# Ranbir Singh v. D.I.O.S., Jalone at Orai and others

- **Citation:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad #39479
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2000
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ranbir-singh-v-d-i-o-s-jalone-at-orai-and-others-39479
- **Pages:** 6

## Text

INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2000
22
valid notice under Section 147(a) could be
issued. This proposition of law was also not
challenged
on
behalf
of
the
revenue.
However, what is evident is that due to the
time
taken
in
the
earlier
round
of
proceedings., the limitation for making an
assessment of the basis of the return of
income, filed in pursuance of the notice dated
5.10.1990, has expired and, therefore, it
cannot be said that either the said notice or the
return of income had revived and could be
treated to be pending. Such a situation has
been taken care of by sub-clause (b) of
Explanation 2 to Section 147. Explanation 2
states that for the purposes of section 147, the
following shall also be deemed to be cases
where income chargeable to tax has escaped
assessment namely:-

(a)..................
(b) Where a return of income has been
furnished by the assessee but no assessment
has been made and it is noticed by the
Assessing Officer that the assessee has
understand the income or has claimed
excessive loss, deduction, allowance of relief
in the return;

(c).....................

12. Thus in view of this Explanation and
the fact that because of the events, narrated
above, no assessment was made on the
assessee partnership firm, it becomes a case
where income chargeable to tax has escaped
assessment. As stated is paragraph 7 of the
counter affidavit, the income was not stated
by the assessee in the return that was filed in
pursuance of the earlier notice under Sec. 148
on 16.11.1990. The income declared in the
said return was only Rs. 99,620/- while as
stated in paragraph 16 of the counter affidavit
during the course of search and seizure
operations, the assessee had offered an
additional income of Rs, one lac. Therefore,
all the conditions mentioned in clause (b)
reproduced above were satisfied in this case
and the assessing officer could reassess the
income after issuing a notice under Section
148. It is not a case of circumventing the
period of limitation but is a case where
because of the certain circumstances, the
statute itself allows the assessing officer an
opportunity to bring to tax escaped income
although the period originally prescribed had
expired. It was also contended that the
impugned notice, copy of which is at page 38
of the paper book as annexure 5, did not
specify whether it was issued to the AOP or to
the partnership firm. No. such ground has
been set up in the writ petition. The notice
has been issued to M/s S.K. Gupta Co. which
as admitted in the petition itself, is a
partnership firm and was being assessed to tax
from before at general index register no. S
302/W1. This number is mentioned in the
notice itself making it quite clear that it has
been issued to the partnership firm. The
conduct of the assessing officer in making the
order under Section 154 also indicated that he
wanted only to assess a partnership firm and
not an AOP. Therefore, in any case there is
no infirmity in the notice on this account as
well.

13. No other point was raised in this writ
petition and for the reasons discussed above,
the same is hereby dismissed with costs to the
respondents. The interim order, if any is
discharged.
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By the Court

1. This special appeal is the third case
relating to the same issues about elections
within a society known as the Mahatma
Gandhi Shiksha Pracharini Samiti, Kudari,
District Jalaun. This society runs an institution
known as the Mahatma Gandhi Uchchttar
Madhyamik Vidyalaya , Khudari district
Jalaun. This institution is recognised under the
U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 and
the
regulations framed under the Act,
aforesaid. The institution has a scheme of
administration which saw amendments and it
is accepted that the scheme of administration
together with the amendments had been
approved
by
the
Deputy
Director
of
Education, Jhansi Region, Jhansi, on 31
December 1983. It was by an ad interim order
dated 17 July 1992 in writ petition no.28805
of 1992 that there was a direction, regard
being had to certain circumstances that the
District Inspector of Schools, Jalaun, was
required to take over the institution forthwith
and operate the accounts of the institution.
Subsequently, by another order of 10 October
1993, a direction was issued to the District
Inspector of Schools to take over the
management of the institution. By the
subsequent order he had also been required to
conduct an election of the office bearers of the
Committee of Management within one month
in accordance with the provisions of the
scheme of administration. The Court also
directed that once the election is over, the
management is to be handed over to the duly
elected Committee of Management. Not to be
unnoticed is that the order was to the effect as
indicated by the Court, even otherwise to be
understood, that the election was to be carried
out in accordance with law.

2. In so far as the issue is concerned,
there, apparently, is no dispute amongst the
parties
at
Bar,
whether
appellant,
the
respondent or even the State respondents. The
issue is that, while the conduct of an election
was in process with the District Inspector of
Schools sitting over as Incharge to run the
management of the institution, could he induct
new members; in the instant case life
members? Submissions have been made at the
Bar on behalf of the appellant, Ranbir Sing
and
the
respondent,
S.K.
Misra,
the
respondent
Committee
of
Management,
whatever be its status, and the District
Inspector of Schools. The issue as noticed
remains. The contentions of parties are also in
affidavits exchanged on the stay application
of the appellants.

3. The District Inspector of Schools in his
affidavit, in paragraph 8 submits that point
involved is, to the effect, whether the District
INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2000
24
Inspector of Schools had powers to induct
new members, while holding the charge of the
institution as a Manager. Unfortunately, in
this affidavit affirmed on 24 May 1996, the
District Inspector of Schools required a petty
clerk to make submission before the High
Court. But, the District Inspector of Schools
seems to be conscious of the powers he may
have been so vested with when the High
Court appointed him to take charge of the
Management of the educational institution.

4. However, as between counsel for the
appellant, Mr. A.P. Sahi and counsel for the
contesting respondent, Mr.V.B. Singh, the
contention has been that the matter may be
seen as analogous to under Section 16-D of
the Act, aforesaid. On the proposition on
whatever may be the powers which may vest
in an Authorised Controller of an institution,
until such time when a Committee of
Management has been lawfully constituted to
replace it, the powers of the District Inspector
of Schools, in the present case, could not be
more unless spelled out by the High Court.
The premises of the issue is accepted by the
parties.

5. In so far as the contention of the
District Inspector of Schools is concerned,
submitted through a clerk on an affidavit, the
Standing Counsel, Mr. U.K. Pandey has been
more than fair to submit that the District
Inspector of Schools can have no more
powers than an Authorised Controller may
not have and in so far as the other aspects are
concerned, has straight away conceded that a
power which has not been spelled out, the
District Inspector of Schools may not have.
Consequently,
learned
Standing
Counsel
submitted, the District Inspector of Schools,
in the present case, cannot assume a power to
induct new members while the committee of
Management
is
superseded.
While
this
proposition of learned Standing Counsel may
remain on record, the Court will see the aspect
as contended between the rival parties.

6. The Court has referred to the two orders
by which the District Inspector of Schools had
been required to replace the Committee of
Management and, thereafter, conduct an
election, in accordance with law, and hand
over
the
management
to
the
elected
Committee of Management and its office
bearers. The issue, apparently, sprang up
when the District Inspector of Schools,
permitted the induction of 31 life members.
This gave rise to writ petition no.35059 of
1995: S.K. Mishra and another v.The District
Inspector of Schools, Jalaun, at Orai, and
others. On this writ petition came a decision
dated 14 December 1995. In so far as the
relevant parts of the judgement are concerned,
the extracts are:
".....There is no doubt that the authorised
controller can never be treated as substitute
for the management committee or the general
body of an Association or Institution. The
authorised controller is not appointed within
the
scheme
of
administration
of
the
Institution. He is appointed by reason of
statutory provisions only to fill up the void
and restore the management of the Institution
according to the scheme of administration by
directing him to hold the election. The
authorised controller is not given power by
reason where of he can induct members in an
association of persons or bring about changes
in the structure of the association much to the
chagrin and prejudice of the members.

7. The authorised controller, who are
directed to hold the election according to
scheme of administration by order dated
10/10/1995 was never empowered under the
scheme of administration to induct members.
An authorised controller can never be
authorised to take upon himself the function
of an association with an element of
democracy.
He
simply
manages
the
administration as stop gap measure. He can
never be empowered to usurp the decision
making process or power with regard to the
basic structure of the association he acts only
as manager. Such a power would be
1ALL] Ranbir Singh V. D.I.O.S., Jalone at Orai and others

25
completely opposed to the concept of an
association
of
persons.
An
authorised
controller if enter upon such a domain in that
event it would amount to encroaching upon
the freedom of association of which he is not
a member. Then again the way the members
have been inducted also does not show that
these members were taken in the normal
course of functioning. All the members have
come in a group for particular purpose. By an
order dated 21.9.1995which is Annexure-VII
to the writ petition the District Inspector of
Schools had already settled the list of
members containing 17 names. Thereafter, he
had issued another letter on 25.11.1995 by
which he has shown 31 new members. This
induction of members is not a part of the
election process. It is a part, which is to be
played
by
the
general
body
or
the
management committee who according to the
authorised controller is entitled to induct
members. The District Inspector of Schools
was authorised to hold the election on the
basis of members of the Institution The
process of election would commence with the
holding of the election with the existing
members
which
he
had
finalised
on
21.9.1995.

8. Be that as it may in the present case Mr.
Rai submits that the election has already been
held and the result has already been declared.
Therefore, the contention of Mr. Sankatha
Rai, counsel for the respondent that this court
cannot interfere with the election process once
started cannot be sustained. Election having
been over the same is now open to scrutiny.

9. The proposition that an election if
commenced the process cannot be stopped
and cannot be interfered with is an established
proposition and it need no repetition as has
been held particularly in the case cited by Mr.
Rai. The said submission now has become
redundant since the result of the election has
already been declared.

10. In the present case the question can be
decided without any further evidence only by
the decision as to the entitlement of the
District Inspector of Schools to induct
members. It is, therefore, would not be
desirable to refer the parties to Civil Court
now.

11. Therefore on the basis of material
placed before this Court when it had been
found that the District Inspector of Schools
has no jurisdiction to induct new members as
has been done in this case, the election in
which those new members admittedly have
taken part, cannot be sustained and therefore
the same is quashed. The District Inspector of
Schools shall hold fresh election on the basis
of the members already on record without
allowing the 31 new members to participate in
the
election.
This
process
should
be
completed within a period of eight weeks
from the date a certified copy of this order is
produced before the District Inspector of
Schools. The petition is thus disposed of.

There will however no order as to costs."

12. Before any thing else is reflected upon
this issue, it would be safer to see the relevant
provisions of the law under the Act, aforesaid.
Given a certain situation, the law permits the
Committee of Management of an institution to
be replaced by the appointment of an
Authorised Controller to take over for a
specified period which may not exceed two
years. This aspect is discernible from sub-
clause (4) to Section 16-D. The Court is not
going into the question as to how long an
Authorised Controller may continue as the
aspect before the Court is on what may be the
limits of his powers. Are they same as are
normally
attributed
in
totality
to
the
Committee of Management? The answer is in
the negative.

13. While the Committee of Management
may have the power to transfer any moveable
property, the Authorised Controller does not.
INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2000
26
The Authorised Controller may set about to
discharge his function day to day but does not
have the power to alienate and transfer any
immovable property, (except by way of letting
from month to month in the ordinary course
of management) but may create a charge on
the properties. Thus, while he may carry out
day to day functions, as the Committee of
Management otherwise may have done, any
special directions he may receive from the
Director for the proper management of the
institution or its properties. This aspect is
spelled out in sub-clause (9) and (11) to
Section 16-D of the Act, aforesaid. Section
16-DD permits an Authorised Controller to
take over charge of the concerned institution
and its properties to the exclusion of the
Committee of Management, but his powers
will be subject to such restrictions as the State
Government may impose. These are the broad
guidelines on the functions of an Authorised
Controller. The rest is a matter of prudence.

14. Plainly the issue is as if there is local
government and local-self-government. An
aspect which can be seen as a corporation -
sole as opposed to a corporation with elected
members. Even where local-self-government,
as an institution, has been provided for and
protected by the Constitution of India, it is not
that
local-self-government
may
not
be
superseded.
But,
the
powers
of
an
Administrator of a superseded local body, a
municipality for instance, are curtailed. He
may carry on the administration, yet may not
impose fresh taxes as this is best left to the
elected representatives. Taking it to a higher
plain, when a Legislature is not in Session a
Governor may issue an Ordinance, but within
a specified period it must be laid before the
legislature.

15. In the instant case, the Committee of
Management is not available, instead there is
a District Inspector of Schools who has been
appointed, in effect, as an Authorised
Controller by an order of the High Court. He
had been caused with an obligation to conduct
an election. The question is whether the
District Inspector of Schools could, during the
course of his management of the institution as
an
Authorised
Controller,
induct
life
members. The learned Judge, who gave the
judgement on the writ petition, was of the
view that the basic structure of the institution,
whether the general body or the Committee of
Management, could not be changed by such
induction of life members. The learned Judge
was of the opinion that this should best be left
to the normalcy of the institution, when there
is a general body and a Committee of
Management. It is for this reason and for good
measure, the Court has observed that an
Authorised Controller can never be treated as
a substitute to a Committee of Management or
a general body of a society or an institution.1

16. Permitting induction of new members
by an Authorised Controller, or, for that
matter, the District Inspector of Schools in a
similar situation would be putting such an
authority into a power and position which
even the law did not spell out. Induction of
new members is best left to be filtered and
inducted by the general body and the
Committee of Management as the scheme of
administration may provide. But for an
Authorised Controller, as a corporation-sole,
to take the responsibility of changing the
fabric of the committee of members of a
society or a trust may be too sweeping a
power which is not compatible with the
provisions
of
the
Act,
aforesaid.
The
appointment of an Authorised Controller is in
itself a temporary phase. The law suffers the
appointment of an Authorised Controller and
provides for it, but does not encourage it.
What is encouraged by the law is the return to
normalcy by an election and the management
being handed over to a Committee of
Management.

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17. In the circumstances, this Court is of
the opinion that the learned Judge was not in
error when he quashed the induction of 31
new members, to participate in an election,
and consequently gave a direction to the
District Inspector of School to hold a fresh
election.

The judgement is affirmed.

The appeal is dismissed with costs.
---------
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By the Court

1. The Petitioners have come up with
prayers to (i) declare Section 39, 60 and 61 of
the Standards of Weights and Measures
(Enforcement) Act, 1985 (hereafter referred to
as the Act) as unconstitutional and void and
(ii) restrain the Respondents from prosecuting
them for violation of the aforementioned
provisions of the Act.

2. Petitioner No.1 claims itself to be
representative
body
of
the
dealers
of
petroleum products in our State, duly
registered with the Registrar- Chits, Firms and
Societies, U.P., Lucknow and its registered
office at Kanpur. Petitioner no.2 is a petrol
pump owner and dealer appointed by the
Indian Oil Corporation situate at G.T. Road,
Bamrauli, Allahabad.