# Ram Pratap Singh v. State of U.P. and Anr

- **Citation:** (2014) 1 ILRA 262
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2014-02-18
- **Case number:** C.M. Application No. 18727 of 2014
- **Bench:** Dharnidhar Jha
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ram-pratap-singh-v-state-of-u-p-and-anr-42772
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

Criminal Law-Cancellation of bail-scope and
circumstances-explained-where bail order
passed deviated from settled principle of
law-tempering evidences and terrorizing
witness-in
absence
of
material-no
cancellation order to be passed-applicant
may approach before Session Judge make
out case within four corner of contingencies
given by Apex Court in Sanjay Gandhi Caseapplication rejected.

Held: Para-12
The above being the position of law, which
holds good till date, in my considered view,
the petitioner ought to have approached
the trial court by filing an appropriate
petition before it and to have followed the
procedure set down by the Supreme Court
in the case of Sanjay Gandhi. The present is
not the forum for considering the bail
cancellation application as I have already
noted that no fact or finding has been
brought into my notice, which could be
making out a case of deviation from settled
principles of law and thereby causing a
prejudice
to
the
prosecution
due
to
granting bail that this Court should recall or
cancel the order which is impugned herein.
The allegation of tampering evidence and
terrorizing the witnesses will require the
other side to be heard appropriately by the
court below and the court below may also
require the evidence to be adduced before it
in the light of Sanjay Gandhi. In that view,
this petition appears of no merit as also not
maintainable before this Court.

Case Law discussed:
AIR Supreme Court 961.

## Text

262 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Court in regard to the quantum of back
wages that must follow the setting aside
of an order of termination.

19. Having due regard to the facts and
circumstances of the case, we order while
setting aside the order of the learned Single
Judge dated 10 April 2013 and the order of
termination dated 3 April 2002 that the
appellant would be entitled to his back
wages which are quantified at 50%.

20. The special appeal is, accordingly,
allowed in these terms. There shall be no
order as to costs.

C.M. Application No. 18727 of 2014

Case
:-
SPECIAL
APPEAL
DEFECTIVE No. - 97 of 2014

***

Hon'ble Dr. Dhananjaya Yeshwant
Chandrachud,Chief Justice

Hon'ble
Dr.
Devendra
Kumar
Arora,J.

This application seeks condonation
of delay in filing the special appeal.

Since sufficient cause has been
shown in the affidavit filed in support of
the delay condonation application, the
delay in filing the appeal is condoned.

The application stands, accordingly,
disposed of.
--------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 18.02.2014

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE DHARNIDHAR JHA, J.

Crl. Misc. Bail Cancellation Application No.
336 of 2014

Ram Pratap Singh..... Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. and Anr...... Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
--

Counsel for the Respondents:
A.G.A., Sri Ashish Kumar Nagvanshi

Criminal Law-Cancellation of bail-scope and
circumstances-explained-where bail order
passed deviated from settled principle of
law-tempering evidences and terrorizing
witness-in
absence
of
material-no
cancellation order to be passed-applicant
may approach before Session Judge make
out case within four corner of contingencies
given by Apex Court in Sanjay Gandhi Caseapplication rejected.

Held: Para-12
The above being the position of law, which
holds good till date, in my considered view,
the petitioner ought to have approached
the trial court by filing an appropriate
petition before it and to have followed the
procedure set down by the Supreme Court
in the case of Sanjay Gandhi. The present is
not the forum for considering the bail
cancellation application as I have already
noted that no fact or finding has been
brought into my notice, which could be
making out a case of deviation from settled
principles of law and thereby causing a
prejudice
to
the
prosecution
due
to
granting bail that this Court should recall or
cancel the order which is impugned herein.
The allegation of tampering evidence and
terrorizing the witnesses will require the
other side to be heard appropriately by the
court below and the court below may also
require the evidence to be adduced before it
in the light of Sanjay Gandhi. In that view,
this petition appears of no merit as also not
maintainable before this Court.

Case Law discussed:
AIR Supreme Court 961.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Dharnidhar Jha, J.)
1 All] Ram Pratap Singh Vs. State of U.P. and Anr.
263

1. I have heard learned counsel on
behalf of the petitioner, who seeks
cancellation
of
Court's
order
dated
10.1.2013 passed in Criminal Misc. Bail
Application No. 32206 of 2011 by which
the opposite party Sujeet Kumar Singh
was directed to be released on bail on
furnishing bond to the satisfaction of the
court concerned.

2. Some of the facts necessary to be
noticed for disposal of the present petition
are as follows:-

3. Undisputedly, the opposite party no.
2 was married to Archana, the deceased, on
25.11.2007 as per Hindu rites and rituals and
it is also not disputed that on the day of
occurrence, i.e., on 16.4.2011, the deceased
was residing in her matrimonial house where
she was killed. The fact that she was killed
does not appear disputed as is recorded in the
very order by the learned Judge, who passed
the impugned order. In addition to what has
been recorded, as may appear from the post
mortem examination report, there were as
many as 16 injuries and it appears from the
perusal of those injuries that before the
deceased had been finally killed by being
strangulated to death with the help of
ligature, she was brutally assaulted as there
were numerous abrasions and contusions on
the dead body.

4. The basic allegations were that
since after being married, the deceased
was being harassed and ill-treated by her
in-laws because they were demanding
Rs.2 lakhs in cash, a refrigerator, a
washing machine and were asking the
lady to convey the demand and ensure
giving of the money and articles to them
by her parents. The father of the deceased
was not inclined to meet the demands of
the accused persons and he appears to
have intervened on social level by
convening a panchayat. But, the accused
persons were not ready to give up their
demands and, ultimately, the deceased
was killed.

5. While granting bail to the opposite
party no. 2, the ground which found favour
with the learned Judge was that undisputedly
the opposite party no. 2-Sujeet Kumar Singh
was working in merchant navy and, on the
relevant day, he was away from India. To a
submission that there was a tacit consent and
connivance of opposite party no. 2 with other
persons in killing the deceased, the learned
Judge was taking a view that it was never the
case of the prosecution and the police had
also not found any conspiratorial angle after
investigating the case and further, the
ingredients of Section 304B I.P.C. that the
death under circumstances not natural
occurred "soon before" the death of the
deceased also did not appear from the
records and, in that view, the learned Judge
directed the release of the opposite party no.
2 on bail as indicated above.

6. While addressing the Court, the
learned counsel submitted that there was
no denial in the F.I.R. that the opposite
party no. 2 was away from India on the
relevant date and he might have not been
present in his house to participate directly
in the commission of the offence but the
tacit consent of the petitioner and his
approval of the acts of his family
members could no less be the evidence as
regards having conspired with his family
members in commission of murder of his
wife. Submission also was that, after
having been enlarged on bail, the opposite
party no. 2 had committed as many as five
overt acts towards tampering with the
evidence and one such instance could be
the lodging of the report by him by self-
264 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
inflicting
an
injury
by
firearm
and
implicating the informant and others, which
report was found palpably false after
investigation by the police. Submission was
that it was a class example of terrorizing the
witnesses so that they could not turn up into
the witness-box to support the charges. The
copy of the report obtained by the petitioner
under the Right to Information Act has been
placed during the course of the present
hearing. As regards the other cases, the
details thereof appears stated in paragraph 13
of the present petition and it was contended
that intimidatory tactics were employed and
adopted by opposite party no. 2 only to
ensure that justice is not meted out to the
victim of the ofence and her family
members.

7. Some principles on cancellation of
an order of bail may be recapitulated. It is
well settled that the consideration for
cancelling an order of bail are the same
which are at the time of granting bail, i.e., (1)
nature of offence and its impact on the
society; (2) the nature of evidence collected
against the accused; (3) the chances of the
accused being available to justice during
trial; (4) the further chances of the accused
not tampering with the evidence; (5) the
chances or any instance of commission of the
offence by the accused; and, lastly, his own
security after being enlarged on bail. If the
court is satisfied on all these aspects of a
prayer for bail, then a court generally admits
an accused to bail. The other factor which is
important as regards granting bail to an
accused is that it could never be by way of a
punishment that the accused should be
refused being admitted to bail so that he is
detained in custody. If the court is satisfied
generally regarding the chances of an
accused remaining available to justice during
trial and that he would not tamper with the
evidence or threaten the witnesses or he
himself is not a threat to the society, then
ordinarily the courts admit accused persons
to bail.

8. Some of the provisions, which have
been specifically incorporated in certain
penal law, like, the Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act (N.D.P.S. Act
for short) by Section 37, have virtually
restricted the powers of a court including the
High Court to grant bail by laying down that
before granting bail, the Public Prosecutor
must have the opportunity of opposing the
prayer and in case of the Public Prosecutor
having opposed the prayer, the Court should
record its satisfaction that there were
reasonable grounds for believing that the
accused had not committed the offence and
further that he is not likely to commit any
offence while on bail. But, in that case also
there are certain provisions, like, those under
Section 21 of the N.D.P.S. Act in which that
rigor, which is put down by Section 37 of the
N.D.P.S. Act, is not applicable as there could
be certain class of ceases which may entitle
an accused to bail after considering the
quantum of sentence, which may be inflicted
upon an accused in cases of the N.D.P.S. Act
as may be in cases of minimum quantity of
the drug or subastance.

9. However, while cancelling an
order of bail, the court has to be very
circumspect and has to consider very
compelling and weighty materials placed
before it as granting bail is a rule and
cancellation of an order granting bail is a
exception to that rule. As regards the
powers of the High Court to cancel an
order of bail, I want to point out that High
Court may cancel its own order but, in
that case, it has to be shown that the High
Court had deviated from some settled
principles of law while granting bail
which has caused prejudice to the
1 All] Ram Pratap Singh Vs. State of U.P. and Anr.
265
prosecution (please see (2004) 2 SCC 362,
Mahboob Dawood Shaikh Vs. State of
Maharashtra), and that pleading has to be very
weighty and supported by very clinching
materials otherwise under the judicial
hierarchy an order of bail passed by the High
Court is treated almost as not reversible and
final in nature. There may be a question as to
what is a weighty ground for cancelling an
order of bail granted by the High Court. To
elucidate, an order of bail passed in favour of
assailant of deceased or a person, whose
participation in a case of rape or docaity with
murder is shown reasonably from some
acceptable materials that in such cases the
High Court may also cancel its order or its
order may be cancelled by the Supreme Court.
In some class of cases if the High Court finds
itself to be misled on account of some
suppression of facts or not being appropriately
apprised of appropriate facts during the course
of hearing then, in my considered view, it may
not hesitate in cancelling its own order of bail.

10. In the present case, there was not
such suppression of fact nor any deviation
from the settled course of law was pleaded
before me. The only contention was that
after being enlarged on bail, the petitioner
has indulged into further acts of threatening
the witnesses or pressurizing them by filing
false criminal charges against them and,
thus, had attempted to tamper with the
evidence of the case. In such a situation, the
High Court could not arrogate to itself the
powers of the court which could be
approached in such circumstances with an
appropriate
application
seeking
the
cancellation of an order of bail.

11. In the case of the State through the
Delhi Administration Vs. Sanjay Gandhi
reported in AIR 1978 Supreme Court 961,
the Supreme Court was considering a similar
prayer for cancelling an order of bail on the
ground of tampering with the evidence by
threatening or intimidating the witnesses or
by pressurizing the witnesses so much so that
they should not turn up in the witness-box. It
was held that the application seeking
cancellation of order of bail has to be heard
by taking evidence and it was in that
connection pointed out that taking of
evidence may be by tendering the same on
affidavit by stating thereon the facts and also
by annexing documents showing as to how
the accused had threatened the witnesses or
attempted to tamper with the evidence. As
regards the proving of allegations regarding
the tampering of evidence or threatening the
witnesses, it was observed that it has to be
done as is done in a civil trial that the
evidence has to be considered on the
preponderance of probabilities and not as is
the consideration in a criminal trial, that is to
say, proved beyond reasonable doubt. No
order of bail should be adjudged on the
yardstick of proof beyond reasonable doubt
rather if the application seeking the
cancellation of bail appears supported by
evidence which on probability showing
reasonable apprehension that the witnesses
were likely to be tampered or indicating the
probability that they had indeed been won
over then such evidence may require the
order of bail to be cancelled.

12. The above being the position of
law, which holds good till date, in my
considered view, the petitioner ought to
have approached the trial court by filing
an appropriate petition before it and to
have followed the procedure set down by
the Supreme Court in the case of Sanjay
Gandhi. The present is not the forum for
considering
the
bail
cancellation
application as I have already noted that no
fact or finding has been brought into my
notice, which could be making out a case
of deviation from settled principles of law
266 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
and thereby causing a prejudice to the
prosecution due to granting bail that this
Court should recall or cancel the order
which is impugned herein. The allegation
of tampering evidence and terrorizing the
witnesses will require the other side to be
heard appropriately by the court below
and the court below may also require the
evidence to be adduced before it in the
light of Sanjay Gandhi. In that view, this
petition appears of no merit as also not
maintainable before this Court.

13. In the result, the petition is
dismissed with the above direction.

14. It is supposed that if the
petitioner files a petition before the trial
court as per the law laid down in Sanjay
Gandhi, the trial court shall entertain it
and shall hear it after giving notice to the
accused whose liberty is required to be
put under jeopardy and after following the
procedure pointed out by Sanjay Gandhi,
the court shall dispose it of.
--------
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 06.02.2014

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE DR. DHANANJAYA
YESHWANT CHANDRACHUD, C.J.
THE HON'BLE SUNIL AMBWANI, J.
THE HON'BLE VIKRAM NATH, J.

Spcial Appeal No. 356 of 2012
alongwith Spl. Appl. No. 371 of 2012 and
379 of 2012.

Shiv Kumar Dubey..... Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. and Ors...... Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Siddharth Khare, Sri R.P. Mishra, Sri
U.C. Chaturvedi
Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Tej Bhan Singh, Sri R.C. Upadhyay, C.S.C.

U.P.
Recruitment
of
dependents
of
Government Servant Dying in Harness
Rules 1974-Rule-5(Provisio I)-guide lines
governing of compassionate appointmentissued-view taken by Division Bench in
Vivek Yadav case-requiring-proviso to Rule5-normally must be exercised-for dealing
case in just and equitable manner-would
not
reflect
correct
position
of
lawsubsequent decision in Salabh Yadav caseholding the government can not dismiss
application blind folded-but to apply its
mind on such application moved beyond 5
years-held-government in appropriate case
being satisfied with material of undue
hardship-can exercise power to condone
the delay.

Held: Para-29&30
29. We now proceed to formulate the
principles
which
must
govern
compassionate
appointment
in
pursuance of Dying in Harness Rules:

(i)
A
provision
for
compassionate
appointment is an exception to the
principle that there must be an equality of
opportunity
in
matters
of
public
employment.
The
exception
to
be
constitutionally valid has to be carefully
structured and implemented in order to
confine compassionate appointment to
only those situations which subserve the
basic object and purpose which is sought
to be achieved;
(ii) There is no general or vested right to
compassionate
appointment.
Compassionate
appointment
can
be
claimed only where a scheme or rules
provide for such appointment. Where
such
a
provision
is
made
in
an
administrative scheme or statutory rules,
compassionate appointment must fall
strictly within the scheme or, as the case
may be, the rules;
(iii) The object and purpose of providing
compassionate appointment is to enable
the dependent members of the family of
a deceased employee to tide over the