# Ramnath Singh v. Lal Sahab Singh & Anr

- **Citation:** (2026) 2 ILRA 1778
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-02-26
- **Case number:** Writ C No. 1001290 of 2005
- **Bench:** Irshad Ali
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ramnath-singh-v-lal-sahab-singh-anr-54192
- **Pages:** 15

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1778 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
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(2026) 2 ILRA 1778
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 26.02.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE IRSHAD ALI, J.

Writ C No. 1001290 of 2005

Ramnath Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
Lal Sahab Singh & Anr. ...Respondents
ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Whether an order passed in mutation proceedings without notice to the recorded tenure holder, resulting in
deletion of his name in violation of principles of natural justice, can be sustained; and whether such order is
amenable to challenge under Article 226.
HEADNOTE
Constitution of India - Art. 226 - U.P. Land Revenue Act - Mutation proceedings - Principles of
natural justice - Deletion of name of recorded tenure holder without notice - Maintainability of
writ petition.

Held: Petitioner's name was mutated in the revenue records on 30.06.1998 and he came into possession of
the bhumidhari land - Such entry remained operative for several years and was not challenged within
reasonable time - Subsequent mutation proceedings in the year 2002 conducted behind the back of the
petitioner without issuing notice or impleading him despite he being the recorded tenure holder - Tehsildar
allowed the mutation application without recording the mandatory statement of the Lekhpal and without
examining whether the applicant had any subsisting right and the order was passed in a mechanical manner
in violation of statutory requirements - Sub-Divisional Officer rightly set aside the mutation order and
remanded the matter for fresh consideration after affording opportunity of hearing to both sides - Revisional
authority, despite noticing that no notice was served upon the petitioner, allowed the revision on
misconception of law and facts and failed to appreciate that any order adversely affecting the rights of a
recorded tenure holder without hearing him is void ab initio - Impugned order resulted in serious miscarriage
of justice by depriving the petitioner of his recorded rights and possession without due process of law - Rule
of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and does not operate as a bar where the impugned order is
without jurisdiction or has been passed in breach of fundamental procedural safeguards - Writ petition held to
be maintainable - Impugned order set aside and order of remand restored. (Paras 46, 47, 48, 50) (E-5)
CASE LAW CITED
Jagdish Narayan Tondon and 3 others, Civil Revision No. 95 of 2017, 20.04.2017 ;
Videocon Appliances Ltd. v. Maker Chambers V Premises Co-op. Society, 2006 (1) BOMCR 6;
Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Smt. Deorjin Debi, AIR 1960 SC 941;
A.V. Venkateswaran v. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani, AIR 1961 SC 1506;
2 All. Ramnath Singh Vs. Lal Sahab Singh & Anr.
1779
M/s Radha Krishan Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 334;
British India Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Jasjit Singh, AIR 1964 SC 1451;
Pramod Kumar v. Sub-Divisional Officer, Khaga, 1999 (90) RD 649;
Kali Shanker Dwivedi v. Board of Revenue, 2000 (18) LCD 1401;
Gudiya v. State of U.P., 2015 (33) LCD 1303;
Shiv Raj Gupta v. Board of Revenue, 1989 (15) ALR 30 - referred to.

List of Acts
U.P. Land Revenue Act;
Constitution of India.
List of Keyword
Mutation proceedings; Recorded tenure holder; Deletion of name; No notice; Principles of natural justice; Void
order; Revisional jurisdiction; Misconception of law; Mechanical order; Mandatory procedure; Lekhpal
statement; Alternative remedy; Maintainability of writ petition; Miscarriage of justice; Due process of law.
CASE ARISING FROM
Order dated 15.02.2005 passed by the Additional Commissioner in Civil Revision No. 591/281/198 of 2003-05.
Appearances for Parties
Advs For Petitioner: Girish Chandra Sinha, Kuldeep Kumar Srivastava, Praveen Kumar Tripathi.
Advs For Respondents: C.S.C., A.S. Chaudhary, Prabhakar Vardhan Chaudhary.
(Delivered by Hon'ble Irshad Ali, J.)

1. Heard Sri G.C. Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri P.V. Chaudhary, learned
counsel for respondent No.1 and Sri Devesh Mishra, learned Additional CSC for respondent No.2.

2. The present writ petition has been filed challenging the impugned judgment and order dated
15.02.2005 passed by respondent No.2 in Civil Revision No.591/281/198 of 2003- 05 contained as
Annexure NO.1 to the writ petition.

3. Factual matrix of the case is that for the purpose of clarifying the fact the following
pedigree is required to be produced hereinbelow:

Narayan Singh

Arjun Singh
Gaya Din Singh
Bhagwati Singh

Gaya Din Singh

Ram Nath (Petitioner)
Ram Lakhan - Phoola Devi

Bhagwati Singh

Amar Nath Singh

Amar Nath Singh

Ram Kuber
Ram Singh
1780 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Lal Sahab Singh

4. The above referred Ram Lakhan died on 16.01.1998 and has left his married daughter
Phoola Devi to be his only heir (in normal course of Hindu Law) but as per the provisions of
Zamindari Abolition Act, the petitioner being the real brother of late Ram Lakhan Singh has
inherited the Bhumidhari Property of the said Ram Lakhan Singh and his name accordingly
mutated in the revenue records on 30.06.1998.

5. The petitioner on the basis of inheritance and order of mutation took possession over the
Bhumidhari lands of the deceased ram Lakhan Singh. The opposite party no.1 has nothing to do
with the property of the late Ram Lakhan Singh but he misled Smt. Phoola Devi, the daughter of
Ram Lakhan Singh and obtained a general power of attorney from her.

6. The opposite party no.1 who had obtained a power of attorney from Smt. Phoola Devi by
misleading her, prepared a fake will deed of Shri Ram Lakhan Singh dated 14.01.1998 in which it
has been mentioned that Shri Ram Lakhan Singh wants to inherit all of his property in favour of his
daughter Smt. Phoola Devi.

7. It is pertinent to mention here that the said will deed was written by one Shyam Sunder
Pandey and opposite party no.1 was one of the witness on the said will deed.

8. On the basis of the forged will deed an objection has been filed after 3 years in the name of
Smt. Phoola Devi against the mutation already done in favour of the petitioner.

9. The opposite party no.1 immediately after filing the objection on behalf of Smt. Phoola
Devi, when realized that Smt. Phoola Devi will not support him for the fraud committed by him, he
immediately prepared another will of Ram Lakhan Singh dated 15.01.1998 in his own favour and
what is important in this reference is that this will deed was also written by some person i.e. Shyam
Sunder Pandey.

10. The opposite party no.1 on the basis of new will deed filed an application for mutation in
the court of Tahsildar, Lalganj, District Pratapgarh on 05.03.2002 for substitution of his name in
the place of deceased Ram Lakhan. It is pertinent to mention here at this stage that at the time of
moving application for mutation by opposite party no.1 the name of Ram Lakhan Singh was not
existing on record and the name of the petitioner was already being mutated but opposite party no.1
has deliberately intentionally concealed this fact from the court and not impleaded the petitioner in
that case.

11. The Tahsildar Lalganj has not recorded the statement of Lekhpal which is mandatory in
law for making an order for mutation, summarily allowed the application for mutation of Ram
Lakhan and passed an order on 16.8.2002, by which he has directed the name of opposite party
no.1 to be mutated at the place of deceased Ram Lakhan Singh. (However, the name of Ram
Lakhan Singh was nowhere in record) and an order of mutation of the name of the petitioner have
already been mutated 4 years ago.
2 All. Ramnath Singh Vs. Lal Sahab Singh & Anr.
1781

12. On the basis of said mutation order, the name of the petitioner has been deleted from the
revenue records (however, there is no such order for deletion of the name of the petitioner) and
when this fact came into knowledge of the petitioner, he preferred an appeal before the court of Sub
Divisional Officer, Lalganj, under Section 210 of the Land Revenue Act against the judgment and
order passed by the Tahsildar, Lalganj.

13. The appeal was registered at case No. 14 'Ram Nath Singh Versus Lal Sahab and the Sub
Divisional Officer, Lalganj, Pratapgarh after hearing the counsel of both the parties, has quashed
the order of Tahsildar Lalganj and recorded a finding that no order of mutation can be passed
without affording opportunity to the petitioner whose name was already entered in the revenue
records and the appellate court has remanded the matter back to the court of Tahsildar Lalganj,
District Pratapgarh with a direction that he should dispose of the application for mutation filed by
Lal Sahab after giving both of the partiers a reasonable opportunity of being heard.

14. The order passed by the Sub Divisional Officer, Lalganj, was legal and acquitable order
and neither of the parties were adversely affected by that order but the malicious opposite party
no.1 who just want to grab the property of the late Ram Lakhan Singh had filed a revision before
the court of opposite party no.2 against the order of Sub Divisional Officer, Lalganj, District
Pratapgarh.

15. The Additional Commissioner, Allahabad, before whom the revision was transferred for
disposal, has heard the counsel for both of the parties and has found that no notice was ever served
to the petitioner in the case of mutation filed by opposite party no.1 but the court has wrongly
allowed the revision on misconception of law and fact.

16. The said order dated 15.02.2005 is impugned order in this writ petition and as the
judgment and order passed by the opp. party no.2 was initially illegal and against the proposition of
law. The opposite party No.1 who was absconding is is informed in the court to be no more alive
and one Ram Singh is claiming to be his elder brother and legal representative, therefore, the said
Ram Singh is impleaded as Opposite party No.1/1.

17. By way of the impugned order the opposite party has deprived the petitioner to protect his
right and title which was over thrown from the revenue records without any order against him and
having no other efficacious and alternative remedy the petitioner has filed the present writ petition
before this Court.

18. Submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the order dated 15.02.2005 passed
by opposite party No.2 in Revision No. 591/281/198 is wholly illegal, arbitrary, and contrary to
settled principles of law. The said order has been passed without proper appreciation of facts and
evidence on record and deserves to be quashed.

19. He further submitted that the petitioner is the lawful successor and recorded tenure holder.
It is submitted that Ram Lakhan Singh, brother of the petitioner, expired on 16.01.1998 leaving
behind only a married daughter, Smt. Phoola Devi. Under the provisions of the Zamindari
Abolition Act, the petitioner, being the real brother, inherited the bhumidhari property of the
1782 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
deceased. Consequently, the petitioner's name was duly mutated in the revenue records on
30.06.1998 and he has since been in lawful possession of the land.

20. He next submitted that the mutation in favour of the petitioner was carried out in
accordance with law after due verification and has remained unchallenged for several years. The
petitioner took possession on the basis of the said mutation and has been cultivating and enjoying
the property peacefully.

21. It is submitted that opposite party No.1 has no right, title, or interest in the property of late
Ram Lakhan Singh. He is a complete stranger to the family and has no legal relationship with the
deceased.

22. He further submitted that opposite party No.1 misled Smt. Phoola Devi and fraudulently
obtained a General Power of Attorney from her. On the basis of the said document, he prepared
forged and fabricated will deeds in order to usurp the property. It is submitted that two alleged wills
dated 14.01.1998 and 15.01.1998 have been brought on record by opposite party No.1. Both the
wills were prepared by the same scribe, namely Shyam Sunder Pandey and opposite party No.1
himself is a witness to one of them. The preparation of multiple wills in close proximity of time and
the active involvement of opposite party No.1 clearly establishes fraud, manipulation, and
fabrication.

23. He submitted that on the basis of the forged will, objections were filed after about three
years against the mutation already standing in favour of the petitioner. The delay itself shows
malafide intention and abuse of process of law.

24. He submitted that opposite party No.1 deliberately concealed the fact that the petitioner's
name was already recorded in the revenue records and that he was in possession of the land. He
also failed to implead the petitioner in the mutation proceedings, thereby violating principles of
natural justice.

25. It is submitted that the Tahsildar, Lalganj, without recording the mandatory statement of
the Lekhpal and without issuing notice to the petitioner, illegally allowed the mutation application
on 16.08.2002. The said order was passed mechanically and in complete disregard of statutory
provisions.

26. He further submitted that on the basis of the illegal mutation order, the petitioner's name
was deleted from the revenue records without any specific order for deletion and without affording
him an opportunity of hearing, which is against law.

27. He next submitted that the Sub-Divisional Officer, Lalganj, after hearing both parties,
rightly quashed the order of the Tehsildar and held that no mutation order could be passed without
hearing the petitioner. The matter was remanded for fresh decision in accordance with law.

28. He submitted that despite the lawful order of the Sub-Divisional Officer, opposite party
No.1 filed a revision only with the intention to grab the property and prolong the litigation.
2 All. Ramnath Singh Vs. Lal Sahab Singh & Anr.
1783
Although the Additional Commissioner found that no notice was served upon the petitioner in
mutation proceedings, he wrongly allowed the revision on misconception of law and facts, thereby
causing serious miscarriage of justice.

29. He further submitted that the impugned order has been passed without granting proper
opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and without considering his lawful rights, which amounts to
violation of natural justice. Due to the impugned order, the petitioner has been unlawfully deprived
of his right, title and possession over the property without any valid judicial determination. In
support of his submissions, he placed reliance upon following judgments:

a) Jagdish Narayan Tondon and 3 others; Civil Revision No.95 of 2017 decided on
20.04.2017

b) Videocon Appliances Ltd. Vs. Maker chambers V Premises Co-Op. Socy.; 2006
(1) BOMCR6

c) Satyadhyan Ghosal Vs. Smt. Deorjin Debi; AIR 1960 Supreme Court 941

30. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No.1 as well as learned Additional CSC
for respondent No.2 - State at the very outset submitted that the present writ petition is not
maintainable in law, as the dispute pertains to mutation proceedings under Section 34 of the U.P.
Land Revenue Act. It is well settled that mutation proceedings are fiscal in nature and do not
determine title. Therefore, invocation of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India is wholly misconceived. The writ petition is liable to be
dismissed with costs on this ground alone.

31. They next submitted that the order dated 15.02.2005 passed by the competent authority is
just, proper, legal and in accordance with law. The said order does not suffer from any illegality,
arbitrariness or procedural irregularity and, therefore, does not call for any interference by this
Hon'ble Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction.

32. They further submitted that the petitioner has deliberately suppressed and distorted the
correct pedigree of the parties with an intention to mislead this Hon'ble Court. The respondent has
placed on record the complete and correct genealogy along with counter affidavit showing the
lawful succession. The petitioner has failed to disclose material facts and has approached this Court
with unclean hands.

33. It is submitted that Ram Lakhan Singh expired on 16.01.1998. On the date of his death,
succession was governed by Section 171 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act,
as amended w.e.f. 19.09.1997. In view of the amended provision, the married daughter, namely
Smt. Phoola Devi became the preferential heir and was legally entitled to succeed to the property of
her father in preference to the brother of the deceased.

34. They submitted that the entry dated 30.06.1998, whereby the petitioner's name was
recorded, was made in collusion with the Supervisor Kanoongo and the Prescribed Authority. The
said entry was illegal and void, as the petitioner was not an heir in the presence of the lawful
daughter. The petitioner never came in lawful possession of the property.
1784 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

35. They submitted that the allegations that the respondent misled Smt. Phoola Devi or
fabricated any will are wholly false and baseless. Smt. Phoola Devi herself moved the mutation
application on the basis of the will and other relevant documents. The respondents played no role in
manipulating the proceedings.

36. It is submitted that the Will dated 15.01.1998 was executed by late Ram Lakhan Singh
voluntarily, in sound disposing state of mind and without any pressure or coercion. The same is
genuine, valid and legally enforceable. The petitioner has failed to produce any cogent material to
challenge the authenticity of the said Will.

37. The petitioner, in connivance with revenue officials, managed to get his name recorded
with undue haste on 30.06.1998, and the corresponding entries in the Khatauni were also made on
the same day, which itself reflects mala fide intention and fraudulent conduct. Such hurried
proceedings cast serious doubt on the legality and genuineness of the petitioner's claim.

38. They further submitted that the orders passed by the Tehsildar and other revenue
authorities are lawful and based on proper appreciation of facts and evidence. The authorities
rightly rectified the fraudulent entry and restored the lawful position. The criticism levelled by the
petitioner against these orders is unwarranted and misconceived.

39. They next submitted that though the respondent filed an appeal, it is submitted that the
order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer was improper and illegal, as it failed to consider the
fraudulent manner in which the petitioner's name was recorded. A person who himself commits
fraud is not entitled to equitable relief or prior hearing for rectification of such fraud.

40. They submitted that the present writ petition has been filed with an oblique motive to grab
the property of late Ram Lakhan Singh by abusing the process of law. The petitioner has
suppressed material facts, made false allegations and indulged in forum shopping. Such conduct
disentitles him to any discretionary relief under Article 226.

41. They pointed out that it is well settled that this Hon'ble Court does not act as a court of
appeal over factual findings in mutation matters. In absence of any patent illegality, perversity or
violation of natural justice, no interference is warranted. The present case does not disclose any
such exceptional circumstances.

42. They also pointed out that the dispute relates to proceedings under Section 34 of the U.P.
Land Revenue Act, and therefore, the writ petition is absolutely not maintainable. The petitioner
has an alternative statutory remedy, which he has failed to pursue effectively. They submitted that
in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the writ petition is devoid of merit and is liable
to be dismissed with exemplary costs for wasting valuable judicial time. In support of submissions,
learned counsel for respondent No.1 placed reliance upon following judgments:

a) A.V. Venkateswaran, Collector of Customs, Bombay Vs. Ramchand Sobhraj
Wadhwani; 1961 AIR Supreme Court 1506.
2 All. Ramnath Singh Vs. Lal Sahab Singh & Anr.
1785

b) M/s Radha Krishan Industries Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (SC); 2021 SCC
Online SC 334.

c) British India Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. Vs. Jasjit Singh (SC); 1964 AIR Supreme
Court 1451.

d) Pramod Kumar Vs. Sub - Divisional Officer, Khaga (Allahabad( (DB) ; 1999 (90)
RD 649.

e) Kali Shanker Dwivedi Vs. Board of Revenue (Allahabad) (Lucknow Bench); 2000
(18) LCD 1401

f) Gudiya (Obje. Filed) Vs. State of U.P. thr. P.S.R.L. (Allahabad) (Lucknow
Bench); 2015 (33) LCD 1303.

g) Shiv Raj Gupta Vs. Board of Revenue, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow (Allahabad);
1989 (15) ALR 30.

43. I have considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and perused
the material on record as well as law reports cited by learned counsel for the parties.

44. To resolve the controversy involved in the matter, relevant portion of the judgments relied
upon by learned counsel for the parties are being quoted below:

Judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner:

a) Jagdish Narayan Tondon (Supra):

"8. Due to some contradictory observations of Supreme Court in Qama-ruddin v. Rasul
Baksh,5 the matter was again referred for consideration of Full Bench of this Court in Ganag
Saran v. Civil Judge.6 The Full Bench after considering entire controversy afresh upheld and
followed Full Bench's decisions in Har Prasad Singh v. Ram Swarup,7 and Jupiter Chit Fund
(Pvt.) Ltd. v. Dwarika Dinesh Dayal8, and Supreme Court's decisions in Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti
Prasad,9 and Vishnu Awatar v. Shiv Autar,10 and held that revision under section 115, C.P.C. is
not maintainable against the order of Appellate or Revisional Court.

14. In view of the aforesaid discussions, do not find any reason to doubt correctness of
the decisions of three Full Benches of this Court as well as Supreme Court, holding that the words
"or other proceedings" have to be read ejus-dem getieris with the words "original suits". They will
not include appeals or revisions. Present revision has been filed from the order passed by
Appellate Court rejecting amendment application, filed in appeal as such the revision is not
maintainable under section 115, C.P.C. as amended in Uttar Pradesh."

b) Videocon Appliances Ltd. (Supra):

"5. Insofar as the maintainability of second revision is concerned, the learned counsel
appearing for the petitioner has contended that in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in
the case of Ishwar Singh v. State of Rajasthan, reported in (2005) 2 SCC 334 that the second
revision is maintainable. It has been contended that the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering
the identical provisions of the Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 which is section 128 of
the said Act and has held that the power conferred on the Joint Registrar and the State Government
1786 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
is concurrent and not alternative and, therefore, a second revisionary power can be exercised
under the very same provision of revision under section 128 of the Rajasthan Co-operative
Societies Act, 1965. The learned counsel has particularly relied upon paras 13 and 14 of the said
judgment to contend that the second revisionary power can be made applicable. The learned
counsel for the petitioner has also contended that in light of the recent judgment of the Supreme
Court in the case of Ishwar Singh v. State of Rajasthan (supra) all the earlier judgments of this
Court which have taken a consistent view that under section 154 of the Maharashtra Cooperative
Societies Act, a second revision is not available and the power of second revision cannot be
exercised by the State Government are impliedly overruled and thus cannot be considered. The
respondent society on the other hand has brought to my attention the judgments of the learned
Single Judges of this Court, particularly the unreported judgment of Lodha, J. in W.P. No. 4180 of
1998 dated 18-2-1999, the judgment in the case of Bhupendra Villa Premises Co-operative Society
Ltd. v. Chandrakant G. Shah, reported in 2007 (2) Mh.L.J. 834, a judgment of another learned
Single Judge in the case of Shri Ramesh T. Gopalani v. The Janata Sahakari Bank Ltd., reported in
2000 (3) Mh.L.J. 115 : 2000 (3) BCR 474, a judgment of another learned single Judge in the case
of Virendra Bhanji Rathod v. Anand Vihar Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., Mumbai, reported in
2004 (1) Mh.L.J. 656 and lastly the judgment of another learned Single Judge in the case of Dadar
Avanti Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, reported in 2004 (5) Mh.L.J.
222 : 2005 (2) Bom.C.R. 604. Each of the aforesaid judgment have taken a consistent view that the
power of revision under section 154 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 cannot
be exercised twice over and once the power having been exercised by the Registrar or the
Secretary, the said power is exhausted and revision against the order of Registrar in exercise of
revisionary power under section 154 is not maintainable before the Secretary and/or Minister of
Co-operation of the State of Maharashtra under very same provision of law. The view has been
consistently taken that the power of revision can only be exercised once and cannot be exercised
twice over under section 154 of the Act. However, the learned counsel for the petitioner has
vehemently contended that the aforesaid views are all impliedly overruled by the recent judgment
of the Apex Court in the case of Ishwar Singh v. State of Rajasthan (supra). I have considered the
judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Ishwar Singh v. State of Rajasthan (supra). Firstly, in my
opinion the said judgment has no application because the provisions of section 128 of the
Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 is in pari materia different to the provisions of the
present case. The power under section 128 is simultaneously conferred on the Government and the
Registrar because the opening words of the provisions of section 128 reads as under:"

"The State Government and the Registrar may call for and examine the record of any
enquiry or proceedings of any other matter."

In contrast to the same, the provisions of section 154 does not give a concurrent
jurisdiction to the Registrar and the State Government because the words prescribed thereunder
are "the State Government or the Registrar may call for and examine the records." The wording in
that section by substitution of the word "or" in place of "and" is materially significant because in
case where the word "and" is used is a conjoint power conferred both on the Registrar as well as
the Government whereas the word "or" indicates that it is the power conferred on "either" or "or"
in such cases the power cannot be exercised by both but it can be exercised by one of the two and
in that view of the matter, I am not inclined to accept the contention that by virtue of the judgment
of the Apex Court in the case of Ishwar Singh v. State of Rajasthan (supra) all the learned Single
Judges judgments of this Court interpreting the very section 154 are deemed to be impliedly
2 All. Ramnath Singh Vs. Lal Sahab Singh & Anr.
1787
overruled. Thus, the contention that the order passed by the Secretary holding that the second
revision is not maintainable is bad in law is rejected. The order passed by the Secretary holding
that the second revision is not maintainable is upheld."

c) Satyadhyan Ghosal (Supra) :

16. It is clear therefore that an interlocutory order which had not been appealed from
either because no appeal lay or even though an appeal lay an appeal was not taken could be
challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order. A special provision was made as regards
orders of remand and that was to the effect that if an appeal lay and still the appeal was not taken
the correctness of the order of remand could not later be challenged in an appeal from the final
decision. If however an appeal did not lie from the order of remand the correctness thereof could
be challenged by an appeal from the final decision as in the cases of other interlocutory orders.
The second sub-section did not apply to the Privy Council and can have no application to appeals
to the Supreme Court, one reason being that no appeal lay to the Privy Council or lies to the
Supreme Court against an order of remand.

22. In our opinion the order of remand was an interlocutory judgment which did not
terminate the proceedings and so the correctness thereof can be challenged in an appeal from the
final order. We hold therefore that the appellant is not precluded from raising before us the
question that Section 28 of the original Thika Tenancy Act was not available to the tenants after the
Thika Tenancy Amendment Act came into force. On this question we have already decided, as
already indicated above, in Mahadeolal Kanodia case [(1960) 3 SCR 578] that Section 28 after its
omission by the amending Act is not available in respect of proceedings pending on the date of the
commencement of the Thika Tenancy Ordinance of 1952.

Judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the respondent No.1:

a) A.V. Venkateswaran, Collector of Customs, Bombay (Supra):

"8. The only point, therefore, requiring to be considered is whether the High Court
should have rejected the writ petition of the respondent in limine because he had not exhausted all
the statutory remedies open to him for having his grievance redressed. The contention of the
learned Solicitor-General was that the existence of an alternative remedy was a bar to the
entertainment of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution unless (1) there was a complete
lack of jurisdiction in the officer or authority to take the action impugned, or (2) where the order
prejudicial to the writ petitioner has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice
and could, therefore, be treated as void or non est. In all other cases, he submitted, Courts should
not entertain petitions under Article 226, or in any event not grant any relief to such petitioners. In
the present case, he urged, the High Court in appeal had expressly dissented from the reasoning of
the learned Single Judge as regards the lack of jurisdiction of the Customs officers to adjudicate
regarding the item under which the article imported fell and the duty leviable thereon. Nor was
there any complaint in this case that the order had been passed without an opportunity to the
importer to be heard, so as to be in violation of the principles of natural justice. The learned
Solicitor-General questioned the correctness of the reasoning of the learned Chief Justice in
condoning the conduct of the respondent in not moving the Government in revision by taking into
account the time that had elapsed between the date of the impugned order and that on which the
appeal was heard. The submission was that if this were a proper test, the Rule as to a petitioner
1788 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
under Article 226 having to exhaust his remedies before he approached the Court would be
practically a dead letter because in most cases by the date the petition comes on for hearing, the
time for appealing or for applying in revision to the departmental authorities would have lapsed.

9. We see considerable force in the argument of the learned Solicitor-General. We must,
however, point out that the Rule that the party who applies for the issue of a high prerogative writ
should, before he approaches the Court, have exhausted other remedies open to him under the law,
is not one which bars the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain the petition or to deal with it,
but is rather a Rule which Courts have laid down for the exercise of their discretion. The law on
this matter has been enunciated in several decisions of this Court but it is sufficient to refer to two
cases : In Union of India v. T.R. Varma [(1958) SCR 499 at pp. 503-504] Venkatarama Ayyar
speaking for the Court said:

"It is well settled that when an alternative and equally efficacious remedy is open to a
litigant, he should be required to pursue that remedy and not invoke the special jurisdiction of the
High Court to issue a prerogative writ. It is true that the existence of another remedy does not
affect the jurisdiction of the Court to issue a writ; but, as observed by this Court in Rashid Ahmed
v. Municipal Board, Kairana "the existence of an adequate legal remedy is a thing to be taken into
consideration in the matter of granting writs". Vide also K.S. Rashid and Son v. Income Tax
Investigation Commission. And where such remedy exists, it will be a sound exercise of discretion
to refuse to interfere in a petition under Article 226, unless there are good grounds therefor."

There is no difference between the above and the formulation by Das, C.J., in State of
Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nooh [(1958) SCR 595 at pp. 605-607] where he observed;

"....It must be borne in mind that there is no Rule, with regard to certiorari as there is
with mandamus, that it will lie only where there is no other equally effective remedy. It is well
established that, provided the requisite grounds exist, certiorari will lie although a right of appeal
has been conferred by statute. The fact that the aggrieved party has another and adequate remedy
may be taken into consideration by the superior court in arriving at a conclusion as to whether it
should, in exercise of its discretion, issue a writ of certiorari to quash the proceedings and
decisions of inferior courts subordinate to it and ordinarily the superior court will decline to
interfere until the aggrieved party has exhausted his other statutory remedies, if any. But this Rule
requiring the exhaustion of statutory remedies before the writ will be granted is a Rule of policy,
convenience and discretion rather than a Rule of law and instances are numerous where a writ of
certiorari has been issued in spite of the fact that the aggrieved party had other adequate legal
remedies."

After referring to a few cases in which the existence of an alternative remedy had been
held not to bar the issue of a prerogative writ, the learned Chief Justice added:

"It has also been held that a litigant who has lost his right of appeal or has failed to
perfect an appeal by no fault of his own may in a proper case obtain a review by certiorari."

In the result this Court held that the existence of other legal remedies was not per se a
bar to the issue of a writ of certiorari and that the Court was not bound to relegate the petitioner to
the other legal remedies available to him."

b) M/s Radha Krishan Industries (Supra):

"27.5. When a right is created by a statute, which itself prescribes the remedy or
procedure for enforcing the right or liability, resort must be had to that particular statutory remedy
2 All. Ramnath Singh Vs. Lal Sahab Singh & Anr.
1789
before invoking the discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. This rule of
exhaustion of statutory remedies is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion."

c) British India Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. (Supra):

"7. We have heard all these matters together because they raise the same question which
was raised for our decision by the appellant in C.A. No. 770 of 1962 [Indo-China Steam
Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Additional Collector of Customs, Calcutta(1964) 34 Comp. Cas. 435 (S.C.).]
. If these matters had not been placed together for hearing along with the said civil appeal, we
would not have entertained them, except C.A. No. 299 of 1963. This latter appeal has been brought
against the decision of the Calcutta High Court and the only point which could have been argued
by the appellant would be one of jurisdiction, since the appellant had moved the said High Court
under article 226, and that too against the order of the Collector of Customs. But in regard to the
other matters, the parties have come to this court directly against the orders of the Collector of
Customs and this court generally does not entertain appeals against the orders passed by a
Tribunal unless the alternative remedies provided by the relevant Act by way of appeals or
revisions have been pursued by the aggrieved party. We have already seen that, against the order
of confiscation and fine passed by the Collector of Customs, an appeal is competent, and against
the decision of the appellate authority, a revision also lies. That being so, we would have hesitated
to entertain these appeals if each one of them had come separately for hearing before us. In fact,
the question as to whether the writ jurisdiction of the High Court could be successfully invoked by
a party immediately after an order is passed against him by the Collector of Customs under section
167(12A) and section 183, does not appear to have ben argued before the Calcutta High Court
when it entertained the writ proceedings from which Appeal No. 299 of 1963 has been brought to
this court. As was observed by this court in A.V. Venkateswaran v. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani
[(1962) 1 S.C.R. 753.] the rule that a party who applies for the issue of a high prerogative writ
should, before he approaches the court, have exhausted other remedies open to him under the law,
though not one which bars the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the petition or to deal with it,
but is a rule which courts have laid down for the exercise of their discretion. That is one aspect
which has to be borne in mind in dealing with C.A. No. 299 of 1963, and the other writ petitions in
this group."

d) Pramod Kumar Vs. Sub - Divisional Officer, Khaga (Supra):

"6. Apart from the aforesaid infirmities, we find substance in the submissions made by Sri
H.R. Mishra, learned Standing Counsel, that this writ petition is not maintainable as it arises out of
proceedings under the Land Revenue Act, which does not involve adjudication of right, title and
interest of a party concerning the lands and the remedy, If at all, to an aggrieved person, is to file
arevislon under Section 219 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act."

e) Kali Shanker Dwivedi (Supra):

"2. The matter pertains to mutation of agricultural land under Section 34 of the Land
Revenue Act. A preliminary objection was raised to the effect that no writ petition lie in a case
where the proceedings are not conclusive and can be decided by regular suit and that mutation
proceedings being also of summary nature and do not decide the title of the parties, therefore, no
writ petition lie under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It was also opposed on the ground
that since alternative remedy is available, therefore, the writ petition also does not lie in cases of
1790 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
mutation proceedings. Learned counsel supported his argument with the case of Akhtar Hussain v.
Board of Revenue [1987 RD 33.] , wherein it has been held that question of title is not conclusively
decided in mutation proceedings and parties can get a judgment from appropriate court on
question of their title over disputed property. The other case is that of Shiv Raj Gupta v. Board of
Revenue U.P.