# Ramvijai Yadav v. State of U.P. and others

- **Citation:** (2013) 2 ILRA 662
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2013-04-02
- **Bench:** Amreshwar Pratap Sahi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ramvijai-yadav-v-state-of-u-p-and-others-42622
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

Constitution
of
India,
Art.
226-
Appointment as Physical instructor in Basic
Education
Deptt.-on
part
time
fixed
honorarium
of
Rs.
7000/-
basis
appointment governed by G.O. 31.01.2013challenged
on
ground
-clause
11(2)
requiring Candidates must be of same block
or
Distt.-offends Art.
14
and
16
of
Constitution-held-short term employmentscheme
like
Shiksha
Mitra-domicile
restrictions survived for long time without
challenge-can not be interfered under writ
jurisdiction.

Held: Para-14
There is yet another reason for not
interfering. These are policy matters for
short-term employments. They do not
deserve to be interfered with necessarily
unless it is so grave that it may require a
redressal under Article 226 of the
Constitution. The process impedes the
implementation of such programmes
that are in public interest and in
particular
for
Basic
Schools
where
conditions
have
fast
deteriorated.
Schemes with domicile restrictions like
Shiksha Mitra have survived for long,
may be without such challenge.

## Text

662 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2013
succession certificate is sought by the
Bank.

13. We have heard learned Counsel
for the parties and perused the record.

14. It is not in dispute that Smt.
Lajja Srivastava was the subscriber of
PPF Account No. 10070430561. In the
said PPF account, no nomination was
made by the subscriber. After the death of
Smt. Lajja Srivastava, petitioner No.1,
who is the husband of Smt. Lajja
Srivastava,
moved
an
application
claiming the amount of PPF, which was
rejected by the bank by saying that until
and unless succession certificate is not
produced by the petitioners, amount of
PPF cannot be disbursed as the claimed
amount is above one lac.

15. Under Clause 12 of the
Provident Fund Scheme, 1968, where
there is no nomination enforce at the time
of death of the subscriber, the amount
standing to the credit of the deceased after
making adjustment, shall be repaid by the
accounts office to the legal heirs of the
deceased on receipt of application in
Form-G. It is also provided that the
balance up to Rs.1 lac may be paid to the
legal heirs on production of letter of
indemnity; and affidavit; a letter of
disclaimer of affidavit; and certificate of
death of subscriber, on stamp paper in the
forms as enclosure to Form-G.

16. On perusal of the Form G, it
reflects that the succession certificate/letter of
administration with attested copy of the
probated Will of the deceased subscriber
issued by the competent Court is required to
be annexed along with the application for
withdrawal. In the bottom of Form-G, it has
been mentioned that succession certificate
clause be struck of, if there is a valid
nomination. Thus, it is clear that in the
absence of nomination, the succession
certificate is required.

17. Admittedly, in the said PPF
account, there is no nominee and the
amount of PPF is more than one lac and
as
such,
requiring
the
succession
certificate from the petitioners by the
Bank in view of the provisions, referred to
above,
is
logical
and
not
illegal.
Furthermore, amendment in paragraph 1
as per Notification dated 23.6.1986 has no
help to the petitioner since the balance
amount is more than 1 lacks insofar as the
current account balance of PPF account of
Late Smt. Lajja Srivastava as on 2.3.2012
is Rs.9,12,870/- as informed by the Bank.

18. Even otherwise, during the
course of arguments, learned Counsel for
the
petitioners
have
raised
certain
objection on the clause of the Act but on
perusal of the reliefs claimed by the
petitioners in the instant writ petition,
petitioners have not challenged any
clause/section/rules of the Act. Therefore,
the judgments, which have been relied
upon by the Counsel for the petitioners,
are not applicable in the facts and
circumstances of the case.

19. For the above reasons, we are
not inclined to interfere under Article 226
of the Constitution of India.

20. The writ petition is, therefore,
dismissed.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 02.04.2013.

BEFORE
2 All] Ramvijai Yadav Vs. State of U.P. and others
663
THE HON'BLE AMRESHWAR PRATAP
SAHI, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 14092 Of 2013

Ramvijai Yadav
 ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. and others ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Ashok Khare
Sri Siddharth Khare

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri A.K.Yadav
Sri R.A.Akhtar

Constitution
of
India,
Art.
226-
Appointment as Physical instructor in Basic
Education
Deptt.-on
part
time
fixed
honorarium
of
Rs.
7000/-
basis
appointment governed by G.O. 31.01.2013challenged
on
ground
-clause
11(2)
requiring Candidates must be of same block
or
Distt.-offends Art.
14
and
16
of
Constitution-held-short term employmentscheme
like
Shiksha
Mitra-domicile
restrictions survived for long time without
challenge-can not be interfered under writ
jurisdiction.

Held: Para-14
There is yet another reason for not
interfering. These are policy matters for
short-term employments. They do not
deserve to be interfered with necessarily
unless it is so grave that it may require a
redressal under Article 226 of the
Constitution. The process impedes the
implementation of such programmes
that are in public interest and in
particular
for
Basic
Schools
where
conditions
have
fast
deteriorated.
Schemes with domicile restrictions like
Shiksha Mitra have survived for long,
may be without such challenge.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Amreshwar Pratap
Sahi, J.)

1. This petition questions the
parameters set out in the Government
Order dated 31.1.2013 for engagement of
Part-Time Instructors, particularly in the
subject of Physical and Health Education,
in Basic Schools run by the respondent
State
under
the
Basic
Education
Department on the ground that the criteria
for providing benefit to Schools having a
student strength of more than 100 is
arbitrary and discriminatory.

2. The second ground is a challenge
to Clause 11(2) of the aforesaid G.O. that
provides that the candidature would stand
restricted to the residents of the same
district which offends Article 16 and 14
of the Constitution as no restriction in
public employment can be enforced on
the basis of geographical limitations or
place of residence.

3. Sri Ashok Khare, learned Senior
Counsel for the petitioner elaborating his
submissions contends that the method to
compute, allocate and identify the posts
on the basis of more than 100 students in
a School is an erroneous approach.
Schools having less than 100 students
would therefore stand discriminated and
deprived of teachers in special subjects
like Physical and Health Education which
is compulsory in Basic Schools.

4. The said argument may not wade
through as the provision made is in
accordance with the student teacher ratio.
If the number of students is less than 100
then there would no justification for
having more teachers than required. For
this one can fall upon the Government
Order dated 5.4.2004 reference whereof
has been made by the petitioner himself in
Paras 26 and 27 of the petition and
appended as Annexure 14. A perusal
664 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2013
thereof provides a remedy which has been
described as unjustifiable by the petitioner
for no valid reason. The submission
therefore has to be rejected.

5. Sri Khare has laid more stress on
the second argument of discrimination on
the ground of residence. He has heavily
relied on two apex court judgments
reported in (2002) 6 SCC Pg. 393
Harshendra Choubisa and others Vs.
State of Rajasthan and others; and
(2002) 6 SCC Pg. 562 Kailash Chand
Sharma Vs. State of Rajasthan and
others coupled with the full bench
decision in the case of J.K. Soni Vs.
State reported in 2010 (7) ADJ Pg. 407
to buttress his stand. He contends that
restricting the candidature only to a
district is denial of opportunity to apply in
other districts. This according to him
violates Article 16 as well. There is no
rationality behind this restriction so as to
achieve any objective of basic education
or even employment. To give preference
compulsorily is prohibitory in nature for
no valid reason. He submits there was no
such restriction under any scheme of part
time engagement, and even if it was, the
same does not appear to have been
challenged. This sort of preference has the
effect of eliminating candidates who are
more meritorious but stand excluded from
consideration altogether. He has invited
the attention of the court to the other
schemes including the engagement in
Kasturba
Gandhi
Awasiya
Balika
Vidyalaya. The
issue of
restricting
applications in the matter of Apprentice
Teachers has also been cited as an
example to contend that this court
interfered with the same.

6. Refuting the submissions, Sri
Ashok Kumar Yadav, learned Standing
Counsel contends that the Government
Order in Clause 1(6) spells out the reason
as follows:-

^^11⁄461⁄2 pwafd va'kdkfyd vuqns'kdksa dks fu;r
ekuns; :0 7000@& izfrekg ij j[kk tk jgk gS
vr% vH;FkhZ dks mlh tuin dk fuoklh gksuk
vfuok;Z gS rkfd og f'k{k.k dk;Z lqxerk ls dj
ldsA^^

7. He further points out Clause 1(13)
which recites as under:-

^^11⁄4131⁄2 vH;FkhZ ftl fodkl[k.M dk fuoklh gS
;FkklEHko mlh fodkl[k.M esa mls rSukrh nh tk;s
izFke rSukrh esa vkoafVr fo|ky; esa ftyk csfld
f'k{kk vf/kdkjh }kjk dksbZ ifjorZu ugha fd;k tk;sxk
,oa p;fur vH;FkhZ dks mlh fo|ky; esa dk;Z djuk
gksxkA^^

8. Sri Yadav submits that this
provision made appears to be in the
interest of the candidates who may be
able to discharge their duties conveniently
as they are being only paid an honraria of
Rs. 7000/-. This also according to him is
in the interest of the institution as parttime teachers would be readily available
nearby and may not have to cover a long
distance and would therefore be able to
discharge their duties efficiently. He
contends that no material has been
brought to contradict the said recitals nor
any thing to the contrary to indicate
dilution of merit. There is no data or facts
pleaded that may remotely suggest the
lowering of merit in selection.

9. Sri Khare in rejoinder contends
that there is no reason as to why a
candidate not belonging to the same
district cannot discharge his duties
efficiently. Covering of a distance is also
not material as a handsome amount is
being paid as honraria and in these hard
days of employment, a candidate would
2 All] Ramvijai Yadav Vs. State of U.P. and others
665
be willingly available to go to another
district. He therefore submits that the
argument is bereft of any rationale.

10. Having heard learned counsel
and having perused the Government
Order dated 31.1.2013 as well as the
judgments cited at the bar, the object
appears to be of providing cheap and
adequate basic education within the
limited sources of the State. The scheme
is also aided by the Central Government.
It offers engagement for only eleven
months, renewable on performance. It is
not
a
substantive
or
permanent
employment. It gives a respite to the
pressure on the teaching staff of a
institution, employment to the local
unemployed youth and benefit to the
children. The object is therefore not to
confer any vested right of public
employment so as to attract the principles
of service jurisprudence to the extent of
constitutionality. The scheme also appears
to cater to sustenance measures for locally
available candidates which has a rational
purpose.

11. The limiting of the candidature
to the district has not been demonstrated
by the petitioner to have necessarily
resulted in lowering or compromising
with merit. As a matter of fact no data has
been disclosed to draw an objective
inference as suggested. If a candidate is
available
locally
for
part-time
engagement, he is in an advantageous
position to discharge his duties. He also
does not have to hassle for his daily needs
if he lives nearby. It is for this reason that
the Government Order provides for
placing a candidate as far as possible in
the same block of the district to which he
belongs. There does not appear to be
anything irrational about the same.
Additionally, there is no challenge or any
pleading criticising the aforesaid quoted
clauses. The restriction of the candidature
to a district does not amount to a complete
prohibition. Rather, the opportunity is
provided in
the
home
district for
convenience.

12. Coming to the two decisions of
the apex court, the facts therein were that
an additional bonus of marks while
preparing merit was given @ 10% marks
to a candidate of the same district and @
5% marks to a candidate of the Rural
Area. The justification pleaded was that it
would give an impetus to candidates of
rural area to stick to their areas and not
rush for a placement in an urban area. The
second reason pleaded was that a
candidate of the same area would be able
to communicate with the students more
efficiently. Both reasons were rejected by
the High Court and upheld by the Apex
Court holding them to be irrational and
the preferential weightage of marks to be
violative of Article 14 and 16 as they
were founded merely on the basis of
residence. The same judgment however in
Para 14 of Kailash Chand Sharma's case
(supra) holds that such discrimination is
not attracted where it is not merely related
to residence but the factum of residence is
taken into account in addition to other
relevant factors. The said decisions were
related to public employment as Gram
Sewaks and Teachers on permanent basis,
and was not concerned with any part-time
scheme
engagement
as
presently
involved.

13. In the instant case no weightage
is being extended to the merit of a
candidate.
There
is
no
positive
discriminatory act which may give
advantage over merit. The said decisions
666 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2013
deprecated any State act that led to variation
in merit. There is no such matter of incidence
involved herein so as to draw a parallel from
the said decisions. The status of employment
and the purpose as pleaded were on an
altogether different footing in the said cases.
The same therefore are of no advantage to
the petitioners. The ratio of the judgment in
the case of J.K. Soni (supra) does not come
close to the controversy at hand and therefore
also does not apply on the facts of the present
case.

14. There is yet another reason for
not interfering. These are policy matters
for short-term employments. They do not
deserve to be interfered with necessarily
unless it is so grave that it may require a
redressal under Article 226 of the
Constitution. The process impedes the
implementation of such programmes that
are in public interest and in particular for
Basic Schools where conditions have fast
deteriorated.
Schemes
with domicile
restrictions like Shiksha Mitra have
survived for long, may be without such
challenge.

15. Accordingly, for all the reasons
set out hereinabove, the petition cannot
succeed and is hereby dismissed.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL.SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 29.04.2013

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE RAN VIJAI SINGH, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 14972 Of 2013

Mohammad Hanif and others..Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. and others ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Hari Om Yadav
Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

Constitution of India-Art.-226- Principle of
Natural
Justice-order
of
entails
Civil
Consequence-opportunity of hearing-mustimpugned order-not only cryptic but-without
any provision of law-held-unsustainable
quashed-principal Secretary Revenue to
issue circular for strict compliance of Natural
Justice-enacting penal provisions against
such erring officer.

Held: Para-11
In view of the above legal position and
undisputed
facts
that
the
order
impugned is not only cryptic but has
been
passed
without
affording
an
opportunity of hearing, it cannot be
legally sustained.

Case Law discussed:
AIR 1978 SC 597; 1985 (3) SCC 398; 1989 (3)
SCC 202; 2005 (6) SCC 321; 1996 (87) RD 66;
2005 (2) AWC 1256; (2010) 13 SCC 336; AIR
1996 SC 432

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ran Vijai Singh, J.)

1. Heard Sri Hari Om Yadav,
learned counsel for the petitioners and
learned Standing Counsel appearing for
the State respondents.

2. Through this writ petition, the
petitioners have prayed for issuing a writ
of certiorari quashing the order dated
25.06.2012 passed by respondent no. 2/
Tahsildar, Sadar, District Bulandshahar.

3. On 15.03.2013, this Court
directed the learned Standing Counsel to
seek instructions in this matter apprising
the Court that under which provision of
law, the impugned order has been passed
on an application without there being any
notice to the affected party.