# Ram Niwas Sharma v. Union Of India & Ors

- **Citation:** (2020) 6 ILRA 926
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2020-02-17
- **Case number:** WRIT A No. 23939 of 2013
- **Bench:** Yashwant Varma
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ram-niwas-sharma-v-union-of-india-ors-45828
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

A.S.G.I., Sri A.Kumar, Sri H.N. Pandey,
Rachna Dubey, S.C.,Sri Vivek Ratan

Practice & Procedure - Maintainability -
"Public
function",
"Public
duty"
-
Constitution of India: Article 226 - An
educational
institution
may
perform
myriad functions touching various facets
of public life and in the societal sphere.
While such of those functions as would
fall within the domain of a "public
function"
or
"public
duty"

be
undisputedly open to challenge and
scrutiny
under
Article
226
of
the
Constitution, actions or decisions taken
solely within the confines of an ordinary
contract of service, having no statutory
force or backing, cannot be recognized
as being amenable to challenge under
Article 226 of the Constitution. In the
absence of the service conditions being
controlled or governed by statutory
provisions the matter would remain in
the realm of an ordinary contract of
service. (Para 16)
The court observed that the contracts of a
purely private nature even though entered by
bodies which may perform a purely private
nature even tough entered by bodies which
may perform a public function would be
subject to judicial review. The only exception
would be where such contracts are governed
or regulated by statute. In present case it is
the undisputed position that the byelaws and
the service conditions which apply are non
statutory. They are deprived of any statutory
ordainment. Such a contract would remain a
pure private contract of service. Therefore, the
instant writ challenging the termination of
such a contract would not be maintainable.
(Para 18)
Writ Petition Rejected. (E-10)

List of cases cited:-

## Text

926 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
petitioner consequently is held disentitled
to relief. Bearing in mind the gravity of
the charges which stood proved, the Court
is
unconvinced
that
the
ultimate
punishment
inflicted
warrants
interference.

25. Petition is dismissed.
----------
(2020)06ILR A926
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 17.02.2020

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE YASHWANT VARMA, J.

WRIT A No. 23939 of 2013

Ram Niwas Sharma ...Petitioner
Versus
Union Of India & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Arun Kumar Gupta, Sri A.G. Gupta, Sri
Om Prakash Yadav, Sarita Singh, Ram
Kumar Dubey

Counsel for the Respondents:
A.S.G.I., Sri A.Kumar, Sri H.N. Pandey,
Rachna Dubey, S.C.,Sri Vivek Ratan

Practice & Procedure - Maintainability -
"Public
function",
"Public
duty"
-
Constitution of India: Article 226 - An
educational
institution
may
perform
myriad functions touching various facets
of public life and in the societal sphere.
While such of those functions as would
fall within the domain of a "public
function"
or
"public
duty"

be
undisputedly open to challenge and
scrutiny
under
Article
226
of
the
Constitution, actions or decisions taken
solely within the confines of an ordinary
contract of service, having no statutory
force or backing, cannot be recognized
as being amenable to challenge under
Article 226 of the Constitution. In the
absence of the service conditions being
controlled or governed by statutory
provisions the matter would remain in
the realm of an ordinary contract of
service. (Para 16)
The court observed that the contracts of a
purely private nature even though entered by
bodies which may perform a purely private
nature even tough entered by bodies which
may perform a public function would be
subject to judicial review. The only exception
would be where such contracts are governed
or regulated by statute. In present case it is
the undisputed position that the byelaws and
the service conditions which apply are non
statutory. They are deprived of any statutory
ordainment. Such a contract would remain a
pure private contract of service. Therefore, the
instant writ challenging the termination of
such a contract would not be maintainable.
(Para 18)
Writ Petition Rejected. (E-10)

List of cases cited:-

1. M.K. Gandhi and ors Vs. Director of
Education (Secondary), U.P., Lucknow and ors
(2005) 3 UPLBEC 187

2. Royachan Abraham Vs. State of U.P. and
ors. (2009) 2 UPLBEC 1148

3. Ramesh Ahluwalia Vs. State of Punjab and
ors (2012) 12 SCC 331

4. Committee of Management, Delhi Public
School and anr Vs. M.K. Gandhi and ors.
(2015) 17 SCC 353

5. Ramkrishna Mission and anr Vs. Kago
Kunya and ors 2019 SCC OnLine SC 501
(followed)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Yashwant Varma, J.)

1. Heard learned counsel for the
petitioner, Sri Abhishek Kumar for the
respondent No. 4, Sri H.N. Pandey for the
Board and Sri Vivek Ratan Agrawal,
learned counsel appearing for NTPC.
6 All. Ram Niwas Sharma Vs. Union of India & Ors. 927

2. The respondents have raised a
preliminary
objection
to
the
maintainability of the writ petition by
contending that the same would not be
maintainable since the petitioner assails
an order of termination made by the
D.A.V. Public School. It is submitted that
notwithstanding the fact that the school
may be said to be performing a public
function or discharging a public duty
since the terms and conditions of service
of the petitioner are not governed by any
statutory rule or regulation, a writ petition
consequently would not lie. Reliance is
placed principally on the Full Bench
decision of the Court in M.K. Gandhi
and Others Vs. Director of Education
(Secondary),
U.P.,
Lucknow
and
Others1. The attention of the Court is
then drawn to a recent decision rendered
by another Full Bench in Roychan
Abraham Vs. State of U.P. and Others2
in support of the objection that is raised.
Counsel for the C.B.S.E. submits that the
terms and conditions of service of the
petitioner are governed by the byelaws
framed by the Board which are not
statutory and in light of the decision in
M.K. Gandhi, the writ petition would not
lie.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner
however submits that the D.A.V. Public
School is funded and aided by N.T.P.C.
which is a Government Corporation and
State within the meaning of Article 12 of
the Constitution. He submits that N.T.P.C.
has set up and established schools in
order to provide educational avenues to
the wards of its employees and those of
the C.I.S.F. personnel employed in its
establishment. He submits that in light of
the financial and administrative aid which
is provided, it must be held to be
performing
a
public
function
and
consequently a writ petition would be
maintainable. Apart from relying upon the
ultimate conclusions recorded by the Full
Bench in Roychan Abraham, learned
counsel also places reliance upon the
decision rendered by the Supreme Court
in Ramesh Ahluwalia Vs. State of
Punjab And Others3 to submit that the
aforesaid decision would clearly merit the
objection as raised being negatived.

4. In order to evaluate the rival
submissions, it would be apposite to
firstly consider the judgment in M.K.
Gandhi. The Full Bench framed 8 points
for
determination.
Insofar
as
the
controversy
that
falls
for
our
consideration is concerned, it would be
pertinent to note the following issues
alone which were framed:-

"...

(i) Whether the DPS School is a
State within the meaning of Article 12 of
the Constitution;

(ii) Whether the Board is a State
within the meaning of Article 12 of the
Constitution of India;

(iii) Whether the 'Affiliation
bye-laws' have statutory force;

........

(vi) Whether a writ petition is
maintainable against a privately managed
school for violation of the Service Rules.

(vii) Whether a writ petition is
maintainable against the Board for nonobservance of its bye-laws;

......"
928 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

5. The Full Bench firstly held that
C.B.S.E. is State within the meaning of
Article 12 of the Constitution. It further
proceeded to hold that the affiliation
byelaws, of which service conditions
form a part, do not have statutory force.
This conclusion was recorded by the Full
Bench in the following terms:

"31. There is nothing in the
constitution of the Board to suggest that
the affiliation bye-laws have statutory
force. The service conditions are in the
bye-laws. They are adopted between the
parties through the agreement and are
binding as a contract. Neither the byelaws nor the agreement are statutory. If
there is any breach of the service
conditions then it is the breach of the
contract and the parties may file suit or
the Board may impose penalty prescribed
under the bye-laws but this does not mean
that the bye-laws or the agreement have
statutory force."

6. Proceeding further the Full Bench
held that the private school is not State
within the meaning of Article 12 and that
the
affiliation
byelaws
being
nonstatutory
only
represent
a
contract
between parties. In paragraph 37 of the
report it observed:

"37.
The
Committee
of
Management of the DPS School is
recognised by the Board but it is neither a
statutory body nor a State with the
meaning of Article
12. The
legal
obligation or duty on the DPS. School is
neither imposed by any statute nor by any
statutory provision; it has been imposed
by the affiliation bye-laws and agreement
which is a contract between the parties
and non-statutory. In view of this the writ
petition is not maintainable against the
DPS School for violation of the affiliation
bye-laws."

7. The Full Bench then proceeded to
record its conclusions in paragraph 76,
which read thus:

"76. Our conclusions are as
follows :

(a) The DPS School is not the
State within the meaning of Article 12 of
the Constitution;

(b) The Central Board of
Secondary Education, (the Board) is the
State within the meaning of Article 12 of
the Constitution;

(c) In case service conditions
have not been framed, then

- Chapter VII of the affiliation
bye-law relating to service condition shall
be deemed to have been adopted by the
school; and

- The agreement between the
parties-unless
any
other
format
is
prescribed by the State/UT Act-shall be
deemed to be in the same format as
Appendix-III to the affiliation bye-laws.

(d) The Service Rules and the
agreement-whether framed by a school
and agreed between the parties by an
agreement or deemed to be adopted by
them and agreement to be in the same
format as Appendix-Ill of the affiliation
bye-laws as held in this case-are merely
private contract between the schools and
the teachers. They do not have statutory
force.
The
writ
petition
is
not
maintainable against the school to enforce
them;
6 All. Ram Niwas Sharma Vs. Union of India & Ors. 929

(e) In case any school does not
follow the Service Rules framed by it or
the bye-laws deemed to be adopted as
held in this case then the school has to
pay penalty for violating the same namely
withdrawal of its affiliation;

(f) The Board is bound to
follow its bye-laws and in case of any
violation it has to take action under its
bye-laws to disaffiliate the school. A writ
petition is maintainable against the Board
in case it fails to perform its duty; and

(g) In the present case, there has
been violation of the bye-laws-deemed to
be adopted as service conditions-by the
DPS School. The Board has failed to
perform its duty by not taking any action
on the complaint filed by the petitioners.
The Board should take action under the
affiliation bye-laws against the DPS
School."

8. It then framed directions
commanding the Board to call upon the
school to show cause why it not be
disaffiliated for terminating the services
of the petitioners contrary to the byelaws.
The decision in M.K. Gandhi was
assailed
by
the
Committee
of
Management of the school before the
Supreme Court. While dealing with that
appeal, the Supreme Court in Committee
of Management, Delhi Public School
And Another Vs. M.K. Gandhi And
Others4 held thus:

"4. With great respect to the
Full Bench of the High Court, we fail to
understand the direction given by the
Allahabad High Court. In our opinion, the
direction given by the Allahabad High
Court
to
the
CBSE
is
totally
misconceived and uncalled for. When the
Allahabad High Court has already held
that the DPS School is not a "State"
within the meaning of Article 12 of the
Constitution of India and the writ petition
is not maintainable, there was no
necessity for giving a direction to the
CBSE
which
virtually
amounts
to
granting a declaration in favour of those
teachers whose services have been
terminated. We fail to appreciate the view
taken by the Allahabad High Court by
unnecessarily complicating the issue by
involving the CBSE in a private dispute
between the teachers and DPS. The
Allahabad High Court should have
stopped short of holding that the said DPS
is a private body and the writ is not
maintainable.

5. Hence, we are of the view
that no writ is maintainable against a
private school as it is not a "State" within
the meaning of Article 12 of the
Constitution of India and no direction
could have been given by the High Court
to
CBSE
for
interfering
with
the
termination of the teachers. The proper
remedy for the teachers was to file a civil
suit for damages, if there was any.

6. Subsequently, we allow this
appeal and set aside the order passed by
the Allahabad High Court to the extent of
giving a direction to the Board. There will
be no order as to costs."

9. As is manifest from a reading of
that decision, the Supreme Court allowed
the appeal and set aside the judgment of
the Full Bench only to the extent that it
had
proceeded
to
frame
directions
commanding the Board to take further
action of disaffiliation. It also observed
that once the High Court had come to
conclude that the writ petition against the
930 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
school itself was not maintainable, it
should have stopped there and left it open
to the aggrieved teachers to institute a suit
for damages.

10. Learned counsel for the
petitioner has however sought to draw
sustenance from the decision rendered in
Ramesh
Ahluwalia.
In
Ramesh
Ahluwalia,
the
Supreme
Court
in
paragraph 12 observed thus:

"12.We have considered the
submissions made by the learned counsel
for the parties. In our opinion, in view of
the judgment rendered by this Court in
Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee
Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav
Smarak Trust v. V.R. Rudani [(1989) 2
SCC 691], there can be no doubt that
even a purely private body, where the
State has no control over its internal
affairs, would be amenable to the
jurisdiction of the High Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution, for
issuance
of
a
writ
of
mandamus.
Provided, of course, the private body is
performing public functions which are
normally expected to be performed by the
State authorities."

11. It went on further to observe as
under:

"14.In view of the law laid
down in the aforementioned judgments of
this Court, the judgment of the learned
Single Judge Ramesh Ahluwalia v State
of Punjab as also the Division Bench
Ramesh Ahluwalia v State of Punjab
[LPA No. 368 of 2010] of the High Court
cannot be sustained on the proposition
that the writ petition would not be
maintainable
merely
because
the
respondent - institution is a purely
unaided private educational institution.
The appellant had specifically taken the
plea that the respondents perform public
functions, i.e. providing education to
children in their institutions throughout
India."

12. It becomes pertinent to notice
that the Supreme Court principally held
that even a purely private body over
whose internal affairs the State may wield
no control would still be amenable to the
jurisdiction of the High Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution provided it
is established that it performs a public
function. The conclusions as recorded in
paragraph of the report also must
necessarily be read bearing in mind that
the same came to be entered in the
context of "...issuance of a writ of
mandamus".

13. It was the decision rendered in
Ramesh Ahluwalia, which led to a learned
Judge doubting the correctness of the
decision rendered in M.K. Gandhi and the
subsequent
reference.
That
reference
ultimately came to be placed before another
Full Bench which rendered decision in
Roychan
Abraham.
In
Roychan
Abraham the Full Bench after exhaustively
noticing the body of precedent that has
come to exist on the question of public
function and public duty as well as the
scope of Article 226 of the Constitution
framed its conclusions as follows:

"Conclusion:

63. We accordingly proceed to
answer the reference in the following
terms:

64.
Question
(i):
Private
Institutions
imparting
education
to
6 All. Ram Niwas Sharma Vs. Union of India & Ors. 931
students from the age of six years
onwards, including higher education,
perform public duty primarily a State
function, therefore are amenable to
judicial review of the High Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

65. Question (ii): The broad
principle
of
law
which
has
been
formulated in the judgement of the Full
Bench in M.K. Gandhi and Division
Bench in Anjani Kr. Srivastava is
confined to the facts obtaining therein and
is not an authority on the proposition of
law that private educational institutions
do not render public function and,
therefore, are not amenable to judicial
review of the High Court. The judgements
do not require to be revisited.

66. The reference to the Full
Bench, shall accordingly stand answered.
The writ petition shall now be placed
before the regular Bench according to
roster for disposal in light of the questions
so answered."

14. Significantly, however, the
decision in M.K. Gandhi was not
overturned and the Full Bench only
observed that it was not liable to be read
as an authority for the proposition that
private educational institutions do not
render public functions or are otherwise
not amenable to judicial review. This
Court bound by the principles so
enunciated by the Full Bench deems it
appropriate to only state that it would be
wholly
incorrect
to
assume
that
educational institutions do not render
public functions or perform public duties.
Those
institutions
as
observed
in
Roychan Abraham act as adjuncts of the
State in the context of the constitutional
obligation of providing avenues of
education. The question, which however
merits consideration, would be whether
employees
of
such
educational
institutions can assail disciplinary actions
taken or petition the High Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution in respect
of matters relating to their service
conditions where the terms and conditions
of service are not governed or controlled
by statutory provisions. This aspect was
considered in Roychan Abraham where
the Full Bench observed thus:

"38. Even if it be assumed that
an educational institution is imparting
public duty, the act complained of must
have direct nexus with the discharge of
public duly. It is undisputedly a public
law action which confers a right upon the
aggrieved to invoke extraordinary writ
jurisdiction under Article 226 for a
prerogative writ. Individual wrongs or
breach of mutual contracts without having
any public element as its integral part
cannot be rectified through petition under
Article 226. Wherever Courts have
intervened in exercise of jurisdiction
under Article 226, either the service
conditions were regulated by statutory
provisions or the employer had the status
of 'State' within the expansive definition
under Article 12 or it was found that the
action complained of has public law
element.

39. We accordingly hold that a
private body though not 'State', but
performing public duty is amenable to the
writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution. Whether a writ would lie at
the behest of an aggrieved party against
the offending act of the private body
performing public duty would depend
upon the facts and the nature of the
offending act complained against."
932 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

15. Roychan Abraham clearly
holds that it is only a "public law action"
which confers a right upon an aggrieved
person to invoke the jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution. It also
notes that wherever the Courts have in
fact intervened and invoked their powers
conferred by Article 226, it was only in
situations where service conditions were
regulated either by statutory provisions or
where the employer had the status of
State.

16. It must be consequently held
that while a body may be discharging a
public function or performing a public
duty and thus its actions becoming
amenable to judicial
review by a
Constitutional Court, its employees would
not have the right to invoke this Courts
powers conferred by Article 226 in
respect of matter relating to service where
they are not governed or controlled by
statutory
provisions. An
educational
institution may perform myriad functions
touching various facets of public life and
in the societal sphere. While such of those
functions as would fall within the domain
of a "public function" or "public duty" be
undisputedly open to challenge and
scrutiny under Article 226 of the
Constitution, actions or decisions taken
solely within the confines of an ordinary
contract of service, having no statutory
force or backing, cannot be recognised as
being amenable to challenge under Article
226 of the Constitution. In the absence of
the service conditions being controlled or
governed by statutory provisions the
matter would remain in the realm of an
ordinary contract of service.

17. This distinction which must
necessarily be borne in mind has been
eloquently explained by the Supreme
Court in a decision rendered just a few
days
after
Roychan
Abraham
in
Ramkrishna Mission and Another Vs.
Kago
Kunya
and
Others5.
After
noticing the earlier decisions rendered on
the subject, the Supreme Court held thus:

"35. Thus, even if the body
discharges a public function in a wider
sense, there is no public law element
involved in the enforcement of a private
contract of service.

36.
Having
analysed
the
circumstances which were relied upon by
the State of Arunachal Pradesh, we are of
the view that in running the hospital,
Ramakrishna Mission does not discharge
a public function. Undoubtedly, the
hospital is in receipt of some element of
grant. The grants which are received by
the hospital cover only a part of the
expenditure. The terms of the grant do not
indicate any form of governmental
control in the management or day to day
functioning of the hospital. The nature of
the
work
which
is
rendered
by
Ramakrishna
Mission,
in
general,
including in relation to its activities
concerning the hospital in question is
purely voluntary.

38. It has been submitted before
us that the hospital is subject to regulation
by
the
Clinical
Establishments
(Registration and Regulation) Act 2010.
Does the regulation of hospitals and
nursing homes by law render the hospital
a statutory body? Private individuals and
organizations are subject to diverse
obligations under the law. The law is a
ubiquitous
phenomenon.
From
the
registration of birth to the reporting of
death, law imposes obligations on diverse
aspects
of
individual
lives.
From
6 All. Ram Niwas Sharma Vs. Union of India & Ors. 933
incorporation to dissolution, business has
to act in compliance with law. But that
does not make every entity or activity an
authority under Article 226 Regulation by
a statute does not constitute the hospital
as a body which is constituted under the
statute. Individuals and organisations are
subject to statutory requirements in a
whole host of activities today. That by
itself cannot be conclusive of whether
such
an
individual
or
organisation
discharges a public function. In Federal
Bank (supra), while deciding whether a
private bank that is regulated by the
Banking Regulation Act, 1949 discharges
any public function, the court held thus:

"33. ...in our view, a private
company carrying on banking business as
a scheduled bank, cannot be termed as an
institution or a company carrying on any
statutory or public duty. A private body or
a person may be amenable to writ
jurisdiction only where it may become
necessary to compel such body or
association to enforce any statutory
obligations or such obligations of public
nature casting positive obligation upon it.
We don't find such conditions are fulfilled
in respect of a private company carrying
on a commercial activity of banking.
Merely regulatory provisions to ensure
such activity carried on by private
bodies work within a discipline, do not
confer any such status upon the
company nor put any such obligation
upon it which may be enforced through
issue of a writ under Article 226 of the
Constitution. Present is a case of
disciplinary action being taken against
its employee by the appellant Bank.
The respondent's service with the Bank
stands terminated. The action of the
Bank was challenged by the respondent
by filing a writ petition under Article
226 of the Constitution of India. The
respondent is not trying to enforce any
statutory duty on the part of the Bank..."
(emphasis supplied)

39. Thus, contracts of a purely
private nature would not be subject to
writ jurisdiction merely by reason of the
fact that they are structured by statutory
provisions. The only exception to this
principle arises in a situation where the
contract of service is governed or
regulated by a statutory provision. Hence,
for instance, in K K Saksena (supra) this
Court held that when an employee is a
workman governed by the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, it constitutes an
exception to the general principle that a
contract of personal service is not capable
of
being
specifically
enforced
or
performed.

...

41. For the above reasons, we
are of the view that the Division Bench of
the High Court was not justified in
coming to the conclusion that the
appellants are amenable to the writ
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution as an authority within the
meaning of the Article."

18. As has been lucidly explained,
contracts of a purely private nature even
though entered by bodies which may
perform a public function would not be
subject to judicial review. The only
exception would be where such contracts
are governed or regulated by statute. In
the present case it is the undisputed
position that the byelaws and the service
conditions which apply are non statutory.
They are deprived of any statutory
ordainment. Such a contract, as noted
934 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
above, would remain a pure private
contract of service. In that view of the
matter the writ petition challenging the
termination of such a contract would not
be maintainable.

19. The preliminary objection is
thus
upheld
and
the
petition
is
consequently dismissed.
----------
(2020)06ILR A934
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 29.01.2020

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE ASHOK KUMAR, J.

WRIT A No. 35625 of 2017

Jitendra Kumar & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus

Union of India & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Tejasvi Misra

Counsel for the Respondents:
A.S.G.I., Sri Rajnish Kumar Rai, Sri S.K
Rai, Sri Vijay Kuar Rai

Civil Law - Declaration/ attestation form
- disclosure of any pending case is
required at two relevant periods that is,
time of filling of the form and second,
stage of filling up of the form of
attestation.
(Para 37)

Petitioners had applied for the post of
constable (GD) in Railway Protection Force in
March 2011 and at that relevant point of time
no case were pending against the petitioner
and subsequently in year 2011 that the case
against the petitioner was registered which
ultimately resulted in their acquittal in 2014
which is after the submission of attestation
form. Thus, both at the time of applying for
the post of constable as well as at the time of
filling up of the attestation form, no criminal
case was pending against any of the
petitioners. (Para 33, 34)

Writ Petition Partly Allowed. (E-10)

List of cases cited:-

1. Avtar Singh Vs. Union of India and others
(2016) 8 SCC 471 (followed)

2. Kalamuddin Ansari and another Vs. Union of
India and 4 others Writ A No. 33265 of 2017

3. Mohd. Imran Vs. State of Maharashtra and
others Civil Appeal No. 10571 of 2018

4. Raj Bahadur Vs. Union of India and others
Writ A No. 39219 of 2017

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ashok Kumar, J.)

1. Heard Sri Tejasvi Misra, learned
counsel for the petitioners and Sri Vijay
Kumar Rai, Advocate holding the brief of
Sri Rajnish Kumar Rai, learned counsel
representing all the respondents.

2. The instant writ petition has been
filed by the petitioners assailing the
orders dated 1.3.2017, 20.3.2017 and
27.3.2017 (Annexures 2-B, 3-B, 4-B and
5-B of the writ petition). The petitioners
have prayed for issuance of a mandamus
commanding the respondents to reinstate
the petitioners into service with all
consequential benefits.

3. Briefly the facts of the case are
that
the
petitioners
responded
in
pursuance
of
an
advertisement
(Advertisement No.1/11) which has been
issued
by
the
Chief
Security
Commissioner, Railway Protection Force
(R.P.F.) Gorakhpur, U.P. (respondent
no.3) for recruitment on the post of
Constables (G.D.) in Railway Protection
Special Force. In pursuance of the