# Ram Sukh & Anr v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2020) 2 ILRA 183
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2020-01-09
- **Case number:** Writ C No. 619 of 2020
- **Bench:** Ajay Bhanot
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ram-sukh-anr-v-state-of-u-p-ors-45569
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

A. Civil Law-Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code,
2006 - Section 24(3) - Period of three
months to dispose of matter - Mandatory or
Directory - Legislature has set pragmatic
standards which are achievable and not
created idealistic goals which are beyond reach
- The realities of administration of justice in
revenue courts have been balanced with the
ideals of speedy justice - Good authority thus
holds
that
statutes
fixing
timelines
to
accomplish an action are directory in nature -
Mere failure to decide the case within three
months does not violate the statutory mandate.
(Para 19, 29 and 32)

B. Interpretation of Statute - Word 'shall' -
Meaning and Scope - The words of a statute
are the best guide to legislative intent - The
settled canons of interpretation of statutes are
the best tools to ascertain the scope of the
statutory duties - Consequences of using the
word 'shall' can vary and are not uniform - The
mandatory effect of the word 'shall' can be
diluted depending upon the context in which
the word 'shall' is employed and the statutory
scheme in which it is placed. In the context the
word 'shall' is also qualified by the words 'as far
as possible' - The latter words limit the
mandatory effect of the word 'shall' - The word
'shall' is indicative of the mandatory nature of
the provision, but it is not conclusive. (Para 16,
20 and 22)

Writ Petition disposed of. (E-1)

List of cases cited :-

## Text

_Characters 0–39,882 of 40,475. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39882 for what follows._

2 All. Ram Sukh & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
183
(2020)02ILR A183

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 09.01.2020

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE AJAY BHANOT, J.

Writ C No. 619 of 2020

Ram Sukh & Anr. ...Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Rakesh Prasad

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Diwakar Singh

A. Civil Law-Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code,
2006 - Section 24(3) - Period of three
months to dispose of matter - Mandatory or
Directory - Legislature has set pragmatic
standards which are achievable and not
created idealistic goals which are beyond reach
- The realities of administration of justice in
revenue courts have been balanced with the
ideals of speedy justice - Good authority thus
holds
that
statutes
fixing
timelines
to
accomplish an action are directory in nature -
Mere failure to decide the case within three
months does not violate the statutory mandate.
(Para 19, 29 and 32)

B. Interpretation of Statute - Word 'shall' -
Meaning and Scope - The words of a statute
are the best guide to legislative intent - The
settled canons of interpretation of statutes are
the best tools to ascertain the scope of the
statutory duties - Consequences of using the
word 'shall' can vary and are not uniform - The
mandatory effect of the word 'shall' can be
diluted depending upon the context in which
the word 'shall' is employed and the statutory
scheme in which it is placed. In the context the
word 'shall' is also qualified by the words 'as far
as possible' - The latter words limit the
mandatory effect of the word 'shall' - The word
'shall' is indicative of the mandatory nature of
the provision, but it is not conclusive. (Para 16,
20 and 22)

Writ Petition disposed of. (E-1)

List of cases cited :-
1. Haryana Vs. Raghubir Dayal (1995) 1 SCC 133

2. N.K. Chauhan Vs. State of Gujarat and
others (1977) 1 SCC 308

3. P.T. Rajan Vs. T.P.M. Sahir and others
(2003) 8 SCC 498

4. Sharif-Ud-Din Vs. Abdul Gani Lone (1980) 1
SCC 403

5. Vikas Trivedi Vs. State of U.P. and others,
reported at (2013) 2 UPLBEC 1193

6. Karnal Improvement Trust, Karnal Vs. Smt.
Parkash Wanti (Dead) and another (1995) 5 SCC 159

7. State of Haryana Vs. P.C. Wadhwa, IPS, Inspector
General of Police and another (1987) 2 SCC 602

8. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner Vs.
K.T. Rolling Mills Pvt. Ltd. (1995) 1 SCC 181

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ajay Bhanot, J.)

1. The petitioner instituted a
proceeding under Section 24 of The Uttar
Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006 before the
Sub-Divisional Officer, Phulpur, District
Allahabad in the year 2009 which was
registered as Case no. 269 of 2009-10
(Ram Sukh Vs Gram Sabha and others).
The dispute pertains to demarcation of the
boundaries of the disputed plots.

2. The petitioner is aggrieved by the
failure of the statutory authority to decide
the aforesaid proceeding, more than 10
years after institution of the case.

3. The only prayer made by Sri
Rakesh Prasad, learned counsel for the
184 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
petitioners is for issuance of a writ in the
nature of mandamus directing the learned
trial
court/Sub-Divisional
Officer,
Phulpur, District Allahabad before whom
the matter is pending, to decide the case
within a stipulated period of time.

4. Sri Rakesh Prasad, learned counsel
for the petitioners calls attention to the
ordersheet to contend that the final
decision in the matter is being inordinately
delayed for no good reasons or valid basis
in law. He also relies on Section 24 of the
Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006 to
contend that the learned trial court is under
an obligation of law to conclude the
proceedings under the aforesaid section
within a period of three months as far as
possible. The learned trial court has
flouted its statutory mandate, by failing to
perform its statutory duty.

5. Heard Sri Rakesh Prasad, learned
counsel for the petitioners, Sri Diwakar
Singh, learned counsel for the Gaon Sabha
and learned Standing Counsel for the State
respondents.

6. A perusal of the ordersheet
discloses that the suit instituted in the year
2009 came up for hearing for the first time
on 03.11.2010 for the first time. The
learned trial court/Sub-Divisional Officer,
Phulpur, District Allahabad issued notices
to the defendants in the suit on 03.11.2010.
Thereafter the suit saw the light of day on
21.1.2011 wherein the matter was fixed for
29.01.2011 by providing a "general date".
Similar cryptic one line orders fixing
various dates for hearing were passed on
21.01.2011,
29.01.2011,
28.02.2011,
08.03.2011,
16.03.2011,
31.03.2011,
04.04.2011, 12/13.04.2011. Such orders
were
also
passed
on
12.05.2011,
23.05.2011, 08.06.2011, 22.10.2016. No
order is in the record of the ordersheet
from 08.06.2011 till 22.10.2016.

7. On 22.10.2016 matter was posted
for 12.01.2017. The case was adjourned on
12.01.2017 as the Presiding Officer was
unavailable.
Similarly
the
case
was
adjourned on 18.12.2017, 26.04.2017 and
on 26.04.2017, due to non availability of
the Presiding Officer for various reasons.
On 27.06.2017 once again a general order
fixing the matter on 27.07.2017 was
passed. The ordersheet then reflects that
the matter could not be heard on
29.08.2017,
08.11.2017,
20.12.2017,
15.03.2018,
26.03.2018,
25.04.2018,
04.06.2018 because the Presiding Officer
was not available due to his engagement in
election related duties, administrative
work and other meetings.

8. The matter was not heard on a
number of days due to strike of counsels.
The dates which record absence of
counsels due to lawyers' strikes were
25.04.2011,
14.06.2017,
8.08.2017,
29.08.2017,
05.04.2018,
28.04.2018,
10.05.2018,
22.05.2018,
25.06.2018,
24.07.2018,
13.08.2018,
28.12.2018,
08.03.2019, 14.06.2019, 16.08.2019. The
defendants appeared before the trial court
on 27.07.2017, when time was granted for
filing their pleadings/responses.

9. It is evident from the ordersheet
that for the past 11 years no effective
hearing has taken place in the matter
except
on
one
occasion
when
the
defendants were granted time to file their
response.

10. The ordersheet has already been
extracted almost fully in the preceding part
of the judgment. A perusal thereof shows
that dates of hearing have been fixed
2 All. Ram Sukh & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
185
initially as a matter of course. The orders
are cryptic and demonstrate that the
proceeding is being adjourned for no
reasons at all. The second categories of
dates are when the matter was not be heard
due to no availability of the Presiding
Officer for various reasons. The third
category
of
the
orders
granting
adjournments are on account of strike of
counsels.

11. The tenor of the ordersheet is
sufficient to defeat the mandate of the
statute in this case. Serious efforts to
decide the appeal with expedition are
clearly lacking in this case. It is a shocking
state of affairs that even eleven years after
the institution of the proceeding effective
hearings have not happened and the
proceeding has not been concluded. On all
dates of hearing adjournments are granted
or the hearing was postponed by one line
orders. The reasons for postponement of
hearing which are described in the earlier
part of the judgment are specious and
unsustainable in law. Judicial proceedings
cannot be stalled for the reasons recited in
the ordersheet.

12. The statutory authority has failed to
discharge his duties is under the Uttar Pradesh
Revenue Code, 2006. Abstention from work
by
the
counsels
is
obstructing
the
implementation of the statutory mandate. It is
not a ground to halt the judicial process.

13. The reasons of the statutory
authority/trial court for adjourning the
matter on account of engagement in
administrative duties is no defence against
the failure to perform statutory functions.
The cases have to be transferred to another
Presiding Officer who is holding the Court
in case any one Presiding Officer is not
available.

14. In light of the preceding
discussion this Court finds that the
provisions of Section 24(3) of The Uttar
Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006, have been
flouted by the Sub-Divisional Officer,
Phulpur, District Allahabad as well as the
counsels for the parties. The authority has
a statutory duty to perform its obligation
under law to decide the matter as far as
possible within three months. The counsels
being officers of the court are expect to
cooperate and assist in a final conclusion
of the matter.

15. The failure to implement the
statutory mandate can be determined once
the nature of the statutory mandate is
understood. Understanding the nature of
the statutory mandate is essentially an
exercise in interpretation of the statute.

16. The words of a statute are the best
guide to legislative intent. The settled canons
of interpretation of statutes are the best tools
to ascertain the scope of the statutory duties.

17. Section 24 of the Uttar Pradesh
Revenue Code, 2006 lays down a
procedure and a time frame for concluding
the proceedings. The provision is extracted
herein under for ease of reference:

"24.
Disputes
regarding
boundaries.-
(1)
The
Sub-Divisional
Officer may, on his own motion or on an
application made in this behalf by a
person interested decide, by summary
inquiry, any dispute regarding boundaries
on the basis of existing survey map or,
where the same is not possible in
accordance with the provisions of the
Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holding
Act, 1953, on the basis of such map.

(2) If in the course of an inquiry
into a dispute under sub- section (1), the
186 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Sub-Divisional Officer is unable to satisfy
himself as to which party is in possession
or if it is shown that possession has been
obtained by wrongful dispossession of the
lawful
occupant,
the
Sub-Divisional
Officer shall -

(a) in the first case, ascertain by
summary inquiry who is the person best
entitled to the property, and shall put such
person in possession;

(b) in the second case, put the
person so dispossessed in possession, and for
that purpose use or cause to be used such force
as may be necessary and shall then fix the
boundary accordingly.

(3) Every proceeding under this
section shall, as far as possible, be concluded
by the Sub-Divisional Officer within [three
months] from the date of the application.

(4) Any person aggrieved by the
order of the Sub-Divisional Officer may prefer
an appeal before the Commissioner within 30
days of the such order. The order of the
Commissioner shall, subject to the provisions
of Section 210, be final."

18. A perusal of the scheme of the
Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006,
particularly Section 24 shows that the
intent of the legislature is clearly to ensure
an expeditious disposal of the case by the
learned trial court/Sub-Divisional Officer.
The legislature was clearly aware of the
realities of governance and the limitations
of revenue courts. In such circumstances,
the legislature was conscious that it may
not be possible to adhere to the letter of a
strict time frame. But it was within the
reach of the learned trial court/SubDivisional
Officer,
Phulpur,
District
Allahabad to comply with the spirit of
deciding the case with dispatch and
expedition.
The
intendment
of
the
legislature is revealed by the words
employed in the provisions.

19. The legislature has taken a
practical view. In the Uttar Pradesh
Revenue Code, 2006 the legislature has set
pragmatic standards which are achievable
and not created idealistic goals which are
beyond
reach.
The
realities
of
administration of justice in revenue courts
have been balanced with the ideals of
speedy justice.

20. The legislative mandate to the
learned trial court/Sub-Divisional Officer,
Phulpur, District Allahabad is that "Every
proceeding under this section shall, as far
as possible, be concluded by the SubDivisional Officer within [three months]
from the date of the application.". The
word "shall" is indicative of the mandatory
nature of the provision, but it is not
conclusive. The Hon'ble Supreme Court
considered the import and consequences of
the word "shall" used by the legislature in
different statutes.

21. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in
the case of State of Haryana Vs.
Raghubir Dayal, reported at (1995) 1
SCC 133, undertook this exercise and held
thus:

"5. The use of the word 'shall' is
ordinarily mandatory but it is sometimes
not so interpreted if the scope of the
enactment, on consequences to flow from
such construction would not so demand.
Normally, the word 'shall' prima facie
ought to be considered mandatory but it is
the function of the Court to ascertain the
real intention of the legislature by a
careful examination of the whole scope of
the statute, the purpose it seeks to serve
and the consequences that would flow
from the construction to be placed
thereon. The word 'shall', therefore, ought
to be construed not according to the
2 All. Ram Sukh & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
187
language with which it is clothed but in the
context in which it is used and the purpose
it seeks to serve. The meaning has to be
ascribed to the word 'shall' as mandatory
or as directory, accordingly/Equally, it is
settled law that when a statute is passed
for the purpose of enabling the doing of
something and prescribes the formalities
which are to be attended for the purpose,
those prescribed formalities which are
formalities which are essential to the
validity
of
such
thing,
would
be
mandatory. However, if by holding them to
be
mandatory,
serious
general
inconvenience is caused to innocent
persons or general public, without very
much furthering the object of the Act, the
same would be construed as directory."

22. Clearly the consequences of
using the word "shall" can vary and are not
uniform. The mandatory effect of the word
"shall" can be diluted depending upon the
context in which the word "shall" is
employed and the statutory scheme in
which it is placed. In the context the word
"shall" is also qualified by the words "as
far as possible". The latter words limit the
mandatory effect of the word "shall".

23. The phrase "as far as practicable"
was interpreted by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of N.K. Chauhan Vs.
State of Gujarat and others, reported at
(1977) 1 SCC 308, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court held thus:

"26. What does 'as far as
practicable' or like expression mean, in
simple
anglo-saxon
?
Practicable,
feasible, possi- ble, performable, are more
or less interchangeable. A skiagraph of the
1959 Resolution reveals that the revival of
the
direct
recruitment,
method
was
motivated
by
'the
inter-
est
of
administration'--an
overriding
object
which must cast the benefit of doubt if two
meanings with equal persuasive- ness
contend. Secondly, going by the text, 50%
of the substantive vacancies occurring in
the cadre should be filled in by selection in
accordance With appended Rules. 'As far
as practicable' finds a place in the
Resolution and the Rule. In the context
what does it qualify ? As far as possible
50% ? That is to say, if 50% is not readily
forth- coming, then less ? Within what
period should be imprac- ticabilitv to felt ?
What is the content of impracticabi- litv' in
the
given
administrative
'setting
?
Contrariwise, can you not contend that
impracticability is not a license to deviate,
a discretion to disobey or a liberty with the
ratio ? Administrative tone is too impor-
tant to be neglected but if sufficient
numbers to fill the direct recruits' quota
are not readily available, substan- tive
vacancies may be left intact to be filled up
when direct recruits are available. Since
the exigencies of administration cannot
wait, expediency has a limited role
through the use of the words 'as far as
practicable'.
Thereby
Government
is
authorised to make ad hoc appointments
by promotion or by creation of ex cadre
posts to be filled up by promotees, to be
absorbed in the 50% portion falling to the
promotional category in later years. In
short 'as far as practicable means, not
interfering with the ratio which fulfils the
interest of administration, but flexible
provision
clothing
government
with
powers to meet special situations where
the normal process of the government
Reso- lution cannot flow smooth. It is a
matter of accent and import which affords
the final test in the choice between the two
parallel interpretations.

27. We have given close thought
to the competing contentions and are
188 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
inclined to the view that the former is the
better. Certainly, Shri Garg is right that
the primary purpose of the quota system is
to improve administrative efficiency. After
all, the Indian administration is run for the
service of the people and not for
opportunities for promotion to a few
persons.
But
theories
of
public
administration
and
experiments
in
achieving
efficiency
are
matters
of
governmental
policy
and
business
management. Apparently, the State, having
given due consideration to these factors,
thought that a blended brew would serve
best. Even so, it could not have been the
intention of government to create artificial
situations, import legal fictions and
complicate the composition of the cadre by
deviating from the natural course. The
State probably intended to bring in fresh
talent to the extent reasonably available
but not at the sacrifice of sufficiency of
hands at a given time nor at the cost of
creating a vacuum by keeping substantive
vacancies
unfilled
for
long.
The
straightforward answer seems to us to be
that the State, in tune with the mandate of
the rule, must make serious effort to secure
hands to fill half the number of vacancies
from the open market. If it does not
succeed, despite honest and serious effort,
it qualifies for departure from the rule. If it
has become non-feasible impracticable
and procrastinatory to get the requisite
quota of direct recruits, having done all
that it could, it was free to fill the posts by
promotion of suitable hands if the filling
up of the vacancies was administratively
necessary
and
could
not
wait.
'Impracticable' cannot be equated with
'impossible'--nor with 'unpalatable'--and
we cannot agree with the learned judges of
the High Court in construing it as
colossally incapable of compliance. The
short test, therefore, is to find out whether
the government, in the present case, has
made effective efforts, doing all that it
reasonably can, to recruit from the open
market necessary numbers of qualified
hands. We do not agree that the
compulsion of the rule goes to the extreme
extent of making government keep the
vacancies in the quota of the direct
recruits open and to meet the urgent needs
of administration by creating ex cadre
posts or making ad hoc appointments or
resorting
to
other
out-of-the-way
expedients. The sense of the rule is that as
far as possible the quota system must be
kept up and if not 'practicable', promotees
in the place of direct recruits or direct
recruits in the place of promotees may be
inducted applying the regular procedures,
without
suffering
the
seats
to
lie
indefinitely vacant."

24. In the case of P.T. Rajan Vs.
T.P.M. Sahir and others, reported at
(2003) 8 SCC 498 while considering
similar provision, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court held thus:

"48. Furthermore even if the
statute specifies a time for publication of
the electoral roll, the same by itself could
not have been held to be mandatory. Such
a provision would be directory in nature.
It is well-settled pinciple of law that where
a statutory functionary is asked to perform
a statutory duty within the time prescribed
therefor, the same would be directory and
not mandatory."

25. A mandatory provision is
required to be complied with strictly on
pain of invalidation. But merely because a
provision is held to be directory, it does
not provide an option of non-compliance
to the authorities. The law has to be
complied with in all circumstances. This is
2 All. Ram Sukh & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
189
the essence of the rule of law. However,
the rigors of compliance may vary
depending upon the statutory provision. In
case of a directory provision, a substantial
compliance of the same would suffice to
meet the ends of law.

26. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has
often dealt with the distinction between a
mandatory provision and a directory
provision, and the issue of compliance of
directory provisions. The Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of Sharif-Ud-Din Vs.
Abdul Gani Lone, reported (1980) 1
SCC 403 held thus:

"9. The difference between a
mandatory rule and a directory rule is that
while the former must be strictly observed,
in the case of the latter, substantial
compliance may be sufficient to achieve
the object regarding which the rule is
enacted (emphasize added). Certain broad
propositions which can be deduced from
several decisions of courts regarding the
rules of construction that should be
followed
in
determining
whether
a
provision of law is directory or mandatory
may be summarized thus: The fact that the
statute uses the word 'shall' while laying
down a duty is not conclusive on the
question whether it is a mandatory or
directory provision. In order to find out
the true character of the legislation, the
Court has to ascertain the object which the
provision of law in question is to sub-serve
and its design and the context in which it
is enacted. If the object of a law is to be
defeated by non-compliance with it, it has
to be regarded as mandatory. But when a
provision
of
law
relates
to
the
performance of any public duty and the
invalidation of any act done in disregard
of that provision causes serious prejudice
to those for whose benefit it is enacted and
at the same time who have no control over
the performance of the duty, such
provision should be treated as a directory
one. Where however, a provision of law
prescribes that a certain act has to be
done in a particular manner by a person in
order to acquire a right and it is coupled
with another provision which confers an
immunity on another when such act is not
done in that manner, the former has to be
regarded
as
a
mandatory
one.
A
procedural rule ordinarily should not be
construed as mandatory if the defect in the
act done in pursuance of it can be cured
by permitting appropriate rectification to
be carried out at a subsequent stage unless
by according such permission to rectify the
error later on, another rule would be
contravened.
Whenever
a
statute
prescribes that a particular act is to be
done in a particular manner and also lays
down that failure to comply with the said
requirement
leads
to
a
specific
consequence, it would be difficult to hold
that the requirement is not mandatory and
the specified consequence should not
follow."

27. A Full Bench of this Court in the
case of Vikas Trivedi Vs. State of U.P.
and others, reported at (2013) 2
UPLBEC 1193 held as under:

"15.
Maxwell
On
the
Interpretation of Statutes (Twelfth Edition)
in
Chapter
13,while
discussing
"Imperative And Directory Enactments"
said following:

'The first such question is: when
a statute requires that something shall be
done, or done in a particular manner or
form, without expressly declaring what
shall
be
the
consequence
of
noncompliance, is the requirement to be
regarded as imperative (or mandatory) or
190 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
merely as directory (or permissive)? In
some cases the conditions or forms
prescribed by the Statute have been
regarded as essential to the act or thing
regulated by it, and their omission has
been held fatal to its validity. In others,
such prescriptions have been considered
as merely directory, the neglect of them
involving nothing more than liability to a
penalty, if any were imposed, for breach of
the enactment. An absolute enactment
must be obeyed or fulfilled exactly, but it is
sufficient if a directory enactment be
obeyed or fulfilled substantially.' It is
impossible to lay down any general rule
for determining whether a provision is
imperative or directory. 'No universal
rule', said Lord Campbell, L.C., 'can be
laid down for the construction of statutes,
as to whether mandatory enactments shall
be considered directory only or obligatory
with
an
implied
nullification
for
disobedience. It is the duty of Courts of
Justice to try to get at the real intention of
the Legislature by carefully attending to
the whole scope of the statute to be
construed.' And Lord Penzance said: 'I
believe as far as any rule is concerned,
you cannot safely go further than that in
each case you must look to the subject
matter; consider the importance of the
provisions that has been disregarded, and
the relation of that provision to the
general object intended to be secured by
the Act; and upon a review of the case in
that aspect decide whether the matter is
what
is
called
imperative
or
only
directory."

"76. At this juncture a note of
caution is required to be given. All
provisions of the statute are required to be
complied with. It is useful to quote
paragraph 5-052 of De-Smith Judicial
Review 6th Edition in which while dealing
with mandatory and directory statutes,
following was observed:-

"5-052. A second reason for the
tangle in this area is the use of the terms
"mandatory" and "directory"; the latter
term is especially misleading. All statutory
requirements are prima facie mandatory.
However, in some situations the violation
of a provision will, in the context of the
statute as a whole and the circumstances
of the particular decision, not violate the
objects and purpose of the statute.
Condoning such a breach does not,
however, render the statutory provision
directory or discretionary. The breach of
the particular provision is treated in the
circumstances as not involving a breach of
the statute taken as a whole. Furthermore,
logically, a provision cannot be mandatory
if a court has discretion not to enforce it."

28.

In
the
case
of
Karnal
Improvement Trust, Karnal Vs. Smt.
Parkash Wanti (Dead) and another,
reported at (1995) 5 SCC 159, the
Hon'ble Apex Court laid down the law in
the following terms:

"11. There is distinction between
ministerial acts and statutory or quasijudicial functions under the statute. When
the statute requires that something should
be done or done in a particular manner or
form, without expressly declaring what
shall
be
the
consequence
of
noncompliance, the question often arise: What
intention is to be attributed by inference to
the legislature? It has been repeatedly said
that no particular rule can be laid down in
determining whether the command is to be
considered as a mere direction or
mandatory
involving
invalidating
consequences in its disregard. It is
fundamental that it depends on the scope
and object of the enactment. Nullification
2 All. Ram Sukh & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
191
is the natural and usual consequence of
disobedience, if the intention is of an
imperative character. The question in the
main is governed by considerations of the
object and purpose of the Act; convenience
and justice and the result that would ensure.
General inconvenience or injustice to innocent
persons or advantage to those guilty of the
neglect, without promoting the real aim and
object of the enactment would be kept at the
back of the mind. The scope and purpose of the
statute under consideration must be regarded
as an integral scheme. The general rule is that
an absolute enactment must be obeyed or
fulfilled exactly but it is sufficient if a directory
enactment be obeyed or fulfilled substantially.
When a public duty, as held before, is imposed
and statute requires that is shall be performed
in a certain manner or within a certain time or
under
other
specified
conditions,
such
prescriptions may well be regarded as
intended to be directory only in cases when
injustice or inconvenience to others who have
no control over those exercising the duty
would result if such requirements are not
essential and imperative."

29. Good authority thus holds that
statutes fixing time-lines to accomplish an
action are directory in nature. In various
cases the legislative intent was sought to
be
defeated
by
a
highly
delayed
compliance on the pretext of the provision
being directory in nature. Such action of
the authorities was on a misconception of
law. This action of the authorities was
invalidated and such interpretation was
negatived by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
Inordinate delay does not satisfy the
requirement of substantial compliance of a
directory provision.

30. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in
the case of State of Haryana Vs. P.C.
Wadhwa, IPS, Inspector General of
Police and another, reported at (1987) 2
SCC 602, while laying down the law,
dispelled all such doubts. The relevant
parts of the judgement are being extracted
for ease of reference:

"14. The whole object of the
making and communication of adverse
remarks is to give to the officer concerned
an
opportunity
to
improve
his
performance, conduct or character, as the
case may. The adverse remarks should not
be understood in terms of punishment, but
really it should be taken as an advice to
the officer concerned, so that he can act in
accordance with the advice and improve
his service career. The whole object of the
making of adverse remarks would be lost if
they are communicated to the officer
concerned after an inordinate delay. In the
instant case, it was communicated to the
respondent after twenty seven months. It is
true that the provisions of Rules 6, 6A and
7 are directory and not mandatory, but
that does not mean that the directory
provisions need not be complied with even
substantially. Such provisions may not be
complied with strictly, and substantial
compliance will be sufficient. But, where
compliance after an inordinate delay
would be against the spirit and object of
the directory provision, such compliance
would not be substantial compliance. In
the instant case, while the provisions of
Rules 6, 6A and 7 require that everything
including the communication of the
adverse remarks should be completed
within a period of seven months, this
period cannot be stretched to twenty seven
months, simply because these Rules are
directory, without serving any purpose
consistent with the spirit and objectives of
these Rules. We need not, however, dilate
upon the question any more and consider
whether on the ground of inordinate and
192 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
unreasonable delay, the adverse remarks
against the respondent should be struck
down or not, and suffice it to say that we
do not approve of the inordinate delay
made in communicating the adverse
remarks to the respondent."

31. The statutes which do not
provide for specific time frame to do an
act, do not provide a clear guidance to the
authorities regarding the time period in
which the act has to be done. In such
cases, the Hon'ble Supreme Court ironed
out such creases in law in the case of
Regional Provident Fund Commissioner
Vs. K.T. Rolling Mills Pvt. Ltd.
reported at (1995) 1 SCC 181 and held:

"4. There can be no dispute in
law that when a power is conferred by
statute without mentioning the period
within which it could be invoked, the same
has to be done within reasonable period,
as
all
powers
must
be
exercised
reasonably, and exercise of the same
within reasonable period would be a facet
of reasonableness. When this appeal was
heard by us on 7-9-1994 and when this
aspect of the matter came to our notice, we
desired
an
affidavit
from
the
Commissioner to put on record regarding
the point of time when he came to know
about the default and to explain the cause
of delay. Pursuant to that order, the
Commissioner filed his affidavit on 10-111994, according to which the power of
levying damages came to be delegated to
the Commissioner by an order dated 1710-1973. As, however, large number of
establishments were in existence in the
State of Maharashtra -- the number of
which in 1985 was 22,189 -- and there was
only
one
Regional
Provident
Fund
Commissioner having power to levy
damages, delay was caused in detection of
the cases of belated payment. According to
the affidavit, the default at hand was
located on 19-4-1985 and the damages
came to be levied by order dated 5-111986."

32. In case, the proceeding is decided
within three months, the letter and spirit of
the statute is implemented. However, mere
failure to decide the case within three
months does not violate the statutory
mandate. In the latter case, the statutory
obligation will be defined by the quality of
the
efforts
made
to
decide
the
suit/proceeding with promptitude and
dispatch. The statutory obligation will be
discharged if the case is decided within a
reasonable time, after the expiry of three
months from the date of its institution.

33. Statutes of limitation are statutes
of repose. Statutes with time lines for
decision making are statutes of endeavour.
Statutory duty is discharged not only when
the act is done but also when effort is
made. However, the leeway to the
authority is not unlimited and the time to
accomplish the act is not indefinite.

34. The statutory duty of the trial
court/Sub-Divisional
Officer,
Phulpur,
District Allahabad, in the event the case is
not decided within three months is to be
seen.
The
trial
court/Sub-Divisional
Officer, Phulpur, District Allahabad in
discharge of its statutory duties has to
make earnest efforts to decide the case
expeditiously in a reasonable time after the
expiry of three months from the institution
of the suit. While the statutory duty of the
trial
court/Sub-Divisional
Officer,
Phulpur, District Allahabad is to make
earnest efforts to decide expeditiously, the
proof of its performance is in the ordersheet of the court. The order-sheet of the
2 All. Ram Sukh & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
193
trial
court/Sub-Divisional
Officer,
Phulpur, District Allahabad is the most
reliable evidence of the sincerity or
earnestness of the efforts made by the
appellate authority. The order-sheet of the
trial
court/Sub-Divisional
Officer,
Phulpur,
District
Allahabad
is
true
testimony to the accomplishment of the
statutory duty or the failure of the
authority to perform its statutory duty. In
the latter case the authority is liable to be
mandamused.

35. In the light of the legal position
stated above, the facts of the case will be
analyzed.

36. The ordersheet has been analysed
at length in the earlier part of the
judgment. A perusal of the order-sheet
discloses that the matter is being adjourned
repeatedly without any good reason and
that virtually no effective hearing has
taken place since the institution of the
proceedings in the year 2009. This
discloses a clear failure of the authority
below to perform its statutory functions
prescribed by law.

37. No lis can remain pending
indefinitely before a court of law.
Indefinite pendency of a lis goes to the
root of administration of justice. Such
delay is not permitted by law and cannot
be countenanced by the court.

38. In light of the preceding
discussion, a writ in the nature of
mandamus is issued commanding the
respondent
no.
2,
trial
court/SubDivisional
Officer,
Phulpur,
District
Allahabad, before whom the Case No. 269
of 2009-10 (Ram Sukh Vs Gram Sabha
and others) is pending to execute the
following directions:

I. The respondent no. 2, trial
court/Sub-Divisional
Officer,
Phulpur,
District Allahabad, shall decide the Case
No. 269 of 2009-10 (Ram Sukh Vs Gram
Sabha and others), after giving an
opportunity of hearing to all the parties to
the proceedings within a period of six
months from the date of receipt of a
certified copy of this order.

II. The respondent no. 2, trial
court/Sub-Divisional
Officer,
Phulpur,
District Allahabad, shall not grant any
unnecessary adjournment to the parties.

III. In case any adjournment is
granted in the paramount interest of
justice, the respondent no. 2, trial
court/Sub-Divisional
Officer,
Phulpur,
District Allahabad, shall impose costs not
below Rs. 10,000/- for each adjournment,
upon the party seeking adjournment.

IV. In case the counsel for any
party
does
not
appear
before
the
respondent
no.
2,
trial
court/SubDivisional
Officer,
Phulpur,
District
Allahabad, on any date on the ground of
strike of advocates, the respondent no. 2,
trial
court/Sub-Divisional
Officer,
Phulpur, District Allahabad, shall not
permit such counsel (of either party) to
appear in this case on future dates.

V. The respondent no. 2, trial
court/Sub-Divisional
Officer,
Phulpur,
District Allahabad, shall proceed with the
case on a day to day basis, if required, to
adhere to the above stipulated time line of
six months. In case the court is vacant the
Commissioner,
Prayagraj
Division,
Prayagraj, shall nominate another court
which is sitting to ensure that the above
stipulated time period of six months to
decide the case, is strictly adhered to.

39. With the aforesaid direction, the
writ petition is disposed of finally.
----------
194 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
(2020)02ILR A194

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 26.09.2019

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE RAMESH SINHA, J.
THE HON'BLE AJIT KUMAR, J.

Writ C No. 2946 of 2019

M/s Dwarka Creations & Ors. ..Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Amrendra Pratap Singh, Sti Subhendra
Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.,
Sri
Anuj
Pratap
Singh,
Sri
Prabhakar Awasthi

Petitioners-valid allotties of industrial plot by
the corporation respondent-allotment done on
20.04.2011-possession memo executed on
09.02.2016-entire premium paid-barely after 9
months from possession- notice issued for not
completing construction work within five yearsextension fee of Rs.12,29,859/- charged-fees
paid with some delay-no third party right
created-impugned order rejected renewal of
leas-illegal-quashed-W.P. allowed.

Held, such a situation, therefore, is quite
unhappy one and if Corporation's action in
taking such a coercive measure as is
reflected from the orders passed by the
Corporation from time to time in the present
case is justified, no one will come forward to
believe this Government agency and then it
will be a serious blow to the industrial policy.
(para 10)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ramesh Sinha, J.)

1. Heard Sri Amrendra Pratap Singh,
learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri
Prabhakar Awasthi, learned counsel for the
respondent Nos. 2 & 3 and learned
Standing Counsel for the State.

2. The petitioners are admittedly
valid allotties of the industrial plot by the
U.P.
State
Industrial
Development
Corporation Limited (hereinafter referred
to as 'Corporation') - the 2nd respondent.
The allotment of the plot was done on 20th
April, 2011 and the petitioners claim to
have paid the entire premium amount
between 1st July, 2012 and 1st July, 2017.
Consequently, a registered lease deed
came to be executed on 15th October,
2011. The petitioners' claim was that
though formal possession letter came to be
issued on 10th July, 2012 on account of
serious
opposition
by
the
villagers
blocking the passage to the plot but in the
absence of any clear approach to the plot,
the petitioners could not carry out the
exercise of construction work over the plot
and it is reiterated that virtually there was
no physical possession given of the plot.
Ultimately, the Corporation managed and
facilitated the physical possession of the
plot to the petitioners by executing the
possession memo on 9th February, 2016.
So, the petitioners claim, no project work
could be started prior to 9th February,
2016.