# Ram Nivas v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2019) 4 ILRA 773
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2019-09-27
- **Bench:** Pankaj Mithal, Saral Srivastava
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ram-nivas-v-state-of-u-p-ors-44948
- **Pages:** 16

## Headnote

A. Civil Law - Land Acquisition Act, 1894 -
Section 6(1) - Proviso (1) - Explanation 1
- Limitation - It is mandatory to make a
declaration under Section 6 of the Act
within one year from such notification -
In computing the aforesaid period of one
year the period during which any action
or proceedings remained stayed by the
order of the court shall stand excluded in
view of Explanation 1 to proviso of
Section 6(1). (Para 13 & 19)

Held - In view of above legal position and the
mandatory
requirement
of
issuing
a
declaration within a year from the date of
publication of notification under Section 4 of
the Act excluding period of stay, the impugned
declaration made under Section 6 of the Act
on 11.05.2012 is patently beyond time and is
not only illegal but a nullity.

B. Civil Law - Land Acquisition Act, 1894
- Proviso (ii) of Section 6 - Computation
of limitation - Effect of Court‟s order to
the period of limitation - Argument that
in a situation, where there is direction
from the court to act upon pursuant to
the notification issued under Section 4 of
the Act and to complete the exercise of
making the declaration within the time
permitted, the limitation provided stands
circumscribed or automatically extended
- Held - The decision of Supreme Court
was rendered on the basis of the
concession or the consent of the parties
774 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
and was not a decision on merits. The
court in passing the said order had not
adjudicated the point of limitation -
Pooran Mal‟s case is distinguishable as it
does not lay down a binding precedent.
(Para 42, 43, 52 & 58)

C. Interpretation of statute - Legal
maxim - Expressio unius est exclusio
alterius - It means that if a statute
provides for a thing to be done in a
particular manner, then it has to be done
in that manner alone and that no other
manner is open and permissible in law.
(Para 30)

Held - In view of the above well acknowledged
legal principle since proviso(ii) to Section 6 of
the Act mandates for issuing of the declaration
within a year from the date of notification
under Section 4 of the Act, the declaration has
to be made within the said period and not
otherwise.

D. Civil Law - Land Acquisition Act, 1894 -
Section 5A - Competency of Special Land
Acquisition Officer to decide the objection
- Under the provision, objection is to be
decided by the „Collector‟ - S.L.A.O. is not
the Collector or the person in-charge of
the revenue- administration. He is not
even an Additional Collector. He is simply
an Assistant Collector of the First Class.
He cannot discharge the functions of the
Collector either under the Code or under
any other Act - SLAO has no authority or
jurisdiction to discharge the functions of
the Collector as envisaged under Section
5A of the Act. (Para 76 & 77)

E. Civil Law - U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 -
Section 4(8) and 12 - Definition of
Collector - Section 4(8) of the Code
defines 'Collector' to be an Officer
appointed by the State Government
under Section 12 and to include an
Additional
Collector
and
Assistant
Collector of the First Class empowered
by the State Government by notification
to discharge all or any of the functions of
a Collector under the Code - Assistant
Collector however is not entitled to
discharge any other functions of the
Collector other than those under the Code
such as those conferred upon the Collector
under the other Acts. (Para 71 & 74)

Writ Petition allowed. (E-1)

List of cases cited: -

## Text

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4 All. Ram Nivas Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
773
benefit of possession of land in dispute
and enjoyed the same without spending
even a single penny towards rent,
damages, compensation etc. for such
enjoyment. Land in question is required
for developmental activities in furtherance
of developing Prayagraj City as "Smart
City". Developmental activities required
an early action, but, by indulging in
litigation,
petitioners
have
already
delayed it sufficiently, therefore, even if
what petitioners' claim that they should
have been given notice or sufficient time
to vacate, the same has already been
achieved as petitioners had already
enough time with them. It is, thus, a fit
case where we do not find that any other
technicality
should
be
allowed
to
intervene and, earliest is the better that
possession of land is transferred to
respondents
so
that
developmental
activities may proceed without any further
delay.

189. However, considering the facts
and circumstances and also the fact that
petitioner has already enjoyed interim
order passed by this Court and continued
in possession over land in dispute for the
last almost more than a year, we direct the
petitioner to vacate disputed land within
one month from the date of delivery of
judgment.

190. In view of above discussion,
we do not find any merit in the petition.
Subject to observations about vacation of
land in dispute, the writ petition is
dismissed.

191. No costs.
----------
(2019)12 ILR A773

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 27.09.2019
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE PANKAJ MITHAL, J.
THE HON'BLE SARAL SRIVASTAVA, J.

Writ C No: 68915 of 2014

Ram Nivas ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Rahul Agarwal

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri M.C. Chaturvedi

A. Civil Law - Land Acquisition Act, 1894 -
Section 6(1) - Proviso (1) - Explanation 1
- Limitation - It is mandatory to make a
declaration under Section 6 of the Act
within one year from such notification -
In computing the aforesaid period of one
year the period during which any action
or proceedings remained stayed by the
order of the court shall stand excluded in
view of Explanation 1 to proviso of
Section 6(1). (Para 13 & 19)

Held - In view of above legal position and the
mandatory
requirement
of
issuing
a
declaration within a year from the date of
publication of notification under Section 4 of
the Act excluding period of stay, the impugned
declaration made under Section 6 of the Act
on 11.05.2012 is patently beyond time and is
not only illegal but a nullity.

B. Civil Law - Land Acquisition Act, 1894
- Proviso (ii) of Section 6 - Computation
of limitation - Effect of Court‟s order to
the period of limitation - Argument that
in a situation, where there is direction
from the court to act upon pursuant to
the notification issued under Section 4 of
the Act and to complete the exercise of
making the declaration within the time
permitted, the limitation provided stands
circumscribed or automatically extended
- Held - The decision of Supreme Court
was rendered on the basis of the
concession or the consent of the parties
774 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
and was not a decision on merits. The
court in passing the said order had not
adjudicated the point of limitation -
Pooran Mal‟s case is distinguishable as it
does not lay down a binding precedent.
(Para 42, 43, 52 & 58)

C. Interpretation of statute - Legal
maxim - Expressio unius est exclusio
alterius - It means that if a statute
provides for a thing to be done in a
particular manner, then it has to be done
in that manner alone and that no other
manner is open and permissible in law.
(Para 30)

Held - In view of the above well acknowledged
legal principle since proviso(ii) to Section 6 of
the Act mandates for issuing of the declaration
within a year from the date of notification
under Section 4 of the Act, the declaration has
to be made within the said period and not
otherwise.

D. Civil Law - Land Acquisition Act, 1894 -
Section 5A - Competency of Special Land
Acquisition Officer to decide the objection
- Under the provision, objection is to be
decided by the „Collector‟ - S.L.A.O. is not
the Collector or the person in-charge of
the revenue- administration. He is not
even an Additional Collector. He is simply
an Assistant Collector of the First Class.
He cannot discharge the functions of the
Collector either under the Code or under
any other Act - SLAO has no authority or
jurisdiction to discharge the functions of
the Collector as envisaged under Section
5A of the Act. (Para 76 & 77)

E. Civil Law - U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 -
Section 4(8) and 12 - Definition of
Collector - Section 4(8) of the Code
defines 'Collector' to be an Officer
appointed by the State Government
under Section 12 and to include an
Additional
Collector
and
Assistant
Collector of the First Class empowered
by the State Government by notification
to discharge all or any of the functions of
a Collector under the Code - Assistant
Collector however is not entitled to
discharge any other functions of the
Collector other than those under the Code
such as those conferred upon the Collector
under the other Acts. (Para 71 & 74)

Writ Petition allowed. (E-1)

List of cases cited: -

1. Deep Chand Vs. State of Rajasthan AIR
1961 S.C. 1527

2. Padmasundara Rao (Dead) Vs. State of
Tamil Nadu & others (2002) 3 SCC 533

3. Ashok Kumar & others Vs. State of Haryana
and another (2007) 3 SCC 470

4. Mahavir Sahkari Awas Samiti Ltd. Vs. State
of U.P. and another (2007) 2 AWC 1162 (DB)

5. Vijay Narayan Thatte & others Vs. State of
Maharastra & others (2009) SCC 92

6. Oxford English School Vs. Government of
Tamil Nadu & others (1995) (5) SCC 206

7. State of Punjab and another Vs. Rajesh Syal
(2002) 8 SCC 158

8. Anil Kumar Gupta Vs. State of Bihar &
others (2012) 12 SCC 443

9. Mishra Sugandhi Karyalaya Vs. State of U.P.
and others 2011 (40) VST 364 (All).

10
M/s
S.K.
Traders
Vs.
Additional
Commissioner of Trade Tax, Ghaziabad and
another 2007 NTN (34) 345

11. Director of Inspection of Income Tax
(Investigation) New Delhi and another Vs.
Pooran Mal and sons AIR (1975) (4) SC 67

(Delivered by Hon'ble Pankaj Mithal, J.
Hon'ble Saral Srivastava, J.)

1. The petitioner has invoked the
writ jurisdiction of this Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India
questioning the validity of the declaration
dated 11.5.2012 issued under Section 6 of
4 All. Ram Nivas Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
775
the
Land
Acquisition
Act,
1894
(hereinafter referred to as "the Act") in
respect of the land of various villages in
district Agra notified for acquisition under
Section 4 of the Act on 3.10.2005 lastly
published on 28.11.2005 for the benefit of
the Agra Development Authority.

2. The petitioner apart from seeking
quashing of the aforesaid declaration has
also made a prayer for the quashing of the
entire acquisition proceedings pursuant to
the notifications dated 3.10.2005 and
11.05.2012 issued under Sections 4 and 6
of the Act respectively.

3. The primary ground for attacking
the declaration made under Section 6 of
the Act is that it is beyond time of one
year from the date of publication of the
notification under Section 4 of the Act as
provided under proviso (ii) to Section 6(1)
of the Act; and that the objections filed by
the petitioner under Section 5-A of the
Act were not decided by the Collector
who is the competent authority but by the
Special Land Acquisition Officer who
was not notified for the purposes of
dealing with the said objections and that
no personal hearing was given to the
petitioner while dealing with the said
objections
and
thereafter
making
recommendation to the State Government.

4. First, the facts in brief for the
better and complete appreciation of
controversy vis-a-vis the legal position
involved and the reasoning for its
resolution.

5. On the proposal of the Collector,
Agra dated 21.12.2004 proceedings were
initiated for the acquisition of the land for
the Taj Nagar Housing Scheme Phase-III
promoted by the Agra Development
Authority. A notification under Section
4(1) read with Section 17(4) of the Act
was issued on 3.10.2005 dispensing with
the enquiry under Section 5A of the Act.
Apart from the Gazette and news-papers it
was last published on 28.11.2005 in the
locality.

6. The said notification was
challenged by many tenure holders by
filing separate writ petitions. The main
one was by Kashma Sahkari Avas Samiti
Ltd. i.e. Writ Petition No.72063 of 2005.
The High Court vide interim order dated
23.11.2005 directed the authorities to
maintain status quo till 28.11.2005.
Thereafter on 12.12.2005 the parties were
directed to maintain status quo until
further orders and they were directed to
exchange the pleadings. The said writ
petition and several other writ petitions
connected with the same were decided
vide judgment and order dated 25.8.2006.
The writ petitions were allowed and the
application of the provision of Section
17(1) and (4) of the Act was held to be
invalid and the liberty was given to the
respondents
to
proceed
with
the
acquisition afresh in accordance with law
from the stage of issuance and publication
of the notification under Section 4 of the
Act by affording opportunity to the
petitioners or to the tenure holders to file
objections under Section 5A of the Act
and thereafter, if necessary, to issue a
declaration under Section 6 of the Act.

7. The State of U.P. as well as the
Agra Development Authority aggrieved
by the aforesaid judgment and order dated
25.8.2006 preferred three special leave
petitions i.e. Special Leave Petition
(Civil) No.19602 of 2006 (State of U.P.
Vs. Kshama Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd. and
others); Special Leave Petition (Civil)
776 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
No.20149 of 2006 (Agra Development
Authority Vs. Kshama Sahkari Avas
Samiti Ltd.) and Special Leave Petition
(Civil)
No.20489
of
2006
(Agra
Development Authority Vs. Sahab Singh).
All the three special leave petitions were
taken up together on 8.12.2006 and apart
from issuing notice to the contesting
parties, a direction was issued to maintain
status quo. These special leave petitions
were finally decided by the Supreme
Court vide its judgment and order dated
13.5.2011 and the State/authorities were
directed
to
publish
notice
inviting
objections under Section 5A of the Act to
be filed within two months and to be
dispose them of in accordance with law
within three months thereafter.

8. Consequent to the above decision
of the Supreme Court, notice inviting
objections was published on 11.6.2011 in
the news-papers pursuant to which a total
213 objections were filed in relation to the
land of eight villages notified for
acquisition. The objections were rejected
by eight separate orders all dated
3.11.2011 passed by the Special Land
Acquisition Officer. Thereafter on report
being submitted to the State Government,
the impugned declaration dated 11.5.12
was issued under Section 6 of the Act.

9. It is in this background that the
petitioner alleges that the declaration issued
under Section 6 of the Act is bad in law as it is
not within time of one year as stipulated vide
proviso (ii) to Section 6(1) of the Act and that
the Special Land Acquisition Officer was not
competent to consider and decide the
objections of the petitioner filed under Section
5A of the Act.

10. We had heard Sri Rahul
Agarwal,
learned
counsel
for
the
petitioner and Sri M.C. Chaturvedi,
Additional Advocate General representing
the State Authorities and also the Agra
Development
Authority.
They
had
consented for the final disposal of the writ
petition on the basis of the pleadings on
record.

11. Before adverting to the legal
aspects
it
would
be
important
to
recapitulate the relevant dates in a tabular
form which would be convenient for
dealing with the first issue regarding the
limitation of issuing declaration under
Section 6 of the Act:

S.No.
Particulars
Date
1.
Date of Notification
under Section 4
03.10.2005
2.
Last
date
of
the
publication
of
the
aforesaid notification.
28.11.2005
3.
Interim order in the
writ petition of Kshama
Sahkari Avas Samiti
Ltd.
23.11.2005
4.
Date of expiry of the
above interim order
28.11.2005
5.
Date of further stay
order in the above writ
petition
12.12.2005
6.
Writ
petition
of
Kshama Sahkari Avas
Samiti Ltd. allowed.
25.08.2006
7.
Date of interim order
passed by the Supreme
Court
in
the
three
special leave petitions.
08.12.2006
8.
Special leave petitions
finally decided
13.05.2011
9.
Declaration
under
Section 6 of the Act
11.05.2012

12. In order to examine the issue of
limitation of declaration under Section 6
of the Act, it would be profitable to quote
the relevant provisions of Sections 4 and
6 of the Act:
4 All. Ram Nivas Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
777

"4. Publication of preliminary
notification
and
power
of
officers
thereupon. - (1) Whenever it appears to
the appropriate Government or Collector
that land in any locality is needed or is
likely to be needed for any public purpose
or for a company, a notification to that
effect shall be published in the Official
Gazette and in two daily newspapers
circulating in that locality of which at
least one shall be in the regional
language, and the Collector shall cause
public notice of the substance of such
notification to be given at convenient
places in the said locality (the last of the
dates of such publication and the giving
of such public notice, being hereinafter
referred to as the date of the publication
of the notification).

(2) ...................."

"6. Declaration that land is
required for a public purpose. - (1)
Subject to the provision of Part VII of this
Act, when the appropriate Government is
satisfied, after considering the report, if
any, made under section 5A, sub-section
(2), that any particular land is needed for
a public purpose, or for a Company, a
declaration shall be made to that effect
under the signature of a Secretary to such
Government or of some officer duly
authorized to certify its orders and
different declarations may be made from
time to time in respect of different parcels
of any land covered by the same
notification under section 4, sub-section
(1) irrespective of whether one report or
different reports has or have been made
(wherever required) under section 5A,
sub-section (2):

 Provided that no declaration in
respect of any particular land covered by
a notification under section 4, sub-section
(1)-

(i)
published
after
the
commencement of the Land Acquisition
(Amendment and Validation) Ordinance,
1967 (1 of 1967), but before the
commencement of the Land Acquisition
(Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made
after the expiry of three years from the
date of the publication of the notification;
or

(ii)
published
after
the
commencement of the Land Acquisition
(Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made
after the expiry of one year from the date
of the publication of the notification:

Provided further in computing
the period of three years referred to in the
preceding proviso, the time during which
the State Government was prevented by or
in consequence of any order of any Court
from making such declaration shall be
excluded.

Provided further that no such
declaration shall be made unless the
compensation to be awarded for such
property is to be paid by a Company, or
wholly or partly out of public revenues or
some fund controlled or managed by a
local authority.

Explanation 1. - In computing
any of the periods referred to in the first
proviso, the period during which any
action or proceeding to be taken in
pursuance of the notification issued under
section 4, sub-section (1), is stayed by an
order of a Court shall be excluded.

Explanation 2. - Where the
compensation to be awarded for such
property is to be paid out of the funds of a
corporation owned or controlled by the
State, such compensation shall be deemed
to be compensation paid out of public
revenues.

(2) Every declaration shall be
published in the Official Gazette, and in
two daily newspapers circulating in the
778 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
locality in which the land is situated of
which at least one shall be in the regional
language, and the Collector shall cause
public notice of the substance of such
declaration to be given at convenient
places in the said locality (the last of the
dates of such publication and the giving
of such public notice, being hereinafter
referred to as the date of the publication
of the declaration), and such declaration
shall state the district or other territorial
division in which the land is situate, the
purpose for which It is needed, its
approximate area, and, where a plan
shall have been made of the land, the
place where such plan may be inspected.

(3) The said declaration shall be
conclusive evidence that the land is
needed for a public purpose or for a
company, as the case may be; and, after
making such declaration, the appropriate
Government may acquire the land in
manner hereinafter appearing."

13. The provisions as quoted above
clearly reflects that the last date of
publication of the notification under
Section 4 of the Act is referred to as the
date of the notification and that it is
mandatory to make a declaration under
Section 6 of the Act within one year from
such notification. In computing the
aforesaid period of one year the period
during which any action or proceedings
remained stayed by the order of the court
shall stand excluded.

14. In the instant case the date of the
notification under Section 4 of the Act is
03.10.2005 but as it was last published on
28.11.2005 the said date i.e. 28.11.2005
shall be the date of the publication of the
notification. Thus a declaration under
Section 6 of the Act in ordinary course
was supposed to be made on or before
28.11.2006. However as there were
interim orders affecting the proceedings
in pursuance to the notification under
Section 4 of the Act, the periods of the
said stay orders are liable to be excluded
and the limitation for making the
declaration would stand extended by such
excluded periods.

15. A perusal of the chart of dates
would indicate that the limitation for
issuing declaration under Section 6 of the
Act commenced on 28.11.2005, the date
on which the notification under Section 4
of the Act was last published. The interim
order in the writ petition of Kshama
Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd. remained in
operation from 23.11.2005 till 28.11.2005
and then from 12.12.2005 till 25.8.2006.
Thus, there was no interim order between
29.11.2005 and 11.12.2005.

16. The Supreme Court passed
interim
order
on
8.12.2006
which
remained in operation till 13.5.2011.
Thus, there was no interim order from the
date of the judgment of the High Court ie.
25.08.2006 till the grant interim order by
the Supreme Court on 8.12.2006. Again
there was no interim stay order from the
date of dismissal of SLPs by the Supreme
Court ie. from 13.05.2011 till the date of
declaration ie. 11.05.2012.

17. In other words, there was no stay
order operating during the following
periods:-

(i) 28.11.2005 to 11.12.2005

(ii) 26.08.2006 to 07.12.2006

(iii) 14.05.2011 to 10.05.2012

The stay was operative only
during the following periods:-

(i) 12.12.05 to 25.08.2006

(ii) 08.12.06 to 13.05.2011
4 All. Ram Nivas Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
779
18. It may be worth noting that there
is no other date except 11.05.2012 on
record
of
the
publication
of
the
declaration under Section 6 of the Act.
Therefore, 11.05.2012 is taken as the last
date of its publication and thus the date of
the said declaration.

19. In view of the explanation 1 to
proviso to Section 6(1) of the Act in
computing the period of one year for
issuing declaration under Section 6 of the
Act from the date of last publication of
notification under Section 4 of the Act,
the period during which the interim order
had remained in operation is liable to be
excluded.

20. Accordingly, the periods of stay
from
12.12.2005
to
25.8.2006;
and
8.12.2006 to 13.5.2011 are liable to be
excluded in computing the period of one
year which commenced on 28.11.05. To put
it differently, the period of limitation of one
year which commenced on 28.11.2005 was
interrupted by the above periods during
which the stay remained in operation but as
there was no interim orders between
28.11.2005 to 12.12.2005 and 25.8.2006 to
8.12.2006 the period of limitation continued
to run in these two periods.

21. It is in view of the above factual
background, we have to examine whether
the declaration made under Section 6 of
the Act on 11.5.2012 is within time of one
year from the date of last publication of
notification under Section 4 of the Act i.e.
28.11.2005 excluding the period in which
interim orders remained operative and
whether in view of the direction of the
Supreme Court contained in its judgment
and order dated 13.5.2011 permitting the
State authorities to publish notice inviting
objections and to decide the objections in
accordance with law within the time fixed
by it would override the statutory
limitation or extend the same, making the
declaration to be a valid one.

22. The date of the notification
under Section 4 of the Act is 28.11.2005
and that of the declaration under Section 6
of the Act is 11.05.2012. Now, let us
examine if the said declaration is within
time of one year from the date of the
notification under Section 4 of the Act
excluding the period during which stay
orders have remained operative.

23. The period of one year referred
to in the proviso (ii) to Section 6(i) of the
Act means a year of 365 days according
to the British Calendar. Section 3(6) of
the General Clauses Act, 1897 also
defines "a year" to mean a year according
to the British Calendar.

24. The Ninth Edition of the Black's
Law Dictionary defines a year to be a
period of 12 calendar months beginning
from January 1 and ending on 31st
December. In other words, a consecutive
period of 365 days beginning from any
point is reckoned as a year as per the
British Calendar.

25. In view of above, the primary issue
is whether the declaration under Section 6 of
the Act in the instant case has been made
within a period of 365 consecutive days
commencing from 28.11.2005 excluding the
period of the stay orders.

26. The limitation of the above one
year
or
365
days
commenced
on
28.11.2005. It started running as under:-

1. November-2005 (29 - 30
Nov.)

2 days
780 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

2. December-2005 (1 - 11 Dec.)

11 days

Note:-
Interrupted
from
12.12.05 to 25.08.06 due to the stay order
of High Court.

1. August-2006 (26 - 31 Aug.)

6 days

2. September-2006

30 days

3. October-2006

31 days

4. November-2006

30 days

5. December-2006

7 days

Note:-
Interrupted
from
08.12.06 to 13.05.2011 due to the stay
order of Supreme Court.

1. May-2011 (14 - 31 May)

18 days

2. June-2011

30 days

3. July-2011

31 days

4. August-2011

31 days

5. September-2011

30 days

6. October-2011

31 days

9. November-2011

30 days

10. December-2011

31 days

11. January-2011

16 days

---------
---------------

Total of 1 to 11

365 days

---------
---------------

Note:-A total of 365 days from
28.11.05
excluding
period
of
stay.
Therefore, Limitation of one year expires
on this day.

12. January-2012

15 days

13. February-2012

28 days

14. March-2012

31 days

15. April-2012

30 days

16. May-2012

10 days (up date of decl-

-aration
i.e.11.05.2012

---------
-----------

Total of 12 to 16

114 days

---------
------------

Note:- A total of (365+114) 479
days from 28.11.05 excluding periods of
stay. Therefore, the declaration is beyond
time of one year by 114 days from
28.11.05 till the date of declaration on
11.05.12

27. It is pertinent to mention that the
Supreme Court in the case of R. Indira
Saratchandra Vs. State of Tamil Nadu
(2011) 10 SCC 344 has held that once a
stay order passed by the court is vacated,
it comes to an end and the clog put on the
running of the limitation gets removed.

28. The above computation of the
limitation would show that on the date of
the declaration made under Section 6 of
the Act a period of 479 days have lapsed
from the date of notification under
Section 4 of the Act excluding the periods
during which the stay orders of the High
Court and the Supreme Court have
remained in operation. The period of one
year 28.11.2005 expired on 16.01.2012.
4 All. Ram Nivas Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
781
Thus, making the declaration dated
11.05.2012 beyond limitation of one year
by 114 days.

29. Thus the declaration made under
Section 6 of the Act is on the face of it
beyond one year and is barred by
statutory limitation.

30. Legal maxim---Expressio unius
est exclusio alterius- means that if a
statute provides for a thing to be done in a
particular manner, then it has to be done
in that manner alone and that no other
manner is open and permissible in law.

31. The above maxim has been
consistently followed by the Supreme
Court right from 1961 in the case of Deep
Chand Vs. State of Rajasthan AIR 1961
S.C. 1527 till date.

32. In view of the above well
acknowledged legal principle since proviso(ii)
to Section 6 of the Act mandates for issuing of
the declaration within a year from the date of
notification under Section 4 of the Act, the
declaration has to be made within the said
period and not otherwise.

33. In Padmasundara Rao (Dead)
Vs. State of Tamil Nadu & others
(2002) 3 SCC 533, the Five Judges of the
Supreme Court in reference to the period
of limitation regarding declaration under
Section 6 of the Act observed that
language of Section 6(1) is plain and
unambiguous. There is no scope for
reading
something
into
it.
If
the
legislature has specifically provided for
the period of limitation and to exclude
periods covered by the stay orders, it
clearly means that no other period is
intended to be excluded and that there is
no scope for providing any other period of
limitation other than which is prescribed
under the Act.

34. In Ashok Kumar & others Vs.
State of Haryana and another (2007) 3
SCC 470 the Apex Court held that the
limitation provided in proviso (ii) appended to
Section 6(1) of the Act is mandatory in nature.
Any declaration made after the expiry of one
year from the date of the notification issued
under Section 4 of the Act would be void and
will have no effect.

35. A Division Bench of this court in
Mahavir Sahkari Awas Samiti Ltd. Vs.
State of U.P. and another (2007) 2 AWC
1162 (DB) of which one of us (P. Mithal J.)
was the member in context to the validity of a
declaration made under Section 6 of the Act
on the ground of its limitation held that the
court had no competence to extend the period
of limitation and that direction of the court to
deal with the mater in accordance with law
does not extend the statutory limitation.
Therefore, a declaration or a fresh declaration
under Section 6 of the Act could not have
been made after the expiry of one year
excluding period of stay, from the date of
issuance of the publication of the notification
under Section 4 of the Act.

36. In Vijay Narayan Thatte &
others Vs. State of Maharastra &
others (2009) SCC 92 again in reference
to a declaration under Section 6 of the Act
it was held since the statute is very clear,
the period of limitation provided in
proviso (ii) to Section 6 of the Act has to
be followed and even the concession of
the counsel cannot obliterate the same as
it is mandatory in nature and must operate
with its full rigour.

37. In Oxford English School Vs.
Government of Tamil Nadu & others
782 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
(1995) (5) SCC 206 it has been laid down
that the High Court could not have given
any direction permitting issuance of the
declaration under Section 6 of the Act
from the date of its judgement if
otherwise the limitation is over.

38. In the State of Punjab and
another Vs. Rajesh Syal (2002) 8 SCC
158 the Supreme Court observed that it
has ample jurisdiction to pass orders
under Article 142 (1) of the Constitution
of India that may be necessary for doing
complete justice in any case but even in
exercise of that power it is more than
doubtful, if it can pass order contrary to
law. Thus, it was held that court can not
extend the period of limitation.

39. Thus, even the Supreme Court in
exercise of its jurisdiction under Article
142 of the Constitution of India would not
ordinarily grant a relief that would be in
violation of statutory provision or to do an
act which may be contrary to the express
provisions of Law.

40. In Anil Kumar Gupta Vs. State
of Bihar & others (2012) 12 SCC 443
the court opined that a declaration issued
under Section 6 of the Act after the expiry
of one year from the date of notification
under Section 4 of the Act, is a nullity.

41. In view of above legal position and
the mandatory requirement of issuing a
declaration within a year from the date of
publication of notification under Section 4 of
the Act excluding period of stay, the
impugned declaration made under Section 6
of the Act on 11.05.2012 is patently beyond
time and is not only illegal but a nullity.

42. This takes us to the second limb
of the arguments of Sri M.C. Chaturvedi,
Additional Advocate General that the
limitation provided proviso (ii) to Section
6 of the Act has no applicability where
there is direction from the court to act
upon pursuant to the notification issued
under Section 4 of the Act and to
complete the exercise of making the
declaration within the time permitted. In
such a situation the limitation provided
stands circumscribed or automatically
extended.

43. First of all the above argument is
based upon complete misreading of the
directions of the Supreme Court dated
13.05.2011 issued while deciding the
three special leave petitions in the matter
of Kshama Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd.

44. The relevant part of the aforesaid
order of the Supreme Court reads as
under:-

"Accordingly, we dispose of the
two Special Leave Petitions by directing
the Land Acquisition Authorities to
publish Notice inviting objections under
Section 5 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 in 'Amar Ujala' and 'Dainik Jagran',
both local daily newspapers, and the said
Notice shall indicate that objections could
be filed within two months from the date
of publication and upon receipt of such
objections,
if
any,
the
concerned
authorities shall dispose of the same in
accordance with law within three months
thereafter.

The interim orders passed in
SLP (C) No.19602 of 2006 are vacated.

Consequently,
SLP
(C)
No.20489 of 2006, filed by the Agra
Development Authority against the same
judgment of the Division Bench of the
High Court, as impugned in the other
4 All. Ram Nivas Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
783
Special Leave Petitions is also disposed of
in the above terms."

45. A plain reading of the above
directions would reveal that the Apex
Court had not granted any liberty to the
respondents to publish a declaration under
Section 6 of the Act even if the time for
making it had expired.

46. In fact the court had not dealt
with the period of limitation for making
the declaration under Section 6 of the Act.
It only permitted the respondents to invite
objections under Section 5A of the Act by
publication of notice in the newspapers
and had prescribed time limit for filing
objections and for its disposal that too in
accordance with law.

47. In accordance with law means
within the time provided under the Act
itself and not otherwise.

48. In view of above, it cannot be
said
that
the
Supreme
Court
has
consciously
waived
the
period
of
limitation
provided
for
making
declaration under Section 6 of the Act or
has extended the same or has otherwise
permitted the respondents to make it even
if the limitation has expired.

49. This apart the period of
limitation provided under the statute
cannot be extended and it is not open for
the court to confer jurisdiction upon any
authority which it had ceased to exercise.
In this regard a reference may be had to
Oxford English School (Supra) and
Mahavir Sahkari Awas Samiti Ltd.
(Supra).

50. Even though no contrary
decision has been cited to dislodge the
principle that the statutory period of doing
a thing can be extended or ignored may be
due to the directions of the court, we have
ourselves laboured hard and have come
across few decisions not in context with
the acquisition of the land but in reference
to tax proceedings wherein a different
view appears to have been expressed.
Therefore, we consider it appropriate to
deal with those decisions also before
expressing our final opinion upon the
validity of the impugned declaration.

51. The convssing that where
proceedings were taken pursuant to the
directions of the court to pass a fresh
order, the statutory limitation provided
would not be a bar can be supported by a
decision in Mishra Sugandhi Karyalaya
Vs. State of U.P. and others 2011 (40)
VST 364 (All). In the said case the order
of assessment pursuant to notice under
Section 21(2) of the U.P. Trade Tax Act,
1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Trade
Tax Act) was the subject matter of
challenge
on
the
ground
that
the
submissions made by the petitioners were
not considered at all. Learned Standing
Counsel conceded and requested that the
matter be remanded with the direction to
pass a fresh order. Accordingly, the order
impugned therein was set aside and the
matter was remanded to pass a fresh order
and it was observed that in view of the
decision in M/s S.K. Traders Vs.
Additional Commissioner of Trade
Tax, Ghaziabad and another 2007 NTN
(34) 345 the limitation would not be a
hindrance.

52. Thus, the aforesaid decision was
rendered on the basis of the concession or
the consent of the parties and was not a
decision on merits. The court in passing
the said order had not adjudicating point
784 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
of limitation but simply applying the ratio
of S.K. Traders (Supra) observed that
the limitation would not come in way of
passing a fresh assessment order.

53. In the case of S.K. Traders
(Supra) the court held that where
proceedings have been set aside by the
High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India the period of
limitation shall not apply in initiating
proceedings thereafter.

54. A reading of the above decision
would reveal that it was rendered
primarily based upon the decision of the
Supreme Court in Director of Inspection
of Income Tax (Investigation) New
Delhi and another Vs. Pooran Mal and
sons AIR (1975) (4) SC 67 which had
laid down that once an order had been
passed within the period of limitation, the
subsequent order made in pursuance to
the order or remand or direction of the
High Court would not be barred by
limitation and can be made at any time.

55. In Pooran Mal's case (Supra)
the controversy was with regard to the
period of time under Section 132(5) of the
Income Tax Act, 1961. The earlier order
was quashed by the High Court with
liberty to the department to look into the
matter afresh. The said order was passed
with the consent of the parties. On the
fresh order being passed, a question of
limitation arose. The Supreme Court
upheld the order as it was passed in
pursuance of the agreement of the parties
and held that the period limitation
mentioned in Section 132(5) of the
Income Tax Act stood waived as the
parties have agreed for an order and are
not entitle to take the plea of limitation on
the principle of estoppal.

56. The very fact that the order
permitting passing of a fresh order was
based upon the consent of the parties and
was with their agreement, the decision of
Pooran Mal's case does not be lay down
a
binding
precedent.
Moreover,
particularly as the principle of waiver and
estoppal was applied therein which are
not attracted in the case at hand, the above
decision is of no relevance in the present
context.

57. It is settled law that the court
should not place reliance a decision
without discussing the factual situation
and comparing the same with the fact
situation of the case at hand as there is
always a peril in treating the words of a
speech or judgement as though they are
words in a legislative enactment. A
decision is only an authority for what is
actually decided. The essence of the
decision is its ratio and not every
observation or what logically follows
from those.

58. The aforesaid decision was
considered in extenso by the Five Judges
Bench
of
the
Supreme
Court
in
Padmasundara Rao's case and the same
was not applied as it was based on the
principle of waiver and estoppal.

59. It would be very fruitful to
reproduce the observation of the Supreme
Court in the case of Padmasundara Rao
distinguishing the above decision of
Pooran Mal's case.

Padmasundara Rao case:-

"Learned
counsel
for
the
respondents
referred
to
some
observations in Pooran Mal case which
form the foundation for decisions relied
upon by him. It has to be noted that
4 All. Ram Nivas Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
785
Pooran Mal Case was decided on entirely
different factual and legal backgrounds. The
Court noticed that the assessee who wanted
the Court to strike down the action of the
Revenue Authorities on the ground of
limitation had himself conceded to the
passing of an order by the Authorities. This
court, therefore, held that the assessee can
not take undue advantage of his own action.
Additionally, it was noticed that the time
limit was to be reckoned with reference to
the period prescribed in respect of Section
132(5) of the IT Act. It was noticed that once
the order has been made under Section 132
(5) within ninety days, the aggrieved person
has got the right to approach the notified
authority under Section 132 (11) within
thirty days and that authority can direct the
Income Tax Officer to pass a fresh order.
This is the distinctive feature vis-a-vis
Section 6 of the Act. The Court applied the
principle of waiver and inter alia held that
the period of limitation prescribed therein
was one intended for the benefit of the
person whose property has been seized and it
was open to that person to waive that benefit.
It was further observed that if the specified
period is held to be mandatory, it would
cause more injury to the citizens than to the
Revenue. A distinction was made with status
providing
periods
of
limitation
for
assessment. It was noticed that Section 132
does not deal with taxation of income.
Considered in that background, ratio of the
decision in Pooran Mal case has no
application to the case at hand."

60. In view of the above, the
decision of Pooran Mal's case and those
of S.K. Traders (Supra) and others do
not affect the reasoning drawn by us on
the point of limitation.

61. Now we deal with the second
argument advanced on behalf of the
petitioners that as the objections filed
under Section 5A of the Act were not
decided by the Collector but by the SALO
who was not competent, the rejection of
the objections and the consequent report
to the government is a nugatory.

62. The objections of the tenure
holders objecting to the acquisition of the
land are required to be heard in
accordance with Section 5A of the Act.