# Ram Yggya v. Addl. Commissioner J Faizabad & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 12 ILRA 334
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-12-17
- **Case number:** Writ C No. 3000129 of 2002
- **Bench:** Irshad Ali
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ram-yggya-v-addl-commissioner-j-faizabad-ors-52923
- **Pages:** 17

## Text

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334 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
this order is filed before him after giving
due opportunity to the affected parties;

(ii) In the eventuality the
application under Order VII Rule 11
C.P.C. is rejected, he shall proceed to
conclude the proceedings of Case
No.5788 of 2024 (Sant Harvindar Singh
vs. Amandeep Singh and others) filed
under Section 144 of the U.P. Revenue
Code,
2006,
within
a
period
as
contemplated para 458 of U.P. Revenue
Court Manual.

33. With the aforesaid observations
the writ petition is allowed, with no
order as to costs.

Exemption Application

In view of the order passed
today, the application is disposed of.
The presence of respondent no.2 is
exempted.
----------
(2025) 12 ILRA 334
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 17.12.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE IRSHAD ALI, J.

Writ C No. 3000129 of 2002

Ram Yggya ...Petitioner
Versus
Addl. Commissioner J Faizabad & Ors.
 ...Respondents

Issue for Consideration
Matter pertains to rejection of objection under
S. 11(2) of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on
Land Holdings Act in respect of Gata No. 613,
on the ground that the declaratory decree dated
03-01-1978 was post cut-off date 24-01-1971,
and whether the ceiling authorities were
justified in ignoring the decree, mutation entries
and long possession without adjudication on
merits. (Paras 2, 6, 7, 22)

Headnotes
Imposition of ceiling on land holdings act,
1960 - S. 11(2) - Objection by third
party/claimant - Maintainability - Persons
claiming
to
be
tenure-holders,
third
parties or those who assert possessory
rights are entitled to file objections under
S. 11(2) of the Ceiling Act and their
objections are required to be adjudicated
on merits - U.P. Zamindari Abolition and
Land Reforms Act, 1950 - Declaratory
decree under S. 229-B - Finality - Effect in
ceiling proceedings - Cannot be brushed
aside mechanically - Cut-off date (24-011971)
-
Post
cut-off
transactions
-
Distinction between fraudulent orders and
final unchallenged decrees - Revenue
entries (Class-9, Khasra, Khatauni)
-
Evidentiary value - Procedural compliance
under Land Records Manual - Requirement
of factual determination - Double entry of
land in ceiling khata and tenure-holder's
khatauni
-
Effect
-
Vitiates
ceiling
determination
if
proved
-
Fraud
-
Allegation
of
-
Nullity
doctrine
-
Requirement of adjudication - Cannot be
presumed. (Paras 23 - 38)
Held: A decree which has attained finality and
has not been challenged ordinarily must be
given effect to and is a relevant piece of
adjudicatory material - Persons claiming to be
tenure-holders, third parties or those who assert
possessory rights are entitled to file objections
under S. 11(2) of the Ceiling Act and their
objections are required to be adjudicated on
merits - The statutory bar against taking into
account transactions occurring after the cut-off
date 24.01.1971 is not an instrument for
obliterating antecedent rights - Procedural
irregularity is a question of fact to be
established by cogent material - and a summary
dismissal of the petitioner's objection without
examining such material is impermissible -
Double-recording of the same plot, if proved to
be a result of error or misidentification, vitiates
the ceiling determination - Neither authority
conducted
a
full
factual
inquiry
-
The
consequence is that the petitioner's right to
have his objections decided on merits was
12 All. Ram Yagya Vs. Addl. Commissioner J Faizabad & Ors.
335
denied - The impugned orders suffer from nonapplication of mind and failure to consider
governing judicial precedents - The impugned
order dated 30.03.2002 and the order dated
28.10.2002 are hereby quashed. (Paras 2328,39-42) (E-7)

Case Law Cited
Dirvijay Singh v. State of U.P., 1984 LCD
324; Shafir v. District Judge, Gonda, 1985
LCD 290; Abdul Hafiz Khan v. District
Judge, Bahraich, 1986 LCD 477; Hari Ram
v. Special Addl. District Judge, Faizabad,
1989 LCD 85; Ravindra Kaur Grewal v.
Manjeet Kaur, (2019) 8 SCC 729; S.P.
Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath, (1994)
1 SCC 1; A.V. Papayya Sastri v. Govt. of
A.P., (2007) 4 SCC 211; Mohd. Raza v.
D.D.C. Banda, 1990 AWC 605; Gurmukh
Singh v. D.D.C., 1997 (2) AWC 649;
Sabhai v. D.D.C. Faizabad, 2024 (1) AWC
812 (LB).

List of Acts
U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings
Act,1960; U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land
Reforms Act, 1950; Specific Relief Act, 1963;
Limitation Act,1963

List of Keywords
Surplus land; bhumidhar; Class-9 entries; PA-10
notice; fraud; final decree; double entry; Ceiling
Act;
Section
229-B;
Adverse
Possession;
Khatauni; Khasra; Mutation.

Case Arising From
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ C No. 3000129
of 2002, challenging the orders of the
Prescribed Authority (Ceiling) and the Additional
Commissioner (Appellate Authority) regarding
the determination of surplus land in Village
Rampur
Puwari,
District
Faizabad
(now
Ayodhya).

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant (Petitioner):
Dr. R.S. Pande, Senior Advocate
Assisted by Sri Virendra Bhatt
Advs. for the Respondents:
Sri S.P. Maurya, Learned Standing Counsel

(Delivered by Hon'ble Irshad Ali, J.)

1. Heard Dr. R.S. Pande, learned
Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Virendra
Bhatt, learned counsel for the petitioner and
Sri S.P. Maurya, learned Standing Counsel
for the State-respondent.

2. By means of the present writ
petition, the petitioner has prayed as under
:-

"(i) a suitable writ, order or
direction in the nature of certiorari
quashing the impugned order dated 30-32002 passed by opposite party No.2
contained in Annexure No-2 and order
dated 28-10-2002 passed by opposite party
No-1 contained in Annexure No-1 to this
petition.

(ii) ...

(iii) ..."

3. The dispute pertains to Gata No.
613, measuring 19 biswa and 5 biswansi,
situated in village Rampur Puwari, Pargana
Amsin, Tehsil and District Faizabad (now
Ayodhya).
Originally,
the
land
was
recorded in the name of late Shankar Singh
after the abolition of zamindari, and was
thereafter cultivated by Sita Ram, father of
the petitioner, since the year 1953. His
name was recorded in the Khasra and
subsequently in Khatauni Part-II under
Class-9 entries on the basis of continuous
possession.

4. On 9-8-1965, Smt. Dukharaji filed a
suit under Section 209 of U.P. Z.A. & L.R.
Act,
1950
seeking
declaration
and
possession. Her claim of Sirdari rights was
dismissed. On 3-1-1978, Sita Ram obtained
a decree under Section 229-B of the U.P.
Z.A. & L.R. Act, wherein he was declared
bhumidhar of Gata No. 613. Based on this
336 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
decree, his name was entered in Khatauni
for the years 1387-1392 Fasli. In ceiling
proceedings, Plot No. 613 was included as
surplus land by order dated 9-12-1976.

5.
Sita
Ram
thereafter
filed
a
correction
application
on
1-12-1978,
asserting that Gata No. 615, and not Gata
No. 613, should be treated as surplus. The
Prescribed Authority passed a correction
order on 17-04-1979, declaring Gata No.
615 surplus in place of Gata No. 613.

6. The petitioner filed an objection
under Section 11(2) of the Ceiling Act on
23-07-1997, asserting (i) that Gata No. 613
was wrongly treated as surplus because the
land had already been decreed in favour of
his father on 3-1-1978, (ii) that the entries
in
the
revenue
records
supported
continuous possession since 1953, and (iii)
that the case involved a double entry, one
in ceiling Khata No. 473 and another in
petitioner's Khatauni.

7. The Prescribed Authority rejected
the objection on 30-03-2002, holding that
(i) Gata No. 613 belonged to the original
tenure-holder Smt. Dukhrani, (ii) the decree
dated 03-01-1978 was passed after the cutoff date 24-01-1971, and any transaction or
declaration after the cut-off date is to be
ignored under Section 5(6) of the Ceiling
Act.

8.
The
Additional
Commissioner
dismissed
the
appeal
on
28-10-2002,
observing that (i) the order dated 03-01-1978
conferred no benefit upon the petitioner, (ii)
the correction order dated 17-04-1979 was
obtained by suppression of material facts and
without hearing the State or original tenureholder, (iii) and the ceiling notice (Form 3)
originally proposed to declare both Gata 613
and Gata 615 surplus.

9. Submission of learned counsel for the
petitioner is that the declaratory decree dated
03-01-1978 in Suit under Section 229-B has
attained finality and established Sita Ram's
rights as bhumidhar. The said decree has
never been challenged, and the name of
father of petitioner stood duly mutated in
revenue records.

10. Learned counsel for the petitioner
submits that the petitioner asserts possession
since 1953, corroborated by Class-9 entries in
Khasra and Khatauni Part-II, thus, Gata 613
could not have been treated as surplus land.

11. It is contended that Gata No. 613
was wrongly recorded twice-once in ceiling
Khata No. 473 and again in the petitioner's
Khatauni. Such double entry, it is submitted,
vitiates the ceiling determination.

12. Further submission of petitioner's
counsel is that the Prescribed Authority, upon
being satisfied that surplus land had been
wrongly identified, rightly corrected the
record by substituting Gata 615 in place of
Gata 613.

13. It is further urged that the ceiling
authorities failed to consider the decree of
1978 and the mutation entries which had
attained finality since 1953.

14. In support of the submission
advanced, learned counsel for the petitioner
placed reliance upon the following judgments
:-

(i) Dirvijay Singh Vs. State of
U.P. (1984 LCD 324). Relevant paragraph
3 is being quoted below :-

"3. I have heard the learned
counsel for the parties. Under the Act the
third party has a right to file the objection
12 All. Ram Yagya Vs. Addl. Commissioner J Faizabad & Ors.
337
u/s 11 (2) of the Act. The petitioner being a
third party could file the objection. Only
the question of delay was required to be
considered. The objection could not be
rejected merely because the matter was
contested by the recorded tenure holder
upto High Court. That will not put to an
end to the right of the claimant. The view
taken by the prescribed authority and the
District Judge is manifestly erroneous and
cannot be sustained."

(ii) Shafir Vs. District Judge
Gonda
(1985
LCD
290).
Relevant
paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 are being quoted
below :-

"8. Learned counsel for the
petitioners has urged that the Prescribed
Authority has rejected the objection filed by
the petitioner under Section 10(2) of the
Act merely on the ground that in the ceiling
proceedings
the
Prescribed
Authority
cannot
determine
the
claim
of
the
petitioners who have claimed sirdari rights
over certain plots of the disputed holding
on the ground of adverse possession for
more than the prescribed period of
limitation. It was urged that the Prescribed
Authority has wrongly refused to consider
the claim of the petitioners on merits which
should have been considered and decided
on merits according to law in view of the
decision of the Full Bench of this Court in
the Case 'Upper Ganges Sugar Mills Ltd.',
reported in 1967 ALJ 556 and also in
Dilbagh Singh's case reported in 1978 ALJ
717. I find much substance in the
contention of the learned counsel for the
petitioners.

9. In Dilbagh Singh's case
(Dilbagh Singh v. State of U.P.,) it was
held by the Division Bench that Section
11(2) permits a tenure-holder to file
objections. Such tenure-holders may be
those who have been served with a notice
and a statement under Section 10(2). It also
includes tenure-holders who have not been
given or served with any such notice or
statement. The construction put by the Full
Bench also embraces persons who claim to
be tenure-holders and who having come to
know of the declaration of their land as
surplus land of some other person wish to
challenge that declaration or notification
thereof in the gazette under Section 14.
They are all entitled to file an objection
under
Section
11(2)
and
get
an
adjudication thereon as required by Section
12.

10. In this view of the matter I
find that the objection which the petitioners
had filed required to be decided on merits
under Section 12. The petitioners have
claimed that they are tenure-holders of
certain plots of the disputed holding
recorded in the name of opposite party No.
4. They thus claimed that opposite party
No. 4 is not tenure-holder of those plots
and the petitioners have acquired rights by
adverse possession having remained in
adverse possession for more than the
prescribed period. Thus those plots could
not be shown in the notice issued to the
opposite party No. 4 under Section 10(2) of
the Act nor the same could be treated to be
holding of the opposite party No. 4 and
declared surplus land in his hands because
in
the
event
petitioners
succeed
in
establishing their Sirdari rights and title by
adverse possession over the land in dispute
it could not be treated to be part of the
holding of opposite party No. 4. The
Prescribed
Authority,
therefore,
was
required to determine this question on
merits as to whether the plots, which were
claimed by the petitioners as their Sirdari
land could be factually and legally
338 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
sustained or not. The Prescribed Authority
should, therefore, consider the claim of the
petitioners
after
giving
them
full
opportunity to lead evidence in support of
their claim. The opposite party No. 4 will
also be given opportunity to contest the
claim of the petitioners. Even in the case
which has been remanded by the learned
District Judge for considering the claim of
opposite party No. 4 for being decided by
now on merits, the Prescribed Authority
will consider the objections filed by the
Petitioners on merits in respect of the plots
in which they have claimed rights by
adverse possession. The objection would be
treated to be maintainable as one under
Section 11(2) of the Act as held by this
Court in the aforesaid decisions and will be
decided on merits even if the land in which
petitioners have claimed title by adverse
possession has been notified under Section
14(1) of the Act because the deletion of
Section 14(2) will not bar maintainability
of such objection, as held in Ram Kumar
Singh v. State of U.P., [ Writ Petition No.
981 of 1976.] decided on 10-10-1984."

(iii) Abdul Hafiz Khan &
another Vs. District Judge Bahraich &
others
(1986
LCD
477).
Relevant
paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 are being quoted
below :-

"7. So far as the question
regarding maintainability of objection
under Section 11(2) of the Act after the
surplus land had been notified under
Section 14(1) of the Act, is concerned, I
find that it stands concluded by a Full
Bench Decisions of this Court in Baldeo
Singh v. State of U.P., [1980 L.L.J. 31.] .
According to the majority view expressed
in the said decision an objection can be
entertained under Section 11(2) of the Act
even after the surplus land had been
notified under Section 14(1) of the Act. The
deletion of Sub-section (3) of Section 14 of
the Act will not affect the tenability of that
objection. In this view I do not find any
merit in the contention of the learned
Standing Counsel that the petitioners had
no right to file objection under Section
11(2) of the Act. Even if the name of the
objectors is not recorded over the land in
dispute as tenure-holder they could file an
objection under Section 11(2) of the Act as
held by the Full Bench of this Court in
Upper Ganges Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Civil
Judge, Bijnor [1969 A.L.J. 556.] ,

8. In the present case the
petitioner had filed an objection on 28th
October, 1978 (Annexure-4) asserting that
they are the tenure-holders of the land
which they had received in the aforesaid
decree for partition and that the opposite
party No. 4 Nazim Ali Khan is not the
tenure-holder of the land situate in village
Kanjarwa and
his
surplus
land
be
determined excluding the land of village
Kanjarwa, which belongs to the petitioner.
This objection was filed under Section 13-A
of the Act though in fact it purported to be
an objection under Section 11(2) of the Act
and deserved to be treated as such for
deciding it on merits. It is well settled that
wrong mentioning of the section or nor
mentioning a correct section in the
objection filed would not by itself disentitle
an objector to appropriate relief which the
Prescribed Authority could grant to the
objector in accordance with the law. In
Ram Kumar Singh v. State of U.P. [1985
L.L.J. 81.] . I had an occasion to consider
similar question, whether an objection filed
under sub-section (3) of Section 14 could
or could not be treated to be one under
Section 11(2) of the Act. It was held in Ram
Kumar Singh's case (supra) that even
without formal application for amendment
12 All. Ram Yagya Vs. Addl. Commissioner J Faizabad & Ors.
339
the Prescribed Authority (Ceiling) should
have proceeded to decided the objection
treating it to be one under Section 11(2) of
the Act because wrong mentioning of
section or not mentioning of correct section
in the objection not by itself disentitle the
objector to the appropriate relief which the
Prescribed
Authority
could
grant
in
accordance with the law.

9. In Abdul Rahman v. The
Prescribed Authority [1979 A.C.J. 10.] a
similar question arose for consideration
before the Division Bench and it was held
:-

"Although the application made
by the petitioners purported to be under
Section 13-A of the Act it was substantially
an objection under Section 11(2), of the
Act."

The Prescribed Authority in the
aforesaid case was, therefore, directed to
consider the claim of the petitioners
treating the application as an objection
under Section 11(2) of the Act."

(iv)
Hari
Ram
v.
Special
Additional District Judge Faizabad &
others (1989 LCD 85). Relevant paragraph
7 is being quoted below :-

"In view of the discussion held
above, it is clear that the petitioners had to
be heard and their objections had to be
treated as objections under Section 11(2) of
the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land
Holdings Act, specifically when the land
was recorded in the revenue records in
their names in pursuance of an order of
mutation passed in their favour. It will not
affect their case if earlier any order was
passed in proceedings between Chandra
Bhan Singh and others and the State. As a
matter of fact, under the first proviso to
Rule 8 of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on
Land Holdings Rules, a notice should have
been issued to the petitioners as well. The
opposite
parties
have
dismissed
the
objections and the appeal preferred by the
petitioners erroneously. The matter had to
be considered on merits on the objections
filed by the petitioners."

(v) Ravindra Kaur Grewal v.
Manjeet Kaur [(2019) 8 SCC 729] on
adverse possession. Relevant paragraphs
13, 14 and 20 are being quoted below :-

"13. In Somnath Burman v. S.P.
Raju [Somnath Burman v. S.P. Raju,
(1969) 3 SCC 129 : AIR 1970 SC 846] ,
this Court has recognised the right of a
person having possessory title to obtain a
declaration that he was the owner of the
land in a suit and an injunction restraining
the defendant from interfering with his
possession.
This
Court
has
further
observed that Section 9 of the Specific
Relief Act, 1963 is in no way inconsistent
with the position that as against a
wrongdoer,
prior
possession
of
the
plaintiff, in an action of ejectment is
sufficient title even if the suit is brought
more than six months after the act of
dispossession complained of and that the
wrongdoer cannot successfully resist the
suit by showing that the title and the right
to possession vested in a third party. This
Court has observed:

"10.
In
Narayana
Row
v.
Dharmachar
[Narayana
Row
v.
Dharmachar, ILR (1903) 26 Mad 514] a
Bench of the Madras High Court consisting
of Bhashyam Ayyangar and Moore, JJ.
held that possession is, under the Indian, as
under the English law, good title against
all but the true owner. Section 9 of the
340 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Specific Relief Act is in no way inconsistent
with the position that as against a
wrongdoer,
prior
possession
of
the
plaintiff, in an action of ejectment, is
sufficient title, even if the suit be brought
more than six months after the act of
dispossession complained of and that the
wrongdoer cannot successfully resist the
suit by showing that the title and right to
possession are in a third person. The same
view was taken by the Bombay High Court
in Krishnarao Yashwant v. Vasudev Apaji
Ghotikar [Krishnarao Yashwant v. Vasudev
Apaji Ghotikar, ILR (1884) 8 Bom 871] .
That was also the view taken by the
Allahabad High Court-see Umrao Singh
v. Ramji Das [Umrao Singh v. Ramji Das,
1913 SCC OnLine All 56 : ILR (1914) 36
All 51] , Wali Ahmad Khan v. Ajudhia
Kandu [Wali Ahmad Khan v. Ajudhia
Kandu, 1891 SCC OnLine All 38 : ILR
(1891) 13 All 537] . In Subodh Gopal Bose
v. Province of Bihar [Subodh Gopal Bose
v. Province of Bihar, 1949 SCC OnLine Pat
30 : AIR 1950 Pat 222] the Patna High
Court adhered to the view taken by the
Madras, Bombay and Allahabad High
Courts. The contrary view taken by the
Calcutta High Court in Debi Churn Boldo
v. Issur Chunder Manjee [Debi Churn
Boldo v. Issur Chunder Manjee, ILR (1883)
9 Cal 39] ; Ertaza Hossein v. Bany Mistry
[Ertaza Hossein v. Bany Mistry, ILR (1883)
9 Cal 130] , Purmeshur Chowdhry v. Brijo
Lall Chowdhry [Purmeshur Chowdhry v.
Brijo Lall Chowdhry, ILR (1890) 17 Cal
256] and Nisa Chand Gaita v. Kanchiram
Bagani [Nisa Chand Gaita v. Kanchiram
Bagani, ILR (1899) 26 Cal 579] , in our
opinion does not lay down the law
correctly."(emphasis supplied)

It is apparent from the aforesaid
decision that a person is entitled to bring a
suit of possessory title to obtain possession
even though the title may vest in a third
person. A person in the possessory title can
get
injunction
also,
restraining
the
defendant
from
interfering
with
his
possession.

14.
Given
the
aforesaid,
a
question to ponder is when a person having
no title, merely on the strength of
possessory title can obtain an injunction
and can maintain a suit for ejectment of a
trespasser. Why a person who has
perfected his title by way of adverse
possession cannot file a suit for obtaining
an injunction protecting possession and for
recovery
of
possession
in
case
his
dispossession is by a third person or by an
owner after the extinguishment of his title.
In case a person in adverse possession has
perfected his title by adverse possession
and after the extinguishment of the title of
the true owner, he cannot be successfully
dispossessed by a true owner as the owner
has lost his right, title and interest.

20. There is an acquisition of title
by adverse possession as such, such a
person in the capacity of a plaintiff can
always use the plea in case any of his rights
are
infringed
including
in
case
of
dispossession. In Mandal Revenue Officer
v. Goundla Venkaiah [Mandal Revenue
Officer v. Goundla Venkaiah, (2010) 2 SCC
461 : (2010) 1 SCC (Civ) 466 : (2010) 1
SCC (Cri) 1501] this Court has referred to
the decision in State of Rajasthan v.
Harphool Singh [State of Rajasthan v.
Harphool Singh, (2000) 5 SCC 652] in
which the suit was filed by the plaintiff
based on acquisition of title by adverse
possession. This Court has referred to
other decisions also in Annakili v. A.
Vedanayagam
[Annakili
v.
A.
Vedanayagam, (2007) 14 SCC 308] and
P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma
12 All. Ram Yagya Vs. Addl. Commissioner J Faizabad & Ors.
341
[P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma,
(2007) 6 SCC 59] . It has been observed
that there can be an acquisition of title by
adverse possession. It has also been
observed
that
adverse
possession
effectively shifts the title already distanced
from the paper owner to the adverse
possessor. Right thereby accrues in favour
of the adverse possessor. This Court has
considered the matter thus:

"48. In State of Rajasthan v.
Harphool Singh [State of Rajasthan v.
Harphool Singh, (2000) 5 SCC 652] , this
Court considered the question whether the
respondents had acquired title by adverse
possession over the suit land situated at
Nohar-Bhadra Road at Nohar within the
State of Rajasthan. The suit filed by the
respondent
against
his
threatened
dispossession was decreed by the trial
court with the finding that he had acquired
title by adverse possession. The first and
second appeals preferred by the State
Government were dismissed by the lower
appellate court and the High Court
respectively. This Court reversed the
judgments and decrees of the courts below
as also of the High Court and held that the
respondent-plaintiff could not substantiate
his claim of perfection of title by adverse
possession. Some of the observations made
on the issue of acquisition of title by
adverse possession which have bearing on
this case are extracted below: (SCC p. 660,
para 12)

'12. So far as the question of
perfection of title by adverse possession
and that too in respect of public property is
concerned, the question requires to be
considered more seriously and effectively
for the reason that it ultimately involves
destruction of right/title of the State to
immovable property and conferring upon a
third-party encroacher title where he had
none. The decision in P. Lakshmi Reddy v.
L. Lakshmi Reddy [P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L.
Lakshmi Reddy, AIR 1957 SC 314] ,
adverted
to
the
ordinary
classical
requirement - that it should be nec vi, nec
clam, nec precario - that is the possession
required must be adequate in continuity, in
publicity, and in extent to show that it is
possession adverse to the competitor. It
was also observed therein that whatever
may be the animus or intention of a person
wanting to acquire title by adverse
possession, his adverse possession cannot
commence
until
he
obtains
actual
possession with the required animus.'

50. Before concluding, we may
notice two recent judgments in which law
on the question of acquisition of title by
adverse possession has been considered
and
reiterated.
In
Annakili
v.
A.
Vedanayagam
[Annakili
v.
A.
Vedanayagam, (2007) 14 SCC 308] , the
Court observed as under: (SCC p. 316,
para 24)

'24. Claim by adverse possession
has two elements: (1) the possession of the
defendant should become adverse to the
plaintiff; and (2) the defendant must
continue to remain in possession for a
period of 12 years thereafter. Animus
possidendi as is well known is a requisite
ingredient of adverse possession. It is now
a well-settled principle of law that mere
possession of the land would not ripen into
possessory title for the said purpose.
Possessor must have animus possidendi
and hold the land adverse to the title of the
true owner. For the said purpose, not only
animus possidendi must be shown to exist,
but the same must be shown to exist at the
commencement of the possession. He must
continue in the said capacity for the period
342 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
prescribed under the Limitation Act. Mere
long possession, it is trite, for a period of
more than 12 years without anything more
does not ripen into a title.'

51. In P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy
v. Revamma [P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy v.
Revamma, (2007) 6 SCC 59] , the Court
considered various facets of the law of
adverse possession and laid down various
propositions including the following: (SCC
pp. 66 & 68, paras 5 & 8)

'8. ... to assess a claim of adverse
possession,
two-pronged
enquiry
is
required:

1.
Application
of
limitation
provision thereby jurisprudentially "wilful
neglect" element on part of the owner
established. Successful application in this
regard distances the title of the land from
the paper-owner.

2. Specific positive [Ed.: The
matter between two asterisks has been
emphasised in original as well.] intention
to dispossess [Ed.: The matter between two
asterisks has been emphasised in original
as well.] on the part of the adverse
possessor effectively shifts the title already
distanced from the paper-owner, to the
adverse possessor. Right thereby accrues in
favour of adverse possessor as [Ed.: The
matter between two asterisks has been
emphasised in original as well.] intent to
dispossess [Ed.: The matter between two
asterisks has been emphasised in original
as well.] is an express statement of urgency
and intention in the upkeep of the property.
(emphasis in original)'"

 (emphasis supplied)"

15. On the other hand, learned
Standing
Counsel
submits
that
any
declaratory decree, transfer, application or
correction made after 24-01-1971 must be
ignored while determining surplus land.
The
decree
dated
03-01-1978
and
correction order dated 17-04-1979 are,
therefore, legally irrelevant.

16. It is further submitted by learned
Standing Counsel that Gata No. 613 was
declared surplus on 09-12-1976, which was
never challenged by the original tenureholder, Smt. Dukhrani. The authorities
validly took possession under Section 14.
The
respondents
contend
that
the
application dated 01-12-1978 was based on
incorrect facts, that no opportunity of
hearing was given to the State or original
tenure-holder, and the order dated 17-041979 was passed on misrepresentation and
is void.

17. In support of his submission, he
placed
reliance
upon
the
following
judgments :-

(i) S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v.
Jagannath [1994 (1) SCC 1]. Relevant
paragraphs 5 and 6 are being quoted below
:-

"5. The High Court, in our view,
fell into patent error. The short question
before the High Court was whether in the
facts and circumstances of this case,
Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree
by playing fraud on the court. The High
Court, however, went haywire and made
observations which are wholly perverse.
We do not agree with the High Court that
"there is no legal duty cast upon the
plaintiff to come to court with a true case
and prove it by true evidence". The
principle of "finality of litigation" cannot
be pressed to the extent of such an
absurdity that it becomes an engine of
12 All. Ram Yagya Vs. Addl. Commissioner J Faizabad & Ors.
343
fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants.
The courts of law are meant for imparting
justice between the parties. One who comes
to the court, must come with clean hands.
We are constrained to say that more often
than not, process of the court is being
abused. Property-grabbers, tax-evaders,
bank-loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous
persons from all walks of life find the
court-process a convenient lever to retain
the illegal gains indefinitely. We have no
hesitation to say that a person, who's case
is based on falsehood, has no right to
approach the court. He can be summarily
thrown out at any stage of the litigation.

6. The facts of the present case
leave no manner of doubt that Jagannath
obtained the preliminary decree by playing
fraud on the court. A fraud is an act of
deliberate deception with the design of
securing something by taking unfair
advantage of another. It is a deception in
order to gain by another's loss. It is a
cheating intended to get an advantage.
Jagannath was working as a clerk with
Chunilal
Sowcar.
He
purchased
the
property in the court auction on behalf of
Chunilal Sowcar. He had, on his own
volition, executed the registered release
deed (Ex. B-15) in favour of Chunilal
Sowcar regarding the property in dispute.
He knew that the appellants had paid the
total decretal amount to his master
Chunilal Sowcar. Without disclosing all
these facts, he filed the suit for the partition
of the property on the ground that he had
purchased the property on his own behalf
and not on behalf of Chunilal Sowcar. Nonproduction and even non-mentioning of the
release deed at the trial is tantamount to
playing fraud on the court. We do not agree
with the observations of the High Court
that the appellants-defendants could have
easily produced the certified registered
copy of Ex. B-15 and non-suited the
plaintiff. A litigant, who approaches the
court, is bound to produce all the
documents executed by him which are
relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a
vital document in order to gain advantage
on the other side then he would be guilty of
playing fraud on the court as well as on the
opposite party."

(ii) A.V. Papayya Sastri v.
Govt. of A.P. [2007 (4) SCC 211].
Relevant paragraphs 22, 26, 38 and 39 are
being quoted below :-

"22. It is thus settled proposition
of law that a judgment, decree or order
obtained by playing fraud on the court,
tribunal or authority is a nullity and non
est in the eye of the law. Such a judgment,
decree or order-by the first court or by
the final court-has to be treated as nullity
by every court, superior or inferior. It can
be challenged in any court, at any time, in
appeal, revision, writ or even in collateral
proceedings.

26. Fraud may be defined as an
act of deliberate deception with the design
of securing some unfair or undeserved
benefit by taking undue advantage of
another. In fraud one gains at the loss of
another. Even most solemn proceedings
stand vitiated if they are actuated by fraud.
Fraud is thus an extrinsic collateral act
which vitiates all judicial acts, whether in
rem or in personam. The principle of
"finality of litigation" cannot be stretched
to the extent of an absurdity that it can be
utilised as an engine of oppression by
dishonest and fraudulent litigants.

38. The matter can be looked at
from a different angle as well. Suppose, a
case is decided by a competent court of law
344 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
after hearing the parties and an order is
passed in favour of the plaintiff applicant
which is upheld by all the courts including
the final court. Let us also think of a case
where this Court does not dismiss special
leave petition but after granting leave
decides the appeal finally by recording
reasons. Such order can truly be said to be
a judgment to which Article 141 of the
Constitution applies. Likewise, the doctrine
of merger also gets attracted. All orders
passed by the courts/authorities below,
therefore, merge in the judgment of this
Court and after such judgment, it is not
open to any party to the judgment to
approach any court or authority to review,
recall or reconsider the order.

39. The above principle, however,
is subject to exception of fraud. Once it is
established that the order was obtained by
a successful party by practising or playing
fraud, it is vitiated. Such order cannot be
held legal, valid or in consonance with law.
It is non-existent and non est and cannot be
allowed to stand. This is the fundamental
principle of law and needs no further
elaboration. Therefore, it has been said
that a judgment, decree or order obtained
by fraud has to be treated as a nullity,
whether by the court of first instance or by
the final court. And it has to be treated as
non est by every court, superior or
inferior."

18. It is submitted that entries not
made as per the procedure in Land Records
Manual have no evidentiary value. The
Class-9 entries relied upon by petitioner
were made without proper notice to the
original tenure-holder.

19. Learned Standing Counsel further
placed reliance on the following judgments
:-

(i) Mohd. Raza Vs. D.D.C.
Banda
(1990
AWC
605).
Relevant
paragraphs 14, 15 and 16 are being quoted
below :-

"14. The other case in Srinath v.
D.D.C., 1983 Rev. Dec. 53 : (1983 All LJ
453), it was held that the procedure under
Para A-80 and A-81 of the U.P, Land
Records Manual not having been followed
on the relevant date such entries cannot be
relied upon the also no mention of the oral
evidence which was not material would not
be sufficient ground for interference in writ
jurisdiction.

15. In Ganga Ram v. D.D.C.,
(1981) UPLTNOC 213) decided by Hon.
K.N. Misra, J. (supra) it was held that the
right of adverse possession cannot be
acquired on the basis of such entries in
which P.A. 10 notice were not served on
the recorded tenure holder.

Similarly in Ram Sakal v. State of
U.P., 1987 Rev. Dec. 264 : (1987 All LJ
1218) it was held that entries, if not made
in the revenue record in accordance with
the procedure prescribed under law cannot
confer any right in case P.A. 10 notice
were not issued and served on the main
tenant whose rights are short to be
extinguished by the trespasser.

16. In view of the discussions
made above I am of the view that the
entries in the revenue papers in favour of
the petitioner were not prepared by
following the procedure prescribed under
Paras A-80, A-81 and Para 423(5) of the
U.P. Land Records Manual and P.A. 10
notice were not served on the main tenant
respondent No. 2. Such entries were of no
evidentiary value and would not confer any
right to the petitioner nor they can be of
12 All. Ram Yagya Vs. Addl. Commissioner J Faizabad & Ors.
345
any
assistance
leading
to
the
extinguishment of the right of the tenureholder, the respondent No. 2. As regards
the oral evidence of petitioner, the person
claiming right under Section 210 of the
U.P.
Zamindari
Abolition
and
Land
Reforms
Act,
and
the
statement
of
respondent No. 2 the person who was main
tenant and whose rights were tried to be
proved to have come to an end under
Section 210 have been considered. It
cannot be said that the Deputy Director of
Consolidation has overlooked or failed to
consider the material oral evidence on the
record. I accordingly do not find any
substance in the submission of the learned
counsel for the petitioner and the objection
of respondent No. 2 under S. 9(2) of the Act
was correctly allowed. There has been no
ground made out for interference in the
impugned order under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India."

(ii) Gurmukh Singh & another
Vs. D.D.C./ A.D.M. (F. & R.) Nainital &
others [1997 (2) AWC 649]. Relevant
paragraphs 6 and 10 are being quoted
below :-

"6. It is clear from para 102-C of
the Land Records Manual that the entries
will have no evidenciary value if they are
not made in accordance with the provisions
of Land Records Manual. There is
presumption of correctness of the entries
provided it is made in accordance with the
relevant provision of Land Records Manual
and secondly, in case where a person is
claiming adverse possession against the
recorded tenure holder and he denies that
he had not received any P.A. 10 or he had
no knowledge of the entries made in the
revenue records, the burden of proof is
further upon the person claiming adverse
possession to prove that the tenure holder
was duly given notice in prescribed form
P.A. 10. Para A-81 itself provides that the
notice will be given by the Lekhpal and he
will obtain the signature of the Chairman,
Land Management Committee as well as
from the recorded tenure holder. It is also
otherwise necessary to be provided by the
person claiming adverse possession. The
law of adverse possession contemplates
that there is not only continuity of
possession as against the true owner but
also that such person had full knowledge
that the person in possession was claiming
a title and possession hostile to the true
owner. If a person comes in possession of
the land of another person, he cannot
establish his title by adverse possession
unless it is further proved by him that the
tenure holder had knowledge of such
adverse possession.

10. The petitioners led evidence
to prove adverse possession. They relied
upon the Khatauni 1375-1377 F and also
twelve year Khasra, 1386-1397 F. Surjan
Singh, father of the petitioners also
tendered oral evidence. Khatauni 1375 F
indicated that respondent No. 3 Mangal
Singh, father of respondent No. 4 was
recorded as sirdar of the land in dispute. In
column No. 9 there is entry that Jagtar
Singh is in possession and has been shown
in column No. 9 in respect of plot No. 150.
This entry is alleged to have been made by
the Supervisor Qanungo.