# Ramesh Chandra Chaubey & Ors v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2019) 2 ILRA 962
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2019-07-16
- **Case number:** Service Single No. 36266 of 2018
- **Bench:** Irshad Ali
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ramesh-chandra-chaubey-ors-v-state-of-u-p-ors-44821
- **Pages:** 18

## Headnote

C.S.C., Sri Ashok Shukla.

A. Latches/ Delay - number of posts
advertised for the post of Sub - Registrar
and Auditor Panchayat were reduced by
the respondents - petitioner joined the
post of Auditor Panchayat on bonafide
belief of reduction of vacancies on
genuine grounds - reduction in vacancies
were challenged by one named Anoop
Singh before the Court - petitioner
claims parity with Anoop Singh after a
lapse of 15 years - law leans in favour of
those
who
are
alert
and
vigilant
2 All. Ramesh Chandra Chaubey & Ors. Vs State of U.P. & Ors.
963
Although there is no period of limitation
provided for filing the writ petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, yet it
should be filed within a reasonable period of
time. Delay and latches are relevant factor for
a Court of Law to determine the question as to
whether the petitioners are entitled to the
benefit which has been provided to others or
not. (Para 34 & 36)

Writ Petition dismissed(E-10)

Cases Cited: -

## Text

_Characters 0–39,961 of 57,568. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39961 for what follows._

962 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Tribunal in this case, from the date of
filing of claim petition till the date of
award.

17. After taking Rs.4 Lakhs as basic
figure, if the interest is calculated on the
said amount @ 6% w.e.f. 21.9.2009 i.e.
the date of accident till the date of award
i.e. 12.3.2009, the amount comes to less
than Rs.8 Lakhs. On the date of award the
compensation payable in case of death
was Rs.8 Lakhs and in view of Rina Devi
(supra), the Tribunal ought to have
awarded the compensation of Rs.8 Lakhs.
The Tribunal has erred in awarding
interest over and above Rs.8 Lakhs.

18. The Tribunal has apportioned
the compensation between the claimantsrespondents. Both of them have been
awarded Rs.4 Lakhs each. The Tribunal
has issued directions for the payment of
half the amount of compensation to the
claimants and for the balance amount to
be invested in a fixed deposit account in
some nationalized bank for a period of
three years.

19. The claimants-respondent nos.1
and 2 are 54 and 51 years of age
respectively. More than 10 years have
passed since the unfortunate incident
occurred. There is evidence on record that
respondent no.1 is suffering from severe
lung disorder and his kidney is also
affected and the respondents are in dire
need of money to take care of medical
expenses of respondent no.1.

20. In view of the above, the
judgment and award dated 12.3.2018 is
modified and the claimants-respondents
are held entitled to a sum of Rs.8 Lakhs as
per the apportionment mentioned in the
award and in view of the law laid down
by the Apex Court in the case of A.V.
Padma v. R. Venugopal, (2012) 3 SCC
378 the appellant is directed to release the
entire decretal amount of Rs.8 Lakhs in
favour
of
the
claimants-respondents
forthwith.

21. No order as to costs.

22. The appeal stands disposed of
accordingly.
----------

(2019)10ILR A 962

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 16.07.2019

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE IRSHAD ALI, J.

Service Single No. 36266 of 2018

Ramesh Chandra Chaubey & Ors.
 ...Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Laltaprasad Misra, Sri Om Prakash
Misra.

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Ashok Shukla.

A. Latches/ Delay - number of posts
advertised for the post of Sub - Registrar
and Auditor Panchayat were reduced by
the respondents - petitioner joined the
post of Auditor Panchayat on bonafide
belief of reduction of vacancies on
genuine grounds - reduction in vacancies
were challenged by one named Anoop
Singh before the Court - petitioner
claims parity with Anoop Singh after a
lapse of 15 years - law leans in favour of
those
who
are
alert
and
vigilant
2 All. Ramesh Chandra Chaubey & Ors. Vs State of U.P. & Ors.
963
Although there is no period of limitation
provided for filing the writ petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, yet it
should be filed within a reasonable period of
time. Delay and latches are relevant factor for
a Court of Law to determine the question as to
whether the petitioners are entitled to the
benefit which has been provided to others or
not. (Para 34 & 36)

Writ Petition dismissed(E-10)

Cases Cited: -

1. Prem Chandra & ors Vs St of U.P. & ors
Special Appeal No. 377 of 2008

2. St of U.P. & ors Vs Santosh Kumar Mishra &
anr (2010) 9 SCC 52

3. K.C. Sharma & ors Vs UOI & ors (1997) 6 SCC 721

4. Inder Pal Yadav & ors Vs UOI & ors (1985)
2 SCC 648

5. St of Karnataka & ors Vs C. Lalitha (2006) 2
SCC 747

6. U.P. Jal Nigam & anr Vs Jaswant Singh &
anr (2006) 11 SCC 464

7. State of Uttaranchal & anr Vs Shiv Charan
Singh Bhandari & ors (2013) 12 SCC 179

8. New Delhi Municial Council Vs Pan Singh &
ors AIR (2007) Supreme Court 1365

9. Tridip Kumar Dingal & ors Vs State of W.B.
& ors (2009) 1 SCC 768

10. St of U.P. thru Secy (Revenue Deptt.) Lko
& ors Vs Dan Bahadur Singh Special Appeal
Defective No. 17
of 2016

11. St of U.P. thru Secy (Revenue Deptt.) Lko
& ors Vs Shyam Lal Special Appeal Defective
No. 147 of 2016

(Delivered by Hon'ble Irshad Ali, J.)

1). Heard Sri L.P. Mishra, learned
counsel for the petitioners and to Sri
Kuldeep Pati Tripathi, learned Additional
Advocate
General
for
the
Staterespondents and Sri Ashok Shukla,
learned counsel for the respondentCommission.

2). Brief fact of the case is that 49
vacancies were requisitioned to the
Commission for initiation of selection
proceeding on the post of Sub Registrar
and Auditor Panchayat. In pursuance
thereof, an advertisement was issued
inviting applications from the eligible and
qualified candidates in the year 2001. The
petitioners having eligibility criteria as
prescribed
under
the
advertisement
applied for the post of Sub Registrar as
well as on the post of Auditor Panchayat.

3). A selection proceeding was
conducted and result of the same was
declared by reducing the vacancies from
49 to 10. In the said selection, the
petitioners were selected on the post of
Auditor Panchayat and joined the post
under bonafide belief that the vacancies
have been reduced on genuine grounds.
One Anoop Kumar Singh filed Writ
Petition No.1697 (SB) of 2010 (Anoop
Kumar Singh Vs. State of U.P. and
others),
wherein
after
exchange
of
affidavits, this Court passed a judgment
with the following direction:

"Resultantly, the writ petition is
allowed in the following terms.

1. Since no other candidate,
who
participated
in
the
selection/examination held pursuant to
the advertisement issued in the month of
February, 2001, has approached this
Court, the directions which are being
issued in this judgment and order shall be
confined to the petitioner alone.
964 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

2.
U.P.
Public
Service
Commission
shall
consider
the
candidature of the petitioner for his
selection to the post of Sub-Registrar in
accordance with his merit on the basis of
U.P.
State
Combined
Subordinate
Services Examination-2001 and in case
based on his merit, the petitioner gets
selected to the post of Sub-Registrar,
recommendation to the State Government
for his appointment shall be made by the
Commission.

3. The recommendation which
may be made by the Commission in
respect of the petitioner's appointment to
the post of Sub-Registrar shall thereafter
be considered by the State Government in
accordance with the law and in case the
petitioner is found suitable and fit, he
shall be appointed on the post of SubRegistrar against an existing vacancy.
However, in case at present no vacancy is
available, he shall be appointed and
adjusted against any other future vacancy
which may occur. The aforesaid exercise
shall
be
completed
by
the
State
Government and the Commission within a
period of four months from the date of
presentation of a certified copy of this
order."

4). After the judgment passed on
29.11.2017, the reasons in regard to
reducing of vacancies from 49 to 10 came
in the knowledge of the petitioners and
thereafter, the present writ petition was
filed before this Court with the prayer to
quash
the
decision
taken
by
the
respondents in reducing the number of
vacancies of the post of Sub Registrar
from 49 to 10 for which the combined
state public service examination was
conducted with the prayer for issuance of
writ of mandamus commanding the
respondents to appoint the petitioners on
the post of Sub Registrar on the ground
considered by this Court in the judgment
referred herein above.

5). Learned counsel for the
petitioners submitted that at the time of
reducing the vacancies, the reasons were
not known to the petitioners. It came in
the knowledge of the petitioners, when
the judgment by this Court was delivered,
wherein the ground was placed before this
Court and was recorded in the judgment.
Therefore, there are no latches on the part
of the petitioners in approaching to this
Court. At earlier point of time, the reasons
were not known to the petitioners,
therefore, they cannot be blamed for the
same.

6). His next submission is that the
proceeding under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India is the proceeding of
equity jurisdiction and in case there is
arbitrariness on the part of the State and
after coming to know the illegalities
committed, the person aggrieved has right
to come to this Court. He further
submitted that no discrimination or
distinction can be carved out between the
candidates, who are on equal footing and
have
participated
in
a
selection
proceeding under bonafide belief that
their right shall not be curtailed on the
discrimination created by the State
Government. He placed reliance upon
certain judgments, which are as under:

i) Prem Chandra and others
Vs. State of U.P. and others; Special
Appeal No.377 of 2008.

ii) State of Uttar Pradesh and
another Vs. Santosh Kumar Mishra
and another; (2010) 9 SCC 52.
2 All. Ramesh Chandra Chaubey & Ors. Vs State of U.P. & Ors.
965

iii) K.C. Sharma and others
Vs. Union of India and others; (1997) 6
SCC 721.

iv) Inder Pal Yadav and
others Vs. Union of India and others;
(1985) 2 SCC 648.

v) State of Karnataka and
others vs. C. Lalitha; (2006) 2 SCC 747.

7). On the other hand, learned
Additional Advocate General and Sri
Ashok Shukla, learned counsel for the
respondents submitted that the petitioners
have approached to this Court after a long
delay of almost 15 years, as the
advertisement was issued in the year 2001
and the selection was completed in the
year 2003, therefore, they are not entitled
to get relief, as claimed in the present writ
petition.

8). Learned Additional Advocate
General placed reliance upon certain
judgments on the point that under Article
226 of the Constitution of India, writ
petition is not maintainable on the ground
of latches in regard to those persons, who
are not vigilant in regard to their rights.
The judgments relied upon by learned
Additional Advocate General are referred
herein below:

i) U.P. Jal Nigam and another
Vs. Jaswant Singh and another; (2006)
11 SCC 464.

ii) State of Uttaranchal and
another Vs. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari
and others; (2013) 12 SCC 179.

iii)
New
Delhi
Municipal
Council Vs. Pan Singh and others; AIR
2007 Supreme Court 1365.

iv) Tridip Kumar Dingal and
others Vs. State of West Bengal and
others; (2009) 1 SCC 768.

v) State of U.P. through its
Secretary (Revenue Deptt.) Lko. and
others Vs. Dan Bahadur Singh 680 (SS)
2015; Special Appeal Defective No.17 of
2016.

vi) State of U.P. through its
Secretary (Revenue Deptt.) Lko. and
others Vs. Shyam Lal 425 (SS) 2011
(Special Appeal Defective No.147 of
2016).

9). Having heard the rival
contentions advanced by learned counsel
for the parties, I perused the material on
record and the judgments relied upon by
learned counsel for the parties.

10). To resolve the controversy
involved in the present writ petition,
relevant portion of the judgments relied
upon by learned counsel for the parties
are being quoted below;

:- The judgments relied upon by
learned counsel for the petitioners:

i) Prem Chandra and others
Vs. State of U.P. and others (Supra):

"A peculiar and a piquant
situation has arisen in the instant case,
where it is not the case, that an aspirant
of the higher post in service on becoming
eligible for promotion or a person seeking
direct appointment on the date when he is
to be considered for such a promotion or
appointment, seeks to interpret the rule of
recruitment in a particular manner,
looking to the past practice, to his
advantage, but here is a case, where the
appellants
were
excluded
from
966 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
consideration of their appointment at the
relevant time earlier, by interpreting the
rule to their disadvantage, and were made
to believe that likewise their candidature
shall be considered later on, for which
various circulars and instructions were
also issued by the State Government, but
when
their
turn
came
for
getting
employment, they are again being put out
of consideration, by interpreting the rule
in a different manner.

Injustice thus, caused to them,
in the hands of the State Government,
therefore, requires to be corrected.

We also take notice of the fact
that under the present advertisement, 766
vacancies have been notified, therefore,
the present appellants, who are much less
in number, can also be considered for
appointment, leaving sizeable vacancies
for the rest of the candidates.

We, therefore, dispose of these
special appeals with the direction that the
appellants' cases shall be considered in
accordance with the pre-existing practice
by considering their appointment on the
basis of their merit taking their batches
into consideration as was being done
earlier but this process would be
available only for the appellants and they
would be accommodated if they are
otherwise
found
eligible
and
the
remaining vacancies would be filled in by
following Rule 15 (2) strictly as directed
by the learned Single Judge."

ii) State of Uttar Pradesh and
another Vs. Santosh Kumar Mishra
and another Supra:

"41. It is on account of a
deliberate decision taken by the State
Government that the private Respondents
were left out of the zone of consideration
for appointment as Pharmacists in order
to accommodate those who had obtained
their diplomas earlier. The decision taken
by the State Government at that time to
accommodate the diploma- holders in
batches against their respective years can
no doubt be discontinued at a later stage,
but not to the disadvantage of those who
had been deprived of an opportunity of
being appointed by virtue of the same
Rules. In our view, the same decision
which was taken to deprive the private
Respondents from being appointed, could
not now be discarded, once again to their
disadvantage to prevent them from being
appointed, introducing the concept of
merit selection at a later stage. The same
may be introduced after the private
Respondents and those similarly-situated
persons have been accommodated."

iii) K.C. Sharma and others Vs.
Union of India and others (Supra):

"6. Having regarding to the facts and
circumstances of the case, we are of the
view that this was a fit case in which the
Tribunal should have condoned the delay
in the filing of the application and the
appellants should have been given relief
in the same terms as was granted by the
Full Bench of the Tribunal. The appeal is,
therefore,
allowed,
the
impugned
judgment of the Tribunal is set aside, the
delay in filing of O.A. No. 774 of 199 is
condoned and the said application is
allowed. The appellants would be entitled
to the same relief in matter of pension as
has been granted by the Full Bench of the
Tribunal in its judgment dated December
16, 1993 in O.A. Nos. 395-403 of 1993
and connected matters. No order as to
costs."
2 All. Ramesh Chandra Chaubey & Ors. Vs State of U.P. & Ors.
967

iv) Inder Pal Yadav and
others Vs. Union of India and others
(Supra):

"5. The scheme envisages that it
would be applicable to casual labour on
projects who were In service as on January
1, 1984. The choice of this date does not
commend, for it is likely to introduce an
invidious distinction between similarly
situated persons and expose some workmen
to arbitrary discrimination flowing from
fortuitous court's order, since, in some
matters, the court granted interim stay
before the workmen could be retrenched
while some other were not so fortunate.
Those in respect of when the Court granted
interim relief by stay suspension of the
order of retrenchment, they would be
treated in service on January 1, 1984 while
others who fail to obtain interim relief
though similarly situated would be pushed
down in the implementation of the scheme.
Therefore, those who could not come to the
Court need not be at a comparative
disadvantage to those who rushed in here. If
they are otherwise similarly situated, they
are entitled to similar treatment. Keeping in
view all the aspects of the matter, the Court
modifies part 5.1 (a) (i) of the scheme by
modifying the date from 1.1.1984 to 1.1.
1981.
With
this
modification
and
consequent rescheduling in absorption from
that date onward, the scheme framed by
Railway Ministry is accepted and a
direction is given that it must be
implemented by re-casting the stages
consistent with the change in the date as
herein directed."

v) State of Karnataka and
others vs. C. Lalitha (Supra):

"29.
Service
jurisprudence
evolved by this Court from time to time
postulates that all persons similarly
situated should be treated similarly. Only
because one person has approached the
court that would not mean that persons
similarly situated should be treated
differently. It is furthermore well-settled
that the question of seniority should be
governed by the rules. It may be true that
this Court took notice of the subsequent
events, namely, that in the meantime she
had also been promoted as Assistant
Commissioner which was a Category I
Post but the direction to create a
supernumerary post to adjust her must be
held to have been issued only with a view
to accommodate her therein as otherwise
she might have been reverted and not for
the purpose of conferring a benefit to
which she was not otherwise entitled to."

:- Sri Kuldeep Pati Tripathi,
learned Additional Advocate General
placed
reliance
in
support
of
his
submissions on following judgments:

i) U.P. Jal Nigam and another
Vs.
Jaswant
Singh
and
another
(Supra):

"4. It appears that during the
pendency of the appeals and writ petitions
before this Court and after disposal of the
same by this Court, a spate of writ
petitions followed in the High Court by
the employees who had retired long back.
Some of the petitions were filed by the
employees who retired on attaining the
age of 58 years long back. However, some
were lucky to get interim orders allowing
them to continue in service. Number of
writ petitions were filed in the High Court
in 2005 on various dates after the
judgment in the case of Harwindra Kumar
(supra) and some between 2002 and
2005. All those writ petitions were
968 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
disposed of in the light of the judgment in
the case of Harwindra Kumar (supra) and
relief was given to them for continuing in
service up to the age of 60 years. Hence,
all these appeals arise against various
orders passed by the High Court from
time to time.

5. So far as the principal issue
is concerned, that has been settled by this
Court. Therefore, there is no quarrel over
the legal proposition. But the only
question is grant of relief to such other
persons who were not vigilant and did not
wake up to challenge their retirement and
accepted the same but filed writ petitions
after the judgment of this Court in the
case of Harwindra Kumar (supra).
Whether they are entitled to same relief or
not ? Therefore, a serious question that
arises for consideration is whether the
employees who

did not wake up to challenge their
retirement
and
accepted
the
same,
collected their post retirement benefits,
can such persons be given the relief in the
light of the subsequent decision delivered
by this Court ?

6. The question of delay and
laches has been examined by this Court in
a series of decisions and laches and delay
has been considered to be an important
factor in exercise of the discretionary
relief
under
Article
226
of
the
Constitution. When a person who is not
vigilant of his rights and acquiesces with
the situation, can his writ petition be
heard after a couple of years on the
ground that same relief should be granted
to him as was granted to person similarly
situated who was vigilant about his rights
and challenged his retirement which was
said to be made on attaining the age of 58
years. A chart has been supplied to us in
which it has been pointed out that about 9
writ petitions were filed by the employees
of the Nigam before their retirement
wherein their retirement was somewhere
between 30.6.2005 and 31.7.2005. Two
writ petitions were filed wherein no relief
of interim order was passed. They were
granted interim order. Thereafter a spate
of writ petitions followed in which
employees who retired in the years 2001,
2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005, woke up to
file writ petitions in 2005 & 2006 much
after their retirement. Whether such
persons should be granted the same relief
or not ?"

8. Our attention was also
invited to a decision of this Court in the
case of State of Karnataka & Ors. v. S.M.
Kotrayya & Ors. reported in (1996) 6
SCC 267. In that case the respondents
woke up to claim the relief which was
granted to their colleagues by the
Tribunal with an application to condone
the delay. The Tribunal condoned the
delay. Therefore, the State approached
this
Court
and
this
Court
after
considering the matter observed as under
:

" Although it is not necessary to
give an explanation for the delay which
occurred within the period mentioned in subsection (1) or (2) of Section 21, explanation
should be given for the delay which
occasioned after the expiry of the aforesaid
respective
period
applicable
to
the
appropriate case and the Tribunal should
satisfy itself whether the explanation offered
was proper. In the instant case, the
explanation offered was that they came to
know of the relief granted by the Tribunal in
August 1989 and that they filed the petition
immediately thereafter. That is not a proper
2 All. Ramesh Chandra Chaubey & Ors. Vs State of U.P. & Ors.
969
explanation at all. What was required of them
to explain under sub-sections (1) and (2) was
as to why they could not avail of the remedy of
redressal of their grievances before the expiry
of the period prescribed under sub-section (1)
or (2). That was not the explanation given.
Therefore, the Tribunal was wholly unjustified
in condoning the delay."

9. Similarly, in the case of
Jagdish Lal & Ors. v. State of Haryana &
Ors. reported in (1997) 6 SCC 538, this
Court reaffirmed the rule if a person
chose to sit over the matter and then woke
up after the decision of the Court, then
such person cannot stand to benefit. In
that case it was observed as follows :

" The delay disentitles a party to
discretionary relief under Article 226 or
Article 32 of the Constitution. The
appellants kept sleeping over their rights
for long and woke up when they had the
impetus from Vir Pal Singh Chauhan
case. The appellants' desperate attempt to
redo the seniority is not amenable to
judicial review at this belated stage."

17. The benefits shall only be
confined to above mentioned persons who
have filed writ petitions before their
retirement or they have obtained interim
order before their retirement. The appeals
filed against these persons by the Nigam
shall fail and the same are dismissed. Rest
of the appeals are allowed and orders
passed by the High Court are set aside.
There would be no order as to costs."

ii) State of Uttaranchal and
another
Vs.
Shiv
Charan
Singh
Bhandari and others (Supra):

"23.
In
State
of
T.N.
v.
Seshachalam, this Court, testing the
equality clause on the bedrock of delay
and laches pertaining to grant of service
benefit, has ruled thus: -

"16. ....filing of representations
alone would not save the period of
limitation. Delay or laches is a relevant
factor for a court of law to determine the
question as to whether the claim made by
an applicant deserves consideration.
Delay and/or laches on the part of a
government servant may deprive him of
the benefit which had been given to
others. Article 14 of the Constitution of
India would not, in a situation of that
nature, be attracted as it is well known
that law leans in favour of those who are
alert and vigilant."

24. There can be no cavil over
the fact that the claim of promotion is
based on the concept of equality and
equitability, but the said relief has to be
claimed within a reasonable time. The
said principle has been stated in Ghulam
Rasool Lone v. State of Jammu and
another.

25. In New Delhi Municipal
Council v. Pan Singh and others, the Court
has opined that though there is no period of
limitation provided for filing a writ petition
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,
yet ordinarily a writ petition should be filed
within a reasonable time. In the said case the
respondents had filed the writ petition after
seventeen years and the court, as stated
earlier, took note of the delay and laches as
relevant factors and set aside the order passed
by the High Court which had exercised the
discretionary jurisdiction."

iii)
New
Delhi
Municipal
Council Vs. Pan Singh and others
(Supra):
970 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

"16. There is another aspect of
the matter which cannot be lost sight of.
Respondents herein filed a Writ Petition
after 17 years. They did not agitate their
grievances for a long time. They, as
noticed herein, did not claim parity with
the 17 workmen at the earliest possible
opportunity.
They
did
not
implead
themselves as parties
even in the
reference made by the State before the
Industrial Tribunal. It is not their case
that after 1982, those employees who
were employed or who were recruited
after the cut-off date have been granted
the said scale of pay. After such a long
time, therefore, the Writ Petitions could
not have been entertained even if they are
similarly situated. It is trite that the
discretionary jurisdiction may not be
exercised
in
favour
of
those
who
approach the Court after a long time.
Delay and laches are relevant factors for
exercise of equitable jurisdiction. See
Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy and others
[(2004) 1 SCC 347], Chairman, U.P. jal
Nigam & Anr. v. Jaswant Singh and
anr.[2006
(12)
SCALE
347]
and
Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. through its
Chairman & Managing Director and
Another v. K. Thangappan and Another
[(2006) 4 SCC 322]."

iv) Tridip Kumar Dingal and
others Vs. State of West Bengal and
others (Supra):

"56. We are unable to uphold
the contention. It is no doubt true that
there can be no waiver of fundamental
right. But while exercising discretionary
jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or
136 of the Constitution, this Court takes
into account certain factors and one of
such considerations is delay and laches
on
the
part
of
the
applicant
in
approaching a writ-Court. It is well
settled that power to issue a writ is
discretionary. One of the grounds for
refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of
the Constitution is that the petitioner is
guilty of delay and laches.

57. If the petitioner wants to
invoke jurisdiction of a writ-Court, he
should come to the Court at the earliest
reasonably
possible
opportunity.
Inordinate delay in making the motion for
a writ will indeed be a good ground for
refusing to exercise such discretionary
jurisdiction. The underlying object of this
principle is not to encourage agitation of
stale claims and exhume matters which
have already been disposed of or settled
or where the rights of third parties have
accrued in the meantime [vide State of
M.P. & Anr. V. Bhailal Bhai, (1964) 6
SCR 261; Moon Mills v. Industrial Court,
Bombay, AIR 1967 SC 1450; Bhoop Singh
v. Union of India & Ors., (1992) 2 SCR
969]. This principle applies even in case
of an infringement of fundamental right
(vide Trilokchand Motichand v. H.B.
Munshi, (1969) 1 SCC 110; Durga
Prasad v. Chief Controller, (1969) 1 SCC
185; Rabindranath Bose v. Union of
India).

58. There is no upper limit and
there is no lower limit as to when a
person can approach a Court. The
question is one of discretion and has to be
decided on the basis of facts before the
Court depending on and vary from case to
case. It will depend upon what the breach
of fundamental right and the remedy
claimed are and when and how the delay
arose.

59.
We
are
in
respectful
agreement
with
the
following
2 All. Ramesh Chandra Chaubey & Ors. Vs State of U.P. & Ors.
971
observations of this Court in P.S.
Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N., (1975) 1
SCC 152;

"It is not that there is any period
of limitation for the Courts to exercise
their powers under Article 226 nor is it
that there can never be a case where the
Courts cannot interfere in a matter after
the passage of a certain length of time.
But it would be a sound and wise exercise
of discretion for the Courts to refuse to
exercise their extra-ordinary powers
under Article 226 in the case of persons
who do not approach it expeditiously for
relief and who stand by and allow things
to happen and then approach the Court to
put forward stale claims and try to
unsettle settled matters"

62.
Though
there
is
considerable force in the argument of the
learned counsel for the State and
contesting respondents that there is
substantial delay on the part of the
appellants in approaching this Court, in
the light of factual scenario and the
direction which we are inclined to issue,
we have thought it fit not to dismiss
Special Leave Petitions on the ground of
delay but considering merits of the case,
we are issuing necessary directions
granting relief to the appellants who were
vigilant about their rights."

v) State of U.P. through its
Secretary (Revenue Deptt.) Lko. and
others Vs. Dan Bahadur Singh (Supra):

"In our view, the case of Pratap
Narain Pandey is clearly distinguishable
having due regard to the fact that in that
case the candidate, who was aggrieved,
had pursued his legal remedies with
reasonable dispatch. The judgment of the
learned Single Judge in Pratap Narain
Pandey's case was delivered on 19 August
2006 in regard to two writ petitions. The
first writ petition was filed by Pratap
Narain Pandey as far back as in 1990
(Writ Petition No.10539 (S/S) of 1990).
Apart from this writ petition, he had filed
another writ petition in 2001 (Writ
Petition No.4031 (S/S) of 2001). Both the
writ petitions had been clubbed together
and were disposed of on 19 August 2006.

On
the
other
hand,
the
respondent filed his writ petition on 22
February 2015, seeking the benefit of the
judgment and order dated 19 August 2006
delivered in the writ petition filed by
Pratap Narain Pandey. By that judgment,
the petitioner in the earlier proceedings
was directed to be given appointment on
the post of regular Collection Amin and to
be treated as a regular Collection Amin in
service since 5 June 1986 for the
purposes of seniority etc. except the
salary for the period for which he had not
worked. In the writ petition which has
been filed by the respondent before the
learned Single Judge, there is absolutely
no explanation much less a cogent
explanation in regard to reasons which
led the respondent to wait for nearly
twenty nine years since 1986 before he
filed a writ petition in 2015. The fact that
other persons may have been granted the
benefit of the judgment in Pratap Narain
Pandey in the interregnum would not
absolve the respondent of his own duty to
explain why he chose to remain silent in
the pursuit of his own rights. In a
situation of this nature where a delay has
been completely unexplained, a writ
petition which was filed in 2015 seeking
the benefit of parity with a case which had
been decided in 2006 and where the
petitioner in the earlier round had been
972 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
vigilant enough in espousing his rights
since
1990,
could
not
have
been
entertained. There was evidently no parity
with the case of Pratap Narain Pandey.

The learned counsel appearing
on behalf of the respondent has relied
upon a judgment of a Division Bench of
this Court dated 8 August 2014 in a batch
of special appeals filed by the State of
Uttar Pradesh (Special Appeal Defective
No.110 of 2012 :State of Uttar Pradesh
Vs Mohd. Usman Ansari) and connected
cases). In that batch of cases, the learned
Single Judge had granted the benefit of
the decision in Pratap Narain Pandey in
various writ petitions. In fact, the
judgment of the Division Bench would
indicate that several of those writ
petitions had been filed as far back as in
1991 (Writ Petition No.4587 (S/S) of
1991, Writ Petition No.6472 (S/S) of 1991
and Writ Petition No.3764 (S/S) of 1991)
which had been decided by the learned
Single Judges on 28 October 2010, 12
May 2010 and 12 May 2010 respectively.
Those petitioners had again been vigilant
enough to pursue their rights and the writ
petitions had remained pending before
this Court. Undoubtedly, one of those writ
petitions in the batch (Writ Petition
No.1595 (S/S) of 2008) had been
dismissed on 26 March 2008 by a learned
Single Judge on the ground of laches and
the special appeal which had been filed
by the State (Special Appeal No.311 of
2008) was disposed of by holding that the
dismissal of the writ petition on the
ground of laches was erroneous in view of
the submission of the learned Standing
Counsel that the case was identical to
Pratap
Narain
Pandey
which
had
attained finality and that the benefit had
been granted to other similarly situated
persons. The case proceeded entirely on a
concession which was made and it would
appear that no effort was made on the
part of the State even to submit before the
Division Bench that there was a factual
difference between the case at hand and
in the case of Pratap Narain Pandey. The
judgment of the Division Bench does not
lay down the principle that a writ petition
which had been filed without any cogent
explanation for a delay, as in the present
case, must still be entertained merely on
the ground of the decision in Pratap
Narain Pandey. Hence, the judgment of
the Division Bench will not assist the case
of the respondent.

The learned counsel appearing
on behalf of the respondent has relied
upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in
Basanti Prasad Vs Chairman, Bihar
School Examination Board2. In that case,
the husband of the appellant, who was an
employee of the School Examination
Board, was convicted of offences under
Sections 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of the
Penal Code on 7 February 1989 against
which, a criminal appeal was filed before
the Additional Sessions Judge. When the
appeal was pending, his services were
terminated in 1992. The husband of the
appellant died during the pendency of the
appeal before the Sessions Court and with
the permission of the Court, the appellant
continued to prosecute the criminal
appeal. After he was acquitted by the
Sessions Court, the appellant moved the
Examination Board for an order that he
would be deemed to have remained in
service till the date of his retirement and
that all the consequential retiral benefits
of her late husband be paid. "

vi) State of U.P. through its
Secretary (Revenue Deptt.) Lko. And
2 All. Ramesh Chandra Chaubey & Ors. Vs State of U.P. & Ors.
973
others Vs. Shyam Lal, 425 (SS) 2011
(Supra):

"Facts
and
issues
involved
herein are same as have already been
considered by us while deciding another
Special Appeal (Defective) No.17 of 2016
and Special Appeal (Defective No.19 of
2016 filed by the State against a similar
order passed in writ petition No.333(SS)
of 2013, Dinesh Chandra Pathak v. State
of U.P., and writ petition no.680(S) of
2015, Dan Bahadur Singh v. State of U.P.
& ors., and the judgments passed by the
writ court were set aside. Relevant
extracts of the judgment dated 10.1.2016
passed in Special Appeal (Defective)
No.17 of 2016 are quoted hereinbelow:

"In our view, the case of Pratap
Narain Pandey is clearly distinguishable
having due regard to the fact that in that
case the candidate, who was aggrieved,
had pursued his legal remedies with
reasonable dispatch. The judgment of the
learned Single Judge in Pratap Narain
Pandey's case was delivered on 19 August
2006 in regard to two writ petitions. The
first writ petition was filed by Pratap
Narain Pandey as far back as in 1990
(Writ Petition No.10539 (S/S) of 1990).
Apart from this writ petition, he had filed
another writ petition in 2001 (Writ
Petition No.4031 (S/S) of 2001). Both the
writ petitions had been clubbed together
and were disposed of on 19 August 2006.

On
the
other
hand,
the
respondent filed his writ petition on 22
February 2015, seeking the benefit of the
judgment and order dated 19 August 2006
delivered in the writ petition filed by
Pratap Narain Pandey. By that judgment,
the petitioner in the earlier proceedings
was directed to be given appointment on
the post of regular Collection Amin and to
be treated as a regular Collection Amin in
service since 5 June 1986 for the
purposes of seniority etc. except the
salary for the period for which he had not
worked. In the writ petition which has
been filed by the respondent before the
learned Single Judge, there is absolutely
no explanation much less a cogent
explanation in regard to reasons which
led the respondent to wait for nearly
twenty nine years since 1986 before he
filed a writ petition in 2015. The fact that
other persons may have been granted the
benefit of the judgment in Pratap Narain
Pandey in the interregnum would not
absolve the respondent of his own duty to
explain why he chose to remain silent in
the pursuit of his own rights. In a
situation of this nature where a delay has
been completely unexplained, a writ
petition which was filed in 2015 seeking
the benefit of parity with a case which had
been decided in 2006 and where the
petitioner in the earlier round had been
vigilant enough in espousing his rights
since
1990,
could
not
have
been
entertained. There was evidently no parity
with the case of Pratap Narain Pandey.

The learned counsel appearing
on behalf of the respondent has relied
upon a judgment of a Division Bench of
this Court dated 8 August 2014 in a batch
of special appeals filed by the State of
Uttar Pradesh (Special Appeal Defective
No.110 of 2012 :State of Uttar Pradesh
Vs Mohd. Usman Ansari) and connected
cases). In that batch of cases, the learned
Single Judge had granted the benefit of
the decision in Pratap Narain Pandey in
various writ petitions. In fact, the
judgment of the Division Bench would
indicate that several of those writ
petitions had been filed as far back as in
974 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
1991 (Writ Petition No.4587 (S/S) of
1991, Writ Petition No.6472 (S/S) of 1991
and Writ Petition No.3764 (S/S) of 1991)
which had been decided by the learned
Single Judges on 28 October 2010, 12
May 2010 and 12 May 2010 respectively.
Those petitioners had again been vigilant
enough to pursue their rights and the writ
petitions had remained pending before
this Court. Undoubtedly, one of those writ
petitions in the batch (Writ Petition
No.1595 (S/S) of 2008) had been
dismissed on 26 March 2008 by a learned
Single Judge on the ground of laches and
the special appeal which had been filed
by the State (Special Appeal No.311 of
2008) was disposed of by holding that the
dismissal of the writ petition on the
ground of laches was erroneous in view of
the submission of the learned Standing
Counsel that the case was identical to
Pratap
Narain
Pandey
which
had
attained finality and that the benefit had
been granted to other similarly situated
persons. The case proceeded entirely on a
concession which was made and it would
appear that no effort was made on the
part of the State even to submit before the
Division Bench that there was a factual
difference between the case at hand and
in the case of Pratap Narain Pandey. The
judgment of the Division Bench does not
lay down the principle that a writ petition
which had been filed without any cogent
explanation for a delay, as in the present
case, must still be entertained merely on
the ground of the decision in Pratap
Narain Pandey. Hence, the judgment of
the Division Bench will not assist the case
of the respondent."

..... ..... ...... ..... ....

"In the present case, we find
from the record that the writ petition
which was filed by the respondent was
without any explanation for the delay.