# Ramayan Yadav v. State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2020) 1 ILRA 668
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2019-12-02
- **Case number:** Application U/S 482 Cr.P.C. No. 43297 of 2019
- **Bench:** Ramesh Sinha
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ramayan-yadav-v-state-of-u-p-anr-45258
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

A. Code of Criminal Procedure - Section
197 - Forgery- Criminal act of forging
documents cannot be in any manner said
to be an act in discharge of official dutyTrial Court to decide question of sanction
and reasonable nexus of the incident with
discharge of official duty -The said issue
of sanction can be taken from stage to
stage and even at the conclusion of the
trial at the time of judgment. (Para 12)

Application u/s 482 Cr.P.C rejected. (E-3)

List of cases cited: -

## Text

668 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
direction. Hence, trial court has rightly
passed impugned summoning order and
this application is to be rejected.

4. Learned A.G.A. also vehemently
opposed the aforesaid prayer.

5. From the perusal of material
placed on record, it is apparent that
complaint was filed by Kamleshwaranand
against Rohit Sharma, Rahul Sharma, Smt.
Urmila Sharma, Smt. Kumud Dhall
(present applicant) and two others at
Police
Station
Indrapuram,
District
Ghaziabad. The contention was that
complainant being a senior citizen of 66
years was owner of flat No.III-A/50, First
Floor, Rachna Vaishali, Ghaziabad and he
entered in an agreement to sell with Smt.
Urmila for Rs.50,00,000/-, out of which on
28.03.2018 Rs.5,00,000/-, on 09.04.2018
Rs.2,00,000/-,
on
25.06.2018
Rs.10,00,000/-
and
on
26.06.2018
Rs.23,65,000/-, in all Rs.33,65,000/- were
paid. Rest Rs.9,35,000/- were said to be
paid subsequently before getting sale deed
executed, but the amount which was
transacted on 25.06.2018 and 26.06.2018
was got returned back by way of an
application with incorrect fact by those
accused persons and this came into notice
of complainant through SMS. Thereafter,
complainant enquired into the matter and
took above steps. Meaning thereby,
regarding applicant accusation is that she
being Branch Manager of Punjab and Sind
Bank, Branch Kaushambi returned back
money to those accused persons in view of
their request for getting same returned
back and this has been said to be under
conspiracy. Hence, complaint itself is for
offence of conspiracy for commission of
fraud by returning money transacted on
25.06.2018 and 26.06.2018 in account of
accused
persons
by
above
Branch
Manager. Nothing more than that is there
in complaint regarding this conspiracy.
Applicant herself has admitted that she had
returned above money in compliance of
request made by concerned Bank, from
which that amount were transacted, and
after knowledge of alleged fraud, the same
money was got returned back and is kept
under freezed account. Hence, apparently,
there is no conspiracy or malice on the part
of accused applicant except her routine
performance of duty. The summoning of
accused applicant for above offences is
apparently without any evidence on
record. Hence, it is misuse of process of
law.

6. Accordingly, this application is
allowed. The impugned summoning order
dated 04.09.2019, passed by Chief Judicial
Magistrate,
Ghaziabad
including
entire
proceeding of Complaint Case No. 32560 of
2018, under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 120B I.P.C. Police Station Indrapuram, District
Ghaziabad is hereby quashed, but it will not
effect the summoning regarding other accused
persons.
----------
(2020)1ILR 668

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 02.12.2019

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE RAMESH SINHA, J.

Application U/S 482 Cr.P.C. No. 43297 of 2019

Ramayan Yadav ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicant:
Sri Imran Ullah, Sri Mohammad Khalid

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
1 All. Ramayan Yadav Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
669
A.G.A., Sri Anil Kumar Mishra

A. Code of Criminal Procedure - Section
197 - Forgery- Criminal act of forging
documents cannot be in any manner said
to be an act in discharge of official dutyTrial Court to decide question of sanction
and reasonable nexus of the incident with
discharge of official duty -The said issue
of sanction can be taken from stage to
stage and even at the conclusion of the
trial at the time of judgment. (Para 12)

Application u/s 482 Cr.P.C rejected. (E-3)

List of cases cited: -

1. Devinder Singh & ors. Vs. St. of Punj. thru
C.B.I. (2016) 4 SCC (Cri.) 15.

2. Amal Kumar Jha Vs. St. of Chhattisgarh &
anr. (2016) 3 SCC (Cri.) 160

3. N.K. Ganguly Vs. CBI, New Delhi (2016) 2
SCC 143

4. Devendra Prasad Singh Vs. St. of Bih. & anr.
2019 Lawsuit (SC) 1007

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ramesh Sinha, J.)

1. Today, Sri Anil Kumar Mishra has
filed vakalatnama on behalf of opposite
party no. 2 which is taken on record.

2. Heard Sri Imran Ullah, learned
counsel for the applicant, Sri Anil Kumar
Mishra, learned counsel for opposite party
no. 2, Sri Gaurav Pratap Singh, learned
A.G.A. for the State and perused the
record.

3. By means of present 482 Cr.P.C.
application, the applicant has prayed for
quashing of the entire proceedings of case
crime no. 263 of 2018 under sections 419,
420, 467, 468, 471, 506, 201, 120-B
I.P.C., police station Jahanganj, District
Azamgarh.

4. The brief facts of the case are that
an F.I.R. was lodged by opposite party no.
2 Smt. Asha Devi on 11.12.2018 at police
station Jahanganj, District Azamgarh for
the offence under sections 419, 420, 467,
468, 471, 506, 201, 120-B I.P.C. with an
allegation that the applicant had helped the
father of the accused of a case of rape by
changing the date of birth of her minor
daughter, namely, Km. Shikha Singh. It is
alleged that on 13.5.2018, one Arvind @
Kallu had committed rape of the daughter
of the complainant for which an F.I.R. was
lodged by her which was registered as case
crime no. 116 of 2018. It seems that the
father of the accused, in order to save his
son from criminal prosecution, in collusion
with the applicant, has done fraud with the
official papers and have issued a transfer
certificate showing her date of birth as
8.2.2000, thereafter, it was signed by the
Block
Education
Officer
and
Basic
Education Officer. The said certificate was
filed in the bail application of Kallu before
this Court. It is alleged that when she came
to know about the said fact through her
counsel various complaints were made by
her against the applicant on which on
27.9.2018, the applicant was given chargesheet by the Department and in the
meanwhile he was suspended. It is also
alleged that before his suspension, the
applicant in order to save his suspension, had
stolen certain papers from the file. It is
further alleged that after rejection of bail, the
accused Arvind Singh started threatening
him due to which, she is terrorized.

5.

After
investigation,
the
investigating officer submitted chargesheet against the applicant on 14.7.2019
and the learned Magistrate on the basis of
the charge-sheet took cognizance of the
offence on 12.10.2018 and summoned the
applicant to face trial.
670 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

6. Learned counsel for the applicant
submits that the applicant is posted as
Principal of a Primary Education Institution
and the cognizance which has been taken on
the basis of charge-sheet is absolutely wrong
as no sanction for prosecution of the applicant
under section 197 Cr.P.C. has been obtained
from the competent authority and without
sanction the proceedings against the applicant
is liable to be quashed. He submits that the
applicant in discharge of his official duty had
issued the transfer certificate of the daughter
of the informant wherein her date of birth has
been mentioned as 8.2.2000 which was
endorsed in the admission register of primary
school Gambheervan-I, Rani ki Sarai, district
Azamgarh where the daughter of the
informant studied upto Class-III and she did
not turn up in the said school and finally on
25.8.2017, she left the school and a transfer
certificate was prepared on 12.10.2017. He
further submits that the date of birth which
was mentioned in the school register of the
minor daughter of the opposite party no. 2
was on the information given by the grand
mother of the minor daughter of opposite
party no. 2 at the time of her admission. He
next submitted that at the most the negligence
on the part of the applicant is that he had
issued the transfer certificate to a person, who
was not authorized to get the same issued
except the opposite party no. 2 or any of the
family member of Km. Shikha Singh. He
pointed out that a departmental proceedings
with respect to the same allegation is going
on, hence the present proceeding is liable to
be quashed. In support of his argument, he
has placed reliance on the judgment of the
Apex Court in the case of Devinder Singh
and others vs. State of Punjab through
C.B.I. reported in (2016) 4 SCC (Cri.) 15.

7. For ready reference, para-39 of the
case of Devinder Singh and others vs.
State of Punjab through C.B.I. (Supra) is
quoted hereinbelow:-

"39. The principles emerging
from
the
aforesaid
decisions
are
summarized hereunder :

39.1 Protection of sanction is an
assurance to an honest and sincere officer
to perform his duty honestly and to the
best of his ability to further public duty.
However,
authority
cannot
be
camouflaged to commit crime.

39.2 Once act or omission has
been found to have been committed by
public servant in discharging his duty it
must
be
given
liberal
and
wide
construction so far its official nature is
concerned. Public servant is not entitled to
indulge in criminal activities. To that
extent Section 197 CrPC has to be
construed narrowly and in a restricted
manner. III.

39.3 Even in facts of a case when
public servant has exceeded in his duty, if
there is reasonable connection it will not
deprive him of protection under section
197 Cr.P.C. There cannot be a universal
rule to determine whether there is
reasonable nexus between the act done
and official duty nor it is possible to lay
down such rule.

39.4 In case the assault made is
intrinsically connected with or related to
performance of official duties sanction
would be necessary under Section 197
CrPC, but such relation to duty should not
be pretended or fanciful claim. The offence
must be directly and reasonably connected
with official duty to require sanction. It is
no part of official duty to commit offence.
In case offence was incomplete without
proving, the official act, ordinarily the
provisions of Section 197 CrPC would
apply.
1 All. Ramayan Yadav Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
671

39.5.
In
case
sanction
is
necessary it has to be decided by
competent authority and sanction has to be
issued on the basis of sound objective
assessment. The court is not to be a
sanctioning authority.

39.6 Ordinarily, question of
sanction should be dealt with at the stage
of taking cognizance, but if the cognizance
is taken erroneously and the same comes
to the notice of Court at a later stage,
finding to that effect is permissible and
such a plea can be taken first time before
appellate Court. It may arise at inception
itself. There is no requirement that
accused must wait till charges are framed.

39.7 Question of sanction can be
raised at the time of framing of charge and
it can be decided prima facie on the basis
of accusation. It is open to decide it afresh
in light of evidence adduced after
conclusion of trial or at other appropriate
stage.

39.8 Question of sanction may
arise at any stage of proceedings. On a
police or judicial inquiry or in course of
evidence during trial. Whether sanction is
necessary or not may have to be
determined from stage to stage and
material brought on record depending
upon facts of each case. Question of
sanction can be considered at any stage of
the proceedings. Necessity for sanction
may reveal itself in the course of the
progress of the case and it would be open
to accused to place material during the
course of trial for showing what his duty
was. Accused has the right to lead
evidence in support of his case on merits.

39.9 In some case it may not be
possible to decide the question effectively
and finally without giving opportunity to
the defence to adduce evidence. Question
of good faith or bad faith may be decided
on conclusion of trial."

8. Learned counsel for the applicant
has
further
placed
reliance
on
the
judgment of the Apex Court in the case of
Amal
Kumar
Jha
vs.
State
of
Chhattisgarh and another reported in
(2016) 3 SCC (Cri.) 160 and drawn the
attention of the Court towards paras-13
and 14 of the case of Amal Kumar Jha
vs. State of Chhattisgarh and another
(Supra) which are quoted hereinbelow:-

" 13. In State of Madhya
Pradesh v. Sheetla Sahai & Ors. 2009 (8)
SCC 617, this Court has laid down thus :

"59.
For
the
purpose
of
attracting the provisions of Section 197 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is not
necessary that they must act in their
official capacity but even where public
servants purport to act in their official
capacity, the same would attract the
provisions of Section 197 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. It was so held by this
Court in Sankaran Moitra v. Sadhna Das
(2006) 4 SCC 584. The question came up
for consideration before this Court in
Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari AIR 1956
SC 44 wherein it was held: (AIR pp. 48-49,
para 17)

"17. Slightly differing tests have
been laid down in the decided cases to
ascertain the scope and the meaning of the
relevant words occurring in Section 197 of
the Code; ''any offence alleged to have
been committed by him while acting or
purporting to act in the discharge of his
official duty'. But the difference is only in
language and not in substance.

The offence alleged to have been
committed must have something to do, or
must be related in some manner, with the
discharge of official duty. No question of
sanction can arise under Section 197,
unless the act complained of is an offence;
the only point to determine is whether it
672 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
was committed in the discharge of official
duty. There must be a reasonable
connection between the act and the official
duty. It does not matter even if the act
exceeds what is strictly necessary for the
discharge of the duty, as this question will
arise only at a later stage when the trial
proceeds on the merits.

What we must find out is whether
the act and the official duty are so
interrelated
that
one
can
postulate
reasonably that it was done by the accused
in the performance of the official duty,
though possibly in excess of the needs and
requirements of the situation. In Hori Ram
Singh v. Crown 1939 FCR 159 Sulaiman,
J. observes:

''The section cannot be confined
to only such acts as are done by a public
servant directly in pursuance of his public
office, though in excess of the duty or
under a mistaken belief as to the existence
of such duty. Nor is it necessary to go to
the length of saying that the act
constituting the offence should be so
inseparably connected with the official
duty as to form part and parcel of the
same transaction.'

The interpretation that found
favour with Varadachariar, J. in the same
case is stated by him in these terms at p.
56:

''There must be something in the
nature of the act complained of that
attaches it to the official character of the
person doing it.'

In affirming this view, the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
observed in Gill case : AIR 1948 PC 128
(IA pp. 59-60)

''A public servant can only be
said to act or to purport to act in the
discharge of his official duty, if his act is
such as to lie within the scope of his
official duty. ... The test may well be
whether the public servant, if challenged,
can reasonably claim that, what he does,
he does in virtue of his office.'

Hori Ram case 1939 FCR 159 is
referred to with approval in the later case
of Lieutenant Hector Thomas Huntley v.
King Emperor 1944 FCR 262 but the test
laid down that it must be established that
the act complained of was an ''official' act
appears to us unduly to narrow down the
scope of the protection afforded by Section
197 of the Criminal Procedure Code as
defined and understood in the earlier case.
The decision in Albert West Meads v. R.
AIR 1948 PC 156 does not carry us any
further; it adopts the reasoning in Gill
case "

60. The said principle has been
reiterated by this Court in B. Saha v. M.S.
Kochar (1979) 4 SCC 177 in the following
terms: (SCC pp. 184-85, paras 17-

"17. The words ''any offence
alleged to have been committed by him
while acting or purporting to act in the
discharge of his official duty' employed in
Section 197(1) of the Code, are capable of
a narrow as well as a wide interpretation.
If these words are construed too narrowly,
the section will be rendered altogether
sterile, for, ''it is no part of an official duty
to commit an offence, and never can be'. In
the wider sense, these words will take
under their umbrella every act constituting
an offence, committed in the course of the
same transaction in which the official duty
is performed or purports to be performed.
The right approach to the import of these
words lies between these two extremes.
While on the one hand, it is not every
offence committed by a public servant
while engaged in the performance of his
official duty, which is entitled to the
protection of Section 197(1), an act
constituting an offence, directly and
reasonably connected with his official duty
1 All. Ramayan Yadav Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
673
will require sanction for prosecution
under the said provision. As pointed out by
Ramaswami, J. in Baijnath v. State of M.P.
AIR 1966 SC 220 : (AIR p. 227, para 16)

16. ... It is the quality of the act
that is important, and if it falls within the
scope and range of his official duties the
protection contemplated by Section 197 of
the Criminal Procedure Code will be
attracted'.

18. In sum, the sine qua non for
the applicability of this section is that the
offence charged, be it one of commission
or omission, must be one which has been
committed by the public servant either in
his official capacity or under colour of the
office held by him."

14. In view of the aforesaid
discussion, it is clear that the omission
complained of due to which offence is stated
to have been committed, was intrinsically
connected with discharge of official duty of
the appellant, as such the protection under
section 197 Cr.PC from prosecution without
sanction of the competent authority, is
available to the appellant. Thus, he could
not have been prosecuted without sanction.
It would be for the competent authority to
consider the question of grant of sanction in
accordance with law. In case sanction is
granted only then the appellant can be
prosecuted and not otherwise. Resultantly,
the impugned orders are set aside, the
appeal is allowed."

9. Learned counsel for the applicant
also cited the judgment of the Apex Court
in the case of N.K. Ganguly vs. Central
Bureau of Investigation, New Delhi
reported in (2016) 2 SCC 143 and has
drawn the attention of the Court towards
para-35 of the case of N.K. Ganguly vs.
Central Bureau of Investigation, New
Delhi
(Supra)
which
is
reproduced
hereinbelow:-

"35. From a perusal of the case
law referred to supra, it becomes clear
that for the purpose of obtaining previous
sanction from the appropriate government
under Section 197 of CrPC, it is
imperative that the alleged offence is
committed in discharge of official duty by
the accused. It is also important for the
Court
to
examine
the
allegations
contained in the final report against the
Appellants, to decide whether previous
sanction is required to be obtained by the
respondent
from
the
appropriate
government before taking cognizance of
the alleged offence by the learned Special
Judge against the accused. In the instant
case, since the allegations made against
the Appellants in the final report filed by
the respondent that the alleged offences
were committed by them in discharge of
their official duty, therefore, it was
essential for the learned Special Judge to
correctly decide as to whether the previous
sanction from the Central Government
under Section 197 of CrPC was required
to be taken by the respondent, before
taking cognizance and passing an order
issuing summons to the appellants for
their presence."

10. Per contra, learned counsel
appearing for opposite party no. 2 and
learned A.G.A. have vehemently opposed
the prayer for quashing of the entire
proceedings and the impugned order on
the ground which has been argued by
learned counsel for the applicant and
submitted that the act of the applicant in
indulging in a criminal act by issuing a
forged transfer certificate by wrongly
mentioning the age of the minor daughter
of the opposite party no. 2, cannot be said
to be an act in discharge of official duty,
hence no sanction is required for such act
before prosecuting the applicant. In this
674 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
regard, reliance has been placed on the
judgment of the Apex Court in the case of
Devendra Prasad Singh vs. State of
Bihar & another reported in 2019
Lawsuit (SC) 1007 and submitted that in
view of the same, the order taking
cognizance of the offence does not suffer
from any illegality, perversity, hence the
present application is liable to be rejected.

11. Having considered the rival
submissions of learned counsel for the
parties and perused the record.

12. Admittedly, the applicant is the
Principal
of
the
Primary
Education
Institution under whose signature the
transfer certificate of the minor daughter
of opposite party no. 2 was issued a copy
of which has been annexed as annexure-7
to the affidavit filed in support of the
present application and the same was
counter signed by the Block Development
Officer and Basic Shiksha Adhikari
Azamgarh. The opposite party no. 2 has
claimed that the date of birth of her minor
daughter which has been mentioned in the
transfer certificate issued by the applicant
was a wrong one as her daughter's date of
birth is 7.8.2006 which was mentioned in
the admission register at serial no. 1392 of
primary school Gambheervan-II, district
Azamgarh -II where she studied upto
class-III. It is alleged by her that though
her daughter was admitted in the primary
school but as she fell seriously ill, she did
not go to study in the said school. It further
reveals from the record that the medical
examination of the victim girl was also
conducted in a case which was registered
against the accused Kallu as case crime no.
116 of 2018 for the offence under section
376, 452, 506 I.P.C. and 3/4 POCSO Act
by opposite party no. 2 against Arvind
Singh @ Kallu wherein as per the
ossification test which was conducted, it
was opined in the report dated 18.5.2018
by the C.M.O., Azamgarh that the victim
is aged about 14 years which goes to show
that the victim was a minor girl. On the
complaint which was made by the opposite
party no. 2 to the District Basic Shiksha
Adhikari, Azamgarh vide complaint dated
16.8.2018, a departmental enquiry has
been ordered and the applicant has been
suspended till pendency of the enquiry. In
the enquiry, the applicant has given some
explanation for issuance of the disputed
transfer certificate wherein the date of
birth of the victim girl has been mentioned
as 8.2.2000. The contention which has
been raised by learned counsel for the
applicant that the transfer certificate which
was issued by the applicant in the name of
the victim girl showing her date of birth
8.2.2000 in place of 7.8.2006 which is
alleged to be a forged documents issued
under the signature of the applicant and
counter signed by the Block Development
Officer and Basic Shiksha Adhikari
Azamgarh, was an act done in discharge of
his official duty is not at all acceptable as a
criminal act of forging documents cannot
be in any manner said to be an act in
discharge of official duty. The sanction
required for the prosecution of the
applicant before taking cognizance by the
Magistrate on the basis of charge-sheet
submitted against him as has been argued
by learned counsel for the applicant
vitiates the proceedings against him, is
also not sustainable in the eyes of law. The
case law which has been relief upon by the
applicant cannot be made applicable in the
facts and circumstances of the present case
as in the case which has been relied upon
by learned counsel for the applicant, i.e.,
Devinder Singh & others vs. State of
Punjab through C.B.I. (Supra), the Apex
Court after going through its earlier
1 All. Bhallu @ Hari Narayan & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
675
decisions has held that public servant is
not entitled to indulge in criminal activities
and in such case sanction under section
197 is not required and to that extent
Section 197 has been construed narrowly
and in a restricted manner and it further
observe that some times certain questions
about requirement of sanction under
section 197 Cr.P.C cannot be decided
without evidence. Such questions like
good faith or bad faith of public servant
can be decided on conclusion of trial. In
the present case also it would be expedient
in the interest of justice that the trial court
is at liberty to prima facie proceed as per
prosecution version and the applicant be
given opportunity to adduce evidence in
his support and if at later stage it comes to
the notice of the Court that there was
reasonable nexus of incident and discharge
of official duty, the Court shall re-examine
the issue of sanction and take decision as
per law. The said issue of sanction can be
taken from stage to stage and even at the
conclusion of the trial at the time of
judgment.

13. In view of the above settled
principle of law as has been referred
above, I do not find any infirmity or
illegality in the order taking cognizance,
the prayer for quashing the impugned
order as well as the entire proceedings
based on the charge-sheet is refused.

14. The present 482 Cr.P.C.
application lacks merit and is, accordingly,
dismissed.
----------
(2020)1 ILR 675

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 12.12.2019

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE RAM KRISHNA GAUTAM, J.

Application U/S 482 Cr.P.C. No. 43786 of 2019

Bhallu @ Hari Narayan & Ors. ...Applicants
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicants:
Sri Devesh Kumar

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
A.G.A.

A. Code of Criminal Procedure- Section
204-
Summoning
order-
Section
482
-
Statements made in application u/s 155(2) of
Cr.P.C., was having recital of facts and
reiterated in the statement recorded u/s 200 of
Cr.P.C.-Corroborated by witnesses in enquiry
u/s 202 of Cr.P.C.-Impugned summoning order
was passed on the basis of evidence collected
by the Magistrate in his enquiry- Under Section
204 of Cr.P.C. Magistrate is not expected to
make analytic analysis of evidences-Only to be
seen as to whether there is existence of a
prima facie case or not on the basis of enquiry
and complaint - High Court in exercise of
inherent power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., is
not expected to make meticulous analysis of
factual aspects because the same is a question
to be gone into during course of trial by the
Trial court. (Para 6 & 7)

Criminal Misc. Application u/s 482 Cr.P.C
rejected. (E-3)

List of cases cited: -

1. St. of A.P Vs. Gaurishetty Mahesh, JT 2010 (6) SC
588: (2010) 6 SCALE 767: 2010 Cr. LJ 3844

2. Hamida Vs. Rashid, (2008) 1 SCC 474

3. Monica Kumar Vs. St. of U.P, (2008) 8 SCC
781

4. Popular Muthiah Vs. State, Rep. by Insp. of
Police, (2006) 7 SCC 29

5. Dhanlakshmi Vs. R.Prasana Kumar, (1990)
Cr LJ 320 (DB): AIR 1990 SC 494