# Ramji & Ors v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 4 ILRA 637
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-04-02
- **Case number:** Writ C No. 14904 of 2016
- **Bench:** Shekhar B. Saraf, Vipin Chandra Dixit
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ramji-ors-v-state-of-u-p-ors-53186
- **Pages:** 14

## Headnote

Civil Law - Constitution of India,1950 -
Article 226 - Urban Land (Ceiling and
Regulation) Act, 1976 - Sections 6(1),
8(3), 8(4), 10(1), 10(3), 10(5) & 10(6) -
Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation)
Repeal Act, 1999 - Sections 3 & 4 - Writ of
Mandamus - Surplus Land
- De Facto
Possession - Abatement of Proceedings - Notice
Requirement - Jurisdiction of Writ Court - Mixed
Question of Law and Fact - Delay in Filing Writ
Petition.

Held:

The petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to
restrain the respondents from dispossessing
them from 67,138.12 square meters of land
declared surplus under the Urban Land (Ceiling
and Regulation) Act, 1976, in village Lawayan,
District Allahabad. Ceiling proceedings against
Bholanath, the original tenure holder, resulted in
an ex-parte order dated 24.05.1983 under
Section 8(4), followed by notifications under
Sections 10(1) and 10(3), and a notice under
Section 10(5) dated 27.05.1996. No voluntary
surrender
or
forceful
dispossession
under
Section 10(6) occurred, and Bholanath and his
heirs remained in physical possession until his
death in 2005 and thereafter. The St. failed to
provide evidence of de facto possession, such as
a memorandum of possession or panchnama,
before the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation)
Repeal Act, 1999. Relying on *St. of U.P. v. Hari
Ram, (2013) 4 SCC 280*, and *M/s A.P.
Electrical Equipment Corporation v. Tahsildar,
2025 SCC OnLine SC 447*, the Court held that
mere vesting under Section 10(3) does not
confer de facto possession, and proceedings
abate under Section 4 of the Repeal Act if
possession was not taken. The issue of
possession, a mixed question of law and fact,
was within the writ court's jurisdiction under
Article 226, despite a 20-year delay, as the St.'s
threat of dispossession in 2015 provided a fresh
cause of action. The writ was allowed, and the
St. was directed to update revenue records in
favor of the petitioners within eight weeks. A
correction application adding counsel's name
was also allowed.

Writ petition allowed; revenue records to
be updated in favor of petitioners.

Case Law Discussed:

## Text

_Characters 0–39,989 of 45,413. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39989 for what follows._

4 All. Ramji & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
637

10
In
light
of
the
same,
the
Superintendent of Police, Sambhal is
directed to ensure that the first information
information report should be registered at
Police Station Chandausi, District Sambhal,
if the parents of the child approach the
police station. The Superintendent of
Police, Sambhal is also directed to look
into the aspect whether any security is
required to be provided to the child and the
parents in accordance with law. The
authorities are also directed to act in
accordance with the judgements indicated
above.

11. With the above directions, the writ
petition is allowed.
----------
(2025) 4 ILRA 637
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 02.04.2025 &
08.04.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SHEKHAR B. SARAF, J.
THE HON'BLE VIPIN CHANDRA DIXIT, J.

Writ C No. 14904 of 2016

Ramji & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Sanjay Goswami

Counsel for the Respondents:
Ms. Shubhra Singh, Sri Mohan Srivastava
(S.C.), Sri Neelambhar Tripathi

Civil Law - Constitution of India,1950 -
Article 226 - Urban Land (Ceiling and
Regulation) Act, 1976 - Sections 6(1),
8(3), 8(4), 10(1), 10(3), 10(5) & 10(6) -
Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation)
Repeal Act, 1999 - Sections 3 & 4 - Writ of
Mandamus - Surplus Land
- De Facto
Possession - Abatement of Proceedings - Notice
Requirement - Jurisdiction of Writ Court - Mixed
Question of Law and Fact - Delay in Filing Writ
Petition.

Held:

The petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to
restrain the respondents from dispossessing
them from 67,138.12 square meters of land
declared surplus under the Urban Land (Ceiling
and Regulation) Act, 1976, in village Lawayan,
District Allahabad. Ceiling proceedings against
Bholanath, the original tenure holder, resulted in
an ex-parte order dated 24.05.1983 under
Section 8(4), followed by notifications under
Sections 10(1) and 10(3), and a notice under
Section 10(5) dated 27.05.1996. No voluntary
surrender
or
forceful
dispossession
under
Section 10(6) occurred, and Bholanath and his
heirs remained in physical possession until his
death in 2005 and thereafter. The St. failed to
provide evidence of de facto possession, such as
a memorandum of possession or panchnama,
before the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation)
Repeal Act, 1999. Relying on *St. of U.P. v. Hari
Ram, (2013) 4 SCC 280*, and *M/s A.P.
Electrical Equipment Corporation v. Tahsildar,
2025 SCC OnLine SC 447*, the Court held that
mere vesting under Section 10(3) does not
confer de facto possession, and proceedings
abate under Section 4 of the Repeal Act if
possession was not taken. The issue of
possession, a mixed question of law and fact,
was within the writ court's jurisdiction under
Article 226, despite a 20-year delay, as the St.'s
threat of dispossession in 2015 provided a fresh
cause of action. The writ was allowed, and the
St. was directed to update revenue records in
favor of the petitioners within eight weeks. A
correction application adding counsel's name
was also allowed.

Writ petition allowed; revenue records to
be updated in favor of petitioners.

Case Law Discussed:

1. Pt. Madan Swaroop Shrotiya Public Charitable
Trust Vs St. of U.P., (2000) 6 SCC 325* -
Proceedings abate under Section 4 of Repeal Act
absent proof of possession.
638 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
2. Vinayak Kashinath Shelkar Vs Deputy
Collector, (2012) 4 SCC 718* - Possession
means actual physical possession, not de jure
possession.

3. St. of U.P. Vs Hari Ram, (2013) 4 SCC 280* -
Mere vesting under Section 10(3) does not
confer de facto possession; St. must prove
voluntary surrender or forceful dispossession.

4. Gajanan Kamlya Patil Vs Additional Collector,
AIR 2014 SC 1843* - Actual physical possession
required under Ceiling Act.

5. St. of Assam Vs Bhaskar Jyoti Sharma, (2015)
5 SCC 321* - Dispossession without notice
under Section 10(5) does not vitiate possession
for Repeal Act purposes if not challenged timely.

6. St. of U.P. Vs Ehsan, 2023 SCC OnLine SC
1331* - Writ court to refrain from deciding
possession disputes with significant delay;
relegation to suit appropriate.

7. M/s A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v.
Tahsildar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 447* -
Possession under Repeal Act is de facto; writ
court can adjudicate mixed questions of law and
fact to prevent miscarriage of justice.

8. Dip Co. Op. Hsg. Soc. Ltd. Vs St. of Gujarat,
2020 SCC OnLine Guj 693* - Possession under
Ceiling Act refers to actual physical possession.

9. Jor Singh @ Chhotelal Vs St. of U.P., Writ C
No. 36691 of 2004* - Supports abatement of
proceedings absent de facto possession.

10. Netra Pal Singh Vs St. of U.P., Writ C No.
34859 of 2013* - Reinforces requirement of
actual possession for Ceiling Act proceedings.

11. St. of Orissa Vs Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei, AIR
1967 SC 1269* - Writ court not precluded from
deciding factual questions in appropriate cases.

Observation:

The Court observed conflicting revenue records,
with petitioners' names in Khasra for 1422 Fasli
(2012) and St.'s name in Khatauni for 14141419 Fasli (2004-2009) and 1426-1431 Fasli
(2016-2021). The St.'s claim of possession via a
1996 Government Order transferring the land to
Prayagraj
Development
Authority
lacked
evidence of actual possession or compensation
payment. The 20-year delay was excused due to
the 2015 dispossession threat, which triggered
the cause of action. Accepting the St.'s claims
without scrutiny risked injustice, justifying
adjudication under Article 226.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Shekhar B. Saraf, J.)

1. This is a writ petition under Article
226 of the Constitution of India wherein the
petitioners have prayed for the issuance of
a writ of mandamus restraining the
respondents
from
dispossessing
or
interfering with the peaceful possession of
petitioners from their surplus declared land
in question, situated in village Lawayan,
Pargana Arail, Tehsil Karchhana, District
Allahabad and in furtherance directing the
respondents not to make any interference in
the peaceful possession of the petitioners
over the land/plots on area 67138.12 square
meter situated at aforementioned place.

FACTS

2. Factual matrix giving rise to the
instant writ petition is delineated below:

a)
In
the
present
lis,
one
Bholanath (father of petitioner no.1 to 4,
father-in-law of petitioner no. 5 and 6, and
grandfather of petitioner no. 7 to 11) was
the owner in possession of various
agricultural
lands
situated
in
village
Lawayan Kala, Pargana Arail, Tehsil
Karchhana, District Allahabad. His name
was also recorded in Khasra of 1422 Fasli
year (corresponding to the year 2012). He
had been cultivating the land since then.

b) The State initiated ceiling
proceedings against Bholanath in Case No.
K-3770/1976 (State v. Bholanath) under
4 All. Ramji & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
639
Section 6 (1) of the Urban Land (Ceiling
and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter
referred to as 'Ceiling Act') based on his
statement regarding vacant land.

c) Thereafter, the Competent
Authority, Urban Land Ceiling, Allahabad
(hereinafter referred to as 'respondent
no.3') passed an ex-parte order dated May
24, 1983 under Section 8 (4) of the Ceiling
Act, declaring 67,138.12 square meter of
land as surplus.

d)
On
July
24,
1993,
a
notification under Section 10 (1) of the
Ceiling Act was published, followed by a
declaration under Section 10 (3) of the
Ceiling Act, in the official gazette.

e) Subsequently, respondent no.3
issued notice dated May 27, 1996 under
Section 10 (5) of the Ceiling Act directing
Bholanath
to
voluntarily
handover/surrender
the
possession
of
surplus land to the Collector/District
Magistrate, Allahabad within 30 days of
receipt of the notice.

f) However, Bholanath neither
voluntarily surrendered the possession of
the land before the authority, nor did the
District Magistrate/Collector, Allahabad or
any other authority take forceful possession
of the same under Section 10 (6) of the
Ceiling Act. The ceiling proceedings only
reached upto the stage of Section 10 (5) of
the Ceiling Act.

g) Bholanath continued in the
actual physical possession of land until his
death in May, 2005. After his demise, his
legal heirs inherited the property, including
the surplus land, and have remained in
actual physical possession since then.

h) Since neither actual physical
possession of the land was taken by the
State Government nor any compensation
was awarded to them for the surplus
declared land, all the proceedings under the
Act, stood abated after enforcement of the
Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation)
Repeal Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as
'Repeal Act').

i) In December 2015, respondent
authorities visited the land and threatened
the petitioners to vacate the surplus land
within 30 days. They warned of forced
dispossession,
if
the
land
was
not
surrendered.

j) Being aggrieved by the exparte order and the threat received from
respondents to dispossess them from the
peaceful possession, the petitioners have
approached this Court seeking relief.

CONTENTIONS
OF
THE
PETITIONERS

3. Learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the petitioners has made the
following submissions:

a) It is a statutory mandate to
issue proper and effective service of notice
along with a draft statement to the person
concerned under Section 8 (3) of the
Ceiling Act before passing an order under
Section 8 (4) of the Ceiling Act. The
petitioners in the present case, were never
served with notice under Section 8 (3).
Inter alia, it is contended by the State in its
counter-affidavit that the notice under
Section 8 (3) of the Ceiling Act was served
upon Sangam Lal (petitioner no. 4) who is
the son of Bholanath and was the original
tenure holder. However, Bholanath was the
640 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
original tenure holder during his lifetime
till 2005.

b) The actual physical possession
of the surplus land vests with the
petitioners though State is showing de facto
possession from the fact stated in its
counter-affidavit that the land has been
transferred
to
Prayagraj
Development
Authority via Government Order dated
December 11, 1996 before the Repeal Act
came into force.

c) Reliance has been placed upon
umpteen judgments of the Apex Court as in
Vinayak Kashinath Shelkar v. Deputy
Collector and Competent Authority and
Ors. reported in (2012) 4 SCC 718;
Gajanan Kamlya Patil v. Additional
Collector and Competent Authority
(ULC) and Ors. reported in AIR 2014
SC 1843; and Dip Co. Op. Hsg. Society
Ltd. v. State of Gujarat reported in 2020
SCC Online Guj 693 wherein it was held
that 'possession' means actual physical
possession not de facto possession and not
mere paper or de jure possession.

d)
Entire
proceedings
were
conducted in an ex-parte manner against
Bholanath
without
providing
any
opportunity of hearing to him.

e) The entries in revenue records
were changed by the State in a whimsical
manner on the basis of notice issued under
Section 10 (5) of the Ceiling Act.

f) State has not filed any
documents/memorandum
of
possession
justifying entries in the revenue records.
State has also not prepared any panchnama
in relation to show that the possession has
been taken over by them.

g) The actual physical possession
of the disputed land was not taken by the
State and the proceedings have gone only
up to the stage of Section 10 (5) of the
Ceiling Act. The acquisition proceeding
stands abated as per the Repeal Act. Hence,
the peaceful possession of the petitioners
should not be interfered with.

h) To buttress the arguments,
reliance has been placed upon a judgment
of the Apex Court in Pt. Madan Swaroop
Shrotiya Public Charitable Trust v. State
of U.P. reported in (2000) 6 SCC 325
wherein the Court has held that in the
absence of record to indicate the possession
over the surplus land, the proceedings have
to be abated under Section 4 of the Repeal
Act. The relevant paragraph of the said
judgment to substantiate the contentions is
quoted below:

"5. Since there is nothing on
record to indicate that the State had taken
possession over the surplus land, the
present proceedings have to be abated and
are hereby abated under Section 4 of the
Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation)
Repeal Act, 1999."

i) In State of U.P. v. Hari Ram
reported in (2013) 4 SCC 280, the Apex
Court has held that mere conferment of
right under Section 10 (3) of the Ceiling
Act does not confer any de facto right on
the State to have possession unless there is
voluntary
surrender
or
delivery
of
possession peacefully under Section 10(5)
of the Ceiling Act or forceful dispossession
under Section 10 (6) of the Ceiling Act.
The relevant paragraphs of the judgment
are quoted below:

"Effect of the Repeal Act
4 All. Ramji & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
641

41. Let us now examine the effect
of Section 3 of Repeal Act 15 of 1999 on
sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the Act. The
Repeal Act, 1999 has expressly repealed
Act 33 of 1976. The objects and reasons of
the Repeal Act have already been referred
to in the earlier part of this judgment. The
Repeal Act has, however, retained a saving
clause. The question whether a right has
been acquired or liability incurred under a
statute before it is repealed will in each
case depend on the construction of the
statute and the facts of the particular case.

42. The mere vesting of the land
under sub-section (3) of Section 10 would
not confer any right on the State
Government to have de facto possession of
the vacant land unless there has been a
voluntary surrender of vacant land before
18-3-1999. The State has to establish that
there has been a voluntary surrender of
vacant land or surrender and delivery of
peaceful possession under sub-section (5)
of Section 10 or forceful dispossession
under sub-section (6) of Section 10. On
failure to establish any of those situations,
the landowner or holder can claim the
benefit of Section 4 of the Repeal Act. The
State Government in this appeal could not
establish any of those situations and hence
the High Court is right in holding that the
respondent is entitled to get the benefit of
Section 4 of the Repeal Act."

j) The judgments of the Division
Bench of this Court that have been placed
reliance upon to buttress the arguments are:
Jor Singh @ Chhotelal v. State of U.P. in
Writ C No. 36691 of 2004; Netra Pal
Singh and another v. State of U.P. and
another in Writ C No. 34859 of 2013.

CONTENTIONS
OF
THE
RESPONDENTS

4.
Learned
Standing
Counsel
appearing on behalf of the State has made
following submissions:

a) Petitioners alleged that they
were not served with the notice dated
December 10, 1980 under Section 8 (3) of
the Ceiling Act before passing an ex-parte
order under Section 8 (4) of the Ceiling Act
declaring 67138.12 square meter as surplus
land. In this regard, it is submitted that
notice along with draft statement under
Section 8 (3) of the Ceiling Act was duly
issued and served on April 13, 1983 upon
Sangam Lal (petitioner no.4) son of
Bholanath, who was the original tenure
holder of the land.

b) Publication of declaration of
surplus land under Section 10 (3) of the
Ceiling Act in the official gazette vide
notification dated February 3, 1996 vests
absolute right in the State Government free
from all encumbrances with effect from
date so specified in the said notification.

c) Upon service of notice and
passing of an order dated May 27, 1996
under Section 10 (5) of the Ceiling Act,
Bholanath
peacefully
transferred
the
possession of land in dispute to respondent
no.3. Accordingly, the revenue records
were rectified, replacing the name of the
original tenure holder with the State
Government.
Hence,
the
physical
possession was validly taken over by the
respondents in accordance with the Act
before the Repeal Act came into force.
Issuance of notice and service thereof was
in accordance with the Act.

d) The land which was in the
name and possession of the State was
transferred
to
Prayagraj
Development
Authority via Government Order dated
642 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
December 11, 1996. Therefore, the de facto
possession of land is implied upon the
State.

e) As per the decision of
allotment committee dated September 2,
2009, the District Magistrate, Prayagraj,
allotted the land vested in State to
Prayagraj Development Authority (PDA)
for development of High Tech Township
and in pursuance of the above decision, a
lease deed dated June 28, 2010 had also
been executed by Prayagraj Development
Authority in favour of M/s Pancham
Realcon. Pvt. Ltd.

f) There is an alternative remedy
under Section 32 of the Ceiling Act against
the order passed under Section 8 (4) of the
Ceiling Act. Petitioners neither challenged
the order dated May 24, 1983 passed under
Section 8 (4) nor challenged the notice
dated May 27, 1996 under Section 10 (5) of
the Ceiling Act but approached this Court
by means of the present writ petition after
gargantuan delay.

 g) To buttress the arguments,
reliance has been placed upon a judgment
of the Apex Court in State of Assam v.
Bhaskar Jyoti Sharma reported in 2015
(5) SCC 321. The relevant paragraphs of
the judgment are quoted below:

"11. Section 3 of the Repeal
Act postulates that vesting of any vacant
land under sub-section (3) of Section 10, is
subject to the condition that possession
thereof has been taken over by the
competent authority or by the State
Government or any person duly authorised
by the State Government. The expression
"possession" used in Section 3 (supra) has
been interpreted to mean "actual physical
possession" of the surplus land and not just
possession that goes with the vesting of
excess land in terms of Section 10(3) of the
Act.

12. The question, however, is
whether actual physical possession of the
land in dispute has been taken over in the
case at hand by the competent authority or
by the State Government or an officer
authorised in that behalf by the State
Government.

 13. The case of the appellant is
that actual physical possession of the land
was taken over on 7-12-1991 no matter
unilaterally and without notice to the
erstwhile landowner. That assertion is
stoutly denied by the respondents giving
rise to seriously disputed question of fact
which may not be amenable to a
satisfactory determination by the High
Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction.
But assuming that any such determination
is possible even in proceedings under
Article 226 of the Constitution, what needs
examination is whether the failure of the
Government or the authorised officer or the
competent authority to issue a notice to the
landowners in terms of Section 10(5) would
by itself mean that such dispossession is no
dispossession in the eye of the law and
hence insufficient to attract Section 3 of the
Repeal Act. Our answer to that question is
in the negative.

***

17. Reliance was placed by
the respondents upon the decision of this
Court in Hari Ram case [State of U.P. v.
Hari Ram, (2013) 4 SCC 280 : (2013) 2
SCC (Civ) 583]. That decision does not, in
our view, lend much assistance to the
respondents. We say so, because this Court
was in Hari Ram case [State of U.P. v.
4 All. Ramji & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
643
Hari Ram, (2013) 4 SCC 280 : (2013) 2
SCC (Civ) 583] considering whether the
word "may" appearing in Section 10(5)
gave to the competent authority the
discretion to issue or not to issue a notice
before taking physical possession of the
land in question under Section 10(6). The
question whether breach of Section 10(5)
and possible dispossession without notice
would vitiate the act of dispossession itself
or render it non est in the eye of the law did
not fall for consideration in that case. In
our opinion, what Section 10(5) prescribes
is an ordinary and logical course of action
that ought to be followed before the
authorities decided to use force to
dispossess the occupant under Section
10(6). In the case at hand if the appellant's
version regarding dispossession of the
erstwhile owner in December 1991 is
correct, the fact that such dispossession
was without a notice under Section 10(5)
will be of no consequence and would not
vitiate or obliterate the act of taking
possession for the purposes of Section 3 of
the Repeal Act. That is because Bhabadeb
Sarma, erstwhile owner, had not made any
grievance based on breach of Section 10(5)
at any stage during his lifetime implying
thereby that he had waived his right to do
so."

 DISCUSSION
AND
ANALYSIS

5. We have considered the rival
submissions and have perused the materials
on record. Before proceeding to the rival
contention canvassed by both the sides, we
must look into Sections 3 and 4 of the
Repeal Act, 1999 which are delineated
below:

 "Section 3. Savings-
 (1) The repeal of the principal
Act shall not affect-

 (a) the vesting of any vacant land
under sub-section (3) of Section 10,
possession of which has been taken over by
the State Government or any person duly
authorised by the State Government in this
behalf or by the competent authority;

 (b) the validity of any order
granting exemption under subsection (1) of
Section 20 or any action taken thereunder,
notwithstanding any judgment or any Court
to the contrary;

 (c) any payment made to the State
Government as a condition for granting
exemption under subsection (1) of Section
20.

 (2) Where-

 (a) any land is deemed to have
vested in the State Government under subsection (3) of Section 10 of the Principal
Act but possession of which has not been
taken over by the State Government or any
person duly authorised by the State
Government in this behalf or by the
competent authority; and (b) any amount
has been paid by the State Government
with respect to such land, then such land
shall not be restored unless the amount
paid, if any, has been refunded to the State
Government.

 Section 4. Abatement of legal
proceedings:-All proceedings relating to
any order made or purported to be made
under
the
principal
Act
pending
immediately before the commencement of
this Act, before any Court, Tribunal or any
authority shall abate;Provided that this
section shall not apply to the proceedings
644 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
relating to Sections 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the
principal Act insofar as such proceedings
are relatable to the land, possession of
which has been taken over by the State
Government or any person duly authorised
by the State Government in this behalf or
by the competent authority."

6. Section 3 of the Repeal Act
provides that if the possession of vacant
land has not been taken by the State
Government or any person duly authorized
by it before the commencement of the
Repeal Act, then, by virtue of Section 4 of
the Repeal Act, the proceedings would
abate. Furthermore, if the ownership has
vested in the State Government under
Section 10 (3) of the Ceiling Act, it must be
restored to the original landholder upon
repayment of any compensation paid by the
State for such land.

7. In State of U.P. v. Hari Ram
(Supra), the Apex Court held that mere
vesting of title under Section 10 (3) of the
Ceiling Act does not equate to the State
having taken de facto possession of the
land as the onus of proving the same is
upon the State. The relevant paragraphs of
the judgment are delineated below:

 "41. Let us now examine the
effect of Section 3 of Repeal Act 15 of 1999
on sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the Act.
The Repeal Act, 1999 has expressly
repealed Act 33 of 1976. The objects and
reasons of the Repeal Act have already
been referred to in the earlier part of this
judgment. The Repeal Act has, however,
retained a saving clause. The question
whether a right has been acquired or
liability incurred under a statute before it is
repealed will in each case depend on the
construction of the statute and the facts of
the particular case.
 42. The mere vesting of the land
under sub-section (3) of Section 10 would
not confer any right on the State
Government to have de facto possession of
the vacant land unless there has been a
voluntary surrender of vacant land before
18-3-1999. The State has to establish that
there has been a voluntary surrender of
vacant land or surrender and delivery of
peaceful possession under sub-section (5)
of Section 10 or forceful dispossession
under sub-section (6) of Section 10. On
failure to establish any of those situations,
the landowner or holder can claim the
benefit of Section 4 of the Repeal Act. The
State Government in this appeal could not
establish any of those situations and hence
the High Court is right in holding that the
respondent is entitled to get the benefit of
Section 4 of the Repeal Act."

 (Emphasis Supplied)

8. Before delving into the issue, it
would be useful to elucidate the facts which
are not disputed by both the parties. The
same are provided below:

 a) 67,138.12 square meter of land
was declared as surplus by order passed by
the Competent Authority under Section 8
(4) of the Ceiling Act.

 b) A notification under Section
10 (1) of the Act was published on July 24,
1993.

 c) Notice dated May 27, 1996,
issued under Section 10 (5) of the Ceiling
Act to handover/surrender the possession of
land to the State.

9. Learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the petitioners submits that the
actual physical possession of the surplus
4 All. Ramji & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
645
land vests with the petitioners and the
possession has never been surrendered or
transferred to the State after issuance of
notice under Section 10 (5) of the Ceiling
Act nor the State has taken forceful
possession of the land under Section 10 (6)
of the Ceiling Act. Moreover, the State is
unable to show the date on which the
possession has been taken by them or the
date on which the land has been transferred
to Prayagraj Development Authority upon
which de facto possession of the land is
contended by the respondents.

10. Ergo, onus to prove the
possession of surplus land vests upon the
State, if they are contending so; but no
documentary
evidence
such
as
memorandum of possession or panchnama
has been brought on record to depict the
same.

11. Per contra, the learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the respondents
debunking the arguments of the petitioners
submitted that the possession of surplus
land had already been taken by the State
after issuance of notice under Section 10
(5) of the Ceiling Act. Furthermore, to
substantiate his arguments, the State is also
showing de facto possession of the land by
the fact that it has been transferred to
Prayagraj
Development
Authority
in
pursuance of the Government Order dated
December 11, 1996, and thereafter, leased
in favour of M/s Pancham Realcon. Pvt.
Ltd on June 28, 2010 for development of
High Tech Township.

12. Before deciding the issue at
hand, it is pertinent to look at the nature of
the issue that has arisen before this Court.

13. The factum of possession is
primarily a question of fact and it is settled
law that normally the disputed question of
fact is not investigated or adjudicated upon
or interfered with by the writ Court while
exercising powers under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. But mere existence of
a disputed question of fact also will not
take away the jurisdiction of the writ Court
in granting appropriate relief.

14. In State of U.P. v. Ehsan
reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1331, the
Apex Court while setting aside the order
passed by the Division Bench of the
Allahabad High Court in Writ C No. 21009
of 2012 has held that Court should refrain
itself from deciding questions with regard
to possession of surplus land through writ
petition as factum of possession is
primarily a question of fact. Hence, the
Special Leave Petition filed by the State
was allowed and the respondents have been
relegated to suit to decide the question with
regard
to
possession.
The
relevant
paragraphs of the judgment are delineated
below:

 "35. In view of the discussion
above and having regard to the following :
(a) that there was a serious dispute with
regard to taking of possession of the
surplus land; (b) that there was a delay of
about seven years in filing the first writ
petition from the date when possession was
allegedly
taken
by
the
State,
after
publication of the vesting notification; (c)
that no documentary evidence such as a
Khasra or Khatauni of the period between
alleged date of taking possession and filing
of the first writ petition was filed by the
original petitioner; (d) that in the earlier
two rounds of litigation, the High Court
refrained from deciding the issue of
possession of the surplus land even though
that issue had arisen directly between the
parties; and (e) that infraction of the
646 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
prescribed statutory procedure for taking
possession cannot be the sole basis to
discard State's claim of possession, when it
is stated to have been taken long before the
date the issue is raised, we are of the
considered view that the High Court should
have refrained from deciding the issue with
regard to taking of actual possession of the
surplus land prior to the cut off date
specified in the Repeal Act, 1999. Instead,
the writ petitioner should have been
relegated to a suit.

 36.
In
view
of
the
above
conclusion, the appeal is allowed. The
impugned order passed by the High Court
is set aside. The first respondent's writ
petition is dismissed without prejudice to
his right to institute a suit. Parties to bear
their own costs."

15. Recently, in a celebrated
judgment, two-Judge Bench of the Apex
Court penned by Justice J.B. Pardiwala in
M/s
A.P.
Electrical
Equipment
Corporation v. Tahsildar reported in
2025 SCC OnLine SC 447, while dealing
with the case of the State of U.P. v. Ehsan
(Supra) has extensively examined the
scope of writ jurisdiction under Article 226
of the Constitution of India, particularly in
relation to disputed questions of fact. The
Court clarified that while writ Courts
generally
avoid
adjudicating
factual
disputes,
their
jurisdiction
is
not
automatically ousted merely because the
State or a party raises such disputes. If the
facts are contested merely to evade judicial
scrutiny, then writ Court has the authority
to examine them in the interest of justice.
The Court also emphasized that when faced
with seemingly conflicting precedents, the
High Court must endeavour to harmonize
the facts of the case accordingly to reach a
conclusion. Furthermore, it was observed
that certain issues, such as determining
possession of surplus land, depends on the
factual matrix of each case. This involves
mixed questions of law and fact, which do
not preclude writ jurisdiction, particularly
when legal interpretation is integral to the
resolution. This judgment reinforces that
writ Courts are not entirely barred from
dealing with factual disputes, and held that
writ Court has discretion to entertain it,
depending on facts of each case and
documentary evidence produced before the
Court. The relevant paragraphs of the
judgment are delineated below:

 "41. The propositions of law
governing the issue of possession in context
with Sections 10(5) and 10(6) respectively
of the Act, 1976 read with Section 3 of the
Repeal Act, 1999 may be summed up thus:

 [1] The Repeal Act, 1999 clearly
talks about the possession being taken
under Section 10(5) or Section 10(6) of the
Act, 1976, as the case may be.

 [2] It is a statutory obligation on
the part of the competent authority or the
State to take possession strictly as
permitted in law.[3] In case the possession
is purported to have been taken under
Section 10(6) of the Act, 1976 the Court is
still obliged to look into whether "taking of
such possession" is valid or invalidated on
any of the considerations in law.

 [3] The possession envisaged
under Section 3 of the Repeal Act, 1999 is
de facto and not de jure only.

 [4] The mere vesting of "land
declared surplus" under the Act without
resuming "de facto possession" is of no
consequence and the land holder is entitled
to the benefit of the Repeal Act, 1999.
4 All. Ramji & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
647
 [5] The requirement of giving
notice under sub-sections (5) and (6) of
Section 10 respectively is mandatory.
Although the word "may" has been used
therein, yet the word "may" in both the
sub-sections should be understood as
"shall" because a Court is obliged to
decide
the
consequences
that
the
legislature intended to follow from the
failure to implement the requirement.

 [6] The mere vesting of the land
under sub-section (3) of Section 10 would
not confer any right on the State
Government to have de facto possession of
the vacant land unless there has been a
voluntary surrender of vacant land before
18th March 1999.

 [7] The State has to establish by
cogent evidence on record that there has
been a voluntary surrender of vacant land
or surrender and delivery of peaceful
possession under sub-section (6) of Section
10 or forceful dispossession under subsection (6) of Section 10.

 ****

 49. There is nothing in Article
226 of the Constitution to indicate that the
High Court in the proceedings, like the one
on hand, is debarred from holding such an
inquiry. The proposition that a petition
under Article 226 must be rejected simply
on the ground that it cannot be decided
without determining the disputed question
of fact is not warranted by any provisions
of law nor by any decision of this Court. A
rigid application of such proposition or to
treat such proposition as an inflexible rule
of law or of discretion will necessarily
make the provisions of Article 226 wholly
illusory and ineffective more particularly
Section 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act, 1976
respectively. Obviously, the High Court
must avoid such consequences.

 50. In the aforesaid context, we
may look into the decision of this Court in
the case of State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss)
Binapani Dei, AIR 1967 SC 1269. In
paragraph 6 at p. 1270 of the said
judgment, this Court has been pleased to
hold as follows:-

 "Under
Art.
226
of
the
Constitution the High Court is not
precluded from entering upon a decision on
questions of fact raised by the petition.
Where
an
enquiry
into
complicated
questions of fact arises in a petition under
Art. 226 of the Constitution before the right
of an aggrieved party to obtain relief
claimed may be determined. The High
Court may in appropriate cases decline to
enter upon that enquiry and may refer the
party claiming relief to a suit. But the
question is one of discretion and not of
jurisdiction of the Court."

 ***

 52.
In
one
of
the
recent
pronouncements of this Court in State of
U.P. & Anr. v. Ehsan & Anr. reported in
2023 INSC 906, this Court observed that:-

 "28. We are conscious of the law
that existence of an alternative remedy is
not an absolute bar on exercise of writ
jurisdiction. More so, when a writ petition
has
been
entertained,
parties
have
exchanged their pleadings/ affidavits and
the matter has remained pending for long.
In such a situation there must be a sincere
effort to decide the matter on merits and
not relegate the writ petitioner to the
alternative remedy, unless there are
compelling reasons for doing so. One such
648 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
compelling reason may arise where there is
a serious dispute between the parties on a
question of fact and materials/evidence(s)
available
on
record
are
insufficient/inconclusive
to
enable
the
Court to come to a definite conclusion.

 29. Bearing the aforesaid legal
principles in mind, we would have to
consider whether, in the facts of the case,
the High Court ought to have dismissed the
third writ petition of the first respondent
and relegate him to a suit as there existed a
serious
dispute
between
the
parties
regarding taking of possession. More so,
when the High Court, in the earlier round
of litigation, refrained from taking up the
said issue even though it had arisen
between the parties.

 30.
No
doubt,
in
a
writ
proceeding between the State and a
landholder, the Court can, on the basis of
materials/evidence(s) placed on record,
determine whether possession has been
taken or not and while doing so, it may
draw adverse inference against the State
where the statutory mode of taking
possession has not been followed [See State
of UP vs. Hari Ram (supra)]. However,
where possession is stated to have been
taken long ago and there is undue delay on
the part of landholder in approaching the
writ court, infraction of the prescribed
procedure for taking possession would not
be a determining factor, inasmuch as, it
could be taken that the person for whose
benefit the procedure existed had waived
his right thereunder [See State of Assam
CA Nos. 4526-4527 of 2024 Page 139 of
145 vs. Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma, (supra)]. In
such an event, the factum of actual
possession would have to be determined on
the basis of materials/evidence(s) available
on record and not merely by finding fault in
the
procedure
adopted
for
taking
possession from the land holder. And if the
writ court finds it difficult to determine
such
question,
either
for
insufficient/inconclusive
materials/evidence(s) on record or because
oral evidence would also be required to
form a definite opinion, it may relegate the
writ petitioner to a suit, if the suit is
otherwise maintainable."

 53. Thus, it would all depend on
the nature of the question of fact. In other
words, what is exactly, that the writ court
needs to determine so as to arrive at the
right decision. If the only issue, that
revolves around the entire debate is one
relating to actual taking over of the
physical possession of the excess land
under the provisions of sub-sections (5)
and (6) of Section 10 of the Act, 1976
respectively, then in such circumstances,
the writ court has no other option but to go
into the factual aspects and take an
appropriate decision in that regard. The
issue of possession, by itself, will not
become a disputed question of fact. If all
that has been said by the State is to be
accepted as a gospel truth and nothing
shown by the landowner is to be looked
into on the ground that a writ court cannot
go into disputed questions of fact, then the
same may lead to a serious miscarriage of
justice.

 54. We are of the considered
opinion that the issue as regards taking
over of the actual physical possession of
the excess land in accordance with the
provisions of sub-sections (5) and (6) of
Section 10 of the Act, 1976 could be said to
be a mixed question of law and fact and not
just a question of fact. Mixed question of
law and fact refers to a question which
depends on both law and fact for its
4 All. Ramji & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
649
solution. In resolving a mixed question of
law and fact, a reviewing court must
adjudicate the facts of the case and decide
relevant legal issues at the same time.
Mixed questions of law and fact are defined
"as questions in which the historical facts
are admitted or established, the rule of law
is resolved and the issue is whether the
facts satisfy the statutory standard, or to
put it another way, whether the rule of law
as applied to the established facts is or is
not violated". [Bausch & Lomb v. United
States C.I.T. 166, 169 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1997]"

16. In the present case, petitioners
showed Khasra for 1422 Fasli year
(corresponding
to
the
year
2012)
depicting the name of Ramji and his legal
heirs and respondents in its counteraffidavit brought on record the Khatauni
for Fasli year 1426-1431 (corresponding
to the year 2016-2021) depicting the
name of State.