# Ram Pal Singh v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal , Lucknow & others

- **Citation:** (2001) 1 ILRA 137
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2000-09-11
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ram-pal-singh-v-state-transport-appellate-tribunal-lucknow-others-39686
- **Pages:** 7

## Text

1All] Ram Pal Singh V. State Transport Appellate Tribunal , Lucknow & others 137
 recall the order dated 4.1.1996
dismissing the suit in default. Therefrom,
in effect it was an application under Order
9 Rule 9 and the simple question which
the learned trial court had before him for
consideration was as to whether on the
date fixed for hearing the plaintiff
appellant was prevented from attending
the court because of sufficient cause or
not and the explanation furnished by him
for
his
non-appearance
constitutes
sufficient cause or no.

11. In the casein hand, the
explanation furnished by the plaintiff
appellant was that he had fallen ill and
was advised bed rest till 15.1.1996 and,
therefore,
could
not
appear.
The
defendant did not give any evidence to
how that the plaintiff was not ill during
that
period.
In
our
opinion,
the
explanation furnished by the plaintiff for
non-appearance does constitute sufficient
cause for his absence. In this view of the
matter, the appeal deserves to be allowed.

12. In the result, this appeal is
allowed. The order of the learned Civil
Judge dated 25.3.1998 is hereby set aside
and the suit No.573 of 1990 is restored for
decision on merit. We further hope and
trust that the learned trial court shall
endeavor
to
dispose
of
the
suit
expeditiously preferably within a period
of six months. Learned counsels for both
the parties have made statement on behalf
of their clients that they will not seek
unnecessary adjournments and will appear
before the court below on the date of
hearing.

13. There shall be no order as to
costs.

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INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2001
138
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By the Court

1. The dispute relates to the route
known as Sector-8 NOIDA.8-10,8-9, 5-6,
1-2, 2-15.3-19.4-19, 9-20, 20-21, 2526,the
provisions
of
31,26-30,27-28
National Botanical Garden. Sector 38-44
40-43,41-42
NEPZ-
KulesraSurajpur_Dadri
and
back
SurajpurKansna
Bilaspur.
Fourteen
persons
including the petitioner have been granted
permits by respondent no.2 to ply their
City Buses on the route. It appears that
certain complaints were made that the
permit holders were not serving a part of
the route i.e. in between Surajpur Dadri
and back and Surajpuir kasna Bilaspur.
The matter came up for consideration in
the meeting of the R.T.A. held on
12.5.2000
and
31.5.2000
on
order(Annesure-6) was passed by the
R.T.A. curtailing 9 kms. route from
Surajpur to Dadri by invoking the
provisions of Section 72(2)(xxii) of the
Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter referred
to the Act). The effect of this order has
been that all the 14 permit holders who
were operating their buses are not now
entitled to ply their buses on a portion of
route in between Surajpur and Dadri
though they are entitled to operate their
buses on the remaining portion of the City
Bus route. This order of the T.T.A was
challenged by present petitioner as well as
one another operator Rajesh by filing two
separate appeal Nos. 52 and 57 of 2000
under Section 89 (1) (b) of the Act.
Respondent no.3 Sadhu Ram intervened
and the Tribunal refusing to implead him
as party to the appeals conceded in his
favour a right of hearing after hearing the
parties
concerned.
The
Tribunal
respondent
no.1
dismissed
both
the
appeals
by
impugned
order
dated
11.9.2000 (Annesure-10).

2. By means of this writ petition the
petitioner has challenged the order dated
31.5.2000 Annexure-6 to the petition.
Passed
by
the
Regional
Transport
Authority, Ghaziabad (hereinafter referred
to the R.T.A) respondent no.2 and the
orders dated 11.9.2000 Annexure-10 to
the writ petition, passed by the State
Transport
Authority
Tribunal,
U.P.
Lucknow- Respondent No. I in Appeal
No. 52 of 2000 whereby the portion of
permitted route for City Bus Service has
been curtailed. It is prayed that the
aforesaid orders be Quashed and a
Direction be issued to the respondents not
to give effect to the order aforesaid.

3. One Sadhu Ram. Who filed a
caveat, was directed to be impleaded as
respondent no.3. he has filed a counter
affidavit has been filed. In view of the
agreement between the parties this writ
petitions was taken up for final disposal
on merit at the admission stage on the
basis of the material available.

Heard Sri Ravi Kant. Learned Senior
Advocate Assisted by Sri H.P. Dubey for
the petitioner, Sri R.N. Singh Senior
Advocate Assisted by Sri A.R. Dubey for
respondent no.,3 and the learned Standing
counsel for the remaining respondents.

4. Sri Ravi Kant, learned counsel for
the petitioner, urged that the impugned
orders have resulted in the abridgement of
the right of the petitioner to operate his
bus throughout the length of the specified
and
notified
route
thereby
directly
affecting his existing right under the
permit which was granted to him;
impugned orders being in the teeth of
1All] Ram Pal Singh V. State Transport Appellate Tribunal , Lucknow & others 139
Section 86 of the Act and in violation of
the principle of natural justice are
required to be quashed by invoking
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution. In substance, the submission
of the learned counsel for the petitioner is
that the orders in question are vitiated by
the failure to observe the principle of
natural justice. A faint suggestion was
also made that the R.T.A. had taken
recourse to an inapplicable provision of
Section 86 to issue the notice but the
order was illegally passed under Section
72(2) (xxii) of the Act. All these
submissions have been repelled by Sri
R.N. Singh, Learned counsel appearing on
behalf respondent no.3 Sadhu Ram as
well as learned Standing counsel and it is
maintained
that
a
fair
hearing
as
postulated
for
the
decision
making
process was given to the petitioner after
due notice and that the decision was taken
by the R.T.A in the best interest of local
population as the petitioner and the other
permit holders were not serving the entire
route for economic reasons.

5. Both the parties counsel have
placed reliance on the plethora of the
decisions of the Apex court with regard to
enunciation of the principle of natural
justice. Without burdening this judgment
with all the cited decisions, which I feel is
not necessary, the position with regard to
the applicability of principle of natural
justice may be succinctly culled out. By
way of preface, it may be mentioned that
the concept of the principle of natural
justice is not a rule of thumb or
straitjacket
formula
or
an
abstract
proposition of law. The applicability of
principle of natural justice depends upon
the nature of proceedings and procedure
adopted by the court, Tribunal or
Authority, This aspect of the matter has
been dealt with by the Apex court in
Managing Director ESIL Hyderabad
Vs.
B.Karunakaran.
JT
1993
(6)
Supreme Court-1, by observing: -

"....The theory of reasonable opportunity
and the principles of natural justice has
been evolved to uphold the rule of law
and to assist the individual to vindicate
his just rights. They are not incantations
to be invoked nor rites to be performed on
all the sundry occasions. Whether in fact,
prejudice has been caused to the
employee or not on account of the denial
to him of the report, has to be considered
on the facts and circumstances of each
case...."

6. No hard and fast rule or yard -
stick can be provided for testing the
question as to whether the principle of
natural justice has been complied or not.
Sri Ravi Kant laid much emphasis on the
point that the conclusion arrived at by the
respondent nos.1 and 2 have no nexus
with the material available before them
and that they failed to record the reasons
which
were
necessary
to
test
the
correctness of the findings or conclusions.
According to him, the impugned order
stands vitiated on account of absence of
reasons which impelled the R.T.A. or the
appellate Tribunal to conclude that the
operators are not serving a part of the
route as it is not economically viable. To
lend strength to his submission, Sri Ravi
Kant placed reliance on the off- quoted
celebrated decision of the apex court in
Union of India V. Mohan Lal Kappor-
(1973) 2 SCC-836, in which it was held
that the reasons are the links between
materials on which certain conclusions
are base to they disclose haw is applied to
the subject matter for a decision whether
it is purely administrative or Quasi
INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2001
140
Judicial.
They
would
reveal
nexus
between the facts considered and the
conclusions reached. This view was
reiterated in Gurdil Singh Fijji Vs. State
of Punjab -(1997)2 SCC-368. In Mohan
Lal Kappor's case (supra), the rules and
regulations required recording of reasons
in
support
of
the
conclusions.
as
mandatory.

7. In an earlier case, Som Dutt Vs.
Union of India (A.I.R.1969 Supreme
Court-414), the apex court was of the
view that apart from any requirement
imposed by statute or statutory rule either
expressly or by necessary implication it
can not be said that there is any general
principle or any rule of natural Justice that
a statutory body should always and in
every case give reasons in support of its
decision. Such orders can not, therefore,
it was observed, be held to be illegal for
not going any reasons for confirming the
orders of the concerned authority. In
view of the expanding horizon of the
concept of principle of natural justice, the
above wide and general statement came to
be restricted and has been hedged with
certain conditions. Now the present slant
of
the
doctrine
of applicability of
principles of natural justice is that unless
the rule expressly or by necessary
implication excludes recording or reasons,
it is implicit that the principles of natural
justice or fair play do require recording of
reasons as a part of fair procedure. The
order of the administrative authority may
not be like a judgement of the court. But
some reasons, howsoever precise they
may be, have to be there. I S.N.
Mukherjee Vs. Union of India (1990) 4
SCC-594, the constitution Bench of the
apex court surveyed the entire case law in
this regard and held that except in cases
where the requirement has been dispensed
with,
expressly
or
by
necessary
implication, an administrative authority
exercising judicial or quasi judicial
function, is required to record reasons for
its decision. In para 36 of the report, at
pages 612 and 613,it was further held that
the recording of reasons excludes chances
of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of
fairness in the process of decision
making. The said principle would apply
equally
to
all
decisions
and
its
implications can not be confined to the
decisions, which are subject to appeal,
revision or judicial review. The same
view was reiterated in the case of
Maharastra State Board of Secondary
and Higher Secondary Education Vs.
K.S. Gandhi and others-(1991)2SCC716 in which it was observed in para 21
off the report as follows:

" Thus it is settled law that the reasons are
harbinger between the mind of the maker
of the controversy in question and the
decision or conclusion arrived at. It also
excludes the chances to reach arbitrary,
whimsical or capricious decision or
conclusion. The reasons assure an inbilt
support
to
the
conclusion/
decision
reached. The order when it affects the
right of a citizen or a person, irrespective
of the fact, whether it is quasi-judicial or
administrative fair play requires recording
of germane and relevant precise reasons.
The recording of reasons is also an
assurance that the authority concerned
consciously applied its mind to the facts
on record....."

8. The extent and nature of the
reasons would depend on particular facts
and circumstances. What is necessary is
that the reasons are clear and explicit so
as to indicate that the authority has given
due
consideration
to the points in
1All] Ram Pal Singh V. State Transport Appellate Tribunal , Lucknow & others 141
controversy. In M.J. Sivani and others.
Vs. State of Karnataka and others
(AI.R) 1995 Supreme Court.-1770) it has
been observed in para 32 of the report, as
under: -

"32, it is also settled laws that the
order need not contain detailed reasons
like court order. Administrative order
itself may contain reasons or the file may
disclose reasons to arrive at the decisions
showing application of mind to the facts
in issue. It would be discernible from the
reasons stated in the order or the
contemporaneous
record
contained.
Reasons are the link between the order
and the mind of its maker. When rules
direct to record reasons, it is a sine qua
non and condition precedent for valid
order, Appropriate brief reasons, though
not like a judgement, are necessary
concomitant for a valid order in support
of the action or decision taken by the
authority or its instrumentality of the
state,"

9. There is another thinking, which
necessitates the recording reasons to
support the conclusion. It is well-settled
law that every action of the State
instrumentality of the State must be
informed by reason. Actions uninformed
by
reason
may
tantamount
to
arbitrariness. The State action must be
just, fair and reasonable. Fair play and
natural
justice
are
part
of
public
administration;
non-arbitrariness
and
absence of discrimination are said to be
hallmarks for good governance under the
rule of law. One can not, therefore,
escape from the conclusion that it is
imperative on the State Government to
inform its order by recording reasons to
reach a particular conclusion.

10. With this caution in mind, and in
the perspective of the law, as mentioned
above, the question is whether the
impugned order withstands the test of
scrutiny at the alter of the principles of
natural justice or not and if it is found that
the reasons are conspicuously missing to
arrive at the conclusion, a further question
would be whether omission to record
reasons, vitiates the impugned order or is
in violation of the principles natural
justice.

11. Admittedly, before a decision for
curtailment of the route, in question, a
notice was issued to the petitioner and the
remaining permit holders. This notice
purported to be under Section 86 of the
Act, which deals with the cancellation and
suspension of the permits under the
circumstances specific in clauses (a) to (f)
of sub-section (1). Sri Ravi Knat, learned
counsel for the petitioner urged that the
provisions of section 86 of the Act were
not attracted to the facts of the present
case and consequently, the petitioner was
misled in submitting the proper reply,
This aspect of the matter has been
suitably dealt with by the appellate
Tribunal respondent no.1 Mention of a
wrong Section in the notice would hardly
be of any consequence. Even if no
provision of law was mentioned in the
notice the fact remains that the various
details
given
in
the
notice
clearly
indicated that the permit holders were not
serving the entire route and, therefore,
appropriate action under the law was
contemplated against them, Moreover,
cancellation and suspension of permit is
an extreme step while the Regional
Transport Authority has merely passed an
order of curtailment of a portion of the
route running about 9kms. Section 72 of
the Act which deals with grant of stage
INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2001
142
carriage permits envisages variation in the
conditions of permit. In clause (xxii) of
sub-section (2) of Section 72, it is
provided that the Regional Transport
Authority May, after giving notice of not
less than one month.

(a) vary the conditions of the permit;

(b) attach to the permit further
condition;

12. Provided that the condition
specified in pursuance of clause (i) shall
not be varied so as to alter the distance
covered by original route by more than 24
kilometres, and any variation such limits
shall be made only after the Regional
Transport is satisfied that such variation
will serve the convenience of the public
and that it is not expedient to grant a
separate permit in respect of the original
route as so varied or any part thereof.

13.

Undoubtedly,
Regional
Transport authority has the authority to
vary the conditions of permit subject to
the requirement that a notice of not less
than one month is given to the permit
holder. As is admitted in the present case
by the parties, one month's notice was
given before passing of the impugned
order by the Regional Transport Authority
It was immaterial as to what label was
given to the notice. The petitioner had
well understood the contents of the notice
and had entered a proper defence in reply
thereto. There was hardly any occasion
for confusion or misgiving on the point.

14. Sri Ravi Knt further pointed out
that the order of the Regional Transport
Authority
is
based
on
extraneous
considerations and insufficient material,
inasmuch as, there was no tangible
evidence to indicate that the petitioner and
other permit holders were not serving the
portion of the route in between the pointsSurajpur and Dadri. It was maintained
that as a matter of fact, the requisite
number of buses were being plied on the
aforesaid portion of the route and the
local public as such has not reflected any
grievance. This submission again is wide
off the marks. Conscious of the fact that
this Court can not enter into factual aspect
of the controversy, suffice it to say that
there was enough material before the
Regional
Transport
Authority
for
recording the finding of fact that the
permit holders including the present
petitioner, were not serving SurajpurDadri route covering a distance of about 9
kilometres for the obvious economic
reasons. An enquiry into the matter was
made and on the letter of the competent
authority, Regional Transport Authority
came to the conclusion that the disputed
portion of the route totally unserved.
Local commuters of this rout obviously
suffered serious inconvenience. The
passenger had to drop at Surajpur and
from there they had to make their own
arrangements
to
go
to
Dadri
and
conversely passengers from Dadri had to
travel by the selves upto Surajpur. In the
matter
of
grant
for
permit,
the
convenience of the public is the supreme
consideration. The petitioner as well as
other permit holders did not deliberately
serve the entire route and left the residents
in a state of lurch, uncertainty and
inconvenience on the portion of the route
between Surajpur and Dadri. This by
itself, was a sufficient ground to curtail or
vary the specified route for which permit
was granted to the petitioner as well as
other 13 operators. Except for two
persons, who filed appeals under Section
89(1)(b) of the Act, no other operator
challenged the impugned order of the
1All] Dharam Vir Singh V. State &of U.P. and others 143
Regional
Transport
Authority,
The
finding of fact recorded by the Regional
Transport Authority that the portion of the
route was not being served by the
petitioner
and
other
operators
as
confirmed in appeal in now final and can
not be made a subject matter of scrutiny
in writ jurisdiction. The said finding is
based
on
tangible
and
believable
evidence. It can not be termed as perverse
or conjectural.

15. The order of the appellate
Tribunal is hedged with appropriate
reasons which provide links to the
conclusion arrived at by it. The impugned
order, as said above, has been passed after
serving due notice on the petitioner and
other operators. The bogey of violation of
the principles of natural justice in the
present case has been unnecessarily
raised. The Regional Transport Authority
as well as the appellate Tribunal have
taken due precautions to ensure that the
principle of natural justice are complied
with in all aspects. The Regional
Transport Authority has rightly passed the
order of curtailment of a portion of the
route by about 9 kilometres as it remained
totally unserved by the permit holders,
including the petitioner. The curtailment
of the route is also one of the kinds of
variation
of
the
conditions.

The
curtailment of the route is also one of the
kinds of variation of the conditions of
permit. Such an order could legally and
legitimately be passed by invoking the
provisions of S. 72 (2) (xxii) of the Act.

16. In the conspectus of the above
facts, I am of the view that is not a case fit
enough in which interference by this
Court
by
invoking
extraordinary
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India is warranted
The
writ
petition
is
dismissed
without any order as to costs.

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