# Ram Keval v. D.D.C., Bahraich & Ors

- **Citation:** (2024) 1 ILRA 691
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-01-10
- **Case number:** Writ-B No. 24 of 2024
- **Bench:** Saurabh Lavania
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ram-keval-v-d-d-c-bahraich-ors-51382
- **Pages:** 16

## Headnote

Civil Law - U.P.Consolidation of Holdings
Act, 1953 - Section 9A(2) - Limitation Act,
1963 - Section 5 - Petition has been filed
challenging order dated 12.07.2023, whereby
opposite party no. 2, condoned delay in filing
objection so as to advance substantial justice and
order dated 27.10.2023, whereby opposite party
no. 3 dismissed two revisions, upheld order passed
by opposite party no. 2, as such, scope of
interference by High Court is limited - Registered
sale deed dated 23.06.1984 in favour of opposite
party no. 3, is still in existence, not set aside till
date, while petitioner's claim rests on subsequent
sale deed dated 04.07.1998 - Suit for cancellation
of earlier sale deed remains pending - Denial to
explanation given in application for condonation of
delay for condoning delay, including date of
knowledge of entry in revenue records and
consolidation proceedings, is vague, as in objection
details of case, basis of denial not indicated - Thus,
Consolidation Officer rightly exercised jurisdiction
in condoning delay, hence, impugned orders suffer
from no infirmity. (Para 24, 31)

Writ petition dismissed. (E-13)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

_Characters 0–39,887 of 54,474. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39887 for what follows._

1 All. Ram Keval Vs. D.D.C., Bahraich & Ors.
691
adverse action and recovery. This Court
fails to understand as to how the State
Government that was not party to MOU
could have taken any action against
university for violation of any term and
condition of MOU and that too without any
enquiry and as to how it could have ordered
for recovery of money funded by ICAR
without there being any objection by
ICAR. There was no involvement of State
Government
in
running
KVK
and
payment of salary of KVK men. The
State Government having found no means
to cow-down university fell prey to false
ego of its advisers and officials and
gagged the mouth of Director and ViceChancellor
of
university
to
pass
impugned orders to retire petitioners at
the age of 60 years. This is an absolutely
arbitrary exercise of power by State
Government and in my considered view
beyond its competence in the matter of
MOU between ICAR and university, both
the autonomous bodies and that too in the
absence of resolution of ICAR supporting
such questionable interpretation.

59. Thus, petitioners, therefore, are
held entitled to all such benefits including
the benefit of age of superannuation at
par with the corresponding position
holders in the teaching faculty of the
university.

60. I may hasten to clarify here that by
this judgment I am not holding petitioners
to be part of the teaching faculty of the
university as they are not teachers of the
university in stricto sensu for not being
appointed to sanctioned strength of the
University but since they are appointed
by the university upon a post of Scientist/
Research
Associate/
Subject
Matter
Specialist and are further given benefits
under the CAS as has been made applicable
by the UGC to the university and that MOU
requires university to give all privileges,
amenities and facilities of the corresponding
position holders of the university to men
employed for KVK, and ICAR is providing
fund for their salary and allowance, they are
held entitled to all such privileges, amenities
and facilities as are admissible to the
Assistant Professor, Associate Professor and
Professor of the university.

61. In view of the above, writ petitions
succeed and are allowed.

62. The orders impugned passed in
respect of the petitioners retiring them at
the age of 60 years in respective petitions
hereby quashed.

63. The status of petitioners in the
Krishi Vigyan Kendra of their respective
universities shall stand restored up to the
age of 62 years. They will be retiring at the
age of 62 years and shall be entitled to all
service benefits including the arrears of
salary for the period till they have attained
or
would
be
attaining
the
age
of
superannuation at the age of 62 years, as
the case may be.
----------
(2024) 1 ILRA 691
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 10.01.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SAURABH LAVANIA, J.

Writ-B No. 24 of 2024

Ram Keval ...Petitioner
Versus
D.D.C., Bahraich & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Rama Kant Dixit, Ram Vishal Tripathi
692 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Counsel for the Respondent:
C.S.C., Vijayendra Prakash Tripathi

Civil Law - U.P.Consolidation of Holdings
Act, 1953 - Section 9A(2) - Limitation Act,
1963 - Section 5 - Petition has been filed
challenging order dated 12.07.2023, whereby
opposite party no. 2, condoned delay in filing
objection so as to advance substantial justice and
order dated 27.10.2023, whereby opposite party
no. 3 dismissed two revisions, upheld order passed
by opposite party no. 2, as such, scope of
interference by High Court is limited - Registered
sale deed dated 23.06.1984 in favour of opposite
party no. 3, is still in existence, not set aside till
date, while petitioner's claim rests on subsequent
sale deed dated 04.07.1998 - Suit for cancellation
of earlier sale deed remains pending - Denial to
explanation given in application for condonation of
delay for condoning delay, including date of
knowledge of entry in revenue records and
consolidation proceedings, is vague, as in objection
details of case, basis of denial not indicated - Thus,
Consolidation Officer rightly exercised jurisdiction
in condoning delay, hence, impugned orders suffer
from no infirmity. (Para 24, 31)

Writ petition dismissed. (E-13)

List of Cases cited:

1. Ajay Dabra Vs Pyare Lal & ors. reported in
2023 SCC OnLine SC 92, (Paras 12 to 14)

2. Bhivchandra Shankar More Vs Balu Gangaram
More reported in (2019) 6 SCC 387, (Paras 15,
16)

3. Ramji Dass & ors. Vs Mohan Singh, 1978
ARC 496

4. N. Balakrishnan Vs M. Krishnamurthy; (1998)
7 SCC 123, (Paras 9 to 11)

5. Esha Bhattacharjee Vs Managing Committee
of
Raghunathpur
Nefar
Academy
&
ors.
reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649, (Para 21)

6. Brijesh Kumar & ors. Vs St. of Har. & ors.
reported in (2014) 11 SCC 351, (Paras 6 to 10)

7. Wander Vs Antox India Pvt. Ltd.; 1990 Supp
SCC 727, (Paras 13, 14)
8. Mohammad Shafeeq Vs Mirza Mohammad
Husain; (2002) 9 SCC 460, (Para 3)

9. S. Kumar Vs S. Ramalingam, (2020) 16 SCC
553, (Paras 14, 15)

10. Kanwar Raj Singh (D) Th. Lrs. Vs Gejo. (D)
Th. Lrs & ors. ; 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1, (Paras 5
to 11)

11. Ram Saran Lall Vs Domini Kuer; 1961 SCC
OnLine SC 133

(Delivered by Hon'ble Saurabh Lavania, J.)

1. Heard Sri Ram Vishal Tripathi,
learned Counsel for the petitioner, Sri
Vijayendra
Prakash
Tripathi,
learned
Counsel appearing for the Caveator and Sri
Hemant Kumar Pandey, learned State
Counsel.

2. In view of order proposed to be
passed, issuance of notice to the privaterespondent(s) is hereby dispensed with.

3. The present petition has been filed
for the following main relief:-

"I. Issue a writ order or direction in the
nature of CERTIORARI quashing thereby
the impugned order dated 27/10 / 2023
passed by opposite party no.1 and also the
order dated 12/7/2023 passed by the
opposite party no. 2 by which the objection
and revision filed by the petitioner has been
rejected, as contained in Annexure No. 1 &
2 to this writ petition.

II. Issue a writ order or direction in the
nature of MANDAMUS commanding the
opposite parties may not create any
hindrance in peaceful possession of the
petitioner over the land in question."

4. By means of the present petition
the petitioner has assailed the order dated
12.07.2023 passed by the opposite party
1 All. Ram Keval Vs. D.D.C., Bahraich & Ors.
693
no.2/Consolidation
Officer-III,
Sadar,
District
Bahraich
in
Case
No.
202354081546030324
(Jawala
Prasad
Versus Ram Kewal, whereby the opposite
party no.2 has condoned the delay in filing
the Objection under Section 9A(2) of
U.P.Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953
(in short 'Act of 1953'). The operative
portion of the same reads as under:-

"उभय पक्ष के तकण पूणण कथन क सुनकर
तथा वदये गये तथ् ं ि वियाद के प्राथणनापि पर
परीक्षण उपरान्त पाया गया वक िादी ज्वािा
प्रसाद द्वारा वदया गया नािान्तरण हेतु आपवत्त
वदनांक 26.09.2014 तथा वियाद प्राथणनापि िें
आपवत्त का ज कारण दशाणया गया है, िह
चकबन्दी प्रवक्रया की जानकारी नहीं ह ने के
आर्ार तथा सिय से अनवभज्ञता का आर्ार
विया गया है। चकबन्दी प्रवक्रया िें दाक्तखि िाद
वियाद का प्रश्न िचीिा ह ने का कई कारण
बनता है, प्रकरण पर परीक्षण का तथ् इंवगत
कर साक्ष् ं के आर्ाररत अवभिेख ं पर वनणणय
का आर्ार सिाप्त नहीं वकया जाना भी प्रयाणप्त
कारण है, वजसके अनुसार वबिम्ब िवषणत वकया
जाना न्यायसंगत है। प्रश्नगत िाद िें सम्बक्तित
खाते पर प्रवतिादी पक्ष के विभाजन आदेश
वदनांक 26.0202016 क वियाद के वबन्दु पर
वबिम्ब की छूि प्रदान की गयी है, जैसा की िूि
पिाििी संिग्न है। आदेश पिक अनुसार
वदनांक
14.11.2017
के
अनुसार
श्रीिती
चन्द्रकिा द्वारा वदए गये बैनािें के वनस्तारण के
सम्बि िें िाद अभी भी न्यायािय वसविि जज
बहराइच के न्यायािय िें िक्तम्बत ह कर
विचारार्ीन है। इस कारण ज्वािा प्रसाद द्वारा
प्रस्तुत वियाद बाहर आपवत्त क प षणीय िाना
गया है। प्रकरण िें प्रस्तुत िाननीय सिोच्च/उच्च
न्यायािय द्वारा वदये गये विवर् व्यिस्थाओं के
अनुसार सारिान न्याय के दृवष्टगत पररसीिा
अवर्वनयि िें वियाद के वबन्दु पर न्याय जहॉ
िक्तम्बत है, वकसी प्रकार के अनुत ष से िंवचत
नहीं वकया जा सकता हैं। ज्वािा प्रसाद का
वियाद हेतु वदया गया प्राथणनापि वनरस्त करने
का क ई प्रयाणप्त कारण नहीं है, अतः वियाद का
िाभ का छूि प्रदान वकया जाता है। आपवत्त
प्राथणनापि रािकेिि पुि छ िेिाि वदनांक
20.09.2017/17.05.2017 तथा श्यािू आवद
वदनांक
26.05.2022/06.06.2022
अन्य
प्राथणनापि बाबत िादी ज्वािा प्रसाद वियाद के
वबन्दु पर तदनुसार वनरस्त कर वनस्ताररत वकया
जाता
है।
दािा
ज्वािा
प्रसाद
वदनांक
26.09.2014 पर आपवत्त रािकेिि पुि छ िे
िाि वदनांक 20.09.2017/05.10.2017 प्रस्तुत
है। अग्रेतर कायणिाहीः िादवबन्दु वनर्ाणरण हेतु
पिाििी वदनांक 19.07.2023 क पेश ह । "

5. A challenge has also been made to
the order dated 27.10.2023 passed by the
opposite party no.1/Deputy Director of
Consolidation, Bahraich (in short 'DDC'),
whereby the opposite party no.1 dismissed
the
two
revisions
i.e.
Revision
No.0368/2023, Computerized Case No.
202354081500000368 (Shyam and Others
Versus Jawala Prasad and Others) and
Revision No. 0369/2023, Computerized
Case No. 202354081500000369 (Ram
Kewal Versus Jawala Prasad and Others)
and up held the order of opposite party no.2
passed on 12.07.2023. The relevant portion
of the order dated 27.10.2023 reads as
under:-

"उपयुणक्त द न ं वनगरावनय ं िें पक्षकार एिं
आराजी एक ही ह ने के कारण वनस्तारण की
सुविर्ा हेतु द न वनगरावनयां एकजाई की जाती
है।
वन०
सं०ःः564/202354081500000368
श्यािू आवद बनाि ज्वािाप्रसाद आवद अग्रणी
पिाििी ह गी।

उभयपक्ष ं के विद्वान अवर्िक्तागण की
बहस ग्राहयता वबन्दु पर सुनी गयी। पक्ष ं द्वारा
दाक्तखि विक्तख बहस का अध्ययन वकया गया।
694 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
पिािविय ं का अिि कन वकया गया। पिाििी
का अिि कन वकया गया। पिाििी के
अिि कन से स्पष्ट है वक चकबन्दी अवर्कारी
द्वारा वदनांक 12-7-2023 क पक्ष क सुनकर
पिाििी िें वियाद का िाभ वदया गया है।
पिाििी िें चकबन्दी अवर्कारी द्वारा गुण द ष
पर अंवति आदेश नहीं पाररत वकया गया है।
वनगरानीकताणगण क परीक्षण न्यायािय िें
सुनिाई का अिसर प्राप्त है। िा० सिोच्च
न्यायािय एिं िा० उच्च न्यायािय की अनेक ं
विवर् व्यिस्थाये है वक िाद का वनस्तारण गुण
द ष पर वकया जाय न वक तकनीकी आर्ार पर।
वियाद के वबन्दु पर उदार दृवष्टक ण अपनाना
चावहए। ऐसी िें चकबन्दी अवर्कारी द्वारा पाररत
आदेश वदनांक 12-7-2023 िें वकसी प्रकार के
हस्तक्षेप की आिश्कता प्रतीत नही ह ती है।
द न वनगरावनयां ग्राहयता वबन्दु पर वनरस्त वकये
जाने य ग्य है।"

6. Brief facts of the case are to the
effect that Smt. Chandrakala w/o Sri Brij
Lal and Sri Sanehi s/o Pyare, executed a
registered sale deed on 23.06.1984 in
favour of Jawala Prasad/opposite party no.3
and thereafter thereafter Smt. Chandrakala
also executed a sale deed in favour of
petitioner/Ram Kewal on 04.07.1998.

7. Smt. Chandrakala also instituted a
suit for cancellation of registered sale deed
dated 23.06.1984 i.e. Suit No. 217/1987
and this suit was decreed ex-parte on
13.08.1987 and thereafter on an application
for
restoration
of
final
order dated
13.08.1987 was moved and the said
restoration application was allowed and the
judgment and order dated 13.08.1987 was
recalled and the suit for cancellation of
registered sale deed is pending before the
competent court of jurisdiction till date and
from the averments made in the present
petition it is apparent that this fact has not
been denied. The effect of pendency of the
suit would be that registered sale deed
dated 23.06.1984 is still in-existence.

8. The opposite party no.3 on
24.09.2014 on coming to know about the
fact that in the revenue records the name(s)
Sanehi and Ram Keval (petitioner) have
been shown, that he contacted an Advocate
on 25.09.2014 and thereafter preferred an
objection under Section 9A(2) of the Act of
1953 along with an application for
condonation of delay on 26.09.2014.

9. The contents of the application for
condonation of delay being relevant is
extracted herein under :-

"वनिेदन है वक प्राथी आपवत्तकताण ने
आराजी नम्बरी गािा सं० 293 रक्बा 1.493हे०
क्तस्थत ग्राि बनकिा पर०-तह०, वज०-बहराइच
क सनेही ि चन्द्रकिा के जररये बैनािा विया था
तथा िौके पर कावबज ि दाक्तखि है। आपवत्तकताण
चकबन्दी प्रवक्रया से अनवभज्ञ है। वदनांक 24-9014 चकबन्दी िेखपाि से सम्पकण वकया त पता
चिा की खाते पर सनेही ि रािकेिि का नाि
दजण है तब िकीि से वदनांक 25-9-14 क
सम्पकण वकया और आज आपवत्त दाक्तखि कर
रहा है। आपवत्तकताण ने जानबूझकर आपवत्त
दाक्तखि करने िें क ई गिती नहीं वकया है बक्तल्क
यह गिती न जानकारी बस हुई है, ज सहिन है
तथा
हस्व
की
दफा-5
भारतीय
वियाद
अवर्वनयि के तहत क्षिा के य ग्य है। आपवत्त
जानकारी की वतवथ से अन्दर वियाद है।

अतः वनिेदन है वक प्रा० पि स्वीकार करते
हुए आपवत्तकताण क वियाद का िाभ प्रदान
करते हुए आपवत्त का वनस्तारण गुण द ष के
आर्ार पर वकये जाने की कृपा की जािे कृपा
ह गी।"

10. It is not in dispute that the
objection under Section 9A(2) of the Act of
1 All. Ram Keval Vs. D.D.C., Bahraich & Ors.
695
1953 was filed prior to publication of
notification under Section 52 of the Act of
1953, which was published on 9.10.2018.

11. In response an objection dated
20.09.2017 was filed, which is extracted
herein under:-

"वनिेदन है वक प्राथणना पि ज्वािा प्रसाद
वदनांवकत
26.9.14
वबल्कुि
असत्य
एिं
िनगढन्त है, क्य ंवक इसी आराजी से सम्बक्तित
िाद देिीपािन िण्डि ग ण्डा िें विचारार्ीन था
वजसिें ज्वािा प्रसाद ने ही आिेि वकए जाने
िुकदिा का वदया है और इन्हीं के प्राथणना पि पर
उक्त विचारार्ीन िाद आिेि हुआ है त ज्वािा
प्रसाद का यह कहना वक ज्वािा प्रसाद
चकबन्दी प्रवक्रया से पूणणतया अनवभज्ञ है गित है
क्य ंवक िुझिें चकबन्दी प्रवक्रया का देिीपािन
िण्डि ग ण्डा के न्यायािय पर ज्ञान ज्वािा
प्रसाद ने ही करिाया है तथा ज्वािा प्रसाद
काफी चािाक ि वफतरती व्यक्तक्त है तथा पढा
विखा है तथा सही तथ् ं क वछपाने िें काफी
िावहर है तथा बनकिा िें र्ारा-4 का प्रकाशन
काफी पहिे ह चुका है तथा ज्वािा प्रसाद ने
अपने वियाद प्राथणना पि िें वियाद के विषय िें
पयाणप्त कारण नहीं दशाणया है। अतएि प्राथणना
पि वियाद ज्वािा प्रसाद वदनांवकत 18-9-14
वनरसत वकया जाना आिश्यक है। ग्राि िें र्ारा
4 का प्रकाशन 2013 िें ही ह चुका है।

अतः श्रीिान जी से अनुर र् है वक प्राथणना
पि / आपवत्त प्राथी स्वीकार करके वियाद प्राथणना
पि वदनांवकत 18.9.14 प्रस्तुत द्वारा ज्वािा प्रसाद
वनरस्त वकये जाने की कृपा की जािे। कृपा
ह गी।"

12. It is apparent from the objection
dated 20.09.2017, quoted above, that it is
completely vague as in the same to
establish the facts that opposite party no. 3
was having knowledge of the consolidation
proceedings related to Gata in issue i.e
Gata no. 293/1.493 Hectare, the details of
the case, which was pending before
Commissioner, Devi Patan Mandal, Gonda,
have not been indicated.

13. Assailing the impugned orders
dated 12.07.2023 and 27.10.2023, the
learned Counsel for the petitioners stated
that the delay for the period of about five
years was not properly explained despite
the same the opposite party no.2 condoned
the delay vide order dated 12.07.2023 and
DDC without taking note of the fact that
delay of about five years, was not properly
explained, affirmed the order of opposite
party no.2 vide order dated 27.10.2023. As
such the indulgence of this Court is
required. In support of his contention he
has placed reliance on the judgment passed
by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
Ajay Dabra Versus Pyare Lal and others
reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 92,
relevant paragraphs of which read as
under:-

"12.This Court, while emphasizing the
scope of Section5of theLimitation Act, in
the
case
ofMahant
Bikram
Dass
Chelav.Financial Commissioner, Revenue,
Punjab, Chandigarh (1977)4 SCC 69has
held:

"21. Section5of theLimitation Actis a
hard task-master and judicial interpretation
has encased it within a narrow compass. A
large measure of case-law has grown
around Section 5, its highlights being that
one ought not easily to take away a right
which has accrued to a party by lapse of
time and that therefore a litigant who is not
vigilant about his rights must explain every
day's
delay.
These
and
similar
considerations which influence the decision
of Section 5 applications are out of place in
cases where the appeal itself is preferred
within the period of limitation but there is
696 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
an irregularity in presenting it. Thus, in the
instant case, there was no occasion to
invoke the provisions of Section5,Limitation
Act, or of Rule 4, Chapter I of the High
Court Rules. If the Division Bench were
aware that Rule 3 of Chapter 2-C is
directory, it would have treated the
appeal as having been filed within the
period
of
limitation,
rendering
it
inapposite to consider whether the delay
caused in filing the appeal could be
condoned."

13.
This
Court
in
the
case
ofBasawarajv.Special Land Acquisition
Officer (2013) 14 SCC 81while rejecting
an application for condonation of delay
for lack of sufficient cause has concluded
in Paragraph 15 as follows:

"15. The law on the issue can be
summarized to the effect that where a
case has been presented in the court
beyond limitation, the applicant has to
explain the court as to what was the
"sufficient
cause"
which
means
an
adequate and enough reason which
prevented him to approach the court
within limitation. In case a party is found
to be negligent, or for want of bona fide
on his part in the facts and circumstances
of the case, or found to have not acted
diligently or remained inactive, there
cannot be a justified ground to condone
the delay. No court could be justified in
condoning such an inordinate delay by
imposing any condition whatsoever. The
application is to be decided only within
the parameters laid down by this Court in
regard to the condonation of delay. In case
there was no sufficient cause to prevent a
litigant to approach the court on time
condoning
the
delay
without
any
justification,
putting
any
condition
whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in
violation of the statutory provisions and it
tantamounts to showing utter disregard to
the legislature."
14.Therefore, we are of
the considered opinion that the High Court
did not commit any mistake in dismissing
the delay condonation application of the
present appellant."

14. Opposing the present petition
learned Counsel for the side opposite
stated that in the facts and circumstances
of the case particularly that earlier
registered sale deed dated 23.06.1984 has
not been cancelled till date and in view of
this fact and the law settled in this regard
that earlier sale deed would prevail over
the later sale deed, the opposite party
no.3/Jawala Prasad possess rights over
the property in issue and as such the
opportunity of hearing to contest the case
on merit is required else the opposite
party no.3 would suffer irreparable loss
and injury.

15. It is also stated that while dealing
with the issue of condonation of delay, a
liberal approach should be taken by the
competent authority/court and in the instant
case the opposite party no.3, was not heard
before the authority and his right would be
affected if the opportunity of hearing is
denied because his right over the property
in issue is based on the registered sale deed
executed by Chandrakala and Smt. Sanehi
dated 23.06.1984 and the claim of the
petitioner is based upon the subsequent sale
deed dated 04.07.1998 executed by Smt.
Chandrakala.

16. He also submitted its proper
explanation was given to condone the
delay, which was not replied in specific
terms and taken note of entire aspect of the
case, the delay was condoned vide order
dated 12.07.2023 affirmed vide order dated
27.10.2023. As such, no interference is
required in the matter.
1 All. Ram Keval Vs. D.D.C., Bahraich & Ors.
697

17. On the issue of condonation of
delay he referred the paragraphs no. 15 and
16 of judgment passed by the Hon'ble
Apex Court in the case of Bhivchandra
Shankar More v. Balu Gangaram More
reported in (2019) 6 SCC 387, which reads
as under:-

"15.It is a fairly well-settled law that
"sufficient cause" should be given liberal
construction so as to advance sustainable
justice when there is no inaction, no
negligence nor want of bona fides could be
imputable to the appellant. After referring
to various judgments, inB. Madhuri[B.
Madhuri Goudv.B. Damodar Reddy, (2012)
12 SCC 693 : (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 546] ,
this Court held as under:

"6. The expression "sufficient cause"
used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
1963 and other statutes is elastic enough to
enable the courts to apply the law in a
meaningful manner which serves the ends
of justice. No hard-and-fast rule has been
or can be laid down for deciding the
applications for condonation of delay but
over the years courts have repeatedly
observed that a liberal approach needs to
be adopted in such matters so that
substantive rights of the parties are not
defeated only on the ground of delay."

16.Observing
that
the
rules
of
limitation are not meant to destroy the
rights
of
the
parties,inN.Balakrishnanv.M.Krishnamurth
y[N.Balakrishnanv.M.Krishnamurthy,
(1998) 7 SCC 123], this Court held as
under:-

"11. Rules of limitation are not meant
to destroy the rights of parties. They are
meant to see that parties do not resort to
dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy
promptly. The object of providing a legal
remedy is to repair the damage caused by
reason of legal injury. The law of limitation
fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for
the redress of the legal injury so suffered.
Time is precious and wasted time would
never revisit. During the efflux of time,
newer causes would sprout up necessitating
newer persons to seek legal remedy by
approaching the courts. So a lifespan must
be fixed for each remedy. Unending period
for launching the remedy may lead to
unending uncertainty and consequential
anarchy. The law of limitation is thus
founded on public policy. It is enshrined in
the maximinterest reipublicae up sit finis
litium(it is for the general welfare that a
period be put to litigation). Rules of
limitation are not meant to destroy the
rights of the parties. They are meant to see
that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics
but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is
that every legal remedy must be kept alive
for
a
legislatively
fixed
period
of
time........."

18. Considered the submissions
advanced by learned Counsel for the parties
and perused the records.

19. The law on the issue of dealing with
the applications for condonation of delay is
well settled. This Court as also Hon'ble
Apex Court in various judgments have held
that an opportunity of hearing should be
given and the hearing should not be shut
down and in the said judgments, it is also
settled that liberal, pragmatic, justice
oriented and non pedantic approach should
be taken by the Courts concerned while
dealing
with
the
applications
for
condonation of delay so as to advance
substantial justice and generally delays in
preferring the appeals are required to be
condoned. The Courts concerned while
dealing with such applications should also
consider the fact that whether the delay has
sufficiently been explained or not. The
698 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
manner of exercising discretion in matters
relating to condonation of delay is fairly
well settled and it has been consistently
held that while exercising discretion in
such matters, the words "sufficient cause"
under Section 5 of The Limitation Act,
1963, should be construed in a liberal
manner and in the absence of anything
showing malafide or deliberate delay as
dilatory tactics, the Court should normally
condone the delay. It is also settled
principle of law that the discretion if
exercised by the Courts concerned then the
Appellate Courts should not interfere in the
discretion
exercised
by
the
Courts
concerned, if the discretion so exercised
has been exercised judicially and not
arbitrarily.

20. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the
case of Ramji Dass and others v. Mohan
Singh, 1978 ARC 496 has held that as far
as possible, Courts' discretion should be
exercised in favour of hearing and not to
shut out hearing. In that case the appeal
was filed against an ex-parte decree after
eight years and the District Court as well as
the High Court had rejected the matter on
the ground of delay. However, setting aside
the order of the High Court, Hon'ble Apex
Court observed as under:

"... we are inclined to the view that, as
far as possible, Courts' discretion should be
exercised in favour of hearing and not to
shut out hearing. Therefore, we think that
the order of the High Court should not have
been passed in the interest of Justice which
always informs the power under S. 115
C.P.C. ..."

21. The manner of exercising
discretion by Courts in matters relating to
condonation of delay was subject matter of
consideration
in
the
case
of
N.
Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy;
(1998) 7 SCC 123, wherein Hon'ble Apex
Court observed as under:-

"9. It is axiomatic that condonation of
delay is a matter of discretion of the court.
Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say
that such discretion can be exercised only if
the delay is within a certain limit. Length of
delay is no matter, acceptability of the
explanation
is
the
only
criterion.
Sometimes delay of the shortest range may
be uncondonable due to a want of
acceptable explanation whereas in certain
other cases, delay of a very long range can
be condoned as the explanation thereof is
satisfactory. Once the court accepts the
explanation as sufficient, it is the result of
positive exercise of discretion and normally
the superior court should not disturb such
finding,
much
less
in
revisional
jurisdiction,
unless
the
exercise
of
discretion
was
on
wholly
untenable
grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a
different matter when the first court refuses
to condone the delay. In such cases, the
superior court would be free to consider the
cause shown for the delay afresh and it is
open to such superior court to come to its
own finding even untrammelled by the
conclusion of the lower court.

10. The reason for such a different
stance is thus:

The primary function of a court is to
adjudicate the dispute between the parties
and to advance substantial justice. The
time-limit fixed for approaching the court
in different situations is not because on the
expiry of such time a bad cause would
transform into a good cause.

11. Rules of limitation are not meant to
destroy the rights of parties. They are
meant to see that parties do not resort to
dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy
promptly. The object of providing a legal
1 All. Ram Keval Vs. D.D.C., Bahraich & Ors.
699
remedy is to repair the damage caused by
reason of legal injury. The law of limitation
fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for
the redress of the legal injury so suffered.
Time is precious and wasted time would
never revisit. During the efflux of time,
newer
causes
would
sprout
up
necessitating newer persons to seek legal
remedy by approaching the courts. So a
lifespan must be fixed for each remedy.
Unending period for launching the
remedy may lead to unending uncertainty
and consequential anarchy. The law of
limitation is thus founded on public
policy. It is enshrined in the maxim
interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it
is for the general welfare that a period be
put to litigation). Rules of limitation are
not meant to destroy the rights of the
parties. They are meant to see that
parties do not resort to dilatory tactics
but seek their remedy promptly. The idea
is that every legal remedy must be kept
alive for a legislatively fixed period of
time.

12. A court knows that refusal to
condone delay would result in foreclosing
a suitor from putting forth his cause.
There is no presumption that delay in
approaching
the
court
is
always
deliberate. This Court has held that the
words "sufficient cause" under Section 5
of the Limitation Act should receive a
liberal construction so as to advance
substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi
Jain v. Kuntal Kumari, AIR 1969 SC 575
and State of W.B. v. Administrator, Howrah
Municipality, (1972) 1 SCC 366 ."

22. In the case of Esha Bhattacharjee
v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur
Nefar Academy and others reported in
(2013) 12 SCC 649, the issue before the
Apex Court was that whether the High
Court rightly condoned the delay of 2449
days in challenging the interim order dated
25.02.2004, which was duly communicated
to the authorities and even for compliance
of the same, the District Inspector of
Schools, Howrah on 24.01.2006, directed
the school authorities to comply with the
directions
issued
vide
order
dated
25.02.2004.
The
Apex
Court
after
considering the earlier judgments allowed
the appeal and set aside the order of the
High Court, condoning the delay. In the
case of Esha Bhattacharjee (supra), the
Apex Court in para 21 of the judgment
culled out the principles on the issue of
condoning the delay, which are as under:-

"21. From the aforesaid authorities the
principles that can broadly be culled out
are:

21.1. (i) There should be a liberal,
pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic
approach while dealing with an application
for condonation of delay, for the courts are
not supposed to legalise injustice but are
obliged to remove injustice.

21.2. (ii) The terms "sufficient cause"
should be understood in their proper spirit,
philosophy and purpose regard being had
to the fact that these terms are basically
elastic and are to be applied in proper
perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.

21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being
paramount and pivotal the technical
considerations should not be given undue
and uncalled for emphasis.

21.4. (iv) No presumption can be
attached to deliberate causation of delay
but, gross negligence on the part of the
counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.

21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable
to a party seeking condonation of delay is a
significant and relevant fact.

21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that
adherence to strict proof should not affect
public justice and cause public mischief
700 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
because the courts are required to be
vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate
there is no real failure of justice.

21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal
approach
has
to
encapsulate
the
conception of reasonableness and it
cannot be allowed a totally unfettered
free play.

21.8. (viii) There is a distinction
between inordinate delay and a delay of
short duration or few days, for to the
former doctrine of prejudice is attracted
whereas to the latter it may not be
attracted. That apart, the first one
warrants strict approach whereas the
second calls for a liberal delineation.

21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour
and attitude of a party relating to its
inaction or negligence are relevant
factors to be taken into consideration. It
is so as the fundamental principle is that
the courts are required to weigh the scale
of balance of justice in respect of both
parties and the said principle cannot be
given a total go by in the name of liberal
approach.

21.10. (x) If the explanation offered
is concocted or the grounds urged in the
application are fanciful, the courts should
be vigilant not to expose the other side
unnecessarily to face such a litigation.

21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind
that no one gets away with fraud,
misrepresentation or interpolation by
taking recourse to the technicalities of
law of limitation.

21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts
are to be carefully scrutinised and the
approach should be based on the
paradigm of judicial discretion which is
founded on objective reasoning and not on
individual perception.

21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body
or an entity representing a collective cause
should be given some acceptable latitude."

23. In the case of Brijesh Kumar and
others v. State of Haryana and others
reported in (2014) 11 SCC 351, the
Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under:-

"6. The issues of limitation, delay and
laches as well as condonation of such delay
are being examined and explained everyday
by the courts. The law of limitation is
enshrined in the legal maxim interest
reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the
general welfare that a period be put to
litigation). Rules of limitation are not
meant to destroy the rights of the parties,
rather the idea is that every legal remedy
must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed
period of time.

7. The Privy Council in General
Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corpn.
Ltd. v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim [(193940) 67 IA 416 : (1941) 53 LW 212 : AIR
1941 PC 6] , relied upon the writings of Mr
Mitra in Tagore Law Lectures, 1932
wherein it has been said that:

A law of limitation and prescription
may appear to operate harshly and unjustly
in a particular case, but if the law provides
for a limitation, it is to be enforced even at
the risk of hardship to a particular party as
the Judge cannot, on equitable grounds,
enlarge the time allowed by the law,
postpone
its
operation,
or
introduce
exceptions not recognised by law.

8. In P.K. Ramachandran v. State of
Kerala [(1997) 7 SCC 556 : AIR 1998 SC
2276] , the Apex Court while considering a
case of condonation of delay of 565 days,
wherein no explanation much less a
reasonable or satisfactory explanation for
condonation of delay had been given, held
as under:

"6. Law of limitation may harshly
affect a particular party but it has to be
applied with all its rigour when the statute
so prescribes and the courts have no power
1 All. Ram Keval Vs. D.D.C., Bahraich & Ors.
701
to extend the period of limitation on
equitable grounds."

9. While considering a similar issue,
this Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v.
Raghunathpur Nafar Academy [(2013) 12
SCC 649 : (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 713 : (2014)
4 SCC (Cri) 450] laid down various
principles inter alia: (SCC pp. 658-59,
paras 21-22)

***

"21.5.
(v)
Lack
of
bona
fides
imputable to a party seeking condonation
of delay is a significant and relevant fact.

***

21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal
approach has to encapsulate the conception
of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed
a totally unfettered free play.

***

21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and
attitude of a party relating to its inaction or
negligence are relevant factors to be taken
into consideration. It is so as the
fundamental principle is that the courts are
required to weigh the scale of balance of
justice in respect of both parties and the
said principle cannot be given a total go-by
in the name of liberal approach.

***

22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to
perceive delay as a non-serious matter and,
hence, lackadaisical propensity can be
exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires
to be curbed, of course, within legal
parameters."

10. The courts should not adopt an
injustice-oriented approach in rejecting the
application for condonation of delay.
However the court while allowing such
application has to draw a distinction
between delay and inordinate delay for
want of bona fides of an inaction or
negligence would deprive a party of the
protection of Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, 1963. Sufficient cause is a condition
precedent for exercise of discretion by the
court for condoning the delay. This Court
has time and again held that when
mandatory provision is not complied with
and that delay is not properly, satisfactorily
and convincingly explained, the court
cannot condone the delay on sympathetic
grounds alone."

24. Needless to say that this petition
has been filed challenging the order dated
12.07.2023, whereby, the C.O. exercised its
discretionary jurisdiction and condoned the
delay in filing the objection so as to
advance substantial justice and the order
dated 27.10.2023, whereby the D.D.C. has
affirmed the order dated 12.07.2023, as
such, the scope of interference by this
Court is limited.

25. It is only where, therefore, there is
complete non-application of mind in
condoning delay which is inexorable, or
where no reasons for condonation of delay
are forthcoming in the order passed by the
court below, this Court would ordinarily
interfere.

26. On the scope of interference with
discretionary orders even in appeal, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court holds thus, in
Wander v.Antox India Pvt. Ltd.; 1990
Supp SCC 727:

"13. On a consideration of the matter,
we are afraid, the appellate bench fell into
error on two important propositions. The
first is a misdirection in regard to the very
scope and nature of the appeals before it
and the limitations on the powers of the
appellate court to substitute its own
discretion in an appeal preferred against a
discretionary order. The second pertains to
the infirmities in the ratiocination as to the
quality of Antox's alleged user of the
702 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
trademark on which the passing-off action
is founded. We shall deal with these two
separately.

14. The appeals before the Division
Bench were against the exercise of
discretion by the Single Judge. In such
appeals, the appellate court will not
interfere with the exercise of discretion of
the court of first instance and substitute its
own discretion except where the discretion
has been shown to have been exercised
arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or
where the court had ignored the settled
principles of law regulating grant or
refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An
appeal against exercise of discretion is said
to be an appeal on principle. Appellate
court will not reassess the material and
seek to reach a conclusion different from
the one reached by the court below if the
one reached by that court was reasonably
possible on the material. The appellate
court would normally not be justified in
interfering with the exercise of discretion
under appeal solely on the ground that if it
had considered the matter at the trial stage
it would have come to a contrary
conclusion. If the discretion has been
exercised by the trial court reasonably and
in a judicial manner the fact that the
appellate court would have taken a
different view may not justify interference
with the trial court's exercise of discretion.
After
referring
to
these
principles
Gajendragadkar, J. in Printers (Mysore)
Private Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph [(1960) 3
SCR 713 : AIR 1960 SC 1156] : (SCR 721).

"...
These
principles
are
well
established, but as has been observed by
Viscount Simon in Charles Osenton & Co.
v. Jhanaton [1942 AC 130] '...the law as to
the reversal by a court of appeal of an
order made by a judge below in the
exercise
of
his
discretion
is
well
established, and any difficulty that arises is
due only to the application of well settled
principles in an individual case'."

The appellate judgment does not seem
to defer to this principle."

27. Interfering with an order of
condoning the delay, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Mohammad Shafeeq v. Mirza
Mohammad Husain; (2002) 9 SCC 460;
observed as under:-

"3. In our opinion, the High Court has
taken too technical a view of the error
committed by the appellant in pursuing the
remedy available to him under the law. The
appellant had been prosecuting his remedy
diligently and there is nothing to doubt his
bona fides. These aspects were taken into
consideration by the learned Additional
District Judge while condoning the delay in
filing the revision. In our opinion, the High
Court ought not to have interfered with the
order of the Additional District Judge,
condoning the delay in filing the revision,
being an order passed in exercise of
discretion vested in the learned Additional
District Judge and for that reason, was not
open to interference by the High Court in
exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction
under Article 227 of the Constitution."

28. It would be apt to indicate the
principles
related
to
execution
and
registration of sale deed.

(a) The earlier sale deed would prevail
over the subsequent sale deed.