# Ram Narain Mehrotra & Ors v. State of U.P

- **Citation:** (2026) 4 ILRA 1060
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-04-02
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1998
- **Bench:** Subhash Vidyarthi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ram-narain-mehrotra-ors-v-state-of-u-p-54353
- **Pages:** 9

## Text

1060 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
statements of P.W3 and P.W.4 were recorded in the Court. Such a long delay, coupled with non
disclosure of presence of appellant and role played by him at the time of crime and other necessary
details shows that the dock identification conducted by the prosecution during testimony of P.W.3
and P.W.4 in Court, was not proper, reliable and trustworthy. Thus the prosecution has failed to
prove that the appellant participated in the crime. There is no other evidence adduced by the
prosecution connecting the appellant to the crime.

49. In view of the above, we come to the conclusion that prosecution have failed to prove
its case beyond reasonable doubt, that the appellant was one of the assailants involved in the
commission of the offence. There is also no evidence that the offence was committed by Fakkad
dacoit gang and the appellant was one of the members of that gang. Therefore, the prosecution has
failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the learned Trial Judge has failed to
appreciate the evidence on record, correctly and thereby came to the wrong conclusion of guilt of
the appellant.

50. In view of the above, the instant criminal appeal is, accordingly, allowed. We set aside
the impugned judgment and order dated 08.01.1985 passed in Sessions Trial No.37 of 1983 and
appellant Ram Swarup @ Chhotey Chela is acquitted of the offence under Section 302 read with
34 IPC and Section 14 of U.P. Dacoity Affected Areas Act No.31 of 1983.

51. The appellant Ram Swarup @ Chhotey Chela is on bail. His bail bonds and personal
bonds are cancelled and the sureties discharged. The appellant Ram Swarup @ Chhotey Chela,
need not surrender.

52. The appellant Ram Swarup @ Chhotey Chela shall execute a personal bond to the
sum of Rs. 25,000/- under Section 481 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023
(corresponding to Section 437-A of the Cr.P.C.) for his appearance, before the appellate court, in
the event of an appeal being preferred against his acquittal.

53. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Trial Court concerned alongwith the Trial Court
record for information and necessary compliance.
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(2026) 4 ILRA 1060
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 02.04.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.

Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1998

Ram Narain Mehrotra & Ors. ...Appellants
Versus
State of U.P. ...Respondent
4 All. Ram Narain Mehrotra & Ors. Vs. State of U.P.
1061
Issue for consideration
Matter pertains to applicability of sec 18 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.

Headnotes
Probation of Offenders Act, 1958-sec 18-Appellant Nos.1, 2 and 4 have died -appeal survives only in
respect of the appellant Nos.3 and 5-Section 18- the benefit of the Probation Act- would not be available to a
person guilty of committing offences under Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947-the appellants
have been convicted for the offence of criminal conspiracy for committing an offence under Section 5(2) read
with Section 5(1)(d) of the Act, 1947-not been held guilty of committing the substantive offences under
Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(d) of the Act, 1947-Appellants are not public servants-they could not be
held guilty of the offences under Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(d) - bar contained in Section 18 of the
Probation Act will not apply to the present case- upholding the conviction of the appellant No. 3 and 5 and
granting them the benefit of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958-period of almost four decades stands elapsed
since the appellants were sentenced- during which the appellants have not committed any other offence-no
need to place them under probation for any further period. (E-9)

Case Law Cited
1. Lakhvir Singh v. State of Punjab, (2021) 2 SCC 763
2. Tarak Nath Keshari v. State of W.B.: (2024) 13 SCC 384
3. Sunita Devi v. State of Bihar: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 984
4. Chellammal v. State, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 870

List of Acts
1. The Probation of Offenders Act, 1958
2. The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947

List of Keywords
Substantive offences; public servants; criminal conspiracy; benefit of Probation

Appearances of parties
Counsel for Appellant(s) : H.D.Srivastava, Abhinav Srivastava, Abhishek Bhasin, Anurag Verma, Nadeem
Murtaza, P Chakrawarti, Suresh Chandra Srivastava, Virendra K Shukla
Counsel for Respondent(s) : Govt. Advocate, A S Rakhra, Anurag Kumar Singh, S.B.Pandey

(Delivered by Hon'ble Subhash Vidyarthi, J.)

1. Heard Shri Abhinav Srivastava, the learned counsel for the appellant and Shri Anurag
Kumar Singh, the learned counsel for the respondent- C.B.I.

2. The instant appeal was filed in the year 1998 by five appellants, namely, (i) Ram Narain
Mehrotra, (ii) Jageshwar Prasad Mehrotra, (iii) Onkar Nath Mehrothra (iv) Nirankar Nath Mehrotra
and (v) Smt. Neera Mehrotra, challenging the validity of a judgment and order dated 30.07.1998
passed by the Special Judge, Anti Corruption (West), U.P., Lucknow in Criminal Case No.02 of
1979, whereby the appellants have been convicted for the offence under Section 120-B I.P.C. read
with Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and have
been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay Rs.4,00,000/-
as fine.
1062 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
3. The appeal was admitted by means of an order dated 12.09.1998, the appellants were
ordered to be released on bail and the payment of fine was also stayed pending disposal of the
appeal.

4. During pendency of the appeal, appellant Nos.1, 2 and 4 have died and the appeal
survives only in respect of the appellant Nos.3 and 5.

5. Briefly stated, the prosecution case arises out of alleged banking frauds committed by
three firms during the year 1972 to 1975. One of the three firms- M/s Guru Prasad Ram Prasad,
Kanpur, was reconstituted in the year 1965 and its partners were Ram Narain Mehrotra, Guru
Prasad Mehrotra, Jageshwar Prasad Mehrotra and Nirankar Nath Mehrotra. The second firm- M/s
MT and Company was constituted on 08.01.1972 and its active partners were Ram Narain
Mehrotra and Anil Kumar Tandon, Onkar Nath Mehrotra was Manager of this firm. The third firm
was M/s MT Agencies, Lucknow. Ram Narain Mehrotra, Anil Kumar Tandon, Smt. Prem Kumari
Mehrotra and Smt. Neera Mehrotra were active partners of this firm and the aforesaid Onkar Nath
Mehrotra was the Manager of this firm also.

6. Another accused B. N. Tandon was working as a Head Clerk in State Bank of India,
Main Branch during the year 1973 to 1975. Yet another accused M. L. Agarwal was working as a
Head Clerk in DDRR Section of the Main Branch, State Bank of India during the period October
1968 to January 1973 and thereafter he was promoted to the post of Officer Grade-II, but he
continued to work on the same post till April 1973 and he also used to perform duties similar to that
of co-accused B. N. Tandon.

7. Some fraudulent transactions came to light during an inspection of the bank made by an
Officer on Special Duty, on the basis whereof three FIRs were lodged. During investigation, it
came to light that out of 35 lost cheques, 8 cheques had been made to disappear by co-accused
persons B. N. Tandon and M. L. Agarwal. 3 cheques related to firm M/s Guru Prasad Ram Prasad
and M/s MT Agencies, 10 of the 25 lost cheques were received in branches of State Bank of India
at Kanpur. It was alleged that co-accused B. N. Tandon had misplaced the cheques under
conspiracy with other co-accused persons and B. N. Tandon had been seen going to meet Ram
Narain Mehrotra in firm- M/s Guru Prasad Ram Prasad, Chowk, Kanpur.

8. The trial Court held that sanction for prosecution of co-accused M. L. Agarwal was valid
but the sanction for prosecution of B. N. Tandon was not valid. Regarding the offence of criminal
conspiracy alleged against the partners of the three firms, it was established that they had issued the
cheques which establish that they were active partners of the firms. The amount for which the
cheques had been issued were not available in the accounts of the firms. The accused persons made
interpolations and forgery in the cheques and made them disappear from the bank by sending same
to the other banks. By the time the cheques could return to the bank, enough time had elapsed.

9. Signature of the appellant no. 5 Smt. Neera Mehrotra have been proved by prosecution
witness 12- S. N. Kakkar. This was done under the criminal Conspiracy with the accused persons-
partners and Manager of the firms.
4 All. Ram Narain Mehrotra & Ors. Vs. State of U.P.
1063
10. After a detailed analysis of the entire prosecution material, the trial court held that the
appellants Nos.3 and 5 are guilty of entering into a criminal conspiracy for commission of offences
under Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and
convicted them for the offence. The accused persons- appellants No.3 and 5 have been sentenced to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year.

11. The learned counsel for the appellants has not assailed the correctness of the findings of
guilt and conviction recorded by the trial court and he has only submitted that appellant No.3 is
presently aged about 90 years and appellant No.5 is a woman aged about 88 years. Both appellants
have no previous criminal history.

12. The learned counsel for the appellants has further submitted that both the appellants are
suffering from old age ailments and it would not be justified to keep them incarcerated at this stage
of their life for an offence allegedly committed more than a half century ago. Therefore, they
should be granted the benefit under the Probation of Offenders Act.

13. Although the learned counsel for the respondent- CBI has advanced submissions in
opposition of the appeal and supporting the order of conviction, he did not oppose the Court taking
a lenient view, so far as sentencing is concerned, keeping in view the advanced age of the
appellants.

14. Before proceeding to decide the request for granting the benefit of the Probation of
Offenders Act, 1958, it would be appropriate to have a look at the relevant provisions of the
Probation Act, which are being reproduced below: -

 "4. Power of court to release certain offenders on probation of good conduct.-(1) When
any person is found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or
imprisonment for life and the court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, having
regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the
offender, it is expedient to release him on probation of good conduct, then, notwithstanding
anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the court may, instead of
sentencing him at once to any punishment, direct that he be released on his entering into a bond,
with or without sureties, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period, not
exceeding three years, as the court may direct, and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of
good behaviour:

 Provided that the court shall not direct such release of an offender unless it is satisfied
that the offender or his surety, if any, has a fixed place of abode or regular occupation in the place
over which the court exercises jurisdiction or in which the offender is likely to live during the
period for which he enters into the bond.

 (2) Before making any order under sub-section (1) is made, the court shall take into
consideration the report, if any, of the probation officer concerned in relation to the case.
1064 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
 (3) When an order under sub-section (1), the court may, if it is of opinion that in the
interests of the offender and of the public it is expedient so to do, in addition pass a supervision
order directing that the offender shall remain under the supervision of a probation officer named in
the order during such period, not being less than one year, as may be specified therein, and may in
such supervision order or impose such conditions as it deems necessary for the due supervision of
the offender.

 (4) The court making a supervision order under sub-section (3) shall require the
offender, before he is released, to enter into a bond, with or without sureties, to observe the
conditions specified in such order and such additional conditions with respect to residence,
abstention from intoxicants or any other matter as the court may, having regard to the particular
circumstances, consider fit to impose for preventing a repetition of the same offence or a
commission of other offences by the offender.
 (5) The court making a supervision order under sub-section (3) shall explain to the
offender the terms and conditions of the order and shall forthwith furnish one copy of the
supervision order to each of the offenders, the sureties, if any, and the probation officer concerned.

 11. Courts competent to make order under the Act, appeal and revision and powers of
courts in appeal and revision.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code or any other
law, an order under this Act may be made by any court empowered to try and sentence the offender
to imprisonment and also by the High Court or any other court when the case comes before it on
appeal or in revision.

 (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, where an order under Section 3 or
Section 4 is made by any court trying the offender (other than a High Court), an appeal shall lie to
the court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the sentences of the former court.

 (3) In any case where any person under twenty-one years of age is found guilty of having
committed an offence and the court by which he is found guilty declines to deal with him under
Section 3 or Section 4, and passes against him any sentence of imprisonment with or without fine
from which no appeal lies or is preferred, then, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code or
any other law, the court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the sentences of the former court may,
either of its own motion or on an application made to it by the convicted person or the probation
officer, call for the examine the record of the case and pass such order thereon as it thinks fit.

 (4) When an order has been made under Section 3 or Section 4 in respect of an offender,
the Appellate Court or the High Court in the exercise of its power of revision may set aside such
order and in lieu thereof pass sentence on such offender according to law:

 Provided that the Appellate Court or the High Court in revision shall not inflict a greater
punishment than might have been inflicted by the court by which the offender was found guilty.

* * *
4 All. Ram Narain Mehrotra & Ors. Vs. State of U.P.
1065
 18. Saving of operation of certain enactments.-Nothing in this Act shall affect the
provisions of Section 31 of the Reformatory Schools Act, 1897 (8 of 1897), or sub-section (2) of
Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (2 of 1947) 3[* * *] or of any law in force in
any State relating to juvenile offenders or borstal schools.

15. As per Section 18, the benefit of the Probation Act would not be available to a person
guilty of committing offences under Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. However,
the appellants have been convicted for the offence of criminal conspiracy for committing an
offence under Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947,
and they have not been held guilty of committing the substantive offences under Section 5(2) read
with Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The appellants are not public
servants and they could not be held guilty of the offences under Section 5(2) read with Section
5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. Therefore, I am of the view that the bar
contained in Section 18 of the Probation Act will not apply to the present case.

16. In Lakhvir Singh v. State of Punjab, (2021) 2 SCC 763, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
granted the benefit of the Probation Act to persons accused of offences under Section 307 IPC., on
the following considerations: -

 "17. The facts of the present case are that the appellants have not served out the
minimum sentence of 7 years though they have served about half the sentences. They were aged
under 19 and 21 years of age as on the date of offence but not on the date of sentence. The
redeeming feature in their case is that the person who suffered, appears to have forgiven them,
possibly with the passage of time. There is no adverse report against them about their conduct in
jail otherwise the same would have been brought to our notice by the learned counsel for the State.
Faced with the aforesaid legal position, this is a fit case that the benefit of probation can be
extended to the appellants under the said Act in view of the provisions of Section 4 of the said Act
on completion of half the sentence."

17. In Tarak Nath Keshari v. State of W.B.: (2024) 13 SCC 384, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court followed the decision in the case of Lakhvir Singh (supra) and granted benefit of the
Probation Act to the appellant, who was convicted of the offence punishable under Section 7 of the
Essential Commodities Act, which provides a minimum sentence for the offence, on consideration
of the facts that the offence was committed more than 37 years back and it was not pointed out at
the time of hearing that the appellant was involved in any other offence. Before all the courts
below, the appellant remained on bail. While entertaining his appeal, even this Court had granted
him exemption from surrendering.

18. In Sunita Devi v. State of Bihar: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 984, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court held that: -

 "28. Before passing the sentence on a convict, after rendering conviction, the Judge shall
consider the feasibility of proceeding in accordance with the provisions of Section 360 of the
CrPC, 1973 which speaks of releasing a convict on probation of good conduct or after admonition.
Being a beneficial provision dealing with a reformative aspect, it is the bounden duty of the Judge
1066 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
to consider the application of this provision before proceeding to hear the accused on sentence.
While doing so, the Judge has to hear the accused and the prosecution. Similarly, the Court has to
apply the salient provisions contained under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act,
1958 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1958"). If an offence is considered as an act against the
society, the resultant action cannot be retributive alone, as equal importance is required, if not
more, to be given to the reformative part. The ultimate goal is to bring the accused back on the
rails, to once again be a part of society. Any attempt to ignore either Section 360 of the CrPC,
1973 or the provisions as mandated in the Act, 1958 would make their purpose redundant. It
looks as if these laudable provisions have been lost sight of while rendering a sentence. The
ultimate objective is to prevent the commission of such offences in future. It can never be done
by a retributive measure alone, as a change of heart at the behest of the accused is the best way
to prevent an act of crime. Therefore, we have absolute clarity in our mind, that a trial court is
duty bound to comply with the mandate of Section 360 of the CrPC, 1973 read with Sections 3, 4
and 6 of the Act, 1958 before embarking into the question of sentence. In this connection, we may
note that sub-section (10) of Section 360 of the CrPC, 1973 makes a conscious effort to remind the
Judge of the rigour of the beneficial provisions contained in the Act, 1958.

 29. Hearing the accused on sentence is a valuable right conferred on the accused. The
real importance lies only with the sentence, as against the conviction. Unfortunately, we do not
have a clear policy or legislation when it comes to sentencing. Over the years, it has become judgecentric and there are admitted disparities in awarding a sentence.

 30. In a country like ours, sentencing accused persons pursuant to a conviction, on a
uniform pattern, would also be prejudicial. When it comes to sentencing, there are various factors
such as age, sex, education, home life, social background, emotional and mental conditions,
caste, religion and community that constitute aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

 31. There is a distinction between knowledge and character. Knowledge is acquired,
while character is formed. The formation of a person's character depends upon various factors.
More often than not, a convict does not have control over the formation of his character. This leads
to certain groups of people inheriting crime. In this connection, we can draw an analogy from
nature itself. Before falling on the ground, rainwater remains the same. It is the soil which changes
the character of the water. Rainwater partakes in the character of the soil, over which it does not
have any control. The issues are extremely complex.

 32. A decision of a Judge in sentencing, would vary from person to person. This will also
vary from stage to stage. It is controlled by the mind. The environment and the upbringing of a
Judge would become the ultimate arbiter in deciding the sentence. A Judge from an affluent
background might have a different mindset as against a Judge from a humble one. A female Judge
might look at it differently, when compared to her male counterpart. An Appellate Court might
tinker with the sentence due to its experience, and the external factors like institutional
constraints might come into play. Certainly, there is a crying need for a clear sentencing policy,
which should never be judge-centric as the society has to know the basis of a sentence.
4 All. Ram Narain Mehrotra & Ors. Vs. State of U.P.
1067
 33. Sentencing shall not be a mere lottery. It shall also not be an outcome of a knee-jerk
reaction. This is a very important part of the Fundamental Rights conferred under Articles 14 and
21 of the Constitution of India. Any unwarranted disparity would be against the very concept of a
fair trial and, therefore, against justice.

 34. Various elements such as deterrence, incapacitation and reformation should form
part of sentencing. There is a compelling need for a studied scrutiny of sentencing, to address in
particular the reformative aspect, while maintaining equality between different groups. Perhaps,
much study is also required on the occurence of repeat offences, which could be attributable to
certain groups. The nexus between particular types of offences and the offenders forming their own
groups has to be taken note of and addressed.

 35. The concept of intuitive sentencing is against the rule of law. A Judge can never have
unrestrictive and unbridled discretion, based upon his conscience formed through his
understanding of the society, without there being any guidelines in awarding a sentence. The need
for adequate guidelines for exercising sentencing discretion, avoiding unwanted disparity, is of
utmost importance."

19. In Chellammal v. State, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 870, it has been held that: -

 "28. Summing up the legal position, it can be said that while an offender cannot seek an
order for grant of probation as a matter of right but having noticed the object that the statutory
provisions seek to achieve by grant of probation and the several decisions of this Court on the
point of applicability of Section 4 of the Probation Act, we hold that, unless applicability is
excluded, in a case where the circumstances stated in sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the
Probation Act are attracted, the court has no discretion to omit from its consideration release of
the offender on probation; on the contrary, a mandatory duty is cast upon the court to consider
whether the case before it warrants releasing the offender upon fulfilment of the stated
circumstances. The question of grant of probation could be decided either way. In the event, the
court in its discretion decides to extend the benefit of probation, it may upon considering the report
of the probation officer impose such conditions as deemed just and proper. However, if the answer
be in the negative, it would only be just and proper for the court to record the reasons therefor.

 29. For the foregoing reasons and in the light of the factual matrix, we are unhesitatingly
of the opinion that the Sessions Judge and the High Court by omitting to consider whether the
appellants were entitled to the benefit of probation, occasioned a failure of justice. Consequently,
there was no worthy consideration as to whether the appellants could be extended the benefit of
probation."

20. In light of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgments noted
above, no purpose will be achieved by placing the appellant Nos.3 and 5 aged 90 years and 88
years respectively, under incarceration and recovery of fine at this stage after expiry of more than
half a century since commission of the offence. It will neither be reformative, nor preventive, nor
deterrent to place them in custody.
1068 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
21. Accordingly, the appeal is disposed off by upholding the conviction of the appellant
No. 3 and 5 and granting them the benefit of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. As a period of
almost four decades stands elapsed since the appellants were sentenced during which the appellants
have not said to have committed any other offence, there is no need to place them under probation
for any further period.
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(2026) 4 ILRA 1068
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 22.04.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.

Criminal Appeal No. 801 of 2012

Anant Ram & Anr. ...Appellant
Versus
State of U.P. ...Respondent

Issue for Consideration
Matter pertains to whether the conviction under Ss. 364, 307/34 and 323/34 IPC could be sustained when the
Trial Court proceeded on the basis that the accused was required to prove his innocence, discarded defence
evidence on conjectures, and whether the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt the intention to
kill so as to attract Ss. 364 and 307 IPC.

Headnotes
Criminal Law - Appreciation of Evidence - Burden of Proof - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Ss. 364,
307/34 and 323/34 - Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 - Prosecution required to prove guilt
beyond reasonable doubt and accused required only to create a doubt about the prosecution
case and the probability of its defence - Trial Court acted under an impression that it is the
accused who is required to prove his innocence rather than the prosecution being required to
prove the guilt of the accused and convicted on the basis that preponderance of probabilities
tilted against the accused - Such approach held unsustainable. (Paras 24-28)
Criminal Law - Defence Evidence - Appreciation of Defence Witnesses - Indian Penal Code, 1860
- Ss. 364, 307/34 and 323/34 - Statements of defence witnesses regarding presence of accused
at workplace discarded on conjecture that employees tend to save co-employees - Trial Court
found no discrepancy in their statements and cross-examination - Conviction cannot be based on
conjectures - Rejection of defence evidence held manifestly erroneous. (Paras 22, 25, 26)
Criminal Law - Appreciation of Evidence - Non-examination of Material Witnesses - Indian Penal
Code, 1860 - Ss. 364, 307/34 and 323/34 - Informant stated that named witnesses had seen the
victim being taken away and had participated in search of victim - Such witnesses not examined
and no witness involved in search examined - Serious doubt raised against prosecution case.
(Paras 29, 30)
Criminal Law - Medical Evidence vis-a-vis Ocular Testimony - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Ss. 364,
307/34 and 323/34 - Victim stated that he had fallen unconscious and regained consciousness in
hospital - Medical records and doctor did not support such version - Trial Court supplied a
creative explanation and altered the meaning of testimony to sustain conviction - Liability of
guilt fastened on conjectures and surmises held impermissible under law. (Para 31)