# Ramit Lala & Ors v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2023) 8 ILRA 848
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-08-10
- **Case number:** Habeas Corpus Writ Petition No. 571 of 2023
- **Bench:** Anjani Kumar Mishra, Vivek Kumar Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ramit-lala-ors-v-state-of-u-p-ors-50612
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

Civil Law-Constitution of India, 1950Article
226
-
Code
of
Criminal
8 All. Ramit Lala & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
849
Procedure,1973-Section167(2))- From a
bare reading of proviso a(ii) of Section 167 subsection 2, it is clear that on the expiry of 60
days of judicial and police remand an accused is
entitled to default bail. This entitlement is
subject to a prayer and readiness of the accused
to furnish bail and such bail should be actually
furnished-No such prayer was made when the
order of remand was passed nor has it been
St.d in the petition or submitted by learned
counsel for the petitioner that bail was actually
furnished-Since the petitioners have been
remanded to judicial custody by a legal order,
such detention is not illegal-Writ of habeas
corpus is not maintainable. (Para 17,18 & 21)
(E-15)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

848 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
on what basis of date of birth of the detenue
have
been
recorded
in
her
school
certificates.

18. Thus second option available
under Section 94 (2)(ii) of the Act is the
birth certificate given by Corporation or
Municipal authority or Panchayat i.e. also
absent in this case. No such certificate has
been filed by either of the parties except
Aadhar card of the detenue in which the
date of birth is 1.1.2004, therefore, no
reliance can be placed on the aadhar card
either since both the options i.e. Section
94(2)(i) and 94(2)(ii) of the Act are of no
use in the given peculiar facts and
circumstance of this case, therefore, the
only course available to ascertain the
correct date of birth of the detenue is
ossification test as per Section 94(2)(iii) of
the Act, which was conducted and
according to which the detenue is major.

19. The right of the detenue vested
under Article 21 of the Constitution of
India cannot be ignored by the Court. The
detenue is not an accused before this Court.
The right guaranteed under Article 21 of
the Constitution of India cannot be denied
on hyper-technicalities while saying that
the detenue is few months less than the age
of majority.

20. Considering the fact that in the
radiological examination conducted by the
medical board the detenue is major; the
detenue has refused to go with the company
of natural guardian; she is married and
wants to live with her husband; the
marriage certificate has also been produced
before this Court and it is not the case of
the any party that she has been abducted or
kidnapped, the detenue cannot be ordered
to be kept in Nari Niketan or can be asked
to live against her wishes with her parents.

21. As discussed above, I have no
hesitation in holding that it is not the case
of illegal detention and that the detenue is
major.

22. At this stage, learned counsel for
the petitioner submits that being father of
the detenue it is not his intention to bother
her daughter any further. Only anxiety is
that she should be legally married. Since,
the marriage certificate has been produced
by the detenue before this Court, therefore,
he does not want to press this petition any
further.

23. On due consideration to the statement
given by learned counsel for the petitioner;
so also the statement of the detenue;
ossification test report; and the record
given otherwise; on merit, the petition fails
and is accordingly dismissed. The detenue
is set at liberty to go as per her own wish.
----------
(2023) 8 ILRA 848
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 10.08.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ANJANI KUMAR MISHRA, J.
THE HON'BLE VIVEK KUMAR SINGH, J.

Habeas Corpus Writ Petition No. 571 of 2023

Ramit Lala & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Ms. Somya Chaturvedi, Sri G.S. Chaturvedi Sr.
Advocate

Counsel for the Respondents:
G.A., Sri Sanjay Kumar Yadav, Sri Gyan Prakash

Civil Law-Constitution of India, 1950Article
226
-
Code
of
Criminal
8 All. Ramit Lala & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
849
Procedure,1973-Section167(2))- From a
bare reading of proviso a(ii) of Section 167 subsection 2, it is clear that on the expiry of 60
days of judicial and police remand an accused is
entitled to default bail. This entitlement is
subject to a prayer and readiness of the accused
to furnish bail and such bail should be actually
furnished-No such prayer was made when the
order of remand was passed nor has it been
St.d in the petition or submitted by learned
counsel for the petitioner that bail was actually
furnished-Since the petitioners have been
remanded to judicial custody by a legal order,
such detention is not illegal-Writ of habeas
corpus is not maintainable. (Para 17,18 & 21)
(E-15)

List of Cases cited:

1. Pradeep Ram Vs St. of Jharkhand & ors., AIR
2019 Supreme Court 3193

2.
Natabar
Parida
Bisnu
Charan
Parida
Batakrushnaparida Balaji Vs St. of Orissa AIR
1976 SC 1465

3. Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain Vs St. of
Mah. (2013) 3 SCC 77

(Delivered by Hon'ble Anjani Kumar
Mishra, J. & Hon'ble Vivek Kumar Singh, J.)

1. Shri G. S. Chaturvedi, learned
Senior Advocate for the petitioner and Shri
Gyan Prakash for the respondents.

2. This petition which has been titled
as a Habeas Corpus Petition seeks the
following reliefs:-

"i) Issue a writ, order or direction in
the nature of Certiorari quashing the
impugned order dated 26.06.2023 passed
by Special Judge, P.C. Act (C.B.I.,
Ghaziabad) in Criminal Misc. Case No.
04/2023 (C.B.I. Vs. Ramit Lala & others),
pertaining to RC No. 2162023A0004 u/s
120-B and Section 7, 8, 9, 10 & 12 P.C.
Act, 1988 (As amended in 2018), P.S.
CBI/AC-I/New Delhi (Annexure No.1) to
this writ petition).

ii). Issue a writ, order or direction in
the nature of Habeas Corpus directing the
respondent
concerned
to
release
the
petitioners from custody and produce
before this Hon'ble Court on the date
fixed."

3. On the matter being taken, a prayer
was made by learned counsel for the
petitioner for deleting the first petitioner,
Ramit Lala, from the array of the parties
which
permission
was
granted
and
necessary deletion has been made in the
array of the parties.

4. The petition has been entered in the
data base as Ramit Lala and three others.
Since the name of the first petitioner has
been deleted, the petition should now be
entered in the data base as Monica Dhawan
and two others. This requisite correction be
made by the Computer Section in the
computer data base.

5. The brief facts of the case are that
the petitioners were arrested on 25.04.2023
in connection with RC No. 2162023A0004
under Sections 120B IPC and Sections 7, 8,
9, 10 & 12 of the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988, P.S. CBI/AC-I/New Delhi.

6. It is submitted that the charge-sheet
was filed on 22.06.2023 and thereafter, the
case was registered as a miscellaneous case
and 26.06.2023 was fixed for hearing on
the question of cognizance. On the next
date i.e., 26.06.2023, the impugned order
was passed. The court did not take
cognizance on that date since requisite
sanction for prosecuting Ramit Lala, a
General Manager of Broadcast Engineering
Consultants India Pvt. Ltd., had not been
obtained.
The
next
date
fixed
was
850 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
10.07.2023. Simultaneously, the petitioners
were remanded to judicial custody under
Section 309 Cr.P.C.

7. It is contended that the power under
Section 309 Cr.P.C., can be invoked by a
Court only after cognizance had been taken
and
not
before
that.
Under
the
circumstances, remanding the petitioners to
judicial custody is illegal and renders
custody of the petitioner illegal.

8. It would be relevant to note that the
petitioners
in
this
writ
petition
are
Managing Director, President & Business
Head and Director respectively of M/s
Fusion Corporate Solutions Pvt. Ltd.

9. The contention of Shri Gyan
Prakash, ASGI, appearing for respondents
is two fold. He has submitted that upon
perusal of the charge-sheet itself, it is clear
that the investigation is still not complete.
He has referred to Page 68 of the paper
book especially paragraph 16.91 of the
charge-sheet. The said paragraph reads as
follows:-

"16.91- Investigation in respect of
certain points with regard to obtaining
bribe by Shri Ramit Lala from some other
contractors is yet not completed and
separate supplementary report will be
submitted under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C., on
conclusion
of
investigation.
Further
investigation in respect of purportedly fake
bills submitted by M/s. Fusion Corporate
Solutions Pvt. Ltd., to BECIL is also kept
open. "

10. He has next submitted that the
remand order is one under Section 167(2)
of the Act as it has been passed when the
investigation is still not complete. He
further submits that in any case mere
mention of Section 309 I.P.C., would not
render the order non-est because the
Magistrate did possess the power to order
judicial remand under Section 167.

11. He has placed reliance upon a
decision of Apex Court namely Pradeep
Ram Vs. State of Jharkhand and others,
AIR 2019 Supreme Court 3193 wherein it
has been held in paragraph 65 as follows:-

"65. The special Judge in his order
has neither referred to Section 309 nor
Section 167 under which accused was
remanded. When the Court has power to
pass a particular order, non-mention of
provision of law or wrong mention of
provision of law is inconsequential. As held
above, the special Judge could have only
exercised power under Section 309(2),
hence, the remand order dated 25.06.2018
has to be treated as remand order under
Section 309(2) Cr.P.C. The special Judge
being empowered to remand the accused
under Section 309(2) in the facts of the
present case, there is no illegality in the
remand order dated 25.06.2018 when the
accused was remanded to the judicial
custody."

12.

We
have
considered
the
submissions made by learned counsel for
the parties and perused the order impugned
dated 26.06.2023.

13. There is no doubt that Section 309
Cr.P.C. cannot be invoked by a Magistrate
or the Special Judge as in the instant case,
at the pre-cognizance stage. The power
under this Section can be exercised only
after the Court has taken cognizance. It is
not in dispute that cognizance has not been
taken as requisite sanction for prosecution
for some of the accused had not been
obtained.
8 All. Ramit Lala & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
851

14. Under the circumstances, the only
provision which permits an accused to be
remanded to judicial custody is Section
167(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code. In
this context, it would be relevant to
examine Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. which
reads as follows:

"167. Procedure when investigation
cannot be completed in twenty four hours:-

(1).............

(2) The Magistrate to whom an
accused person is forwarded under this
section may, whether he has or has not
jurisdiction to try the case, from time to
time, authorise the detention of the accused
in such custody as such Magistrate thinks
fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days in
the whole; and if he has no jurisdiction to
try the case or commit it for trial, and
considers further detention unnecessary, he
may order the accused to be forwarded to a
Magistrate
having
such
jurisdiction:
Provided that-

(a). the Magistrate may authorise the
detention of the accused person, otherwise
than in the custody of the police, beyond
the period of fifteen days; if he is satisfied
that adequate grounds exist for doing so,
but no Magistrate shall authorise the
detention of the accused person in custody
under this paragraph for a total period
exceeding,-

(i) ninety days, where the investigation
relates to an offence punishable with death,
imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a
term of not less than ten years;

(ii) sixty days, where the investigation
relates to any other offence, and, on the
expiry of the said period of ninety days, or
sixty days, as the case may be, the accused
person shall be released on bail if he is
prepared to and does furnish bail, and
every person released on bail under this
sub- section shall be deemed to be so
released under the provisions of Chapter
XXXIII for the purposes of that Chapter;

(b) no Magistrate shall authorise
detention in any custody under this section
unless the accused is produced before him;

(c) no Magistrate of the second class,
not specially empowered in this behalf by
the High Court, shall authorise detention in
the custody of the police. Explanation I.-
For the avoidance of doubts, it is hereby
declared that, notwithstanding the expiry of
the period specified in paragraph (a), the
accused shall be detained in custody so
long as he does not furnish bail;
Explanation II.- If any question arises
whether an accused person was produced
before the Magistrate as required under
paragraph (b), the production of the
accused person may be proved by his
signature
on
the
order
authorising
detention."

15. The first proviso to the said
Section namely a(ii) provides that the
total period of remand of an accused
cannot be more than 60 or 90 days
depending upon the offence An accused
who has completed 60/90 days in custody
as per the offence under investigation
shall be released on bail if investigation
has not been concluded and if he is
prepared and does furnish bail.

16.

This
provision
came
for
consideration before the Apex Court in
Natabar Parida Bisnu Charan Parida
Batakrushnaparida Balaji Vs. State of
Orissa AIR 1976 SC 1465 as observed as
follows:-

"But then the command of the
Legislature in proviso (a) is that the
accused person has got to be released on
bail if he is prepared to and does furnish
bail and cannot be kept in detention beyond
852 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the period of 60 days even if the
investigation may still be proceeding."

17. From a bare reading of proviso
a(ii) of Section 167 sub-section 2, it is clear
that on the expiry of 60 days of judicial and
police remand an accused is entitled to
default bail. This entitlement is subject to a
prayer and readiness of the accused to
furnish bail and such bail should be
actually furnished.

18. In the case at hand, on a pointed
query by the Court, Shri Gopal Chaturvedi
has stated that no such prayer was made on
26.06.2023 seeking bail when the order of
remand was passed nor has it been stated in
the petition or submitted by learned counsel
for the petitioner that bail was actually
furnished.

19. The Apex Court in Suresh
Kumar Bhikamchand Jain Vs. State of
Maharashtra (2013) 3 SCC 77 has laid
down as follows:-

"17. In our view, grant of sanction is
nowhere contemplated under Section 167
Cr.P.C. What the said Section contemplates
is the completion of investigation in respect
of different types of cases within a
stipulated period and the right of an
accused to be released on bail on the
failure of the investigating authorities to do
so. The scheme of the provisions relating to
remand of an accused, first during the
stage of investigation and, thereafter, after
cognizance is taken, indicates that the
Legislature
intended
investigation
of
certain crimes to be completed within 60
days and offences punishable with death,
imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a
term of not less than 10 years, within 90
days. In the event, the investigation is not
completed by the investigating authorities,
the accused acquires an indefeasible right
to be granted bail, if he offers to furnish
bail. Accordingly, if on either the 61st day
or the 91st day, an accused makes an
application for being released on bail in
default of charge-sheet having been filed,
the Court has no option but to release the
accused on bail. The said provision has
been considered and interpreted in various
cases, such as the ones referred to
hereinbefore. Both the decisions in Natabar
Parida's case (supra) and in Sanjay Dutt's
case (supra) were instances where the
charge-sheet was not filed within the period
stipulated in Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. and an
application having been made for grant of
bail prior to the filing of charge-sheet, this
Court held that the accused enjoyed an
indefeasible right to grant of bail, if such
an application was made before the filing
of the charge-sheet, but once the chargesheet was filed, such right came to an end
and the accused would be entitled to pray
for regular bail on merits.

18. None of the said cases detract from
the position that once a charge-sheet is
filed within the stipulated time, the question
of grant of default bail or statutory bail
does not arise. As indicated hereinabove, in
our view, the filing of charge-sheet is
sufficient compliance with the provisions of
Section 167(2)(a)(ii) in this case. Whether
cognizance is taken or not is not material
as far as Section 167 Cr.P.C. is concerned."

20.

Under
the
circumstances,
therefore, the order of remand cannot be
said to be illegal. For the same reason and
since the remand order dated 26.06.2023
was not per se illegal in the absence of a
prayer for default bail and in the absence of
any bail bond, security etc., having been
furnished. Moreover, the charge-sheet had
already been filed and therefore, question
8 All. Bhoopendra Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
853
of granting default bail did not arise even if
cognizance had not been taken.

21. Therefore, the order of judicial
remand passed on 26.06.2023 cannot be
said to be illegal in any manner despite
mention of section 309 Cr.P.C. in the order
of remand dated 26.06.2023, in view of the
pronouncement of the Supreme Court in
Pradeep Ram (Supra). Since the petitioners
have been remanded to judicial custody by
a legal order, such detention is not illegal.
Therefore, no habeas corpus will lie. The
petition, insofar as it claims issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus is not maintainable

22. Since a charge-sheet had been
filed against the petitioners on 22.06.2023,
they were not entitled to default bail. Their
judicial remand by the impugned order
dated 26.06.2023 is fully justified. The
order, therefore, is not liable to be quashed.

23. Since, both the reliefs claimed in
the writ petition cannot be granted for the
reasons given above, this writ petition fails
and is dismissed.
----------
(2023) 8 ILRA 853
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 22.08.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SYED QAMAR HASAN RIZVI, J.

PIL No. 1843 of 2023

Bhoopendra Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Rajeev Kumar, Sri Prashant Yadav

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Krishna Kant Singh, Sri Pradeep
Kumar Upadhyay

Civil Law - Public Interest Litigation -
Maintainability - Chapter XXII - Rule 1(3A) of the Allahabad High Court Rules,
1952 - Petitioner failed to disclose specific
and precise credentials as mandated - No
prima facie public cause established -
Mere assertion of being a resident and
Gaon Sabha member insufficient - Petition
filed for personal or oblique motive -
Frivolous PIL discouraged in view of
Supreme Court precedents - Petition
dismissed.

Held - The petitioner, while seeking relief
in a PIL regarding installation and location
of a borewell in village Garhi Madusua,
failed to disclose his credentials in the
specific and precise manner as required
under Rule 1(3-A) of Chapter XXII of the
High Court Rules. No public interest or
violation of public rights was shown. The
averments
were
vague
and
lacked
supporting documents. In absence of prima
facie case and proper disclosures, the
petition was not maintainable as a PIL.
Dismissed
with
liberty
to
approach
concerned authorities.

PIL dismissed.

Case law discussed:

1. St. of Uttranchal Vs Balwant Singh Chaufal,
2010 AIR SCW 1029

2. Pankaj Srivastava Vs High Court of Judicature
at Allahabad, (2014) 3 UPLBEC 1832

3. Ashok Kumar Pandey Vs St. of W.B., AIR
2004 SC 280

4. Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware Vs St. of Mah.,
(2005) 1 SCC 590

5. M/s Holicow Pictures (P) Ltd. Vs Prem
Chandra Mishra, (2007) 14 SCC 281

(Delivered by Hon'ble Syed Qamar Hasan
Rizvi, J.)