# Ramashankar Yadav And Anr v. Union of India & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 10 ILRA 738
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-10-15
- **Case number:** Writ C No. 26529 of 2025
- **Bench:** Mahesh Chandra Tripathi, Anish Kumar Gupta
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ramashankar-yadav-and-anr-v-union-of-india-ors-52718
- **Pages:** 14

## Headnote

Ravi
Kant,
A.S.G.I.,
C
S.C.,
Pranjal
Mehrotra

Issue for Consideration
Matter pertains to "whether the present writ
petition is maintainable in view of the statutory
remedy available under S. 34 of the Arbitration
Act, 1996."

Headnotes
Constitution of India, Art. 226 - Writ
petition
challenging
compensation
determined by Arbitrator under S. 3G (5)
of the National Highways Act, 1956 -
Maintainability - writ jurisdiction under
Article 226 should ordinarily not be
exercised
when
an
adequate
and
efficacious alternative remedy is available
- National Highways Act, 1956, S.s 3G(5),
3G(6) - Statutory scheme - Arbitration
under S. 3G(5) is a "comprehensive
statutory framework" and the "provisions
of the Arbitration Act, 1996 shall apply" -
Challenges
must
be
under
S.
34
Arbitration
Act
-
Arbitration
and
Conciliation Act, 1996, S. 34 - Adequacy
or quantum of compensation - Falls within
statutory challenge - High Court cannot
re-appreciate evidence in writ jurisdiction
- Circle rates - Letter dated 26.06.2025
relied on by petitioners - Circle rates are
general guidelines - do not ipso facto
entitle identical compensation - Remand
compliance
-
District Judge
directed
reconsideration treating land as "abadi
land"
-
Arbitrator
"has
faithfully
complied"

-
Grievance
only
about
quantum, not non-compliance.

Held: Writ petition not maintainable in view of
efficacious statutory remedy under S. 34
Arbitration Act - present case does not fall
within any of the recognized exceptions -
Arbitrator acted within jurisdiction and followed
due process - Arbitrator has not violated District
Judge's remand directions - has faithfully
complied by acknowledging abadi land -
Grievance
relates
only
to
quantum
of
compensation, which must be agitated under S.
34 - This is essentially a dispute about valuation
and adequacy of compensation - Circle rates
not
conclusive
for
determination
of
compensation - High Court cannot function as
appellate forum over arbitral awards - this writ
petition is dismissed as not maintainable, with
liberty to the petitioners to avail the statutory
remedy under S. 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996
- No opinion expressed on merits or adequacy
of compensation.
(Paras 6.6, 6.7, 6.8, 6.96.12, 6.16-6.18 ,6.18-6.20,8,8.1) (E-7)

Case Law Cited
Commissioner of Income Tax v. Chhabil Dass
Agarwal,(2014) 1 SCC 603; Dr. Rajeev Sinha v.
Union of India, 2024 (2) ADJ 594; Sri Navin
Tyagi v. Union of India,2013 (10) ADJ 283 (DB);
McDermott
International
v.
Burn
Standard,(2006) 11 SCC 181; ONGC v. Saw
Pipes Ltd.,(2003) 5 SCC 705; National Highways
Authority of India v. Sayedabad Tea Company
Limited and Others.,(2020) 15 SCC 161;
National
Highways
&
Infrastructure
Development Corp. Ltd. v. Prakash Chand
Pradhan,(2020) 15 SCC 533; National Highways
Authority of India v. Sheetal Jaidev Vade and
Others,(2022) 16 SCC 391

List of Acts
National Highways Act, 1956; U.P. Zamindari
Abolition
and
Land
Reforms
Act,
1950;
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; The Right
to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act,

## Text

_Characters 0–39,872 of 47,163. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39872 for what follows._

738 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
cannot take place but the measurement
books of the work executed from time to
time would form a reasonable basis for
assessing the amount due and payable to
the writ petitioner, but such process could
be undertaken only by the agreed forum i.e.
arbitration and not by the writ court as it
does not have the expertise in respect of
measurements or construction of roads.

25. A perusal of the matter shows
that collusion of some of the officers of the
appellants with the contractor cannot be
ruled out. Such collusion seems to be the
basis of the writ petition filed before the
High Court."

9. The coordinate Bench of this Court
in the case of M/S Bio Tech System v.
State Of U.P. and Others reported in
(2020) 11 ADJ 488DB has emphasised the
limited power of the writ court exercising
obligation in contractual matters . The
relevant paragraphs are delineated below:

"39. The general principles which
may be culled out from the aforementioned
judgments is that in a case where the
contract entered into between the State and
the person aggrieved is of a non-statutory
character and the relationship is governed
purely in terms of a contract between the
parties, in such situations the contractual
obligations are matters of private law and
a writ would not lie to enforce a civil
liability arising purely out of a contract.
The proper remedy in such cases would be
to file a civil suit for claiming damages,
injunctions or specific performance or such
appropriate reliefs in a civil court. Pure
contractual obligation in the absence of
any statutory complexion would not be
enforceable through a writ.

40. The remedy under Article 226
of the Constitution being an extraordinary
remedy, it is not intended to be used for the
purpose of declaring private rights of the
parties. In the case of enforcement of
contractual rights and liabilities the normal
remedy of filing a civil suit being available
to the aggrieved party, this Court may not
exercise its prerogative writ jurisdiction to
enforce such contractual obligations."

10. In the present factual matrix, the
petitioner has not been able to bring on
record
any
document
wherein
the
respondent authorities have admitted that a
particular sum is owed to them. On the
contrary, the respondents have disputed the
claim of the petitioner in their counter
affidavit. It has to be kept in mind that
when disputed questions of fact are present,
the writ jurisdiction is not the viable forum,
as such disputes cannot be decided upon
bare exchange of affidavits. As clearly
enunciated in the judgments cited above, in
areas of contractual disputes, parties have
to approach the civil courts or go for
arbitration (if provided for). The writ court
would only in exceptional circumstances,
when
the
outstanding
payments
are
admitted by the respondents, enter into the
arena and pass a writ of mandamus and in
no other case.

11. Accordingly, the writ petition is
dismissed.

12. No order as to cost.
----------
(2025) 10 ILRA 738
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 15.10.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MAHESH CHANDRA
TRIPATHI, J.
THE HON'BLE ANISH KUMAR GUPTA, J.

Writ C No. 26529 of 2025

Ramashankar Yadav And Anr. ...Petitioner
Versus
Union of India & Ors. ...Respondents
10 All. Ramashankar Yadav And Anr Vs. Union of India & Ors.
739
Counsel for the Petitioner:
Vatsala

Counsel for the Respondents:
Ravi
Kant,
A.S.G.I.,
C
S.C.,
Pranjal
Mehrotra

Issue for Consideration
Matter pertains to "whether the present writ
petition is maintainable in view of the statutory
remedy available under S. 34 of the Arbitration
Act, 1996."

Headnotes
Constitution of India, Art. 226 - Writ
petition
challenging
compensation
determined by Arbitrator under S. 3G (5)
of the National Highways Act, 1956 -
Maintainability - writ jurisdiction under
Article 226 should ordinarily not be
exercised
when
an
adequate
and
efficacious alternative remedy is available
- National Highways Act, 1956, S.s 3G(5),
3G(6) - Statutory scheme - Arbitration
under S. 3G(5) is a "comprehensive
statutory framework" and the "provisions
of the Arbitration Act, 1996 shall apply" -
Challenges
must
be
under
S.
34
Arbitration
Act
-
Arbitration
and
Conciliation Act, 1996, S. 34 - Adequacy
or quantum of compensation - Falls within
statutory challenge - High Court cannot
re-appreciate evidence in writ jurisdiction
- Circle rates - Letter dated 26.06.2025
relied on by petitioners - Circle rates are
general guidelines - do not ipso facto
entitle identical compensation - Remand
compliance
-
District Judge
directed
reconsideration treating land as "abadi
land"
-
Arbitrator
"has
faithfully
complied"

-
Grievance
only
about
quantum, not non-compliance.

Held: Writ petition not maintainable in view of
efficacious statutory remedy under S. 34
Arbitration Act - present case does not fall
within any of the recognized exceptions -
Arbitrator acted within jurisdiction and followed
due process - Arbitrator has not violated District
Judge's remand directions - has faithfully
complied by acknowledging abadi land -
Grievance
relates
only
to
quantum
of
compensation, which must be agitated under S.
34 - This is essentially a dispute about valuation
and adequacy of compensation - Circle rates
not
conclusive
for
determination
of
compensation - High Court cannot function as
appellate forum over arbitral awards - this writ
petition is dismissed as not maintainable, with
liberty to the petitioners to avail the statutory
remedy under S. 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996
- No opinion expressed on merits or adequacy
of compensation.
(Paras 6.6, 6.7, 6.8, 6.96.12, 6.16-6.18 ,6.18-6.20,8,8.1) (E-7)

Case Law Cited
Commissioner of Income Tax v. Chhabil Dass
Agarwal,(2014) 1 SCC 603; Dr. Rajeev Sinha v.
Union of India, 2024 (2) ADJ 594; Sri Navin
Tyagi v. Union of India,2013 (10) ADJ 283 (DB);
McDermott
International
v.
Burn
Standard,(2006) 11 SCC 181; ONGC v. Saw
Pipes Ltd.,(2003) 5 SCC 705; National Highways
Authority of India v. Sayedabad Tea Company
Limited and Others.,(2020) 15 SCC 161;
National
Highways
&
Infrastructure
Development Corp. Ltd. v. Prakash Chand
Pradhan,(2020) 15 SCC 533; National Highways
Authority of India v. Sheetal Jaidev Vade and
Others,(2022) 16 SCC 391

List of Acts
National Highways Act, 1956; U.P. Zamindari
Abolition
and
Land
Reforms
Act,
1950;
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; The Right
to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act,
2013.

List of Keywords
Maintainability;
adequate
and
efficacious
alternative remedy; arbitral award; abadi land;
circle
rate;
judicial
indiscipline;
valuation;
compensation; statutory scheme; arbitrator;
reasoned order; quantum of compensation;
patently illegal; public policy; complete code.

Case Arising From
Writ-C No. 26529 of 2025, challenging the order
dated 03.07.2025 passed by the District
Magistrate (Arbitrator) under S. 3G (5) of the
National Highways Act, 1956.

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Petitioners:
740 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Mrs. Vatsala
Advs. for the Respondents:
Ravi Kant, A.S.G.I.
C.S.C.
Sri Pranjal Mehrotra
Sri Fuzail Ahmad Ansari (Standing Counsel for
the State)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Mahesh Chandra
Tripathi, J.)

1. Heard Mrs. Vatsala, learned counsel
for the petitioners, Sri Pranjal Mehrotra,
learned counsel for the respondent no. 2-
National Highways Authority of India1,
and Sri Fuzail Ahmad Ansari, learned
Standing Counsel for the State respondents.

A. PRAYER:

2. This writ petition has been filed,
inter alia, praying for the following relief:

"a). Issue a writ, order or
direction in the nature of Certior ari
quashing the order dated 03.07.2025
passed by the Respondent No.3 under
Section 3G(5) of the Act, 1956 (marked as
Annexure No.I to this writ petition).

b). Issue a writ, order or
direction in the nature of Mandamus
directing the respondent no.3 to decide the
claim of the petitioners as per the circle
rate defined in Phase-III of the letter dated
26.06.2025."

B. FACTS OF THE CASE:-

3. The petitioners are permanent
residents of Village Gausganj, Tehsil
Sikandrarau, District Hathras. They became
lawful owners of the disputed land during
2007-2008 through two registered sale
deeds. The land in question consists of two
separate parcels, both bearing Gata No.267,
admeasuring approximately 0.2300 hectare
each, situated at Mauza Iqbalpur, Tehsil
Sikandrarau,
District
Hathras.
These
parcels were purchased by the petitioners
from the original tenure-holders Manju
Devi and Rohan Lal via two separate
transactions, i.e. one dated 14.11.2007 and
the other dated 29.05.2008.

3.1. After purchasing the land, the
petitioners applied under Section 143 of the
Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and
Land Reforms Act, 19502 for conversion of
the land from agricultural use to nonagricultural (abadi) use. Their application
was registered as Case No.10 before the
Court
of
Sub
Divisional
Magistrate/Additional
Collector-I,
Sikandrarau. The said application was
allowed vide order dated 31.01.2008, and
consequently, the nature of the land was
officially recorded as non-agricultural.
Thereafter, the petitioners constructed a
living room and boundary wall over the
said property.

3.2. In 2018, Respondent No.1 - Union
of
India,
initiated
land
acquisition
proceedings for expansion of National
Highway No.91 (Aligarh-Kanpur section
from kilometer 165.600 to kilometer
186.000). A notification under Section 3A
of the National Highways Act, 1956 was
published in the Official Gazette on
09.03.2018. The same was also published
in daily newspapers, namely Amar Ujala
and The Times of India, on 16.03.2018.
Subsequently, on 05.07.2018, a declaration
under Section 3D of the Act, 1956 was
issued, which too was widely published on
25.07.2018
in
the
said
newspapers.
Through these notifications, objections
were invited from all interested persons
whose land was affected by the acquisition.
The petitioners land, being Gata No.267,
also fell within the acquisition.
10 All. Ramashankar Yadav And Anr Vs. Union of India & Ors.
741

3.3. The petitioners submitted their
objections
on
11.07.2018
before
Respondent
No.4
[The
Competent
Authority Land Acquisition, Additional
District
Magistrate
(Finance
and
Revenue)], praying that the compensation
be determined at the rate applicable to
abadi land, as their land had already been
converted from agricultural use to nonagricultural use by virtue of the order dated
31.01.2008. However, vide order dated
13.12.2018, Respondent No.4, determined
the compensation treating the land as
agricultural.

3.4. Being aggrieved, the petitioners
preferred an arbitration petition under
Section 3G(5) of the Act, 1956 before
Respondent No.3 - the District Magistrate
(Arbitrator). Their claim was registered as
Arbitration
Petition
No.07
of
2020.
Respondent
No.3,
vide
order
dated
12.06.2020, rejected their claim and
affirmed the award dated 13.12.2018.

3.5. The petitioners challenged the
said arbitral award by filing Arbitration
Petition No.102 of 2020 before the Court of
Special Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, Hathras, under Section 34
of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
19964. After hearing the parties, the
learned appellate court, vide judgment
dated 13.05.2022, allowed the petitioners'
application, set aside the arbitral award
dated 12.06.2020, and directed Respondent
No.3/ Arbitrator to decide the matter
afresh.

3.6.
Pursuant
to
this
direction,
Respondent No.3/ Arbitrator reconsidered
the matter and passed a fresh order dated
21.07.2022. By this order, the computation
report of Respondent No.4 was rejected to
the extent it related to the petitioners' land,
i.e. Gata No.267, and it was held that the
compensation had been wrongly calculated
as per agricultural rates, whereas the land
had already been declared non-agricultural
in 2008.

3.7. Being dissatisfied with the order
dated 21.07.2022, the Respondent No.2/
The
Project
Director
(Project
Implementation
Unit),
NHAI,,
filed
Miscellaneous Application No.97 of 2022
before the Court of District Judge, Hathras.
The
case
was
registered
as
Misc.
Application No.5C under Section 34 of the
Arbitration Act, 1996. After hearing the
parties, the Learned District Judge passed
an order dated 10.09.2024 whereby the
order dated 21.07.2022 was partially set
aside. The award dated 13.12.2018 was
restored, but at the same time, the matter
was remanded back to Respondent No.3/
Arbitrator with a specific direction to
reassess the claim of the petitioners as per
the circle rate applicable to abadi land, and
not the agricultural land.

3.8. Thereafter, in compliance with the
directions of the District Judge dated
10.09.2024, Respondent No.3/ District
Magistrate
(Arbitrator)
once
again
undertook proceedings and issued notices
to all parties. Ultimately, Respondent No.3
passed
the
impugned
order
dated
03.07.2025 under Section 3G(5) of the Act,
1956
in
Case
No.148
of
2025
(Computerized
Case
No.D202518340000148). By this order, the
claim of the petitioners was allowed to the
limited
extent
of
enhancing
the
compensation to Rs.4,000/- per square
meter, treating the land as abadi land
situated at a distance of six meters from the
main road. Aggrieved with the impugned
order dated 03.07.2025, the petitioners
have preferred the instant writ petition.
742 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

C. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF
OF PETITIONERS:

4. Mrs. Vatsala, learned counsel for
the petitioners, submitted that the District
Judge,
Hathras,
vide
order
dated
10.09.2024,
categorically
directed
Respondent No. 3/Arbitrator to reassess the
compensation on the basis of circle rates
applicable to abadi land. However, the
impugned order dated 03.07.2025 has
arbitrarily fixed compensation at only Rs.
4,000/- per square meter, in utter disregard
of the binding directions of the superior
court, amounting to judicial indiscipline.

4.1. She submitted that the Deputy
Registrar (Stamp), Sikandrarau, through
letter dated 26.06.2025, confirmed that the
petitioners' land falls under Phase-III,
where the notified rates are Rs. 14,500/-
and Rs.12,000/- per square meter. The
Arbitrator, ignoring this official document,
has arbitrarily applied a rate of Rs. 4,000/-
per square meter, which is perverse and
contrary to record.

4.2. Learned counsel further submitted
that the compensation must be determined
with reference to the nature, status, and
potential use of the land at the time of
notification. The petitioners' land was
converted to non-agricultural use on
31.01.2008 and also duly recorded in
revenue records as such from that date
onward, the land ceased to be used for
agricultural purposes, yet it was wrongly
treated as agricultural land earlier and
undervalued even as abadi land now.
Factors under Section 26 of The Right to
Fair Compensation and Transparency in
Land
Acquisition,
Rehabilitation
and
Resettlement Act, 20135 including market
value, location, and displacement damages,
were completely overlooked.

4.3. She vehemently argued that
despite pursuing remedies for over seven
years, the petitioners have been denied just
compensation,
resulting
in
continued
financial hardship and violation of their
statutory rights.

4.4. On the issue of maintainability of
the writ petition, she submitted that
although statutory remedies exist, the
present case falls within the exceptions
justifying interference under Article 226, as
the Arbitrator has acted contrary to law,
ignored judicial directions, and violated
natural justice.

4.5. In support of her submissions, she
placed reliance on the Division Bench
judgment dated 05.02.2024 in Dr. Rajeev
Sinha v. Union of India, and the letter
dated 26.06.2025 of the Deputy Registrar
(Stamp), Sikandrarau, addressed to the
Assistant
Inspector
General
(Stamp),
Hathras, confirming the notified rates of
Rs. 14,500/- and Rs. 12,000/- per square
meter for Phase-III land.

4.6. She lastly prayed that this Hon'ble
Court may quash the impugned order dated
03.07.2025 and direct the Respondent No.
3/Arbitrator
to
reassess
compensation
strictly in accordance with the notified
circle rates of Phase-III as on 26.06.2025,
and till such reassessment, restrain the
respondents from utilizing the petitioners'
land.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF
THE STATE RESPONDENTS AND
NHAI:-

5. Sri Fuzail Ahmad Ansari, learned
Standing Counsel for the State respondents,
at the outset, raised a preliminary objection
to the maintainability of this writ petition.
10 All. Ramashankar Yadav And Anr Vs. Union of India & Ors.
743
He contended that the petitioners had
approached
this
Court
in
direct
circumvention of the statutory appellate
mechanism provided under Section 34 of
the Arbitration Act, 1996. According to
him, when Parliament has consciously
enacted
a
self-contained
code
for
challenging arbitral awards through a
designated forum with prescribed timelines
and grounds, the extraordinary jurisdiction
under Article 226 ought not to be invoked
merely because a party is dissatisfied with
the outcome. He placed strong reliance
upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v.
Chhabil Dass Agarwal, wherein it has
been held that writ jurisdiction should not
be exercised when an effective alternate
remedy exists.

5.1. He further submitted that the
dispute raised in this writ petition is not
regarding acquisition itself but relates only
to
valuation
and
determination
of
compensation. The Statutory Arbitrator,
after considering the material on record,
fixed the rate at Rs.4,000/- per square meter
treating the land as abadi land, and also
added the statutory solatium. This exercise
is an adjudicatory function under Section
3G of the Act, 1956, to which the
machinery of the Arbitration Act applies.
Thus, if the petitioners are dissatisfied with
the valuation, their recourse lies only under
Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996.
Writ jurisdiction cannot be converted into
an
appellate
forum
to
re-appreciate
evidence or re-determine compensation.

5.2. Shri Ansari further submitted that
constitutional
courts
exercising
writ
jurisdiction do not function as courts of
appeal to review the correctness of factual
or evaluative determinations made by
statutory tribunals or arbitrators. Questions
such as the appropriate market value of
land, the relevance of circle rates, the
comparability of sale instances, and the
impact of locational factors are all matters
of evidence and expert assessment. The
petitioners are essentially seeking a fresh
adjudication on valuation by this Court,
which would be contrary to settled
principles of judicial restraint. He pointed
out that the petitioners heavily relied on a
letter dated 26.06.2025 from the Deputy
Registrar (Stamp) indicating higher circle
rates of Rs.14,500/- and Rs.12,000/- per
square meter. However, he submitted that
circle rates are indicative benchmarks for
stamp
duty
purposes
and
do
not
automatically translate into compensation
entitlements under land acquisition law,
where multiple variables must be judicially
evaluated.

5.3.
Addressing
the
petitioners'
contention that the Arbitrator failed to
implement the directions contained in the
order dated 10.09.2024 of the Learned
District
Judge,
Hathras,
Shri
Ansari
submitted that this allegation is factually
incorrect.
The
District
Judge
had
specifically remanded the matter with an
instruction to reconsider compensation
treating the property as abadi (nonagricultural) land instead of agricultural
land. The Statutory Arbitrator, in the
impugned order, has expressly recognized
the converted status of the land and has
determined compensation at Rs.4,000/- per
square meter accordingly, departing from
the earlier agricultural classification. Thus,
according to him, the substantive direction
has been followed. The fact that the
petitioners expected a higher monetary
figure does not mean that the judicial
mandate was disobeyed.

5.4. Shri Ansari, further submitted that
the petitioners had placed reliance on
744 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Division Bench judgment in Dr. Rajeev
Sinha
(supra),
to
justify
the
maintainability of the writ petition, but the
said case was decided in peculiar facts and
circumstances wherein the Arbitrator had
acted in complete defiance of binding
directions of the District Judge, and had
virtually passed a non-speaking order. The
Division Bench carved out an exception in
those
extraordinary
circumstances.
However, in the present case, Respondent
No.3/
Statutory
Arbitrator
has
duly
considered the nature of land, relevant
material, and has passed a detailed
reasoned order. Therefore, the ratio of
Rajeev Sinha (supra) does not apply. On
the contrary, the present case falls within
the general rule that arbitral awards are to
be challenged only under Section 34 of the
Arbitration Act, 1996.

5.5. He further submitted that this
Hon'ble Court has consistently declined to
entertain
writ
petitions
challenging
compensation awards passed under Section
3G of the Act, 1956. Reference is made to
Sri Navin Tyagi v. Union of India,
wherein this Court held that disputes
pertaining to the adequacy or correctness of
compensation cannot be agitated in writ
jurisdiction when the Arbitration Act, 1996
provides a comprehensive mechanism for
such challenges. The rationale underlying
this principle is to preserve the integrity of
the arbitration framework and to prevent
parallel litigation.

5.6. Shri Ansari had drawn the Court's
attention
to
the
authoritative
pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in in McDermott International v.
Burn Standard and ONGC v. Saw Pipes
Ltd., which lay down the parameters of
interference with arbitral awards. These
judgments reiterate that even if an arbitral
award contains errors of fact or law,
judicial intervention is permissible only on
the limited grounds enumerated under
Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996,
such as incapacity of parties, invalidity of
arbitration agreement, lack of proper
notice, matters beyond the scope of
reference, patent illegality, or contravention
of public policy. He submitted that
dissatisfaction with quantum does not
constitute any of these statutory grounds,
and therefore, entertaining such grievances
in writ jurisdiction would effectively
nullify the legislative policy underlying the
Arbitration Act.

5.7. On the question of whether any
exceptional circumstances exist in the
present case that would warrant the Court's
interference despite the availability of an
alternate remedy, Shri Ansari submitted
that none of the judicially recognized
exceptions are attracted. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Commissioner of
Income Tax and others Vs. Chhabil Dass
Agarwal, has outlined situations where
writ
jurisdiction
may
be
exercised
notwithstanding the existence of statutory
remedies such as where the impugned
action is wholly without jurisdiction, where
there is a violation of principles of natural
justice,
where
the
statute
itself
is
unconstitutional, or where the order is
passed mala fide or in gross abuse of
power. He submitted that the petitioners
have neither pleaded nor substantiated any
such exceptional circumstance. There is no
allegation of bias, fraud, or procedural
impropriety.
The
proceedings
were
conducted transparently with due notice to
all concerned, and the Arbitrator passed a
speaking
and
reasoned
order
after
considering the materials placed before
him.

5.8. Shri Ansari emphasized that
entertaining the present writ petition would
10 All. Ramashankar Yadav And Anr Vs. Union of India & Ors.
745
set
a
dangerous
precedent
whereby
dissatisfied claimants in land acquisition
matters
could
routinely
bypass
the
arbitration regime by directly approaching
the High Court on grounds of perceived
inadequacy of compensation. Such a
practice would undermine the legislative
intent behind enacting Section 3G(6) of the
Act, 1956, which expressly makes the
Arbitration Act, 1996 applicable to disputes
arising under Section 3G(5). If the
legislature intended compensation disputes
to be finally adjudicated by High Courts in
writ jurisdiction, there would have been no
need to prescribe the arbitration mechanism
or to provide for challenges under Section
34. In this backdrop, he submitted that the
statutory scheme must be respected.

5.9. Lastly, Shri Ansari prayed that
this Hon'ble Court may decline to entertain
the writ petition and dismiss the same as
not maintainable, while granting liberty to
the petitioners to pursue their remedy under
Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996, in
accordance with law and within the period
of limitation prescribed thereunder. He
submitted that such a course would uphold
the rule of law, respect the legislative
scheme,
and
avoid
the
undesirable
consequence of converting constitutional
courts into appellate tribunals for arbitral
awards.

5.10. Sri Pranjal Mehrotra, learned
counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent
No.2-National Highways Authority of India
(NHAI), associateed himself entirely with
the submissions advanced by Shri Fuzail
Ahmad Ansari, learned Standing Counsel
for the State respondents, and adopted the
same without any objection/ reservation.

D. DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS:-

6. The primary question that arises for
consideration in the instant matter is
whether the present writ petition is
maintainable in view of the statutory
remedy available under Section 34 of the
Arbitration Act, 1996. This Court has
carefully considered the rival submissions
and the legal precedents cited by both
parties.

6.1. It is well-established that writ
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution is discretionary and should
ordinarily not be exercised when an
adequate
and
efficacious
alternative
remedy is available. The Supreme Court in
Commissioner of Income Tax v. Chhabil
Dass Agarwal (supra) has consistently held
that challenge to arbitral awards must be
made through the statutory mechanism
provided
under
Section
34
of
the
Arbitration Act, 1996, except in rarest of
rare cases where the order is passed in
complete
defiance
of
law,
without
jurisdiction, or in violation of natural
justice.

6.2. Before proceeding further, it
would be apposite to refer to the relevant
statutory provisions applicable in the
instant case. Section 3G(5) of the Act, 1956
provides that "If the amount determined by
the competent authority under sub-section
(1) or sub-section (2) is not acceptable to
either of the parties, the amount shall, on an
application by either of the parties, be
determined
by
the
arbitrator
to
be
appointed by the Central Government."
Further, Section 3G(6) of the Act, 1956
mandates that "Subject to the provisions of
this Act, the provisions of the Arbitration
Act, 1996 shall apply to every arbitration
under this Act." A conjoint reading of these
provisions makes it abundantly clear that
the legislature has created a comprehensive
statutory framework where compensation
disputes are to be resolved through
746 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
arbitration under Section 3G(5) of the Act,
1956, and the procedural aspects as well as
challenges to such arbitral awards are
governed by the Arbitration Act, 1996 by
virtue of Section 3G(6) of the Act, 1956.
This legislative scheme leaves no room for
bypassing
the
statutory
arbitration
mechanism and directly invoking writ
jurisdiction for matters that are specifically
entrusted to the arbitral process.

6.3. The learned counsel for the
petitioners had placed heavy reliance upon
the Division Bench judgment of this Court
in Dr. Rajeev Sinha (supra). However, a
careful analysis of judgment of the Rajeev
Sinha case reveals that it was decided on
entirely different factual matrix and legal
considerations peculiar to that case, which
do not apply to the present case.

6.4. In Dr. Rajeev Sinha (supra), the
Division Bench was confronted with a
situation
where
the
Arbitrator
had
completely ignored and defied the specific
directions issued by the District Judge in
the remand order dated 27.04.2022. The
Court in paragraph 30 of that judgment
specifically noted that the Arbitrator had
acted
"in
defiance
of
fundamental
principles of judicial procedure particularly
by not following the directions of the
learned District Judge" and that not even a
single direction issued by the District Judge
in the order of remand had been obeyed.
The Court found that the Arbitrator had
passed virtually a non-speaking order in
complete
violation
of
the
remand
directions,
which
constituted
judicial
indiscipline of the highest order. Paras 26
and 30 of the judgment in Dr. Rajeev
Sinha (supra) are reproduced hereinbelow:

"26. In view of the above
discussion,
the
argument
of
learned
counsel for NHAI that the writ petition
should be dismissed on the ground of
availability of alternative remedy under
Section 34 of the Act of 1996, does not have
any force in the facts and circumstances of
the present case and this Court is satisfied
that the instant case falls within the well
recognised exceptions to the general rule of
exhaustion of alternative remedies, as held
above by the Supreme Court and, therefore,
the present writ petition is not liable to the
dismissed on this ground.

30. In the present case, this Court
is fully satisfied that Arbitrator/Collector,
Jhansi
has
acted
in
defiance
of
fundamental
principles
of
judicial
procedure particularly by not following the
directions of the learned District Judge, as
aforesaid, and in view of the above
discussion, the order impugned dated
28.07.2023 cannot sustain on merits and is
liable to the quashed despite the fact that it
has been recalled by the Collector on
03.11.2023, inasmuch as, reasons for
setting aside the order on merits were
required to be recorded in the present
judgement so that the fresh exercise to be
carried out by the Arbitrator/Collector
Jhansi even after recalling his order,
should be strictly in accordance with law
and based upon material on record, as
noted by the District Judge in the order of
remand dated 27.04.2022."

(Emphasis supplied)

6.5. More significantly, in paragraphs
16 and 17 of the Rajeev Sinha judgment,
the Division Bench specifically observed
that
the
Arbitrator
had
considered
"absolutely nothing, except what had been
recorded by the Special Land Acquisition
Officer in the initial award" and that the
order was a mere reproduction of earlier
findings
without
any
independent
10 All. Ramashankar Yadav And Anr Vs. Union of India & Ors.
747
application of mind. The Court noted that
the Arbitrator had "simply referred to the
non-declaration under Section 143 U.P.
Z.A. & L.R. Act and swept away the sale
deeds produced by the petitioner in a single
line". This amounted to a complete
abdication
of
judicial
function
and
warranted extraordinary intervention.

6.6. The factual scenario in the present
case is fundamentally different. Here,
Respondent
No.3/Arbitrator
has
not
ignored or defied the directions of the
District Judge dated 10.09.2024. On the
contrary, the Arbitrator has faithfully
complied with the primary direction by
acknowledging that the petitioners' land
should
be
treated
as
abadi
(nonagricultural) land and not as agricultural
land. The compensation has been enhanced
from agricultural rates to Rs.4,000/- per
square
meter,
recognizing
the
nonagricultural character of the land. The
District Judge's direction was to "reassess
the claim of petitioners as per the circle rate
applicable
to
abadi
land,
and
not
agricultural
land",
which
has
been
substantially complied with.

6.7. In pith and substance, the
grievance of the petitioners is not about
non-compliance with judicial directions,
but about the quantum of compensation
awarded. They seek compensation at
Rs.14,500/- and Rs.12,000/- per square
meter based on the letter dated 26.06.2025
from the Deputy Registrar (Stamp). This is
essentially a dispute about valuation and
adequacy of compensation, which squarely
falls within the domain of Section 34
proceedings under the Arbitration Act,
1996.

6.8. The circle rates notified for stamp
duty purposes are general guidelines and
their applicability in individual cases
depends upon various factors including
location, potentiality, comparable sales, and
evidence led before the Arbitrator. The
mere existence of higher circle rates does
not ipso facto entitle the landowners to
identical compensation. These are matters
of fact and evidence which fall within the
exclusive domain of the Arbitrator and are
subject to scrutiny in proceedings under
Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996, not
in writ jurisdiction.

6.9. This Court has consistently held
that
disputes
regarding
adequacy
of
compensation cannot be entertained under
writ jurisdiction when a complete statutory
remedy exists. The precise issue regarding
the maintainability of a writ petition
challenging an award passed by the
Arbitrator under Section 3G(5) of the Act,
1956 has been considered by a Division
Bench of this Hon'ble Court in Sri Navin
Tyagi (supra). In that case, the petitioners
were primarily aggrieved by the quantum
of
compensation
determined
by
the
Arbitrator. The Hon'ble Division Bench
observed in Paragraph 13 as under:

"13. Prima facie the objection as
taken by the learned counsel for the
respondent has much water. A perusal of
Section 3G sub clause (7) shows that for
determining the amount as payable under
Section 3G(7), certain parameters are to be
considered which have been classified in
Clause a,b,c,d. Meaning thereby the
fixation of quantum of compensation is not
an exercise in abstract and the same is
governed by the parameters given in sub
Section (7) and Clause a,b,c,d, which have
to be kept in mind by the authority
concerned while determining the quantum
of
compensation.
The
quantum
of
compensation
as
such
is
a
logical
748 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
conclusion of the procedure to be adopted
by the Arbitrator keeping in mind the
parameters as given under the Act of 1956,
while determining the quantum and thus,
the grievance of the petitioners, if any, is to
the effect that the quantum of compensation
as determined is not in accordance with the
parameters as prescribed under the Act,
1956 for the said purpose."

6.10. Furthermore, in Paragraph 21 of
the same judgment, the Hon'ble Division
Bench laid down the following guiding
principles:

"21. From the above decisions,
the following principles emerge:

a) An Award, which is

(i)
contrary
to
substantive
provisions of law; or

(ii)
the
provisions
of
the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; or

(iii) against the terms of the
respective contract; or

(iv) patently illegal, or

(v) prejudicial to the rights of the
parties, is open to interference by the Court
under Section 34(2) of the Act.

(b) Award could be set aside if it
is contrary to:

(a) fundamental policy of Indian
Law; or

(b) the interest of India; or

(c) justice or morality;

(c) The Award could also be set
aside if it is so unfair and unreasonable
that it shocks the conscience of the Court.

(d) It is open to the Court to
consider whether the Award is against the
specific terms of contract and if so,
interfere with it on the ground that it is
patently illegal and opposed to the public
policy of India."

6.11. Accordingly, in the aforesaid
case, Sri Navin Tyagi (supra), this Court
categorically held that the determination of
compensation is not an abstract exercise
but one guided by the statutory factors
enumerated under Section 3G(7) of the Act,
1956.
Therefore,
if
the
parties
are
aggrieved by the quantum of compensation,
their appropriate remedy lies under Section
34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996.

6.12.
The
Supreme
Court
in
McDermott
International
v.
Burn
Standard (supra) and ONGC v. Saw
Pipes
Ltd.
(supra)
has
repeatedly
emphasized that arbitral awards, even if
containing
errors
in
appreciation
of
evidence or determination of compensation,
can be challenged only on the limited
grounds available under Section 34 of the
Arbitration Act, 1996. Courts cannot sit in
appeal over arbitral awards or re-appreciate
evidence as appellate forums.

6.13. It is apt to consider the
provisions of Section 3G(5) of the Act,
1956 vis-a-vis Section 11 of the Arbitration
Act, 1996, which were called into question
before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
National Highways Authority of India v.
Sayedabad Tea Company Limited and
Others. The principal question that arose
was whether an application under Section
11 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 would be
maintainable in view of the specific
mechanism provided under Section 3-G(5)
of the Act, 1956 for appointment of an
Arbitral Tribunal. In the said case, the
landowner, being dissatisfied with the
award of compensation determined by the
competent authority under Section 3-G(1)
of the Act, 1956 had made an application to
the
Central
Government
seeking
appointment of an Arbitrator under Section
3-G(5). As there was no response from the
10 All. Ramashankar Yadav And Anr Vs. Union of India & Ors.
749
Central
Government,
the
applicant
approached the High Court under Section
11(6) of the Arbitration Act, 1996. The
High Court, while appointing an Arbitrator,
observed that the Central Government,
having failed to act on the request, had
forfeited its right to appoint an Arbitrator.
Subsequently, a review application was
filed pointing out that under the Act, 1956,
the authority to appoint an Arbitrator vests
exclusively with the Central Government
under Section 3-G(5), and hence, the
application under Section 11(6) of the
Arbitration
Act,
1996
was
not
maintainable. The review petition was,
however, dismissed.

6.14. Aggrieved thereby, the National
Highways Authority of India preferred an
appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
Relying upon its earlier decision in
National Highways & Infrastructure
Development
Corporation
Ltd.
v.
Prakash Chand Pradhan, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court held as follows:

"18. After analysing the scheme,
it can be assumed that the legislature
intended the 1956 Act to act as a complete
code in itself for the purpose of acquisition
until culmination including disbursement
and for settlement of disputes and this
conclusion is further strengthened in view
of Section 3-J of the Act which eliminates
the application of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894, to an acquisition under the 1956 Act.

19. It is settled principles of law
that when the special law sets out a selfcontained code, the application of general
law would impliedly be excluded. In the
instant case, the scheme of the 1956 Act
being a special law enacted for the purpose
and for appointment of an arbitrator by the
Central Government under Section 3-G(5)
of the 1956 Act and sub-section (6) of
Section 3-G itself clarifies that subject to
the provisions of the 1956 Act, the
provisions of the 1996 Act shall apply to
every arbitration obviously to the extent
where the 1956 Act is silent, the arbitrator
may take recourse in adjudicating the
dispute invoking the provisions of the 1996
Act for the limited purpose. But so far as
the appointment of an arbitrator is
concerned, the power being exclusively
vested with the Central Government as
envisaged under subsection (5) of Section
3-G of the 1956 Act, Section 11 of the 1996
Act has no application."

6.15. Further, in National Highways
Authority of India v. Sheetal Jaidev
Vade and Others, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court considered whether a High Court, in
exercise of its jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution of India, could
execute an arbitral award. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court held in paragraphs 11 and
12 as follows:

"11.