# Rama Shanker Pandey v. Ram Raj and others - **Citation:** (2003) 1 ILRA 23 - **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad - **Decided:** 2002-12-05 - **Case number:** First Appeal From Order No. 660 of 2002 - **Bench:** B.K. Rathi - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/rama-shanker-pandey-v-ram-raj-and-others-39989 - **Pages:** 3 ## Headnote Motor Vehicles Act 1988- Section 173 (3)- Appeal filed without depositing the amount as per provisions of new Act- pleas taken by the appellant about the date of cause of action as well as the pre condition of deposit is under 173 of the new Act while the Appeal has been filed under section 110-B- can not be sustained- Held- para 6 In view of this decision of the Apex Court which is directly on the point, the argument of the learned counsel cannot be accepted and it is also not necessary for me to consider in detail the law laid down in the above referred case. Case law discussed: 1933 Suppl (2) SCC-724 1987 (3) SCC-516 AIR 1955 SC-84 AIR 1953 SC-21 ## Text http://www.allahabadhighcourt.nic.in 1 All] Rama Shankar Pandey Vs. Ram Raj and others 23 petitioners shall also be declared forthwith so that they may be entitled to join/attend the next semester and to proceed with their studies in accordance with law. So far papers in which the petitioners could not appear the respondents 1/2 will do the needful in accordance with law. --------- APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL SIDE DATED: ALLAHABAD 5 DECEMBER, 2002 BEFORE THE HON'BLE B.K. RATHI, J. First Appeal From Order No. 660 of 2002 Rama Shanker Pandey ...Appellant Versus Ram Raj and others ...Respondents Counsel for the Appellant: Sri Bharat Ji Agarwal Sri S.D. Singh Counsel for the Respondents: Motor Vehicles Act 1988- Section 173 (3)- Appeal filed without depositing the amount as per provisions of new Act- pleas taken by the appellant about the date of cause of action as well as the pre condition of deposit is under 173 of the new Act while the Appeal has been filed under section 110-B- can not be sustained- Held- para 6 In view of this decision of the Apex Court which is directly on the point, the argument of the learned counsel cannot be accepted and it is also not necessary for me to consider in detail the law laid down in the above referred case. Case law discussed: 1933 Suppl (2) SCC-724 1987 (3) SCC-516 AIR 1955 SC-84 AIR 1953 SC-21 (Delivered by Hon'ble B.K. Rathi, J.) 1. This appeal has been preferred against the award given by the Motor Accident claims Tribunal Chitrakoot. The stamp reporter has reported that the amount as required under the proviso of Section 173 (3) as condition precedent for admission of the appeal, has not been deposited. The deposit is pre-condition for the admission of the appeal. 2. I have heard Sri Bharatji Agarwal, learned Sr. Advocate assisted by Sri S.D. Singh for the appellant. 3. It has been argued that the accident in this case took place on 15.1.1984 when the old Motor Vehicles Act (herein after referred to as the Act) was in force. That the new Act was enforced from 1.7.1989 and thereafter the application for compensation was moved. It has been argued that right to claim compensation accrued under the old act and the same has been protected under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. It has therefore been argued that the claim petition shall be considered to have filed under Section 110-A of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. That the proceedings also took place under the said Section and therefore the appellant has right to appeal under Section 110-D of the said Act. That the appeal has not been filed under Section 173 of the new Act of 1988 and therefore, the proviso to Section 173 of the new Act does not apply. 4. The learned counsel in support of the argument has referred to Section 6 of the General Clauses Act and has argued that the right has accrued which is http://www.allahabadhighcourt.nic.in 24 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2003 protected under clause 6 (e) after the repeal of 1988 Act. The learned counsel in support of the argument has also referred to the following decisions- (1) M/s P.V. Mohammad Barmay Sons Vs. Director of Enforcement 1933 Supp (2) Supreme Court Cases Page 724, (2) Commissioner of Income Tax, U.P. Vs. M/s Shah Sadiq and sons (1987)3 Supreme Court Cases Page 516, (3) State of Punjab vs. Mohan Singh Pratap Singh, AIR 1955 SC page 84 AND (4) M/s Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and others AIR 1953 Sup, Court Page 221 5. I have considered the decision of all these cases, in which the rights which accrued under the repealed Act have been protected under Section 6 (e) of General Clauses Act were considered by the Apex Court in various cases. However, none of these case is regarding the rights accrued under the old Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, after its repeal. There is direct decision of the Apex Court in the case of Motor Vehicles Act which is otherwise. I may refer to the decision of Apex Court in Vinod Gurudas Raikar Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and others, AIR 1991 Supreme Court page 2156. It was held in this case as under : "Where the accident took place when the old Motor Vehicles Act was in force, however, the claim petition was filed after the repeal of the old Act and the new Act came into force, the case would be covered by the new Act and delay for a longer period than six months could not be condoned. In such a case, Cl. (e) of Sec. 6 of General Clauses Act is not attracted because by the enactment of the new law the remedy of the claimant has not been affected at all. His right to claim compensation by filing the claim within the same period of limitation has been preserved. And there was no application for condonation of delay in a proceeding pending at the time of repeal so as to allow him to claim any privilege available under the old Act. Though the claimant earlier could file an application even more than six months after the expiry of the period of limitations, but this cannot be treated to be a right which the appellant had acquired. The claim to compensation which the claimant was; entitled to by reason of the accident was certainly enforceable as a right. It cannot be said in such a case that the present case must be considered as one where an accrued right has been affected, because the option to move an application for condonation of delay belatedly filed should be treated as a right. There is a vital difference between an application claiming compensation and a prayer to condone the delay in filing such an application. Liberty to apply for a right is not in itself an accrued right or privilege. Moreover, claimant's right to claim compensation was not affected at all by the substitution of one Act with another. Since the period of limitation remained the same there was no question of the claimant being taken by surprise. So far the question of condonation of six months delay was concerned, there was no change in the position under the new Act." http://www.allahabadhighcourt.nic.in 1 All] Mazhar Alam Khan Vs. Union of India and others 25 6. In view of this decision of the Apex Court which is directly on the point, the argument of the learned counsel cannot be accepted and it is also not necessary for me to consider in detail the law laid down in the above referred case. 7. The objections of the appellant are accordingly rejected. The appellant is liable to deposit the amount as required by the proviso of Section 173 of the Act. Accordingly, list this appeal as and when the amount is deposited. --------- APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL SIDE DATED: ALLAHABAD 5 DECEMBER, 2002 BEFORE THE HON'BLE B.K. RATHI, J. Second Appeal No. 1217 of 2001 Mazhar Alam Khan ...Appellant Versus Union of India and others ...Respondents Counsel for the Appellant: Sri M. Islam Sri Anil Kumar Sharma Counsel for the Respondents: Srik Jagan Nath Singh Code of Civil Procedure- Section 100- Appellant working as Rakshak" after displinary proceeding removed from service- confirmed by appellate authority- challenged before civil court- Trial court decreed the suit first Appellate Court interfered with the findings of fact- held - dismissal order passed by the Assistant Security officer, while the appointing authority is the Chief Security officer- held - Delegate can not delegate- in absence of any authority regarding delegation of power- order passed by the A.C.O. is illegal. Therefore, the contention that the power was not according to the law as the same could not be delegated. Accordingly, the order of Assistant Security Officer dated 22.5.1985 removing the appellant from service is without jurisdiction and is void. The order of dismissal of appeal is therefore also illegal. (Delivered by Hon'ble B.K. Rathi, J.) 1. This is an appeal under Section 100 of C.P.C. against the judgment and decree of the Appellate Court dated 18.3.1993 passed in Civil Appeal No. 78 of 1991. 2. I have heard Sri Anil Kumar Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri Jagan Nath Singh for the respondents. 3. There is no dispute regarding the facts of the case which may briefly be narrated as follows . 4. The appellant was working as 'Rakashak' Railway Protection force. Disciplinary proceedings were started against him and after competition of enquiry he was removed from the service by Assistant Security officer. The appellant preferred an appeal against that order before the Commandant Railway Protection Force, which has also been dismissed. Therefore, the appellant filed a suit for declaration that the order of removal dated 29.9.1986 are illegal and void and that he be treated in service and is also entitled to the salary and the other benefits of service. The respondents contested the suit and alleged that the appellant was rightly dismissed from the service. The trial court framed necessary