# Ram Lal v. D.D.C., Sultanpur & Anr

- **Citation:** (2021) 10 ILRA 730
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2021-10-01
- **Case number:** Consolidation No. 22410 of 2021
- **Bench:** Ravi Nath Tilhari
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ram-lal-v-d-d-c-sultanpur-anr-46407
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

A. Civil Law - Consolidation - Condonation
of delay - U.P. Consolidation of Holdings
Act, 1954 - Section 48 - Rule 109-A -
Limitation Act,1963 - Section 5 - It is a
well settled proposition of law that
existence of sufficient cause is sine quo
non, for condonation of delay. In absence
of being any finding that the cause shown
is sufficient the delay cannot be condoned.
It is true that length of delay does not matter,
but what matters is, the existence of sufficient
cause and for condoning the delay a specific
finding must be recorded that the cause shown
is sufficient, which lacks in the order of the
Settlement
Officer
of
Consolidation.
The
Settlement
Officer
of
Consolidation
has
specifically written on the point of delay that the
cause shown was casual one and even the date
of knowledge of the order dated 04.05.1983
(implementation of which, deleted petitioner's
name from revenue records) was not disclosed
by the petitioner. Even then the Settlement
Officer of Consolidation has condoned the delay
of 38 years in filing the appeal from the date of
the order and 27 years from 1994 (since
petitioner's name was mutated in place of his
grandfather). (Para 11)

B. Law of limitation may harshly affect a
particular party but it has to be applied
with all its rigour when the statute so
prescribe and the Courts have no power to
extend
the
period
of
limitation
on
equitable grounds. The court cannot enquire
into belated and state claims on the ground of
equity. Delay defeats equity. The court helps
those who are vigilant and "do not slumber over
their rights." (Para 12, 13)

It is settled in law that even though a liberal
and justice oriented approach is required to be
adopted in exercise of powers u/s 5 of the
10 All. Ram Lal Vs. D.D.C., Sultanpur & Anr.
731
Limitation Act, the Courts cannot be oblivious of
the fact that the successful litigant has acquired
certain rights on the basis of the judgment
passed quite long ago against which no remedy
was availed within the period of limitation, or
even thereafter, within the reasonable period.
Although the length of delay by itself cannot be
a
ground
to
reject
the
application
for
condonation of delay there must be sufficient
cause for condonation of delay, and particularly
where such application is filed after more than
38 years from the date of the order. (Para 15)

C. In the exercise of revisional jurisdiction
the discretion by the court below in
condoning the delay cannot be lightly
interfered but where the court while
condoning the delay or not condoning the
delay, acted with material irregularity or
contrary to law or on no evidence to
support the cause for condonation of
delay such order can be interfered with.
(Para 17)

Writ petition dismissed. (E-4)

Precedent followed:

## Text

730 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
come to the help of the petitioner for the
reasons that even if the long standing
entries of the revenue records may be
treated as presumptive but nevertheless the
fact remains that it is for the petitioner to
have displaced the said presumption by
leading cogent and substantial evidence to
rebut the said presumption.

67. Needless to say that the same has
not been done and despite both oral and
documentary evidence having been led
before the three Consolidation Authorities
which have concurrently recorded that the
petitioner is not entitled to claim of 1/3rd
share on the basis of co-tenancy in Khata
No. 123 and 141 is based on proper
appreciation and material available on
record and is concluded by the concurrent
findings which for the reasons as recorded
herein above do not suffer from any error
which may persuade this Court to interfere
in exercise of powers conferred on this
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India.

68. This Court does not find that there
is any merit in the petition, accordingly, the
same
is
liable
to
be
dismissed.
Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed.
The order passed by the Consolidation
Authorities are affirmed. In the facts and
circumstances, there shall be no order as to
costs.
----------

(2021)10ILR A730
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 01.10.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAVI NATH TILHARI, J.

Consolidation No. 22410 of 2021
Ram Lal ...Petitioner
Versus
D.D.C., Sultanpur & Anr. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Prabhat Kumar, Vinod Kumar

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Ajay Pratap Singh 'Vatsa'

A. Civil Law - Consolidation - Condonation
of delay - U.P. Consolidation of Holdings
Act, 1954 - Section 48 - Rule 109-A -
Limitation Act,1963 - Section 5 - It is a
well settled proposition of law that
existence of sufficient cause is sine quo
non, for condonation of delay. In absence
of being any finding that the cause shown
is sufficient the delay cannot be condoned.
It is true that length of delay does not matter,
but what matters is, the existence of sufficient
cause and for condoning the delay a specific
finding must be recorded that the cause shown
is sufficient, which lacks in the order of the
Settlement
Officer
of
Consolidation.
The
Settlement
Officer
of
Consolidation
has
specifically written on the point of delay that the
cause shown was casual one and even the date
of knowledge of the order dated 04.05.1983
(implementation of which, deleted petitioner's
name from revenue records) was not disclosed
by the petitioner. Even then the Settlement
Officer of Consolidation has condoned the delay
of 38 years in filing the appeal from the date of
the order and 27 years from 1994 (since
petitioner's name was mutated in place of his
grandfather). (Para 11)

B. Law of limitation may harshly affect a
particular party but it has to be applied
with all its rigour when the statute so
prescribe and the Courts have no power to
extend
the
period
of
limitation
on
equitable grounds. The court cannot enquire
into belated and state claims on the ground of
equity. Delay defeats equity. The court helps
those who are vigilant and "do not slumber over
their rights." (Para 12, 13)

It is settled in law that even though a liberal
and justice oriented approach is required to be
adopted in exercise of powers u/s 5 of the
10 All. Ram Lal Vs. D.D.C., Sultanpur & Anr.
731
Limitation Act, the Courts cannot be oblivious of
the fact that the successful litigant has acquired
certain rights on the basis of the judgment
passed quite long ago against which no remedy
was availed within the period of limitation, or
even thereafter, within the reasonable period.
Although the length of delay by itself cannot be
a
ground
to
reject
the
application
for
condonation of delay there must be sufficient
cause for condonation of delay, and particularly
where such application is filed after more than
38 years from the date of the order. (Para 15)

C. In the exercise of revisional jurisdiction
the discretion by the court below in
condoning the delay cannot be lightly
interfered but where the court while
condoning the delay or not condoning the
delay, acted with material irregularity or
contrary to law or on no evidence to
support the cause for condonation of
delay such order can be interfered with.
(Para 17)

Writ petition dismissed. (E-4)

Precedent followed:

1. Shanti Prasad Gupta Vs Deputy Director of
Consolidation, Camp at Meerut, 1984 RD page
382 (SC) (Para 4)

2. State of Jharkhand & ors. Vs Ashok Kumar
Chokhani & ors., (2009) 2 SCC 667 (Par 5)

3. P.K. Ramachandran Vs St. of Kerala, AIR
1998 SC 2276 (Para 12)

4. Pundlik Jalam Patil (dead) by LRS. Vs
Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project
anr., (2008) 17 SCC 448 (Para 13)

5.
Maniben
Devraj
Shah
Vs
Municipal
Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, 2012 (5) SCC
157 (Para 14)

Precedent distinguished:

1.
Paras
Nath
Vs
Deputy
Director
of
Consolidation, Basti, 2002 (93) R.D. 764 (Para
5)

Present petition challenges order dated
04.08.2021, passed by Deputy Director of
Consolidation, Sultanpur.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ravi Nath Tilhari, J.)

1. Heard Sri Prabhat Kumar, learned
counsel for the petitioner and Sri Ajay
Pratap Singh ''Vatsa', learned counsel for
the opposite party No.2 and Dr. Krishna
Singh, learned Standing Counsel for the
State.

2. This petition has been filed
challenging the order dated 04.08.2021
passed
by
the
Deputy
Director
of
Consolidation, Sultanpur in Revision No.
1171, Ram Keval Vs. Ram Lal, Annexure
No. 1 to the petition.

3. In the consolidation proceedings,
the Consolidation Officer passed an order
dated 04.05.1983 on the basis of some
compromise said to be between the parties
or their predecessor. Ram Sumer, grand
father of the petitioner never challenged the
order dated 04.05.1983, during his life
time. On his death, the petitioner was
mutated on 2.1.1994, in place of Ram
Sumer as the name of Ram Sumer had
continued in the revenue records. The
petitioner's father had predecreed Ram
Sumer. Later on, in the proceedings under
Rule 109-A of the U.P. Consolidation of
Holdings Act, 1954 the order dated
04.05.1983 was implemented, and the
name of the petitioner was deleted. The
petitioner filed appeal before 25.03.2021,
after about 38 years of the order dated
04.05.1983 with the prayer for condonation
of delay inter alia on the grounds that the
order dated 04.05.1983 was not in his
knowledge and his name had been mutated
on the death of his grand father on
2.1.1994.
732 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

4.

The
Settlement
Officer
of
Consolidation, by order dated 25.03.2021
condoned the delay and directed the matter
to be listed for hearing on merits. The
opposite party No.2 filed revision, which
has been allowed by the Deputy Director of
Consolidation by order dated 04.08.2021
against which, the present petition has been
filed.

5. Sri Prabhat Kumar submits that the
Settlement Officer of Consolidation having
condoned the delay in the exercise of its
discretion,
the
Deputy
Director
of
Consolidation is legally not justified in
interfering with such direction, which was
to advance substantial justice, in the
exercise of revisional jurisdiction under
Section 48 of the Act. He has placed
reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble the
Supreme Court in the case of Shanti
Prasad Gupta Vs. Deputy Director of
Consolidation, Camp at Meerut reported
in 1984 RD page 382 (SC). He further
placed reliance on judgment of this Court
in the case of Paras Nath Vs. Deputy
Director of Consolidation, Basti reported
in 2002 (93) R.D. 764 in support of his
contention that the order condoning the
delay is an interlocutory order and the
revision was not maintainable. He has
further placed reliance in the case of State
of Jharkhand and others Vs. Ashok
Kumar Chokhani and others (2009) 2
SCC667 in support of his contention that
while
deciding
an
application
for
condonation of delay in filing the appeal,
the merits of the case could not be gone
into.

6. Sri Ajay Pratap Singh ''Vatsa',
submits that the delay was inordinate, of
38 years, in filing the appeal. The
petitioner's grand father Ram Sumer did
not challenge the order dated 4.5.1983
during his life time. The order dated
4.5.1983 was recorded in revenue records
in the year 1994 but inspite thereof, the
petitioner did not challenge the same for
27 years. There was no sufficient cause to
condone the delay, but the Settlement
Officer of Consolidation not only allowed
the application without recording any
finding in favour of the petitioner on the
point of sufficient cause, but also made
vital observations on the merits of the case
and as such the order has been rightly set
aside
by
the
Deputy
Director
of
Consolidation.

7. I have considered the submissions
advanced by learned counsels for the
parties and perused the material on record.

8.

The
Deputy
Director
of
Consolidation has set aside the order of the
Settlement Officer of Consolidation on the
ground that Ram Sumer during his life time
did
not
challenge
the
order
dated
04.05.1983. It has also recorded that for the
cause of delay as mentioned therein, that
the petitioner was minor in the year 1983,
no evidence of minority was adduced.

9. Learned counsel for the petitioner
could not answer the query of the Court
about the age of the petitioner in 1983.
However, perusal of the affidavit dated
13.09.2021 in support of the writ petition
mentions the age of the petitioner as 79
years.

10. I have considered the order passed
by the Settlement Officer of Consolidation
and a perusal thereof shows that the
Settlement Officer of Consolidation was
even not satisfied with the cause shown, as
would appear from the following, part of
the order dated 25.03.2021: which reads as
under:
10 All. Ram Lal Vs. D.D.C., Sultanpur & Anr.
733

"fe;kn ds lEcU/k esa mHk;i{kksa ds
dFku ls Li"V gS fd vihydrkZ }kjk foyEc ds
fcUnq ij ljljh rkSj ls dkj.k izLrqr fd;k x;k]
izfroknh dk dFku lgh gS fd foyEc dh
tkudkjh dk fnukad vihy esa vafdr ugha fd;k
x;k gSA "

11. It is a well settled proposition of
law that existence of sufficient cause is sine
quo non, for condonation of delay. In
absence of being any finding that the cause
shown is sufficient the delay cannot be
condoned. It is true that length of delay
does not matter, but what matters is, the
existence of sufficient cause and for
condoning the delay a specific finding must
be recorded that the cause shown is
sufficient. It, lacks in the order of the
Settlement Officer of Consolidation. The
Settlement Officer of Consolidation has
specifically written on the point of delay
that the cause shown was casual one and
even the date of knowledge of the order
dated 04.05.1983 was not disclosed by the
petitioner. Even then the Settlement Officer
of Consolidation has condoned the delay of
38 years in filing the appeal from the date
of the order and 27 years from 1994.

12. In P. K. Ramachandran Vs. State
of Kerala, AIR 1998 SC 2276 the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has held that, "Law of
limitation may harshly affect a particular
party but it has to be applied with all its
rigour when the statute so prescribe and the
Courts have no power to extend the period
of limitation on equitable grounds."

13. In Pundlik Jalam Patil (dead) by
LRS. Vs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon
Medium Project and Anr. (2008) 17 SCC
448, in para 17 of the judgment, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, "...The
evidence on record suggests neglect of its
own right for long time in preferring
appeals. The court cannot enquire into
belated and state claims on the ground of
equity. Delay defeats equity. The court
helps those who are vigilant and "do not
slumber over their rights."

14. In Maniben Devraj Shah Vs.
Municipal
Corporation
of
Brihan
Mumbai, 2012 (5) SCC 157, in para 18 of
the judgment, the Supreme Court held as
under:

"What needs to be emphasised is
that even though a liberal and justice
oriented approach is required to be
adopted in the exercise of power under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other
similar statutes, the Courts can neither
become oblivious of the fact that the
successful litigant has acquired certain
rights on the basis of the judgment under
challenge and a lot of time is consumed at
various stages of litigation apart from the
cost. What colour the expression 'sufficient
cause' would get in the factual matrix of a
given case would largely depend on bona
fide nature of the explanation. If the Court
finds that there has been no negligence on
the part of the applicant and the cause
shown for the delay does not lack bona
fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on
the other hand, the explanation given by
the applicant is found to be concocted or he
is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his
cause, then it would be a legitimate
exercise of discretion not to condone the
delay. In cases involving the State and its
agencies/ instrumentalities, the Court can
take note of the fact that sufficient time is
taken in the decision making process but no
premium can be given for total lethargy or
utter negligence on the part of the officers
of the State and / or its agencies
/instrumentalities and the applications filed
by them for condonation of delay cannot be
734 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
allowed as a matter of course by accepting
the plea that dismissal of the matter on the
ground of bar of limitation will cause
injury to the public interest."

15. In view of the aforesaid
judgments, it is settled in law that even
though a liberal and justice oriented
approach is required to be adopted in
exercise of powers under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, the Courts can not be
oblivious of the fact that the successful
litigant has acquired certain rights on the
basis of the judgment passed quite long ago
against which no remedy was availed
within the period of limitation, or even
thereafter, within the reasonable period.
Although the length of delay by itself
cannot be a ground to reject the application
for condonation of delay there must be
sufficient cause for condonation of delay,
and particularly where such application is
filed after more than 38 years from the date
of the order.

16. In Shanti Prasad Gupta (supra),
the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that
whether or not there is sufficient cause for
condonation of delay, is a question of fact
dependent upon the facts and circumstances
of a particular case, and the proposition is
well settled that when order has been made
under Section 5, Limitation Act by the
lower court in the exercise of its discretion
allowing or refusing an application to
extend time, it cannot be interfered with in
revision, unless the lower court has acted
with material irregularity or contrary to law
or has come to that conclusion on no
evidence. It has been held that in exercise
of revisional jurisdiction under Section 48
of Consolidation of Holdings Act, the
Deputy Director of Consolidation cannot
lightly interfere with the discretion in the
exercise of Consolidation Officer in favour
of condonation of delay.

17. In view of the order of Settlement
Officer of Consolidation condoning the
delay, in the absence of any finding that the
cause shown is sufficient and also that the
cause shown was casual one, as also in
view of the judgment in the case of Shanti
Prasad Gupta (supra), finding that the
Settlement Officer of Consolidation acted
with material irregularity or contrary to law
and condoned the delay on no evidence, the
submission of the petitioner's counsel that
in exercise of revisional jurisdiction the
Deputy Director of Consolidation, could
not interfere with the discretion exercised
by the Settlement Officer of Consolidation
cannot be accepted. The proposition of law
in Shanti Prasad (supra) is that in the
exercise of revisional jurisdiction the
discretion by the court below in condoning
the delay cannot be lightly interfered but
where the court while condoning the delay
or not condoing the delay, acted with
material irregularity or contrary to law or
on no evidence to support the cause for
condonation of delay such order can be
interfered with.

18. In the case of Ashok Kumar
(supra), it has been observed that it is well
settled that while deciding an application of
condonation of delay in filing the appeal, the
merits of the case could not be gone into.
This proposition of law applies with respect
to the order passed by the Settlement Officer
of Consolidation as well, as a perusal thereof,
shows that while condoning the delay the
Settlement Office of Condonation entered
into the merits of the case, as according to it,
there being four brothers and the property
being ancestral it should have been divided
equally amongst them.
10 All. M/s Magma Industries Ltd., Muzaffarnagar Vs. Designated Committee, Office of
 Commissioner C.G.S.T., Commissionerate, Meerut & Ors.
735

19. I n the case of Paras Nath (supra),
it has been held by this Court that against
an interlocutory order no revision is
maintainable. Interlocutory order is an
order, which does not touch the merit of the
case and which does not prejudice any
party, while arguing the case on merits. It
was found, therein, that by condonation of
delay the merits of the case had not been
touched
by
the
Settlement
Officer
Consolidation. From reading of Paras Nath
(supra) it is evident that the interlocutory
order is such order by which the delay is
condoned but without touching the merits
of the case. In the present case, as
mentioned above, the Settlement Officer of
Consolidation while condoning the delay
has touched the merits of the case, and,
therefore,
the
order
passed
by
the
Settlement Officer of Consolidation is not
be an interlocutory order.

20. For the aforesaid reasons, I do not
find any illegality in the order of the
Deputy Director of Consolidation. The
order passed by the Settlement Officer of
Consolidation was not sustainable and
therefore this Court is not inclined to
interfere in the matter. However, the Court
finds that the courts below ought not to
have made any observation on the merit of
the case. Therefore, it is observed that any
observation made by the Deputy Director
of Consolidation or the Settlement Officer
of Consolidation in their respective orders
on the merits of the claim of the parties
shall not be taken into consideration by any
authority.

21. The writ petition is dismissed
with the aforesaid observation.
----------
(2021)10ILR A735
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 07.09.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE NAHEED ARA MOONIS, J.
THE HON'BLE SAUMITRA DAYAL SINGH, J.

Writ Tax No. 110 of 2021

M/s
Magma
Industries
Ltd.,
Muzaffarnagar ...Petitioner
Versus
Designated
Committee,
Office
of
Commissioner C.G.S.T., Commissionerate,
Meerut & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Suyash Agarwal

Counsel for the Respondents:
A.S.G.I., Sri Ramesh Chandra Shukla

A. Tax Law - Sabka Vishwas (Legacy
Dispute
Resolution)
Scheme,
2019
-
Sections
125,
125(1)(e),
123(c),
124(1)(d), 121(r), 121(m) & 133 - Central
Excise Act, 1944 - Income Tax Act, 1961 -
Section 119(1) - A person against whom
an enquiry, investigation or audit may be
pending and whose 'tax dues' may not
have been 'quantified', would remain
ineligible to make a declaration on form
SVLDRS-1. (Para 10)

There is no doubt that the 'Panchnama'
document dated 10.02.2016 prepared by the
Central Excise authorities, in writing, clearly
mentioned the amount Rs. 2,18,516/- as the
amount of duty short paid by the petitioner.
Again, there can be no doubt that a director of
the petitioner-company Dinesh Garg, in his
statement recorded, in writing, on 13.05.2016
further
admitted
duty
avoidance
by
the
petitioner, to the tune of Rs. 45,38,231/-. The
total of these two admissions is Rs. 47,56,751/-.
Section 121(r) does not, in any manner
suggest or seek to limit the meaning of
the phrase 'written communication' to be
one written and issued by any Central
Excise authority. Plainly, it refers to an
amount of duty under any indirect tax