of the law under Section 16(c)
of the Specific Relief Act, the findings of valid
execution,
timely
filing,
and
continuous
readiness and willingness by the plaintiff were
well-supported by evidence - further reiterated
that there is no straitjacket formula for deciding
the suit/appeal relating to specific performance
of contract rather same will depend upon the
facts and concurrent findings of both courts
below warranted no interference - Accordingly,
second appeal dismissed at the admission stage.
(Para - 14, 15, 16)

Appeal Dismissed. (E-11 )

CASE LAW CITED
V. Muthusami (Dead) by LRs. v. Angammal &
Ors., AIR 2002 SC 1279 - Shamsher Singh &
Ors. v. Rajinder Kumar & Ors., AIR 2014 SC
2253 - Madhukar Nivrutti Jagtap & Ors. v.
Pramilabai
Chandulal
Parandekar
(Dead)
through LRs. & Ors., AIR 2019 SC 4252
LIST OF ACTS
Specific Relief Act, 1963 - Indian Evidence Act,
1872 - Civil Procedure Code, 1908.

LIST OF KEYWORDS
Specific performance, agreement to sell, earnest
money, readiness and willingness, loan security,
comparative hardship, execution of sale deed,
limitation, discretionary relief, second appeal,
concurrent findings

CASE ARISING FROM
Judgement and decree dated 07.02.2011 -
passed in Original Suit No. 602 of 2005
(Raghuveer Singh v. Ramgiri) and order dated
18.02.2022 passed in Civil Appeal No. 46 of
2011 passed by learned Additional District
Judge, Court No.13, Agra.
APPEARANCE OF PARTIES
Counsel for Appellant(s): Mr. B. Malik assisted
by Mr. Amit Malik.
Counsel
for
Respondent(s):
Mr.
Rishikesh
Tripathi.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Chandra Kumar
Rai, J.)

1. Heard Mr. B. Malik, learned
counsel, assisted by Mr. Amit Malik,
learned counsel for the defendant-appellant
and Mr. Rishikesh Tripathi, learned counsel
for the plaintiff-respondent.

2. Brief facts of the case are that
plaintiff-respondent no.1 filed a suit for
specific performance of agreement dated
5.9.2003 against the defendant-appellant
which was registered as Original Suit
No.602 of 2005. In the plaint it was alleged
that agreement dated 5.9.2003 was entered
into between the plaintiff and defendant for
sale of 1⁄2 share of khasara no.1411, area
2.326
hect.
for
consideration
of
Rs.2,60,000/- and Rs.2,48,000/- was paid
as earnest money before the Registrar and
remaining Rs.12,000/- was to be paid at the
time of execution of sale deed. The time
period
for
execution
of
sale
deed
mentioned in agreement to sell was 1 year.
The defendant has filed his written
statement, stating that he was in need of
Rs.2,00,000/- for his personal work but he
never intended to sell his property as plot
no.1411 is the only source of maintenance
of his family. Before the trial court, 7
issues were framed. The parties have
adduced oral and documentary evidence in
support of their cases. The trial court while
deciding issue nos. 1, 3 and 7, has recorded
finding that valid agreement to sell dated
5.9.2003
was
executed
between
the
plaintiff and defendant but defendant has
not executed the sale deed in favour of
plaintiff, hence, the suit for specific
performance has been rightly filed on
behalf of the plaintiff. The trial court while
8 All. Ram Giri Vs. Raghuvir Singh & Ors.
515
deciding the issue no.2, relating to
readiness and willingness, has recorded
finding that plaintiff was always ready and
willing to perform his contract in pursuance
of agreement to sell dated 5.9.2003. The
trial court vide judgment and decree dated
7.2.2011, decreed the plaintiff's suit for
specific performance of contract and
directed the defendant to execute the sale
deed within a period of one month in
pursuance of agreement to sell dated
5.9.2003
after
getting
the
balance
consideration from the plaintiff. Against
the judgment and decree of the trial court
dated 7.2.2011, civil appeal was filed
before the District Judge and the same was
registered as Civil Appeal No.46/2011. The
aforementioned appeal was heard by the
Additional District Judge, Court no.13,
Agra. In the aforementioned civil appeal,
three points of determination were framed
by the court. The 1st appellate court
considering the finding recorded by the
trial court, has held that agreement to sell
dated 5.9.2003 (paper no.9-Ka) was rightly
executed
between
the
plaintiff
and
defendant and the plaintiff was always
ready and willing to perform his contract in
pursuance of the agreement to sell dated
5.9.2003. The 1st appellate court has also
taken into consideration the provisions of
Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act and
has
held
that
decree
for
specific
performance has been rightly granted by
the trial court in pursuance of the
agreement to sell dated 5.9.2003. The 1st
appellate court vide judgment and decree
dated 18.2.2022 dismissed the civil appeal
filed by the defendant. Hence, this second
appeal on behalf of the defendant for the
following relief:-

"Relief sought through this
appeal is that this Hon'ble High Court
may be pleased to set aside the judgment
and decree dated 18.2.2022 passed by the
learned Additional District Judge, Court
No.13, Agra, dismissing the Civil Appeal
No.46 of 2011 and affirming judgment
and decree dated 7.2.2011 passed by
Civil Judge, Agra in Original Suit
No.602 of 2005 (Raghuveer Singh vs.
Ramgiri)."

3. The following substantial questions
of law have been framed by the appellant in
the memorandum of instant second appeal:-

"1. Whether, the decree for
specific performance must be granted if
the defendant admits the execution of
document (agreement), but only as
security of loan of 2,00,000/- to fulfill his
to repay the amount of his losses. Or the
decree is discretionary when defendant
has paid the amount to the plaintiff
before suit when suit filed about one year
after service of notice after the service of
notice of defendant to plaintiff?

2. Whether, it is a case of
hardship on the ground that land has
been highly valuable (Rs. 6, 00, 000/-or
Rs. 10,00, 000/-) and disputed land (1.2
hectare) is only land held by defendant's
family of six members all are educated
and unemployed specially in U.P. where
the execution of agreement against loan
usual practice. distinction is to be found
right or wrong?

3. Whether, the decree for
specific performance should be refused
in case, the defendant paid in part or in
full amount to the plaintiff and suit filed
about one year or moreso, notice by
plaintiff to the defendant?"

4. The second appeal was neither
admitted nor any interim order was granted
516 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
by this Court, accordingly, in Execution
Case No.02 of 2022, the sale deed has been
executed in favour of plaintiff-respondent
and the possession has also been delivered
to the plaintiff-respondent, accordingly,
execution court has disposed of the
Execution Case No.02 of 2022 vide order
dated 29.10.2024 on the ground that decree
has been satisfied.

5. Counsel for the appellant submitted
that decree for specific performance cannot
be granted if the defendant has denied the
execution of agreement to sell alleged to be
executed
between
the
plaintiff
and
defendant. He submitted that decree of
specific performance is discretionary relief
and in the facts and circumstances of the
instant case,
the decree of specific
performance cannot be granted by the
Court. He further submitted that suit for
specific performance has been filed in the
instant matter after about 1 year from the
date of service of notice to plaintiff, as
such, decree for specific performance
cannot be granted. He further submitted
that disputed land measuring about 1.2
hect. was highly valuable land (Rs.6 lacs to
Rs.10 lacs) but for meager amount of
Rs.2,48,000/- the decree for specific
performance has been granted by the trial
court for execution of the sale deed in
respect to the aforementioned area of the
plot in question. He further submitted that
the provisions of Section 20 of the Specific
Relief Act has not been considered in
proper manner, as such, the decree for
specific performance passed by the trial
court is liable to be set aside. He submitted
that the execution of sale deed in the
execution proceeding in absence of the
interim order in the instant second appeal,
will not prejudice the claim of the appellant
in the instant second appeal. He submitted
that second appeal should be allowed and
the judgment and decree passed by the trial
court as well as 1st appellate court should
be set aside and plaintiff's suit should be
dismissed. He further placed reliance on the
following judgments of the Hon'ble Apex
Court in order to demonstrate that decree
for specific performance is discretionary
one and comparative hardship is to be
looked into while granting decree for
specific performance:-

"1. AIR 2002 Supreme Court
1279, V. Muthusami (dead) by Lrs. vs.
Angammal and Others;

2. AIR 2014 Supreme Court
2253, Shamsher Singh and Others vs.
Rajinder Kumar and Others;

3. AIR 2019 Supreme Court
4252, Madhukar Nivrutti Jagtap and
Others vs. Smt. Pramilabai Chandulal
Parandekar (dead) through Lrs. And
Others.

6. On the other hand, Mr. Rishikesh
Tripathi, learned counsel for the plaintiffrespondent
submitted
that
concurrent
finding of fact has been recorded by the
trial court and 1st appellate court to the
effect that registered agreement to sell was
executed
between
the
plaintiff
and
respondent for execution of sale deed in
respect to the plot in question within time
limit fixed in the agreement to sell. He
further submitted that both the courts have
recorded finding of fact that plaintiff was
always ready and willing to perform his
contract in pursuance of agreement to sell
dated 5.9.2003. He also submitted that
provisions of Section 20 of the Specific
Relief
Act
was
also
taken
into
consideration while passing impugned
judgment, as such, there is no further scope
of interference by this Court in exercise of
8 All. Ram Giri Vs. Raghuvir Singh & Ors.
517
jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Civil
Procedure Code as no substantial questions
of law are involved in the second appeal. He
submitted that in pursuance of the decree of
specific performance dated 7.2.2011, the sale
deed has been executed and execution case has
been disposed of on the ground that decree has
been satisfied as well as possession has been
delivered to the plaintiff, as such, the second
appeal should be dismissed on this ground
also. He placed reliance upon the judgment of
the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2021 AIR
(Supreme Court) 5342, V. Anantha Raju
and Another vs. T.M. Narasimhan and
Others.

7. I have considered the arguments of
the learned counsel for the parties and
perused the records.

8. There is no dispute about the fact
that suit for specific performance filed by
the plaintiff-respondent was decreed by the
trial court vide judgment and decree dated
7.2.2011
and
civil
appeal
filed
by
defendant,
has
been
dismissed
vide
judgment and decree dated 18.2.2022.

9. In order to appreciate the controversy
involved in the matter, the perusal of the seven
issues framed before the trial court will be
relevant which are as under:-

पक्षकारों के अभिवचनों के आधार पर भनम्न
वाद भिन्दू भवरभचत भकये गय ेंः

"1- क्या प्रभतवादी ने वादी के पक्ष म दावी
संपभि के 1/2 िाग को 2,60,000/- रू० मेभवक्रय करने
हेतु भदनांक 05'09.03 को मु० 2,48,000/- रू० ियाना
प्राप्त करके पंजीकृत इकरारनामा भनष्पाभदत भकया?

2- क्या वादी अनुिंध के अनुसार अपने िाग
को पूरा करने के भिये तत्पर एवं इच्छुक रहा है और अि िी
तत्पर व इच्छुक है?

3- क्या वादी को प्रस्तुत वाद दायर करने का
वाद कारण प्राप्त है?

4-क्या वादी का वाद भवभनभदिष्ट अनुतोष
अभधभनयम की धारा 38 व 41 से िाभधत है?

5- क्या वादी का वाद भवभधक रूप से पोषणीय
है?

6- वादी भकस अनुतोष को पाने का अभधकारी
है?

7- क्या प्रभतवादी ने वादी भदनांक 05.09.03
को दो िाख रूपये ितौर ऋण थे और उसकोमय ब्याज एक
साि के अंदर 2,48,000/-रू० के रूप म वादी को अदा कर
भदये यभद हााँ तो प्रिाव ?"

10. The trial court considering the oral
and documentary evidence adduced by the
parties has recorded finding of fact that
there was proper execution of agreement to
sell dated 5.9.2003 in favour of plaintiff
and defendant for execution of sale deed in
respect of half share of khasra no.1411. The
trial court has also recorded finding of fact
that plaintiff was always ready and willing
to perform his contract in pursuance of
agreement to sell dated 5.9.2003. The
finding of fact has also been recorded by
the trial court that decree of specific
performance is the proper relief to the
plaintiff
rather
for
payment
of
compensation to the plaintiff.

11. In civil appeal, the 1st appellate
court in compliance of the provisions
contained under Order 41 Rule 31 of the
Civil Procedure Code, has framed three
points of determination which are as
under:-

उिय पक्ष की ओर से प्रस्तुत तकों, भवभध
व्यवस्थाओं व पत्राविी पर उपिब्ध समस्त मौभखक व
518 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
प्रिेखीय साक्ष्य के सम्यक पररशीिन के आधार पर वतिमान
भसभवि अपीि म भनम्नभिभखत अवधायि भिन्दु भनभमित भकए
जाते हैं :-

"1. क्या पंजीकृत इकरारनामा भदनांभकत
05.09.2003 खसरा संख्या-1411 के क्षेत्रफि 2.326
है० भस्थत ग्राम खाण्डा, तहसीि एत्मादपुर, भजिा आगरा के
1/2 िाग को मु0 2,60,000/- प्रभतफि म भवक्रय करने हेतु
तय भकया गया तथा 2.48,000/- रूपए अभग्रम धनराभश के
रूप म अदा कर, उपरोक्त पंजीकृत इकरारनामा, इस शति के
साथ भक शेष मु० 12,000/- रूपए एक वषि के अन्दर अदा
करके िैनामा भनष्पाभदत भकया जाएगा, प्रभतवादी / अपीिाथी
ने वादी / प्रत्यथी के पक्ष म पंजीकृत इकरारनामा भनष्पाभदत
भकया और वादी / प्रत्यथी इकरारनामा भदनांभकत
05.09.2003 की शतों के अनुसार िैनामा करने के भिए
सदैव तत्पर व इच्छुक रहा है ? यभद हॉ तो प्रिाव।

2. क्या पंजीकृत इकरारनामा भदनांभकत
05.09.2003 की शतों म ऋण की भकसी शति का उल्िेख
न होने के कारण, प्रभतवादी / अपीिाथी के द्वारा पंजीकृत
इकरारनामा भदनांभकत 05.09.2003 की शतों (ऋण के
िावत) के संिंध म अभिकथन व साक्ष्य गृाह्य योग्य हैं अथवा
नहीं ?

3. क्या भवद्वान भवचारण न्यायािय द्वारा पाररत
प्रश्नगत भनणिय भदनांभकत 07.02.2011 व भडकी पत्राविी म
उपिब्ध तथ्यों, साक्ष्यों व भवभधक उपिन्धों के सम्यक
भववेचना पर आधाररत है एवं क्या प्रश्नगत आदेश/भडकी पाररत
करने म भवचारण न्यायािय ने अपने क्षेत्राभधकार का भवभधपूणि
ढंग से प्रयोग भकया है ?"

12. The 1st appellate court while
deciding the aforementioned points of
determination, has taken into consideration
the provisions contained under Section 92
of the Indian Evidence Act as well as
Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act. The
1st appellate court has recorded finding of
fact that there was valid execution of
agreement to sell between the plaintiff and
defendant on 5.9.2003 and plaintiff was
always ready and willing to perform his
contract in pursuance of agreement to sell
dated 5.9.2003. The 1st appellate court has
maintained the judgment and decree passed
by the trial court considering the ratio of
law laid down by the Court from time to
time.

13. The scope of Section 16(c) of the
Specific Relief Act, 1963 has been
considered in the judgment of Hon'ble
Apex Court reported in 2006 (2) JCLR 201
(SC)
Aniglase
Yohannan
Versus
Ramlatha & Ors. Paragraph Nos. 9, 10,
11, 12, 13 & 14 of the judgment of Hon'ble
Apex Court in which earlier judgment of
Hon'ble Apex Court has been considered
will be relevant for perusal which are as
under :-

"9. In Ardeshir H. Mama v.
Flora Sassoon, AIR 1928 PC 208, the
Privy Council observed that where the
injured party sued at law for a breach,
going to the root of the contract, he
thereby elected to treat the contract as at
an end himself and as discharged from
the obligations. No further performance
by him was either contemplated or had
to be tendered. In a suit for specific
performance on the other hand, he
treated and was required by the Court to
treat the contract as still subsisting. He
had in that suit to allege, and if the fact
was traversed, he was required to prove
a continuous readiness and willingness
from the date of the contract to the time
of the hearing, to perform the contract
on his part. Failure to make good that
averment brings with it and leads to the
inevitable dismissal of the suit. The
observations were cited with approval in
Prem Raj v. The D.L.F. Housing and
Construction (Private) Ltd. and Anr.,
AIR (1968) SC 1355.
8 All. Ram Giri Vs. Raghuvir Singh & Ors.
519

10. The requirements to be
fulfilled for bringing in compliance of
the Section 16(c) of the Act have been
delineated by this Court in several
judgments. Before dealing with the
various judgments it is necessary to set
out the factual position. The agreement
for sale was executed on 15.2.1978 and
the period during which the sale was to
be completed was indicated to be six
months. Undisputedly, immediately after
the expiry of the six months period
lawyer's notice was given calling upon
the present appellant to execute the sale
deed. It is also averred in the plaint that
the plaintiff met the defendant several
times and requested him to execute the
sale deed. On finding inaction in his part,
the suit was filed in September, 1978.
This
factual
position
has
been
highlighted in the plaint itself. Learned
Single Judge after noticing the factual
position as reflected in the averments in
the plaint came to hold that the plaint
contains essential facts which lead to
inference to plaintiff's readiness and
willingness. Para 3 of the plaint indicates
that the plaintiff was always ready to get
the sale deed prepared after paying
necessary consideration. In para 4 of the
plaint reference has been made to the
lawyer's
notice
calling
upon
the
defendant to execute the sale deed. In the
said
paragraph
it
has
also
been
described as to how after the lawyer's
notice was issued plaintiff met the
defendant. In para 5 it is averred that
defendant is bound to execute the sale
deed on receiving the balance amount
and the plaintiff was entitled to get the
document executed by the defendant. It
is also not in dispute that the balance
amount of the agreed consideration was
deposited in Court simultaneously to the
filing of the suit. While examining the
requirement of Section 16(c) this Court
in Syed Dastagir v. T.R. Gopalakrishna
Settty, [1999] 6 SCC 337 noted as
follows:

"So the whole gamut of the
issue raised is, how to construe a plea
specially with reference to Section 16(c)
and what are the obligations which the
plaintiff has to comply with in reference
to his plea and whether the plea of the
plaintiff could not be construed to
conform to the requirement of the
aforesaid section, or does this section
require specific words to be pleaded that
he has performed or has always been
ready and is willing to perform his part
of the contract. In construing a plea in
any pleading, courts must keep in mind
that a plea is not an expression of art and
science but an expression through words
to place fact and law of one's case for a
relief. Such an expression may be
pointed, precise, sometimes vague but
still it could be gathered what he wants
to convey through only by reading the
whole pleading, depending on the person
drafting a plea. In India most of the
pleas are drafted by counsel hence the
aforesaid difference of pleas which
inevitably differ from one to the other.
Thus, to gather true spirit behind a plea
it should be read as a whole. This does
not distract one from performing his
obligations as required under a statute.
But to test whether he has performed his
obligations, one has to see the pith and
substance of a plea. Where a statute
requires any fact to be pleaded then that
has to be pleaded may be in any form.
The same plea may be stated by different
persons through different words; then
how could it be constricted to be only in
any particular nomenclature or word.
Unless a statute specifically requires a
520 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
plea to be in any particular form, it can
be in any form. No specific phraseology
or language is required to take such a
plea. The language in Section 16(c) does
not require any specific phraseology but
only that the plaintiff must aver that he
has performed or has always been and is
willing to perform his part of the
contract.
So
the
compliance
of
"readiness and willingness" has to be in
spirit and substance and not in letter and
form. So to insist for a mechanical
production of the exact words of a
statute is to insist for the form rather
than the essence. So the absence of form
cannot dissolve an essence if already
pleaded."

11. Again in Motilal Jain v.
Ramdasi Devi (Smt.) and Ors., [2000] 6
SCC 420 it was noted as follows:

The other contention which
found favour with the High Court, is
that plaint averments do not show that
the plaintiff was ready and willing to
perform his part of the contract and at
any rate there is no evidence on record
to prove it. Mr. Choudhary developed
that contention placing reliance on the
decision in Varghese case [1969] 2 SCC
539. In that case, the plaintiff pleaded an
oral contract for sale of the suit
property. The defendant denied the
alleged oral agreement and pleaded a
different agreement in regard to which
the plaintiff neither amended his plaint
nor filed subsequent pleading and it was
in that context that this Court pointed
out
that
the
pleading
in
specific
performance should conform to Forms
47 and 48 of the First Schedule of the
Code of Civil Procedure. That view was
followed in Abdul Khader case (JT 1989
(3) SC527)

However, a different note was
struck by this Court in Chandiok case
[1970] 3 SCC 140 : AIR [1971] SC 1238.
In that case `A' agreed to purchase from
`R' a leasehold plot. `R' was not having
lease of the land in his favour from the
Government nor was he in possession of
the same. `R', however, received earnest
money pursuant to the agreement for
sale which provided that the balance of
consideration would be paid within a
month at the time of the execution of the
registered
sale
deed.
Under
the
agreement `R' was under obligation to
obtain permission and sanction from the
Government before the transfer of
leasehold plot. `R' did not take any steps
to apply for the sanction from the
Government. `A' filed the suit for
specific performance of the contract for
sale. One of the contentions of `R' was
that `A' was not ready and willing to
perform his part of the contract. This
Court observed that readiness and
willingness could not be treated as a
straitjacket formula and that had to be
determined from the entirety of facts
and
circumstances
relevant
to
the
intention and conduct of the party
concerned. It was held that in the
absence of any material to show that `A'
at any stage was not ready and willing to
perform his part of the contract or that
he did not have the necessary funds for
payment when the sale deed would be
executed after the sanction was obtained,
`A' was entitled to a decree for specific
performance of contract.

That decision was relied upon
by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in
Syed Dastagir case [1999] 6 SCC 337
wherein it was held that in construing a
plea in any pleading, courts must keep in
mind that a plea is not an expression of
8 All. Ram Giri Vs. Raghuvir Singh & Ors.
521
art and science but an expression
through words to place fact and law of
one's case for a relief. It is pointed out
that in India most of the pleas are
drafted by counsel and hence they
inevitably differ from one to the other;
thus, to gather the true spirit behind a
plea it should be read as a whole and to
test whether the plaintiff has performed
his obligations, one has to see the pith
and substance of the plea. It was
observed :

"Unless a statute specifically
requires a plea to be in any particular
form, it can be in any form. No specific
phraseology or language is required to
take such a plea. The language in Section
16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 does
not require any specific phraseology but
only that the plaintiff must aver that he
has performed or has always been and is
willing to perform his part of the
contract. So the compliance of `readiness
and willingness' has to be in spirit and
substance and not in letter and form."

It is thus clear that an averment
of readiness and willingness in the plaint
is not a mathematical formula which
should only be in specific words. If the
averments in the plaint as a whole do
clearly
indicate
the
readiness
and
willingness of the plaintiff to fulfil his
part of the obligations under the
contract which is the subject-matter of
the suit, the fact that they are differently
worded will not militate against the
readiness and willingness of the plaintiff
in a suit for specific performance of
contract for sale."

12. Lord Campbell in Cork v.
Ambergate etc. and Railway Co., (1851)
117 ER 1229 observed that in common
sense the meaning of such an averment
of readiness and willingness must be that
the non-completion of the contract was
not the fault of the plaintiffs, and that
they were disposed and able to complete
it had it not been renounced by the
defendant.

13. The basic principle behind
Section 16(c) read with Explanation (ii)
is that any person seeking benefit of the
specific performance of contract must
manifest that his conduct has been
blemishless throughout entitling him to
the specific relief. The provision imposes
a personal bar. The Court is to grant
relief on the basis of the conduct of the
person seeking relief. If the pleadings
manifest that the conduct of the plaintiff
entitles him to get the relief on perusal of
the plaint he should not be denied the
relief.

14. Section 16(c) of the Act
mandates the plaintiff to aver in the
plaint and establish as the fact by
evidence aliunde that he has always been
ready and willing to perform his part of
the contract. On considering almost
identical fact situation it was held by this
Court in Surya Narain Upadhyaya v.
Ram Roop Pandey and Ors., AIR (1994)
SC
105
that
the
plaintiff
had
substantiated his plea."

14. In view of ratio of law laid down
by Hon'ble Apex Court on the scope of
Section 16(c) of Specific Relief Act, 1963,
there is no illegality in the judgment of trial
Court as well as first appellate Court
granting relief of specific performance of
contract in the instant matter.

15. There can be no straitjacket
formula
for
deciding
the
suit/appeal
522 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
relating to specific performance of contract
rather the same will depend upon the facts
and circumstances of each case as to
whether
the
decree
for
specific
performance
is
to
be
granted
or
compensation be paid to the defendant or
earnest money be paid along with interest
to the defendant.

16.
In
the
instant
matter,
the
agreement to sell was denied by the
defendant but both the courts have recorded
finding on the basis of evidence on record
that
there
was
valid
execution
of
agreement to sell between the plaintiff
and defendant. The suit was filed within
limitation in the year 2005 in view of the
expiry of period as mentioned in the
agreement to sell dated 5.9.2003. The
finding of continuous readiness and
willingness is also in favour of the
plaintiff and the provisions of Section 20
of the Specific Relief Act has also been
taken into consideration, as such, there
can be no interference against the
concurrent judgment and decree passed
by the trial court as well as the 1st
appellate court, decreeing the suit for
specific performance. The substantial
questions of law as framed in the
memorandum of second appeal are not
involved in this second appeal.

17. Considering the entire facts and
circumstances, no interference is required
in the matter. The second appeal is
dismissed at the admission stage.
----------
(2025) 8 ILRA 522
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 25.08.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SANDEEP JAIN, J.
First Appeal No. 742 of 1994

Sukh Ram Singh ...Appellant
Versus
State Of U.P. & Anr. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:
Devnendra Dahma, Shiv Kumar Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
S.C.

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Whether the reference filed under Section 18 of
the Land Acquisition Act was time-barred.
Whether the Collector was justified in awarding
compensation based on the lowest exemplar.
Whether the appellant is entitled to enhanced
solatium, additional compensation, and interest
under the amended provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act.

HEADNOTES
Civil Law - Land Acquisition Act, 1894 -
Sections 4(1), 6, 11, 12(2), 18, 28, 54 -
Landowner's Appeal u/section 54 - against
rejection of Reference case as time-barred and
for enhancement of compensation awarded -
Land acquisition proceedings - Notification
under Section 4(1) of the Act published in the
year 1979 - objections invited - Award -
declaration under Section 12(2) published in
1980 - possession of the land taken - appellant
held entitled to receive compensation at the rate
of Rs. 479.15 per acre along with 15% solatium
and Rs. 374.69 u/section 11 of the Act -
appellant filed an application in 1989 seeking
enhancement of compensation - matter referred
by the Collector u/section 18 of the Act -
appellant contended lack of prior knowledge
regarding the acquisition and non-receipt of
notice, copy of the award, or compensation -
District Judge rejected his reference as timebarred - instant appeal - court finds that the
reference was filed within six months from the
date of knowledge - Collector's assessment of
compensation found to be arbitrary and based
on an inappropriate exemplar - Court held that
the Reference Court erred in dismissing the
appellant's
claim
as
time-barred
and
in
upholding
the
inadequate
compensation
awarded by the Collector - since the Collector's