# Ram Kishor Dixit v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2024) 12 ILRA 775
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-11-22
- **Case number:** Special Appeal No. 973 of 2024
- **Bench:** Vivek Kumar Birla, Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ram-kishor-dixit-v-state-of-u-p-ors-54540
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

(A) Service Law - Claims for arrears in pay
scales and promotion benefits - Doctrine
of Delay and Laches - intra court appeal -
Claims based on a continuing wrong are
not barred by delay but are subject to the
doctrine of laches and limitation - Relief
for monetary arrears in 'recurring wrongs'
is generally limited to three years prior to
the filing of a writ or application. (Para -
29)

(B) Service Law - Distinction between
Continuing wrong and Completed Wrong -
continuing wrong' arises from a wrongful
act that creates a continuous source of
injury -wrongdoer remains liable as long
as the injury continues - 'completed
wrong' results in a one-time injury, even if
its effects persist - Pension claims are
treated as 'recurring wrongs', with a fresh
cause of action arising each month - Relief
for 'continuing wrongs' in service-related
claims may be granted despite delay,
provided it does not disturb settled rights
- In cases of 'completed wrongs, delay or
laches
often
bars
monetary
claims,
especially arrears - A 'completed wrong' is
a one-time act or omission with persistent
effect
and
does
not
qualify
as
a
'continuing wrong'. (Para - 29)

(C) Service Law - Distinction between
Delay, Laches, and Acquiescence - Laches
involves unreasonable delay or negligence
in pursuing a claim, causing prejudice to
the other party - Two essential factors -
length of delay and the nature of acts
done during the interval - Acquiescence
means
tacit
or
passive
acceptance,
implying reluctant consent to an act -
presupposes
knowledge
and
passive
acceptance, leading to a new implied
agreement between parties. (Para -28)

Appellant, employed as an Assistant Teacher in
CT Grade - claim for arrears due to the merger
of CT Grade into LT Grade - promotional pay
scale benefits - claims were raised for the first
time in 2023, years after his retirement in 2009
- opposed by the State - citing delay and laches
- Single Judge dismissed writ petition - ground -
unexplained delay - held - claim was barred by
laches - hence appeal. (Para - 3 to 117)

HELD: - Claim for arrears due to the merger of
CT Grade into LT Grade and promotional pay
scale was time-barred and lacked merit. No
patent error or illegality in the order passed by
learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition
on the ground of delay/laches. (Para - 30 to 32)

Appeal dismissed. (E-7)
List of Cases cited:

## Text

12 All. Ram Kishor Dixit Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
775
correct this error while he had questioned
the order rejecting recall in revision before
this Court but he deliberately withdrew it
for the reason that the court might have
expressed the view that for non-deposit
made under Section 17 no application for
recall could have been made and I find that
court recorded very categorically that
present petitioner was avoiding compliance
of Section 17 of Provincial Small Cause
Courts Act, 1887.

15. It is thus, clear that Misc.
Application for recall was filed before the
competent court having jurisdiction may be
mentioning a wrong provision of law and
this itself could not have invalidated the
application. The court could have tried it
provided the petitioner had made deposit
under Section 17 of the Act to press it on
merits. The court of course, rejected the
application on the ground that it was not
maintainable but the petitioner had the
opportunity to question it in revision but
instead of questioning it in revision on
merits, he chose to withdraw the same and
that too without any liberty to move any
application
afresh.
Thus,
for
the
observations that have come up to be made
by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court while
deciding his revision petition filed against
the ex parte judgment under its order dated
18.01.2019, and there being no liberty
further availed by petitioner, the second
recall application before the court under
Order IX Rule 13 was clearly not
maintainable.

16. Still further, I do not find there to
be any averment coming up in the entire
petition regarding any deposit made of the
decretal amount under Section 17 of the
Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887.
Petitioner?s
revision
has
also
been
dismissed, may be on the ground of delay,
confirming the order passed by the Judge
Small Causes for eviction.

17. Thus, the challenge laid to the ex
parte
judgment
and
decree
dated
11.12.2023 is also over. It is not stated that
this order of the High Court was further
challenged.

18. In such above view of the matter,
therefore, I do not find any justification to
interfere with the order passed by the court
rejecting application filed under Order IX
Rule 13 CPC.

19. Revision application is devoid of
merits
and
is
accordingly,
rejected.
However, it is clarified that this order will
not come in the way qua title of property
between the parties if being contested
before competent court of law/ forum.

20. For the reasons recorded and
discussed together above, the review
petition No. 5 of 2024 is also dismissed.

21. Cost made easy.
----------
(2024) 12 ILRA 775
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 22.11.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE VIVEK KUMAR BIRLA, J.
THE HON'BLE DR. YOGENDRA KUMAR
SRIVASTAVA, J.

Special Appeal No. 973 of 2024

Ram Kishor Dixit ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Gyanesh Kumar, Manoj Kumar Singh
776 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

(A) Service Law - Claims for arrears in pay
scales and promotion benefits - Doctrine
of Delay and Laches - intra court appeal -
Claims based on a continuing wrong are
not barred by delay but are subject to the
doctrine of laches and limitation - Relief
for monetary arrears in 'recurring wrongs'
is generally limited to three years prior to
the filing of a writ or application. (Para -
29)

(B) Service Law - Distinction between
Continuing wrong and Completed Wrong -
continuing wrong' arises from a wrongful
act that creates a continuous source of
injury -wrongdoer remains liable as long
as the injury continues - 'completed
wrong' results in a one-time injury, even if
its effects persist - Pension claims are
treated as 'recurring wrongs', with a fresh
cause of action arising each month - Relief
for 'continuing wrongs' in service-related
claims may be granted despite delay,
provided it does not disturb settled rights
- In cases of 'completed wrongs, delay or
laches
often
bars
monetary
claims,
especially arrears - A 'completed wrong' is
a one-time act or omission with persistent
effect
and
does
not
qualify
as
a
'continuing wrong'. (Para - 29)

(C) Service Law - Distinction between
Delay, Laches, and Acquiescence - Laches
involves unreasonable delay or negligence
in pursuing a claim, causing prejudice to
the other party - Two essential factors -
length of delay and the nature of acts
done during the interval - Acquiescence
means
tacit
or
passive
acceptance,
implying reluctant consent to an act -
presupposes
knowledge
and
passive
acceptance, leading to a new implied
agreement between parties. (Para -28)

Appellant, employed as an Assistant Teacher in
CT Grade - claim for arrears due to the merger
of CT Grade into LT Grade - promotional pay
scale benefits - claims were raised for the first
time in 2023, years after his retirement in 2009
- opposed by the State - citing delay and laches
- Single Judge dismissed writ petition - ground -
unexplained delay - held - claim was barred by
laches - hence appeal. (Para - 3 to 117)

HELD: - Claim for arrears due to the merger of
CT Grade into LT Grade and promotional pay
scale was time-barred and lacked merit. No
patent error or illegality in the order passed by
learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition
on the ground of delay/laches. (Para - 30 to 32)

Appeal dismissed. (E-7)
List of Cases cited:

1. U.O.I.& ors.Vs Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC
648

2. Balakrishna Savalram Pujari Waghmare Vs
Shree Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan, AIR
1959 SC 798

3. M.R. Gupta Vs U.O.I., (1995) 5 SCC 628

4. Shiv Dass Vs U.O.I.& ors., (2007) 9 SCC 274

5. State of Bihar Vs Deokaran Nenshi, (1972) 2
SCC 890

6. Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Amritsar Vs
Suresh Seth, (1981) 2 SCC 790

7. UP Jal Nigam and another Vs Jaswant Singh
and another, (2006) 11 SCC 464

8. State of MP & ors.Vs Yogendra Shrivastava,
(2010) 12 SCC 538

9. Prahlad Rout Vs All India Institute of Medical
Sciences, (2021) 14 SCC 472

10. U.O.I. Vs N. Murugesan, (2022) 2 SCC 25

(Delivered by Hon'ble Dr. Yogendra
Kumar Srivastava, J.)

1. Heard Sri Manoj Kumar Singh,
learned counsel for the appellant and Sri
Ankit Gaur, learned Standing Counsel
appearing for the State-respondent.
12 All. Ram Kishor Dixit Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
777

2. The present intra court appeal is
directed against the judgment and order
23.08.2024 passed by the learned Single
Judge in Writ-A No.12140 of 2024 (Ram
Kishor Dixit Vs. State of UP and others), in
terms of which the writ petition has been
dismissed on the ground of the delay.

3. The records of the case indicate that
the writ petition had been filed with the
assertion that the petitioner was initially
appointed as Assistant Teacher in the CT
Grade
in
a
recognized
and
aided
educational institution on 01.09.1973, and
was
regularized
by
an
order
dated
30.06.1975. He was awarded revised pay
scale vide order dated 03.06.1989 and the
benefit of selection grade after 10 years'
service in the LT Grade.

4. It is stated that the petitioner was
subsequently
promoted
as
Lecturer
(Sociology) on a vacant post in the
institution
by
the
Committee
of
Management with the approval of the
District Inspector of Schools by an order
dated
20.11.1997.
The
petitioner
subsequently superannuated on 30.06.2009.

5. Certain representations by the
petitioner raising claims for arrears of
salary from CT Grade to LT Grade and
promotional pay scale were said to have
been submitted.

6. The petitioner thereafter preferred a
writ petition being Writ-A No.12140 of
2024 seeking a direction to the Director,
Secondary Education, UP, Allahabad to
take appropriate action for payment of
arrears due to him from CT Grade to LT
Grade and promotional pay scale together
with
interest,
and
to
decide
the
representations stated to be pending in this
regard.

7. The writ petition was opposed by
the counsel appearing for the Staterespondents on the ground of the same was
barred by delay and laches.

8. The writ Court, upon examining the
facts of the case, particularly that the
petitioner had superannuated in the year
2009, held that his claim for payment of
arrears from CT Grade to LT Grade and
also promotional pay scale, could not be
entertained, particularly as he had been
given the LT Grade in the year 1989, and
the promotional pay scale in the year 1996.

9. The learned Single Judge upon
taking note of the fact that the petitioner
had not raised the issue for the last 35
years, and the writ petition having been
filed without explaining laches, proceeded
to dismiss the writ petition on the ground of
delay.

10.
Counsel
appearing
for
the
appellant has pressed the appeal by arguing
that the relief sought being with regard to
arrears of salary, pertains to a recurring
cause of action arising from month to
month, and therefore the same could have
been rejected on the ground of delay. It has
been further urged that reliance placed by
the learned Single Judge on the decision in
the case of Union of India and others Vs.
Tarsem Singh, is misplaced, and the said
judgment would not be applicable in the
facts of the case.

11.
Learned
Standing
Counsel
appearing for the State-respondents has
supported the reasoning given by the
learned Single Judge, and has contended
that the claim which had been sought to be
raised by the appellant-petitioner was
highly time barred and that the same has
rightly been rejected.
778 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

12.
Counsel
appearing
for
the
appellant, despite specific queries made by
the Court, could not point out from the
records the basis on which the claim was
being made for arrears from CT Grade to
LT Grade and the promotional pay scale.
The averments in the writ petition and the
documents which have been annexed
alongwith the same also are not very clear
in this regard.

13. There is no specific mention in the
pleadings of the writ petition regarding the
date on which the benefit of LT Grade was
granted to the petitioner and also the period
for which the arrears in this regard has been
sought to be claimed. The only mention in
this regard is in a representation dated
25.05.2023 said to have been submitted by
the appellant, wherein it is sought to be
asserted that the petitioner was placed in
the LT Grade on 01.01.1986. In the
representation also, no details have been
mentioned regarding the period for which
arrears were sought to be claimed.

14. It is the own case of the petitioner
that he was substantively appointed against
the post of Assistant Teacher in the CT
Grade and that consequent to the decision
of the State Government declaring CT
Grade to be the dying cadre, his services
stood merged in the LT Grade.

15. The order dated 19.11.1997, a
copy whereof is on record as annexure no.2
to the writ petition, and in terms of which
the petitioner was given ad hoc promotion
against the vacant post of Lecturer in the
institution, is also indicative that the
petitioner had been holding the substantive
post in the CT Grade.

16. There is no material on record
which may suggest that upon merger of the
CT Grade into LT Grade, any arrears in
regard to the same became due to the
petitioner, and that the same had remained
unpaid. There is also no material available
on record which may suggest that any
arrears were due to the petitioner in regard
to the promotional pay scale.

17. The petitioner raised his claim for
the first time, upon attaining the age of
superannuation, by a representation stated
to have been submitted on 25.05.2023 and
thereafter sought to agitate his claim by
preferring a writ petition in the year 2024.
The significant delay raises concerns as to
whether the claims would be barred by
laches.

18. In the judgment in the case of
Union of India Vs. Tarsem Singh
(supra), which has been relied upon by the
writ Court, and upon which counsel for the
appellant has also sought to place reliance,
it was held that claims based on 'continuing
wrong' would not be barred by delay, but
in respect of relief for recovery of arrears
for a past period, the principles relating to
'recurring/successive wrongs' would apply.

19. The position in this regard was
summarized as follows:-

"To
summarise,
normally,
a
belated service related claim will be
rejected on the ground of delay and laches
(where remedy is sought by filing a writ
petition) or limitation (where remedy is
sought
by
an
application
to
the
Administrative Tribunal). One of the
exceptions to the said rule is cases relating
to a continuing wrong. Where a service
related claim is based on a continuing
wrong, relief can be granted even if there is
a long delay in seeking remedy, with
reference to the date on which the
12 All. Ram Kishor Dixit Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
779
continuing wrong commenced, if such
continuing wrong creates a continuing
source of injury. But there is an exception
to the exception. If the grievance is in
respect of any order or administrative
decision which related to or affected
several others also, and if the reopening of
the issue would affect the settled rights of
third parties, then the claim will not be
entertained. For example, if the issue
relates to payment or refixation of pay or
pension, relief may be granted in spite of
delay as it does not affect the rights of third
parties. But if the claim involved issues
relating to seniority or promotion, etc.,
affecting others, delay would render the
claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation
will be applied. Insofar as the consequential
relief of recovery of arrears for a past
period is concerned, the principles relating
to recurring/successive wrongs will apply.
As a consequence, the High Courts will
restrict the consequential relief relating to
arrears normally to a period of three years
prior to the date of filing of the writ
petition."

 (emphasis supplied)

20.
The
principle
underlying
'continuing wrongs' was explained in an
earlier decision in the case of Balakrishna
Savalram Pujari Waghmare Vs. Shree
Dhyaneshwar
Maharaj
Sansthan,
wherein it was observed as follows:-

"31. In other words, did the cause
of action arise de die in diem as claimed by
the appellants? In dealing with this
argument it is necessary to bear in mind
that Section 23 refers not to a continuing
right but to a continuing wrong. It is the
very essence of a continuing wrong that it
is an act which creates a continuing source
of injury and renders the doer of the act
responsible and liable for the continuance
of the said injury. If the wrongful act
causes an injury which is complete, there is
no continuing wrong even though the
damage resulting from the act may
continue. If, however, a wrongful act is of
such a character that the injury caused by it
itself continues, then the act constitutes a
continuing wrong. In this connection it is
necessary to draw a distinction between the
injury caused by the wrongful act and what
may be described as the effect of the said
injury. It is only in regard to acts which can
be properly characterised as continuing
wrongs that Section 23 can be invoked."

 (emphasis supplied)

21. The distinction between a claim
with regard to monthly salary and a claim
for recovery of arrears for a past period,
was considered in the case of M.R. Gupta
Vs. Union of India, and it was held that as
long as the person concerned is in service,
fresh cause of action arises every month
when he is paid his salary on the basis of a
wrong computation made contrary to the
rules whereas in respect of a claim for
recovery of arrears for a past period, the
question of limitation would arise. It was
further held that any claim for recovery of
arrears calculated on the basis of difference
in pay which has become time barred
would not be recoverable. The observations
made in this regard are as follows:-

"So long as the appellant is in
service, a fresh cause of action arises every
month when he is paid his monthly salary
on the basis of a wrong computation made
contrary to rules. It is no doubt true that if
the appellant's claim is found correct on
merits, he would be entitled to be paid
according to the properly fixed pay scale in
the future and the question of limitation
would arise for recovery of the arrears for
the past period. In other words, the
780 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
appellant's claim, if any, for recovery of
arrears calculated on the basis of difference
in the pay which has become time barred
would not be recoverable, but he would be
entitled to proper fixation of his pay in
accordance with rules and to cessation of a
continuing wrong if on merits his claim is
justified. Similarly, any other consequential
relief claimed by him, such as, promotion
etc. would also be subject to the defence of
laches etc. to disentitle him to those reliefs.
The pay fixation can be made only on the
basis of the situation existing on 1-8-1978
without taking into account any other
consequential relief which may be barred
by his laches and the bar of limitation. It is
to this limited extent of proper pay fixation
the application cannot be treated as time
barred since it is based on a recurring cause
of action."

(emphasis supplied)

22. The question of delay or laches in
approaching the High Court under Article
226 of the Constitution of India was
examined in Shiv Dass Vs. Union of India
and others, and it was held that in a case of
pension though the cause of action
continues from month to month, the same
cannot be a ground to overlook delay in
filing the petition. It was stated thus:-

"6. Normally, in the case of
belated approach writ petition has to be
dismissed. Delay or laches is one of the
factors to be borne in mind by the High
Courts
when
they
exercise
their
discretionary powers under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India. In an appropriate
case the High Court may refuse to invoke
its extraordinary powers if there is such
negligence or omission on the part of the
applicant to assert his right as taken in
conjunction with the lapse of time and
other circumstances, causes prejudice to the
opposite party. Even where fundamental
right is involved the matter is still within
the discretion of the Court as pointed out in
Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of
Imports and Exports [(1969) 1 SCC 185 :
AIR 1970 SC 769] . Of course, the
discretion has to be exercised judicially and
reasonably.

10. In the case of pension the
cause of action actually continues from
month to month. That, however, cannot be
a ground to overlook delay in filing the
petition. It would depend upon the fact of
each case. If petition is filed beyond a
reasonable period say three years normally
the Court would reject the same or restrict
the relief which could be granted to a
reasonable period of about three years. The
High Court did not examine whether on
merit the appellant had a case. If on merits
it would have found that there was no
scope for interference, it would have
dismissed the writ petition on that score
alone."

23. The concept of what would
constitute 'continuing wrong' has been
evolved through legal pronouncements,
based on the factual context of the cases. In
State of Bihar Vs. Deokaran Nenshi, the
distinction between an 'act or omission
which constitutes an offence once and for
all' and an 'act or omission which
continues, and therefore constitutes a
fresh offence every time', was pointed out
and it was observed as follows:-

"5. A continuing offence is one
which is susceptible of continuance and is
distinguishable from the one which is
committed once and for all. It is one of
those offences which arises out of a failure
to obey or comply with a rule or its
requirement and which involves a penalty,
the liability for which continues until the
12 All. Ram Kishor Dixit Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
781
rule or its requirement is obeyed or
complied with. On every occasion that such
disobedience or non-compliance occurs and
re-occurs, there is the offence committed.
The distinction between the two kinds of
offences is between an act or omission
which constitutes an offence once and for
all and an act or omission which continues,
and therefore, constitutes a fresh offence
every time or occasion on which it
continues."

(emphasis supplied)

24.
The
distinction
between
a
'continuing wrong' and a 'wrong or
default which is complete when it is
committed', was again pointed out in the
case of Commissioner of Wealth Tax,
Amritsar
Vs.
Suresh Seth,
in
the
following words:-

"11. ...The distinctive nature of a
continuing wrong is that the law that is
violated makes the wrongdoer continuously
liable for penalty. A wrong or default
which is complete but whose effect may
continue to be felt even after its completion
is, however, not a continuing wrong or
default.

17. The true principle appears to
be that where the wrong complained of is
the omission to perform a positive duty
requiring a person to do a certain act the
test to determine whether such a wrong is a
continuing one is whether the duty in
question is one which requires him to
continue to do that act..."

(Emphasis supplied)

25. The basis of the doctrine of laches
and the factors which are to be considered
where delay and laches would be sufficient
to deny relief to the petitioner, were
examined in UP Jal Nigam and another
Vs. Jaswant Singh and another and
referring to the statement of law in
Halsbury's Laws of England, para 911, p.
395, it was stated thus:-

"12. The statement of law has
also been summarised in Halsbury's Laws
of England, para 911, p. 395 as follows:

"In determining whether there has
been such delay as to amount to laches, the
chief points to be considered are:

(i) acquiescence on the claimant's
part; and

(ii) any change of position that
has occurred on the defendant's part.

Acquiescence in this sense does
not mean standing by while the violation of
a right is in progress, but assent after the
violation has been completed and the
claimant has become aware of it. It is
unjust to give the claimant a remedy where,
by his conduct, he has done that which
might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a
waiver of it; or where by his conduct and
neglect, though not waiving the remedy, he
has put the other party in a position in
which it would not be reasonable to place
him if the remedy were afterwards to be
asserted. In such cases lapse of time and
delay are most material. Upon these
considerations rests the doctrine of laches."

26. The differential treatment between
a continuing wrong and an accrued wrong
was subject matter of consideration in
State of MP and others Vs. Yogendra
Shrivastava, and it was held that in regard
to
claim
for
higher
allowances
prospectively from the date of application,
the bar of limitation or the principle of
delay or laches would not be applicable
since denial of benefit of higher allowance
is a continuing wrong and cause of action
arises every month at time of payment of
salary; however, for consequential relief of
payment of arrears for past period,
782 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
principle of successive or recurring wrong
would apply and arrears would not be
granted for any period beyond three years
prior to the date of original application. The
observations made in this regard in the
aforesaid decision are as follows:-

"18. ...Where the issue relates to
payment or fixation of salary or any
allowance, the challenge is not barred by
limitation or the doctrine of laches, as the
denial of benefit occurs every month when
the salary is paid, thereby giving rise to a
fresh cause of action, based on continuing
wrong. Though the lesser payment may be
a consequence of the error that was
committed at the time of appointment, the
claim for a higher allowance in accordance
with the Rules (prospectively from the date
of application) cannot be rejected merely
because it arises from a wrong fixation
made several years prior to the claim for
correct payment. But in respect of grant of
consequential relief of recovery of arrears
for the past period, the principle relating to
recurring and successive wrongs would
apply. Therefore the consequential relief of
payment of arrears will have to be
restricted to a period of three years prior to
the date of the original application. (See
M.R. Gupta v. Union of India [(1995) 5
SCC 628] and Union of India v. Tarsem
Singh, [(2008) 8 SCC 648]"

(emphasis supplied)

27. The proposition of law laid down
in the case of Union of India Vs. Tarsem
Singh (supra) was examined in Prahlad
Rout Vs. All India Institute of Medical
Sciences, and the same was held to be
unexceptionable. It was reiterated that
where there is a 'continuing wrong' in
relation to a service related claim, relief
may be granted notwithstanding delay,
provided the granting of the relief does not
unsettle matters settled and affect third
parties. It was further observed that where
the cause of action is not a continuing one,
the Court may refuse monetary claim on
the ground of delay, specially in respect of
arrears. The observations made in this
regard are being reproduced below:-

"28. The proposition of law laid
down by this Court in Union of India v.
Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648 is
unexceptionable. It is well settled that
where there is a continuing wrong in
relation to a service related claim, relief
may be granted notwithstanding delay,
provided the granting of the relief does not
unsettle matters settled and affect third
parties. The judgment was, however,
rendered in the context of discretionary
relief in proceedings under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India, for which there is
no limitation prescribed. Where the cause
of action is not a continuing one the High
Courts refuse monetary claim on the
ground of delay, specially arrears. In this
context it would be pertinent to refer to the
concluding part of paras 7 and 8 of the
judgment of this Court in Tarsem Singh."

(emphasis supplied)

28. The principles relating to the effect
of discretion under Article 226 of the
Constitution to interfere in cases of the
undue delay, laches and acquiescence were
summarised in Union of India Vs. N.
Murugesan and the following observations
were made:-

"Delay, laches and acquiescence

20. The principles governing
delay,
laches,
and
acquiescence
are
overlapping and interconnected on many
occasions. However, they have their
distinct characters and distinct elements.
One can say that delay is the genus to
12 All. Ram Kishor Dixit Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
783
which laches and acquiescence are species.
Similarly, laches might be called a genus to
a species by name acquiescence. However,
there may be a case where acquiescence is
involved, but not laches. These principles
are common law principles, and perhaps
one could identify that these principles find
place in various statutes which restrict the
period of limitation and create nonconsideration of condonation in certain
circumstances. They are bound to be
applied by way of practice requiring
prudence of the court than of a strict
application
of
law.
The
underlying
principle governing these concepts would
be one of estoppel. The question of
prejudice is also an important issue to be
taken note of by the court.

Laches

21. The word "laches" is derived
from
the
French
language
meaning
"remissness
and
slackness".
It
thus
involves unreasonable delay or negligence
in pursuing a claim involving an equitable
relief while causing prejudice to the other
party. It is neglect on the part of a party to
do an act which law requires while
asserting a right, and therefore, must stand
in the way of the party getting relief or
remedy.

22. Two essential factors to be
seen are the length of the delay and the
nature of acts done during the interval. As
stated, it would also involve acquiescence
on the part of the party approaching the
court apart from the change in position in
the interregnum. Therefore, it would be
unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer
a remedy on a party who knocks its doors
when his acts would indicate a waiver of
such a right. By his conduct, he has put the
other party in a particular position, and
therefore, it would be unreasonable to
facilitate a challenge before the court.
Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on
equity is not expected to be allowed to
avail a remedy.

23. A defence of laches can only
be allowed when there is no statutory bar.
The question as to whether there exists a
clear case of laches on the part of a person
seeking a remedy is one of fact and so also
that of prejudice. The said principle may
not have any application when the
existence of fraud is pleaded and proved by
the other side. To determine the difference
between the concept of laches and
acquiescence is that, in a case involving
mere laches, the principle of estoppel
would apply to all the defences that are
available to a party. Therefore, a defendant
can succeed on the various grounds raised
by the plaintiff, while an issue concerned
alone would be amenable to acquiescence.

Acquiescence

24. We have already discussed
the relationship between acquiescence on
the one hand and delay and laches on the
other.

25. Acquiescence would mean a
tacit or passive acceptance. It is implied
and reluctant consent to an act. In other
words, such an action would qualify a
passive assent. Thus, when acquiescence
takes place, it presupposes knowledge
against
a
particular
act.
From
the
knowledge comes passive acceptance,
therefore instead of taking any action
against any alleged refusal to perform the
original
contract,
despite
adequate
knowledge of its terms, and instead being
allowed
to
continue
by
consciously
ignoring it and thereafter proceeding
further, acquiescence does take place. As a
consequence, it reintroduces a new implied
agreement between the parties. Once such a
situation arises, it is not open to the party
that acquiesced itself to insist upon the
compliance of the original terms. Hence,
what is essential, is the conduct of the
784 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
parties. We only dealt with the distinction
involving a mere acquiescence. When
acquiescence is followed by delay, it may
become laches. Here again, we are inclined
to hold that the concept of acquiescence is
to be seen on a case-to-case basis."

29. Having regard to the foregoing
discussion, the legal position that emerges,
may be summarised as follows:

29.1. A 'continuing wrong' arises
from a wrongful act that creates a
continuous
source
of
injury.
The
wrongdoer remains liable as long as the
injury continues. A 'completed wrong'
results in a one-time injury, even if its
effects persist.

29.2.
Claims
based
on
a
'continuing wrong' (e.g, incorrect pay
fixation or pension) are not barred by delay
if they involve ongoing injury. Relief for
monetary arrears in 'recurring wrongs' is
generally limited to three years prior to the
filing of a writ or application, and Courts
would refuse relief where granting it
disturbs settled rights or impacts third
parties.

29.3. Recurring cause of action
or fresh cause of action arises each month
when an employee receives a salary based
on wrongful pay computation. Relief for
pay fixation can be sought at any time
while in service whereas recovery of
arrears is subject to the limitation period
and does not extend beyond three years.

29.4. Pension claims are treated
as 'recurring wrongs', with a fresh cause
of action arising each month. Courts limit
retrospective relief to three years before
filing
the
claim
unless
the
delay
significantly prejudices the opposite party
or public interest.

29.5.
Relief
for
'continuing
wrongs' in service-related claims may be
granted despite delay, provided it does not
disturb
settled
rights.
In
cases
of
'completed wrongs', delay or laches often
bars monetary claims, especially arrears.

29.6. A 'continuing wrong'
arises out of failure to comply with a rule,
leading
to
ongoing
liability
until
compliance and fresh periods of limitation
arise as long as the wrongful act or breach
persists, provided there is a positive duty to
perform an act. A 'completed wrong' is a
one-time act or omission with persistent
effect and does not qualify as a 'continuing
wrong'.

30. In the instant case, as we have
already noted above, no material has been
placed before us to substantiate the basis of
the claim for arrears on account of the
merger of CT Grade into LT Grade, as also
on account of the benefit of promotional
pay scale which had been granted to the
petitioner subsequently.

31. Even otherwise, the arrears on
account of the petitioner having been
placed in the LT Grade, as also on account
of the benefit of the promotional pay scale,
would have become due on the dates when
the aforesaid benefits had been granted i.e.
in the year 1986 and the year 1996
respectively. Any cause of action in regard
to the same could be said to have arisen on
the said dates, and would constitute a 'onetime cause of action' and not a 'recurring
cause of action'.

32. The claim in regard to the
aforesaid arrears having not been agitated
by the petitioner while being in service and
the same having raised by submitting a
representation in the year 2023 and
thereafter filing a writ petition in the year
2024, much after the petitioner had
superannuated in the year 2009, we do not
12 All. Chhedi Ram Pandey (Deceased) & Ors. Vs. Smt. Malti Bajpai (Deceased) & Ors
785
find any patent error or illegality in the
order passed by the learned Single Judge
dismissing the writ petition on the ground
of delay/laches.

33. The appeal lacks merit and is
accordingly dismissed.
----------
(2024) 12 ILRA 785
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 26.11.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE AJIT KUMAR, J.

Writ-A No. 17588 of 2024

Chhedi Ram Pandey (Deceased) & Ors.
 ...Petitioners
Versus
Smt. Malti Bajpai (Deceased) & Ors
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Ravi Anand Agarwal, Shreya Gupta

Counsel for the Respondents:
Prakash
Chandra
Dwivedi,
Padmaker
Pandey

Civil Law - Constitution of India,1950 -
Article 227 - Civil Procedure Code,1950 -
Order 41 Rules 27 - Uttar Pradesh Urban
Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and
Eviction) Act, 1972 - Sections - 21(1)(a)
&
21(1)(b):-
Petition
u/Article
227
-
questioning the findings of the prescribed
authority as well as appellate authority on the
score of release application being granted
exercising power chiefly the Act, 1972 -
Bonafide need - plea setup in defence by the
tenant before the court below that they have
sufficient alternative accommodation in the form
of a vacant space behind the shop in question
being used as a godown - court finds that, it
clearly transpires that landlords needed not only
the shop to settle the sons but also for the
purpose of self-settlement as they were not
having sufficient financial resources for their
sons and daughters to survive and since
building was in a dilapidated state they intended
it reconstruction after demolition - and survey
commission report did not support the case of
tenant, - and, once the landlord has set up a
need and it has come to be stated and proves
that members of the family are not gainfully
employed, any business even if run a few may
not suffice the financial need of the entire family
and, therefore, need would be bona fide - held,
landlord is a sole arbitrator of his need and it
does not lie in the mouth of tenant to suggest
as to which accommodations would suit the
landlord better - A tenant must understood that
after all he is a tenant and cannot claim an
indefeasible right to retain tenancy - and if the
bona fide need issue has been decided correctly
in favour of the landlord, the question whether
the building was in a dilapidated condition or
not need not be gone into - and the application
for release deserved to be allowed - petition
lack merit and is, accordingly, dismissed.
(Para - 24, 25, 29, 33)

Application Dismissed. (E-11)

List of Cases cited:

1. Shiv Sarup Gupta Vs Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta
- (1999 vol. 6 SCC 222),

2. Guru Prasad Vs 1st A.D.J., Kanpur ((1999 Vol.
2 ARC 28),

3. Ramesh Chand & anr. Vs Ghaziabad
Development Authority & ors. (Appeal Civil No.
2349 of 2008 decided 31.03.2008,

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ajit Kumar, J.)

1. Heard Ms. Shreya Gupta, learned
counsel for the petitioners and Sri Atul
Dayal, learned Senior Advocate assisted by
Sri Prakash Chandra Dwivedi, learned
counsel for the respondent - landlord.

2. This is a tenant petition filed under
Article 227 of the Constitution invoking
superintending and supervisory jurisdiction