# Ramesh Chandra Sharma v. District Judge, Farrukhabad and another

- **Citation:** (2007) 3 ILRA 879
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2007-11-06
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 55192 of 2007
- **Bench:** Sudhir Agarwal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ramesh-chandra-sharma-v-district-judge-farrukhabad-and-another-41123
- **Pages:** 3

## Headnote

Constitution
of
India
Art.
226Disciplinary proceeding-initiated after 12
years-challenged on ground of delayheld-initiation of belated enquiry not
fetal but once enquiry initiated but not
conclude-direction issued to conclude
the same within specific period.

Held: Para 6

The submission that delay of about 12
years is fatal for inquiry is thoroughly
misconceived. There is no principle of
law that an inquiry would stand vitiated
merely for the reason that it has been
initiated after a long time.
Case law discussed:
1995 (2) SCC-570, 1999 SCC (L&R)-646, AIR
2006 SC-2064, W.P. No. 6095 (S/S) decided
on 9.8.07

## Text

3 All] Ramesh Chandra Sharma V.D.J., Farrukhabad and another
879
B.Ed. in Special Education meant for the
specially
challenged
students.
The
appellants have produced the document of
19th January 2005, which shows that the
NCTE has entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding
with
Rehabilitation
Council
of
India
on
19.1.2005
recognizing
that
the
Rehabilitation
Council of India will decide the minimum
standard for offering teachers' education
for
specific
disability
specialization.
Madhya Pradesh Bhoj (Open) University,
Bhopal from where the appellants had
studied, has the recognition from this
Rehabilitation Council of India. The fact,
however, remains that they have obtained
their degrees in the year 2003, which is
prior to this equivalence being granted by
NCTE. That being so, at the relevant time,
they had not obtained the degrees from
the institution, which could be said to be
recognized by the NCTE or by any
equivalent body. For this reason, this
appeal cannot succeed and, therefore,
stands dismissed.

19. All these appeals stand disposed
of with this order. There will not be any
order as to costs.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 06.11.2007

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SUDHIR AGARWAL, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 55192 of 2007

Ramesh Chandra Sharma
...Petitioner
Versus
District Judge, Farrukhabad and another

 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri J.P. Singh
Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Amit Sthalekar

Constitution
of
India
Art.
226Disciplinary proceeding-initiated after 12
years-challenged on ground of delayheld-initiation of belated enquiry not
fetal but once enquiry initiated but not
conclude-direction issued to conclude
the same within specific period.

Held: Para 6

The submission that delay of about 12
years is fatal for inquiry is thoroughly
misconceived. There is no principle of
law that an inquiry would stand vitiated
merely for the reason that it has been
initiated after a long time.
Case law discussed:
1995 (2) SCC-570, 1999 SCC (L&R)-646, AIR
2006 SC-2064, W.P. No. 6095 (S/S) decided
on 9.8.07

(Delivered by Hon'ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.)

1. Heard learned counsel for the
petitioner.

2. The petitioner, an employee of the
District Judgeship, Farrukhabad, has filed
this petition challenging the order dated
05.09.2007 passed by the District Judge,
Farrukhabad conducting regular inquiry
against the petitioner and appointing
inquiry officer for the said purpose and
against the order dated 15.10.2007 which
is a consequential order since earlier
inquiry officer was posted as A.D.J. III
and now he is A.D.J. II.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner
submits that he has requested the District
Judge to change the inquiry officer and
since no action has been taken thereon,
therefore, he is not able to participate in
the inquiry.
880 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2007
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner
also submitted that the charge levelled
against the petitioner relates to an incident
which is about 12 years old and,
therefore, no inquiry now can be held
after such a long time. In support of his
contention, he placed reliance on Apex
Court's judgement in State of Madhya
Pradesh Vs. Bani Singh and another
1990 (Supp.) SCC 738.

5. I do not find any material making
substantial allegations contained in the
writ petition levelling mala fide against
the respondent no. 2 and on the other
hand it is evident that the petitioner is
only delaying departmental inquiry by not
cooperating therein and it appears that he
has filed this petition only to further delay
the proceedings.

6. The submission that delay of
about 12 years is fatal for inquiry is
thoroughly misconceived. There is no
principle of law that an inquiry would
stand vitiated merely for the reason that it
has been initiated after a long time. On
the contrary, whether delay in initiating
inquiry would be fatal or not would
depend
on
various
facts
and
circumstances. Dealing this question and
considering Bani Singh (Supra) the
Apex court in State of Punjab Vs.
Chaman Lal Goel, 1995 (2) SCC 570
declined
to
set
aside
disciplinary
proceeding initiated after a long time and
said:-

"9. Now remains the question of
delay. There is undoubtedly a delay of five
and half years in serving the charges. The
question is whether the said delay
warranted the quashing of charges in this
case. It is trite to say that such
disciplinary
proceeding
must
be
conducted soon after the irregularities
are committed or soon after discovering
the irregularities. They cannot be initiated
after lapse of considerable time. It would
not be fair to the delinquent officer. Such
delay also makes the task of proving the
charges difficult and is thus not also in
the interest of administration. Delayed
initiation of proceedings is bound to give
room for allegations of bias, mala fides
and misuse of power. If the delay is too
long and is unexplained the court may
well interfere and quash the charges. But
how long a delay is too long always
depends upon the facts of the given case.
Moreover, if such delay is likely to cause
prejudice to the delinquent officer in
defending himself, the enquiry has to be
interdicted. Wherever such a plea is
raised, the court has to weigh the factors
appearing for and against the said plea
and take a decision on the totality of
circumstances. In other words, the court
has to indulge in a process of balancing."

7. In Additional Superintendent of
Police Vs. T. Natrajan, 1999 SCC (L &
S) 646 Apex Court held as under:-

"It is settled law that some delay in
initiating proceedings would not vitiate
the enquiry unless the delay results in
prejudice to the delinquent officer."

8. The same view was reiterated in
P.D. Agarwal Vs. State Bank of India
and others, AIR 2006 SC 2064.

9. A Division Bench (in which I was
also a Member) in Writ Petition No.
6095 (S/S) of 1996 (State of U.P. &
another Vs. S.P. Singh Pundhir and
another)
decided
on
09.08.2007,
considering the aforesaid judgements of
the Apex Court, has also held as under:-
3 All] Tulsi V. Doodh Nath and others
881
"There is no hard and fast rule that
disciplinary proceedings initiated after a
long time would be per se improper or
illegal merely for the reason that it has
been initiated after long lapse of time but
it
depends
upon
the
facts
and
circumstances of that case. For example,
if the delinquent employee could show
that after long lapse of time he has lost
evidence or has no capacity to defend
himself due to loss of memory etc. then
indulgence can be granted on this ground
but mere delay in the proceedings can not
vitiate the same."

10. However, since disciplinary
proceeding, once initiated, should not be
allowed to continue for long time, in my
view, it would be appropriate to direct the
respondents to complete disciplinary
inquiry against the petitioner within a
period of three months from the date of
production of certified copy of this order.
It is made clear that in case the petitioner
fails to cooperate, it is open to the
authority concerned to proceed and
complete inquiry in accordance with law
without participation of the petitioner.

11. With the aforesaid direction, this
writ petition is dismissed.
---------
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 07.09.2007

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MRS. POONAM SRIVASTAVA, J.

Second Appeal No. 955 of 1995

Tulsi

...Plaintiff-Appellant
Versus
Doodh Nath and others

...Defendant-Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:
Sri H.C. Saxena
Sri O.P. Pandey

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri A.K. Mishra

Code of Civil Procedure-Section-100Second
Appeal-suit
for
injunctionconcurrent finding of facts-regarding
possession
of
defendant-unless
declaration sought of title suit before
civil
court
not
maintainable-Held-No
scope for interference under Section 100
required.

Held: Para 9

The findings by the two courts below
that the suit was not maintainable since
the question of title and respective right
was
to
be
determined.
In
the
circumstances, I do not find that the
substantial question of law raised in the
instant appeal worth consideration, the
findings to the contrary by the two
courts below do not call for interference
and can not be interfered in exercise of
jurisdiction under Section 100 C.P.C.
Case law discussed:
AIR 1972 SC-2299
1992 RD-429
1968 RD-410 (FB)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Mrs. Poonam Srivastav, J.)

1. Heard Sri H.C. Saxena and Sri
O.P. Pandey, learned counsels for the
appellant and Sri A.K. Mishra Advocate
for the contesting respondents

2. This is plaintiffs second appeal
against the judgment and decree dated
31.8.1995 passed by the Additional
District Judge, Varanasi, Maharajganh in
Civil Appeal No. 1 of 1994 confirming
the judgment and decree dated 15.12.1993
passed by Munsif Magistrate, Farenda,