# Ramdeen Yadav Revisionist v. State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2023) 8 ILRA 157
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-08-28
- **Case number:** Criminal Revision Defective No. 308 of 2023
- **Bench:** Shamim Ahmed
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ramdeen-yadav-revisionist-v-state-of-u-p-anr-50565
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

(A) Criminal Law - Revision - Defective -
The Limitation Act, 1963 - Section 5 -
delay condonation - "sufficient cause" - to
receive a liberal construction so as to
advance substantial justice and generally
a delay in preferring appeal/revision may
be condoned in interest of justice where
no gross negligence or deliberate inaction
or lack of bona fide is imputable to
parties, seeking condonation of delay - if
delay has occurred for reasons which does
not smack of mala fide, the Court should
be reluctant to refuse condonation - The
Code of criminal procedure, 1973 -
Section 25 - maintenance. (Para - 6,16)

(B) Words/Phrases/Maxims - 'Interest
reipublicae up sit finis litium' - it is for the
general welfare that a period be put to
litigation - when an action becomes
barred by time - Court should be slow to
ignore delay for the reason that once
limitation expires, other party matures his
rights on the subject with attainment of
finality. (Para -8)

Revision filed with delay of 1088 days -
revisionist/applicant was in court below - aware
of the proceedings in court below - complete
careless and reckless long delay - on the part of
revisionist/applicant
-
remain
virtually
unexplained at all.(Para -16)

HELD:-Reasons given in the affidavit not
justified and convincing. No reason to exercise
judicial discretion exercising judiciously so as to
justify condonation of delay in the present case.
Application for condonation of delay deserves to
be dismissed. (Para -16)

Delay condonation application dismissed.

Revision dismissed. (E-7)
158 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
List of Cases cited:-

## Text

8 All. Ramdeen Yadav Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
157
illegal but irregularity which has crept in,
in no circumstances; the accused could
have been convicted under Section 302 of
I.P.C.

16. In view of the aforementioned
discussion, we are of the view that both
these appeals have to be partly allowed,
hence, are partly allowed.

17. The conviction of the appellants
under Section 302 read with Section 34 of
I.P.C. of Indian Penal Code is converted to
conviction under Section 304 (Part I) of
Indian Penal Code and the appellants are
sentenced
to
undergo
10
years
of
incarceration with fine which is reduced to
Rs.1,000/- for each appellant-accused.

18. If period of incarceration is over,
the accused shall be released forthwith, if
not required in any other case. The
judgment and order dated 17.1.2018 of trial
court shall stand modified accordingly.

19. Let a copy of this judgment alongwith the trial court record be sent to the
Court and Jail Authorities concerned for
compliance.

20. This Court is thankful to the
learned Advocates for ably assisting the
Court.
----------
(2023) 8 ILRA 157
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 28.08.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SHAMIM AHMED, J.

Criminal Revision Defective No. 308 of 2023

Ramdeen Yadav ...Revisionist
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Revisionist:
Shashank Shukla, Prachi Shukla

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
G.A.

(A) Criminal Law - Revision - Defective -
The Limitation Act, 1963 - Section 5 -
delay condonation - "sufficient cause" - to
receive a liberal construction so as to
advance substantial justice and generally
a delay in preferring appeal/revision may
be condoned in interest of justice where
no gross negligence or deliberate inaction
or lack of bona fide is imputable to
parties, seeking condonation of delay - if
delay has occurred for reasons which does
not smack of mala fide, the Court should
be reluctant to refuse condonation - The
Code of criminal procedure, 1973 -
Section 25 - maintenance. (Para - 6,16)

(B) Words/Phrases/Maxims - 'Interest
reipublicae up sit finis litium' - it is for the
general welfare that a period be put to
litigation - when an action becomes
barred by time - Court should be slow to
ignore delay for the reason that once
limitation expires, other party matures his
rights on the subject with attainment of
finality. (Para -8)

Revision filed with delay of 1088 days -
revisionist/applicant was in court below - aware
of the proceedings in court below - complete
careless and reckless long delay - on the part of
revisionist/applicant
-
remain
virtually
unexplained at all.(Para -16)

HELD:-Reasons given in the affidavit not
justified and convincing. No reason to exercise
judicial discretion exercising judiciously so as to
justify condonation of delay in the present case.
Application for condonation of delay deserves to
be dismissed. (Para -16)

Delay condonation application dismissed.

Revision dismissed. (E-7)
158 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
List of Cases cited:-

1. Collector, Land Acquisition Vs Katiji, 1987(2)
SCC 107

2. P.K. Ramachandran Vs St. of Kerala, AIR
1998 SC 2276

3. Shakuntala Devi Jain Vs Kuntal Kumari, AIR
1969 SC 575

4. Privy Council in Brij Indar Singh Vs Kanshi
Ram ILR (1918) 45 Cal 94

5. Vedabai @ Vaijayanatabai Baburao Vs
Shantaram Baburao Patil & ors., JT 2001(5) SC
608

6. Pundlik Jalam Patil (dead) by LRS. Vs
Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project &
anr. (2008) 17 SCC 448

7.
Maniben
Devraj
Shah
Vs
Municipal
Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, 2012 (5) SCC
157

(Delivered by Hon'ble Shamim Ahmed, J.)

(Order on C.M. Application No. 1 of
2023)

1. Heard Shri Shashank Shukla,
learned counsel for revisionist, Shri S.P.
Tiwari, learned A.G.A-I for the Stateopposite party No.1 and perused the
material placed on record. No counsel
appeared on behalf of the opposite party
No.2.

2. As per the report of the Stamp
Reporter of this Court, this revision is
barred by limitation and has been filed with
delay of 1088 days.

3.

Learned
Counsel
for
the
revisionist/applicant submits the present
application has been filed with prayer to
condone the delay in filing the present
revision. He further submits that the
revisionist immediately filed an objection
but he became ill and was not in contact
with his counsel and thereafter, when he
came to know that an ex-parte order had
been passed by learned court below,
immediately a recall application was filed
and then the Covid-19 outbreak happened,
thereafter, he was informed that his case
has been dismissed. He further submits that
when the revisionist received a recovery
certificate, then he contacted a new counsel
and he came to know about the impugned
order. He further submits that due to
aforementioned reasons, the delay in filing
this revision is not intentional or deliberate,
thus, the present application may be
allowed. He further submits that impugned
order dated 15.06.2018 under Section 125
Cr.P.C. passed by learned Additional
Sessions Judge/ Family Judge FTC New,
Gonda to pay the maintenance of amount of
Rs.2000/- per month from the date of
application filed by the opposite party No.2
is illegal and passed without application of
mind, thus, it is liable to be set aside and
reversed.

4. Learned A.G.A-I has opposed the
contention of learned Counsel for the
revisionist/applicant and submits that there
is no plausible reasons given in the
affidavit filed in support of the delay
condonation application for delay in filing
the present revision and he further submits
that the order impugned in this revision was
passed in the year 2018, since, then more
than five years have passed but there was
no step taken by the revisionist for
challenging the impugned order and now
this revision has been filed only with the
intention to harass the opposite party No.2
and to deny her rightful claim of
maintenance as provided under Family
Courts
Act.
The
amount
fixed
for
8 All. Ramdeen Yadav Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
159
maintenance was Rs. 2000/- per month for
the opposite party no. 2, which in the
present days of high price rise cannot be
said
to
be
either
excessive
or
disproportionate. The provisions of Section
125 of Cr.P.C are beneficial provisions
which are enacted to stop the vagrancy of a
destitute wife and provide some succour to
her, who is entitled to get the maintenance
which has been wrongly denied, thus, the
present application for condonation of
delay may be dismissed.

5. After considering the arguments of
learned Counsels for the parties made at the
Bar, it transpires that the explanation as
given in the affidavit filed in support of
delay condonation application in filing the
present revision is neither acceptable nor
trustworthy since revisionist/applicant was
already in court below, therefore, it cannot
be said that he was not aware of the
proceedings in court below. In my view,
there is no explanation what to say of
satisfactory explanation as to why the
matter was not taken with due earnest and
reasonable expediency and the present case
was filed after delay of 1088 days before
this Court.

6. The expression "sufficient cause"
in Section 5 of Act, 1963 has been held to
receive a liberal construction so as to
advance substantial justice and generally a
delay in preferring appeal/revision may be
condoned in interest of justice where no
gross negligence or deliberate inaction or
lack of bona fide is imputable to parties,
seeking condonation of delay. In Collector,
Land Acquisition Vs. Katiji, 1987(2)
SCC 107, the Court said, that, when
substantial
justice
and
technical
considerations are taken against each other,
cause of substantial justice deserves to be
preferred, for, the other side cannot claim to
have vested right in injustice being done
because of a non deliberate delay. The
Court
further
said
that
judiciary
is
respected not on account of its power to
legalise injustice on technical grounds but
because it is capable of removing injustice
and is expected to do so.

7. In P.K. Ramachandran Vs. State
of Kerala, AIR 1998 SC 2276 the Court
said:

"Law of limitation may harshly
affect a particular party but it has to be
applied with all its rigour when the statute
so prescribe and the Courts have no power
to extend the period of limitation on
equitable grounds."

8. The Rules of limitation are not
meant to destroy rights of parties. They
virtually take away the remedy. They are
meant with the objective that parties should
not resort to dilatory tactics and sleep over
their rights. They must seek remedy
promptly. The object of providing a legal
remedy is to repair the damage caused by
reason of legal injury. The statute relating
to limitation determines a life span for such
legal remedy for redress of the legal injury,
one has suffered. Time is precious and the
wasted time would never revisit. During
efflux of time, newer causes would come
up, necessitating newer persons to seek
legal remedy by approaching the courts. So
a life span must be fixed for each remedy.
Unending period for launching the remedy
may lead to unending uncertainty and
consequential
anarchy.
The
statute
providing limitation is founded on public
policy. It is enshrined in the maxim Interest
reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the
general welfare that a period be put to
litigation). It is for this reason that when an
action becomes barred by time, the Court
160 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
should be slow to ignore delay for the
reason that once limitation expires, other
party matures his rights on the subject with
attainment of finality. Though it cannot be
doubted that refusal to condone delay
would result in foreclosing the suiter from
putting forth his cause but simultaneously
the party on the other hand is also entitled
to sit and feel carefree after a particular
length of time, getting relieved from
persistent and continued litigation.

9. There is no presumption that delay
in approaching the court is always
deliberate. No person gains from deliberate
delaying a matter by not resorting to take
appropriate legal remedy within time but
then the words "sufficient cause" show that
delay, if any, occurred, should not be
deliberate, negligent and due to casual
approach of concerned litigant, but, it
should be bona fide, and, for the reasons
beyond his control, and, in any case should
not lack bona fide. If the explanation does
not smack of lack of bona fide, the Court
should show due consideration to the suiter,
but, when there is apparent casual approach
on the part of suiter, the approach of Court
is also bound to change. Lapse on the part
of litigant in approaching Court within time
is understandable but a total inaction for
long
period
of
delay
without
any
explanation whatsoever and that too in
absence of showing any sincere attempt on
the part of suiter, would add to his
negligence, and would be relevant factor
going against him.

10. I need not to burden this judgment
with a catena of decisions explaining and
laying down as to what should be the
approach of Court on construing "sufficient
cause" under Section 5 of Act, 1963 and it
would be suffice to refer a very few of
them besides those already referred.

11. In Shakuntala Devi Jain Vs.
Kuntal Kumari, AIR 1969 SC 575 a three
Judge Bench of the Court said, that, unless
want of bona fide of such inaction or
negligence as would deprive a party of the
protection of Section 5 is proved, the
application must not be thrown out or any
delay cannot be refused to be condoned.

12. The Privy Council in Brij Indar
Singh Vs. Kanshi Ram ILR (1918) 45 Cal
94 observed that true guide for a court to
exercise the discretion under Section 5 is
whether the appellant acted with reasonable
diligence in prosecuting the appeal. This
principle still holds good inasmuch as the
aforesaid decision of Privy Council as
repeatedly been referred to, and, recently in
State of Nagaland Vs. Lipok AO and
others, AIR 2005 SC 2191.

13. In Vedabai @ Vaijayanatabai
Baburao Vs. Shantaram Baburao Patil
and others, JT 2001(5) SC 608 the Court
said that under Section 5 of Act, 1963 it
should adopt a pragmatic approach. A
distinction must be made between a case
where the delay is inordinate and a case
where the delay is of a few days. In the
former case consideration of prejudice to
the other side will be a relevant factor so
the case calls for a more cautious approach
but in the latter case no such consideration
may arise and such a case deserves a liberal
approach. No hard and fast rule can be laid
down in this regard and the basic guiding
factor is advancement of substantial justice.

14. In Pundlik Jalam Patil (dead) by
LRS. Vs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon
Medium Project and Anr. (2008) 17 SCC
448, in para 17 of the judgment, the Court said :

"...The
evidence
on
record
suggests neglect of its own right for long
8 All. Ramdeen Yadav Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
161
time in preferring appeals. The court
cannot enquire into belated and state
claims on the ground of equity. Delay
defeats equity. The court helps those who
are vigilant and "do not slumber over their
rights."

15. In Maniben Devraj Shah Vs.
Municipal
Corporation
of
Brihan
Mumbai, 2012 (5) SCC 157, in para 18 of
the judgment, the Court said as under:

"What needs to be emphasized is
that even though a liberal and justice
oriented approach is required to be
adopted in the exercise of power under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other
similar statutes, the Courts can neither
become oblivious of the fact that the
successful litigant has acquired certain
rights on the basis of the judgment under
challenge and a lot of time is consumed at
various stages of litigation apart from the
cost. What colour the expression 'sufficient
cause' would get in the factual matrix of a
given case would largely depend on bona
fide nature of the explanation. If the Court
finds that there has been no negligence on
the part of the applicant and the cause
shown for the delay does not lack bona
fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on
the other hand, the explanation given by
the applicant is found to be concocted or he
is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his
cause, then it would be a legitimate
exercise of discretion not to condone the
delay. In cases involving the State and its
agencies/instrumentalities, the Court can
take note of the fact that sufficient time is
taken in the decision making process but no
premium can be given for total lethargy or
utter negligence on the part of the officers
of
the
State
and
/
or
its
agencies/instrumentalities
and
the
applications filed by them for condonation
of delay cannot be allowed as a matter of
course by accepting the plea that dismissal
of the matter on the ground of bar of
limitation will cause injury to the public
interest."

16. In my view, the kind of explanation
rendered
herein
does not
satisfy
the
observations of Apex Court that if delay has
occurred for reasons which does not smack of
mala fide, the Court should be reluctant to
refuse condonation. On the contrary, I find
that here is a case which shows a complete
careless and reckless long delay of 1088 days
on the part of revisionist/applicant which has
remain virtually unexplained at all and the
reasons given in the affidavit is not justified
and convincing. Therefore, I do not find any
reason to exercise my judicial discretion
exercising judiciously so as to justify
condonation of delay in the present case.

17. In the result, the application for
condonation of delay deserves to be
dismissed.

18.

Accordingly,
the
present
application for condonation of delay is
hereby dismissed.

(Order on memo of Revision)

1.

The
application
seeking
condonation of delay in filing the present
revision having been dismissed vide order
of date, this revision being barred by
limitation, is accordingly dismissed.

2. The court below is at liberty to
proceed in the matter in accordance with
law.

3. The Senior Registrar of this Court
is directed to send a copy of this order to
162 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the
concerned
court
below
for
its
compliance.

4. No order as to cost(s).
----------
(2023) 8 ILRA 162
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 23.08.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.

Criminal Revision No. 935 of 2023

Mahant Prasad Ram Tripathi @ M.P.R.
Tripathi ...Revisionist
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Revisionist:
Prateek Tewari

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
Shiv P. Shukla

(A) Criminal Law - The Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 - Section 397/401 -
Revision , Section 27 - Discharge ,
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 -
Section 7 - Offence relating to public
servant
being
bribed
,
The
Indian
Telegraph Act, 1885 - Section 5 - Power
for Government to take possession of
licensed
telegraphs
and
to
order
interception
of
messages,
Indian
Telegraph Rules, 1951 - Rule 419 - Any
evidence cannot be refused to be admitted
by the Court on the ground that it had
been obtained illegally.(Para - 25)

(B) Words and Phrases - 'intercept' - 'to
stop and catch something or someone
before that thing or person is able to
reach a particular place' - 'to stop, seize or
interrupt in progress or before arrival,
receive
(a
communication
or
signal
directed elsewhere) usually secretly' - 'to
stop, deflect or seize on the way from one
place to another, prevent from arriving or
proceeding.(Para -19)

Conversation made between accused persons
through their mobile phone - co-accused was
directed by CBI officials to make phone call to
applicant - make a conversation with him
regarding the payment of bribe - communication
received by putting mobile phone of co-accused
on speaker mode - recorded in another device
called 'digital voice recorder' - applicant sought
discharge under Section 227 of Cr.P.C. - digital
voice recorder conversation was inadmissible in
evidence - trial court rejected the application -
hence revision.(Para -17)

HELD:- No illegality in the order rejecting the
discharge application filed by the revisionist.
Telephonic conversation between the two
accused persons was intercepted or not and
whether it was done legally or not, would not
affect
the
admissibility
of
the
recorded
conversation in evidence against the applicant.
(Para -21,29)

Revision dismissed. (E-7)

List of Cases cited:-

1. People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) Vs.
U.O.I. & anr. , (1997) 1 SCC 301

2.
Sanjay
Pandey
Vs
Directorate
of
Enforcement, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 4299

3. Rayala M. Bhuvaneswari Vs Nagaphanender
Rayala, AIR 2008 AP 98

4. St. Vs N.M.T. Joy Immaculate, (2004) 5 SCC
729

5. St. (NCT of Delhi) Vs Navjot Sandhu, (2005)
11 SCC 600

6. Sanjay Pandey Vs D.O.E., 2022 SCC OnLine
Del 4299

7. Rayala M. Bhuvaneswari Vs. Nagaphanender
Rayala, AIR 2008 AP 98

8. Gayatri Prasad Prajapati Vs D.O.E. 2023 SCC
OnLine All 376