# Ranjeet Kumar v. The Registrar Corporative Societies & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 6 ILRA 138
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-06-09
- **Case number:** Writ - A No. 19042 of 2024
- **Bench:** J.J. Munir
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ranjeet-kumar-v-the-registrar-corporative-societies-ors-53565
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

Law
-
UP
Co-operative
Societies' Employees Service Regulations,
1975 - Reg. 84 - Disciplinary proceeding
- Punishment -Withholding of increment
with cumulative effect - Principle of
natural justice - Applicability - Petitioner
took defence against the charges imposed
- Non-speaking punishment order was
passed
-
Validity
challenged
-
No
discussion about defence was made -
Effect - Held, in the absence of a
discussion on the particulars of the three
charges, the petitioner's defence and
reasons to conclude why the charges were
held proved, the underlying decision of
the
Committee
of
Management,
as
expressed in the impugned order passed
by the Secretary/Chief Executive Officer
of the Bank, is certainly violative of
natural justice. -The order, despite being
verbose on other details, maintains critical
silence on what went on in the mind of the
decision makers to conclude that the
charges against the petitioner are proved
by the requisite standard of preponderant
probability. (Para 16)

B. Constitution of India,1950 - Article 14
-Classification - Vires of Reg. 84 of
Regulation,
1975
not
classifying
the
penalty of withholding of increment as
major penalty - How far Court can
interfere in the absence of challenge to it
-
Held,
the
penalty
of
withholding
increments with cumulative effect, that
6 All. Ranjeet Kumar Vs. The Registrar Corporative Societies & Ors.
139
would have the effect of postponing
future increments, would be certainly a
major penalty by all established norms,
and Reg. 84, to this extent seems to
arbitrarily classify penalties. But, that
question cannot be gone into in the
absence of a challenge laid by the
petitioner
to
the
vires
of
the
said
Regulation. (Para 12)

Writ petition allowed. (E-1)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

138 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the employee is entitled to under the rules
at the time of retirement.

34. In view of all that we have
found, the impugned order, directing
retention of a sum of Rs.19,25,500/- in
fixed deposit, pledged in favour of the
Bank, subject to the condition that the
petitioner ensures recovery of the Bank's
non-performing asset, the impairment of
the avenues of recovery whereof has been
attributed to the petitioner, cannot be
sustained. The petitioner has to be paid all
his post retiral benefits, without any
abridgement or abatement.

35. In the result, this writ petition
succeeds and is allowed. The impugned
order dated 18.11.2024 and the impugned
resolution
of
the
Committee
of
Management dated 08.10.2024, insofar as
these relate to the petitioner's claim to his
post retiral benefits, are hereby quashed.
The Secretary & Chief Executive Officer
and the Committee of Management of the
Bank are commanded by a mandamus to
forthwith release and pay to the petitioner
the sum of Rs.19,25,500/-, retained with
them and invested in an FDR, together with
the accrued interest on the instrument.

36. There shall be no order as to
costs.

37. Let a copy of this judgment be
communicated to the Secretary & Chief
Executive Officer, District Cooperative
Bank
Limited,
Ghaziabad
and
the
resolution
of
the
Committee
of
Management of the said Bank by the
Registrar (Compliance).
----------
(2025) 6 ILRA 138
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 09.06.2025
BEFORE

THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.

Writ - A No. 19042 of 2024

Ranjeet Kumar ...Petitioner
Versus
The Registrar Corporative Societies & Ors.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Rajendra Prasad Mishra, Ramakant Tiwari

Counsel for the Respondent:
Ashok Kumar Lal, C.S.C.

A.
Service
Law
-
UP
Co-operative
Societies' Employees Service Regulations,
1975 - Reg. 84 - Disciplinary proceeding
- Punishment -Withholding of increment
with cumulative effect - Principle of
natural justice - Applicability - Petitioner
took defence against the charges imposed
- Non-speaking punishment order was
passed
-
Validity
challenged
-
No
discussion about defence was made -
Effect - Held, in the absence of a
discussion on the particulars of the three
charges, the petitioner's defence and
reasons to conclude why the charges were
held proved, the underlying decision of
the
Committee
of
Management,
as
expressed in the impugned order passed
by the Secretary/Chief Executive Officer
of the Bank, is certainly violative of
natural justice. -The order, despite being
verbose on other details, maintains critical
silence on what went on in the mind of the
decision makers to conclude that the
charges against the petitioner are proved
by the requisite standard of preponderant
probability. (Para 16)

B. Constitution of India,1950 - Article 14
-Classification - Vires of Reg. 84 of
Regulation,
1975
not
classifying
the
penalty of withholding of increment as
major penalty - How far Court can
interfere in the absence of challenge to it
-
Held,
the
penalty
of
withholding
increments with cumulative effect, that
6 All. Ranjeet Kumar Vs. The Registrar Corporative Societies & Ors.
139
would have the effect of postponing
future increments, would be certainly a
major penalty by all established norms,
and Reg. 84, to this extent seems to
arbitrarily classify penalties. But, that
question cannot be gone into in the
absence of a challenge laid by the
petitioner
to
the
vires
of
the
said
Regulation. (Para 12)

Writ petition allowed. (E-1)

List of Cases cited:

1. Special Leave Petition (C) No.18983 of 2023;
Bihar Rajya Dafadar Chaukidar Panchayat
(Magadh Division) Vs St. of Bihar & ors.,
decided on 02.04.2025

2. Basudev Dutta Vs State of W.B. & ors.; 2024
SCC OnLine SC 3616

(Delivered by Hon'ble J.J. Munir, J.)

1. This writ petition is directed against
the order of the Secretary/Chief Executive
Officer, District Cooperative Bank Limited,
Bareilly, dated 28.02.2023, inflicting upon
the petitioner punishment of withholding
two increments with cumulative effect,
after holding disciplinary proceedings. The
decision carried in the order impugned is
one
taken
by
the
Committee
of
Management of the Bank last mentioned,
but formally made by the Secretary/ Chief
Executive Officer.

2. The petitioner is a clerk in the
employ of the District Cooperative Bank
Limited, Bareilly (for short, 'the Bank').
The period of time, to which the
proceedings giving rise to the present writ
petition relate, the petitioner was posted in
the Meerganj Branch of the Bank at
Bareilly
as
Cashier-cum-Clerk.
The
petitioner asserts that his service record is
otherwise free from blemish. He was
placed under suspension pending inquiry
vide order dated 20.12.2021 under the
provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Cooperative Societies' Employees Service
Regulations,
1975
(for
short,
'the
Regulations of 1975') on allegation that on
the day specified therein, when the cash
was checked, it was found short. There is
also an allegation against the petitioner that
he had taken a loan from a member of the
public and remained absent from duty
without information or leave. A chargesheet was issued to the petitioner on
04.03.2022,
after
approval
by
the
Secretary/ Chief Executive Officer of the
Bank. The petitioner filed his reply dated
15.04.2022, denying all the charges.

3. During the inquiry, the petitioner
was called in by the Inquiry Officer,
directing him to appear before him on
04.02.2022 at 11.30 a.m. to defend himself.
The petitioner submitted his defence further
before the Inquiry Officer on the date fixed,
that is to say, on 04.02.2022. The Inquiry
Officer submitted his inquiry report or the
inquiry note, holding the petitioner guilty.
The petitioner was then required by the
Secretary/ Chief Executive Officer of the
Bank, vide a letter dated 28.07.2022, to
appear before him for a personal hearing on
05.08.2022 at 4.00 p.m. In compliance with
the said letter, the petitioner appeared
before the Secretary/ Chief Executive
Officer of the Bank. He denied the charges.
This proceeding was followed by another
notice dated 01.09.2022 from the Secretary/
Chief Executive Officer, directing the
petitioner to appear before the Committee
of Management on 05.09.2022 at 1.00 p.m.
for
a
personal
hearing
and
make
submissions in his defence. A show cause
notice was then issued by the Secretary/
Chief Executive Officer, requiring the
petitioner to answer the charges against
him finally. The petitioner submitted his
140 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
reply dated 15.12.2022, again refuting the
charges. The petitioner was called in person
to appear before the Committee of
Management once again on 24.01.2023,
vide letter dated 18.01.2023, scheduling the
time at 1.00 p.m., but the petitioner could
not appear on account of being ill.

4. The petitioner has pleaded in the
writ petition that the impugned order is
vitiated because during the course of
inquiry, no witness was produced on behalf
of the establishment in support of the three
charges. It is particularly said that two
witnesses, around whom two of the charges
centre, to wit, Smt. Gunjan Singh and Smt.
Haseena, were not produced by the
establishment. It is also urged that no date,
time and place was fixed for hearing the
witnesses for the establishment, where the
petitioner could cross-examine them and
lead his own evidence, if he thought so. It
is pointed out that the inquiry was lingering
on and so was his suspension. Therefore, he
instituted Writ-A No.21058 of 2022 before
this Court, questioning his order of
suspension,
or
rather
his
continued
suspension. The said writ petition was
disposed of with a direction to the
Disciplinary Authority to conclude the
proceedings within a period of three
months of the date of production of a
certified copy of the order made in the
aforesaid writ petition. It was also provided
that if the proceedings are not concluded
within the said period of time, the petitioner
may submit a representation to the Authority,
described as respondent No.3 in this Court's
order, who shall consider and decide the
petitioner's
representation
expeditiously,
preferably within a period of one month. The
said detail appears to be now unnecessary
because the impugned order passed by the
Secretary/ Chief Executive Officer of the
Bank has notified the decision of the
Committee of Management to punish the
petitioner with the withholding of two
increments
with
cumulative
effect.
In
addition, he has been warned to be careful in
future with a direction that in case of
repetition of the misconduct, the Bank would
be compelled to dismiss him from service.
The petitioner was reinstated in service,
providing
that
during
the
period
of
suspension, whatever subsistence allowance
has been received by him, is all that would be
there towards his emoluments and nothing
more would be payable on account of salary
and allowances.

5. The petitioner has instituted the
present writ petition, aggrieved by the order
dated 28.02.2023, punishing him as above
indicated.

6. A notice of motion was issued
vide order dated 02.12.2024, and, in course of
time, parties have exchanged affidavits. The
writ petition was admitted to hearing on
12.12.2024. The hearing proceeded that day
to conclusion. Judgment was reserved.
7. Heard Mr. Umesh Chandra Tiwari,
Advocate holding brief of Mr. Rajendra
Prasad Mishra, learned Counsel for the
petitioner, Mr. Ashok Kumar Lal, learned
Counsel for respondent Nos.2 and 3 and Mr.
S.C. Upadhyay, learned Standing Counsel,
appearing on behalf of respondent Nos.1 and
4.

8. Upon hearing learned Counsel
for the parties and perusing the record,
what we find is that the following three
charges were laid against the petitioner:

 "आरोप संख्या - 01

 प्रधान कार्ाालर् के उक्त आदेश के अनुपालन में
अधोहस्ताक्षरी द्वारा प्रकरण की जााँच की गर्ी, जॉच में पार्ा गर्ा,
6 All. Ranjeet Kumar Vs. The Registrar Corporative Societies & Ors.
141
कक शाखा प्रबन्धक, शाखा - मीरगंज ने अपने पत्र कदनांक
20.12.2021 के माध्र्म से अवगत करार्ा, कक कदनांक
18.12.2021 को आप द्वारा खाता धारक श्रीमती गुंजन कसंह
पत्नी श्री गौरव कसंह को उनके अंकन 70,000=00 रु0 के
आहरण पर अंकन 69,500=00 रु0 मात्र का भुगतान ककर्ा
गर्ा और अंकन 500=00 रु0 का कम भुगतान ककर्ा गर्ा,
कजसकी जॉच करने पर श्रीमती गुंजन कसंह द्वारा अवगत करार्ा गर्ा,
कक उनके द्वारा शाखा मीरगंज में खुले अपने बचत खाता संख्र्ा -
21248 से कदनांक 18.12.2021 को अंकन 70,000=00
रु0 कनकालने के कलए आहरण पत्र उक्त धनराकश का कदर्ा गर्ा,
ककन्तु तत्समर् आप द्वारा उन्हें अंकन 69,500=00 रु0 मात्र का
भुगतान ककर्ा गर्ा, जो अंकन 500=00 रु0 कम था। उनके बारबार कहने के उपरान्त भी उन्हें अंकन 500=00 रु0 आप द्वारा
नहीं कदर्े गर्े, कजसकी कशकार्त शाखा प्रबन्धक महोदर् से की
गर्ी, तदउपरान्त शाखा प्रबन्धक महोदर् ने आपसे अंकन
500=00 रु0 वापस कदलवार्े। प्रकरण की जानकारी लेने पर
शाखा प्रबन्धक द्वारा अवगत करार्ा गर्ा, कक शाम को कैश बन्द
करते समर् कैश कगनने पर 20 रु0 के 20 नोट कम कनकले अथाात
400=00 कैश में कम थे, कजसको पूरा कराने के उपरान्त कैश को
बन्द करार्ा गर्ा। साथ ही शाखा प्रबन्धक द्वारा अवगत करार्ा गर्ा,
कक श्रीमती गुंजन कसंह बैक की पुरानी खाता धारक हैं एवं एक
प्रकतकित नागररक हैं, उनके साथ श्री रंजीत कुमार कैकशर्र द्वारा इस
प्रकार का व्र्वहार ककर्े जाने के कारण बैंक की कवश्वसनीर्ता एवं
छकव
खराब
हो
रही
है।
अतः आपको शाखा-मीरगंज पर कैकशर्र पद पर कार्ारत रहते हुए
कैश शाटा करने, तथा कैकशर्र के रूप में कार्ा करते हुए कैश में
हेरा-फेरी कर बैंक की कवश्वसनीर्ता को धूकमल करने के आरोप से
आरोकपत ककर्ा जाता है।

 आरोप संख्या-02

 प्रकरण की जााँच के दौरान अधोहस्ताक्षरी द्वारा शाखा
मीरगंज में कशकार्तकताा से बर्ान कलर्े जा रहे थे तभी शाखा
प्रबन्धक की उपकस्थकत में शाखा मीरगंज के कई ग्राहकों ने
अधोहस्ताक्षरी को अवगत करार्ा, कक आप द्वारा उनको गुमराह
करते हुए नकद रूपर्े उधार ले कलर्े गर्े हैं और बहुत मााँगने पर भी
वाकपस नहीं कर रहे हैं। प्रकरण की जााँच के दौरान कदनांक
04.02.2022 को मुख्र्ालर् में श्रीमती हसीना खाता संख्र्ा
5354 शाखा फरीदपुर द्वारा कलकखत रूप से कहा गर्ा है कक आप
द्वारा अपने पद का दुरूपर्ोग एवं उनको गुमराह करते हुए अंकन
10,000=00 रु0 उधार कलर्े हैं। उक्त कशकार्त के सन्दभा में जब
आपसे अपना पक्ष जानने के कलए जानकारी ली गर्ी तो आप द्वारा
कलकखत रूप से अपने उक्त कृत्र् की स्वीकारोकक्त की गर्ी।
अतः आप द्वारा बैंक के ग्राहकों को गुमराह करते हुए रूपर्े उधार
कलर्े जाने की पुकि होती है, कजसके कारण आपको ग्राहकों व आम
जनता से रूपर्े उधार लेकर बैंक की छकव धूकमल करने के आरोप से
आरोकपत ककर्ा जाता है।

 आरोप संख्या - 03

 प्रकरण की जॉच करते समर् अधोहस्ताक्षरी द्वारा बैंक
प्रधान कार्ाालर् पत्रांक 3005 / कनरी0 - संग्रह / 2021-22
कदनांक 10.01.2022 के माध्र्म से शाखा प्रबन्धक शाखा -
फरीदपुर सार्ं0 से, आपके शाखा से अनुपकस्थत रहने के सन्दभा में
सूचना मांगी गर्ी, साथ ही अधोहस्ताक्षरी द्वारा भी शाखा पर रकक्षत
कमाचाररर्ों के उपकस्थकत रकजस्टर / प्रपत्रों की जॉच करने पर पार्ा
गर्ा, कक आप कदनांक 01.05.2017, 02.05.2017,
16.08.2017,
02.09.2017,
31.09.2017,
16.10.2017, 17.10.2017, 19.10.2020 को शाखा
से कबना ककसी सूचना के अनुपकस्थत रहे हैं और पार्ा गर्ा, कक आप
द्वारा कनम्न कदनांक को शाखा पर कार्ा नहीं ककर्ा गर्ा, कजसके
सम्बन्ध में शाखा प्रबन्धक से जानकारी ली गर्ी, तो उनके द्वारा
अवगत करार्ा गर्ा, कक उक्त कदनांक पर -

31.0
7.20
17

18.0
9.20
17

27.0
7.20
18

21.0
8.20
18

27.0
5.20
19

07.0
8.20
19

29.0
8.20
19

01.0
8.20
17

29.0
9.20
17

30.0
7.20
18

27.0
8.20
19

27.0
5.20
19

08.0
8.20
19
19.1
0.20
20

02.0
8.20
17
24.0
7.20
18

31.0
7.20
18

29.0
8.20
18

21.0
6.20
19

26.0
8.20
19

18.1
2.20
20

03.0
8.20
17

25.0
7.20
18

01.0
8.20
18

20.1
0.20
18

05.0
8.20
19

27.0
8.20
19

19.1
2.20
20

17.0
8.20
17

26.0
7.20
18

20.0
8.20
18

07.0
5.20
19
06.0
8.20
19

28.0
8.20
19
142 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
 आपको अकजात अवकाश कदखार्ा गर्ा है, जबकक
मुख्र्ालर् के प्रशासन अनुभाग से प्राप्त सूचना से स्पि होता है, कक
आप द्वारा न तो कोई अकजात अवकाश हेतु कोई आवेदन ही ककर्ा
गर्ा और न ही इस प्रकार का कोई अवकाश मुख्र्ालर् स्तर से
आपको प्रदान ककर्ा गर्ा।

 अग्रेतर जॉच में पार्ा गर्ा, कक पूवा में भी आपके
द्वारा इस प्रकार की अकनर्कमतता/ पलार्न का कृत्र् ककर्ा जाता रहा
है, कजसका संज्ञान लेते हुए प्रधान कार्ाालर् पत्रांक
217/प्रशासन/2015-16 कदनांक 12.05.2015 द्वारा आपसे
कदनांक 21.042015 से 21.04.2015 तक शाखा में कबना
सूचना के अनुपकस्थत रहने का स्पिीकरण मााँगा गर्ा था। पूवा में भी
प्रधान कार्ाालर् पत्रांक 862/प्रशासन/2016-17 कदनांक
20.07.2016 को भी शाखा फरीदपुर सार्ं0 के
27.06.2016 को कबना ककसी सूचना के अद्यतन शाखा में
अनुपकस्थत रहने और पत्रांक 3348/प्रशासन/ 2018-19 कदनांक
03.01.2019 के द्वारा कदनांक 19.12.2018 से कदनांक
24.12.2018 तक अकजात अवकाश पर होने परन्तु
27.12.2018 तक शाखा पर उपकस्थत न होने के सम्बन्ध में एवं
ककसी प्रकार की सूचना शाखा पर न देने कवषर्क स्पिीकरण आपसे
मााँगा गर्ा और बैंक मुख्र्ालर् द्वारा कबना सूचना के अनुपकस्थत
मानते हुए उक्त कतकथर्ों के वेतन रकहत का भी नोकटस आपको कदर्ा
गर्ा। इसी क्रम में प्रधान कार्ाालर् पत्रांक 2387/प्रशासन/201920
कदनांक:
15.01.2020
द्वारा
आपसे
कदनांक
08.01.2020 को शाखा पर कबना ककसी सूचना के अनुपकस्थत
रहने
कवषर्क
स्पिीकरण
मााँगा
गर्ा।
पत्रांक
1023/प्रशासन/20210-21 कदनांक 19.08.2020 द्वारा भी
कदनांक
23.07.2020
से
27.07.2020
एवं
01.08.2020 से कनरन्तर अनुपकस्थत रहने का भी स्पिीकरण
मांगा गर्ा साथ ही इस सम्बन्ध में मुख्र्ालर् पत्रांक
740/प्रशासन/2021-22 कदनांक 09.07.2021 के द्वारा
आपको कदनांक 23.07.2020 से 27.07.2020 तक तथा
कदनांक 01.08.2020 से 27.09.2020 तक कबना ककसी
सूचना के शाखा से पलाकर्त रहने कवषर्क चेतावनी पत्र भी कनगात
ककर्ा गर्ा।

 अतः आप शाखा / मुख्र्ालर् को भ्रकमत कर कबना
सूचना के प्रार्ः पलाकर्त रहते रहे हैं, कजसके कलए आपको कबना
ककसी सूचना के शाखा से पलाकर्त रहने और बैंक कार्ों में रूकच न
लेने के आरोप से आरोकपत ककर्ा जाता है।"
9. The petitioner offered his
substantial
defence
to
these
charges
together with a record of his leave on the
dates of his absence vide his written
statement
dated
15.04.2022.
It
was
emphatically argued by the learned Counsel
for the petitioner that since disciplinary
proceedings were held, a date, time and
place of inquiry ought have been intimated
to the petitioner, and more than that, in
support of the charges, it was the duty of
the establishment to lead both documentary
and oral evidence through a presenting
officer
before
an
inquiry
formally
convened. The Inquiry Officer did not
convene any formal inquiry, nor did he
write a formal report. Indeed, a report of
the inquiry has not figured on the record; if
not placed by the petitioner, by the
respondents either. About this issue, the
question would be, if the respondents were
obliged to hold a formal inquiry. The
further issue on the facts of this case that
would arise would be if they were obliged
to hold an inquiry, where evidence, both
documentary and oral, ought have been led,
are they so obliged now that they have
imposed the punishment of withholding
two increments with cumulative effect?

10. We think that going by the
settled law that lays down salutary
principles
governing
the
holding
of
disciplinary proceedings, where a major
penalty may be imposed, the respondents to
begin with, when they held the inquiry,
were obliged to formally convene an
inquiry before their Inquiry Officer, where
they ought have led both documentary and
oral evidence. In fact, once they issued a
charge-sheet and appointed an Inquiry
Officer, it is evident that they had one of
the three major penalties envisaged under
Regulation 84 (i) (e), (f) and (g) of the
Regulations of 1975 in mind. They ought,
6 All. Ranjeet Kumar Vs. The Registrar Corporative Societies & Ors.
143
therefore,
have
proceeded
with
the
disciplinary
proceedings,
adhering
to
salutary principles, where, apart from
fixing a date, time and place for holding the
inquiry, they should have convened the
inquiry formally with the Inquiry Officer,
requiring the establishment to produce
evidence, both documentary and oral, in
support of the charges. This was apparently
not done. This breach would have vitiated
the proceedings from the stage of the
charge-sheet, meriting an inquiry de novo
from that stage, but on facts, the event in
the disciplinary proceedings would make
the last mentioned principle inapplicable
here. The reason is that the penalty that was
imposed is one of withholding two
increments with cumulative effect and not
one of the three penalties under Regulation
84, for which recourse to disciplinary
proceedings is mandatory.

11. Generally, under the law and
most service rules, the imposition of the
penalty of withholding increments - one or
more - with cumulative effect is regarded a
major penalty. Here, Regulation 84 dictates
differently.
Regulation
84
of
the
Regulations of 1975 provides:

 "84.
Penalties.-
(i)
Without
prejudice to the provisions contained in any
other
regulation,
an
employee
who
commits a breach of duty enjoined upon
him or has been convicted for criminal
offence or an offence under section 103 of
the Act or does anything prohibited by
these regulations shall be liable to be
punished by any one of the following
penalties : -

 (a) censure,

 (b) withholding of increment,

 (c) fine on an employee of
Category IV (peon, chaukidar, etc.).

 (d) recovery from pay or security
deposit to compensate in whole or in part
for any pecuniary loss caused to the cooperative
society
by
the
employee's
conduct,

 (e) reduction in rank or grades
held substantively by the employee,

 (f) removal from service, or

 (g) dismissal from service.

 (ii)
Copy
of
order
of
the
punishment shall invariably be given to the
employee concerned and entry to this effect
shall be made in the service record of the
employee.

 (iii) No penalty except censure
shall be imposed unless a show cause
notice has been given to the employee and
he has either failed to reply within the
specified time or his reply has been found
to be unsatisfactory by the punishing
authority.

 (iv)
(a)
The
charge-sheeted
employee shall be awarded punishment by
the appropriate authority according to the
seriousness of the offence:

 Provided that no penalty under
sub-clause (e), (f) or (g) of clause (i) shall
be imposed without recourse to disciplinary
proceedings.

 (b)
No
employee
shall
be
removed or dismissed by an authority other
than by which he was appointed unless the
appointing
authority
has
made
prior
144 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
delegation of such authority to such other
person or authority in writing.

 (v) The appointing authority or
person authorised by him while passing
orders for stoppage of increments shall
state the period for which it is stopped and
whether it shall have effect of postponing
future increments or promotion."

12. One might think that the
penalty of withholding increments with
cumulative effect, that would have the
effect of postponing future increments,
would be certainly a major penalty by all
established norms, and Regulation 84, to
this extent seems to arbitrarily classify
penalties. But, that question cannot be gone
into in the absence of a challenge laid by
the petitioner to the vires of the said
Regulation. The rare course of judging the
vires of Regulation 84 would arise if,
during hearing, this Court had been
confronted with the issue and a rule issued
to the respondents on the question of vires
of the said Regulation. This was never a
point that was raised during hearing as
well, let alone a formal challenge being
raised. The consequence would be that the
procedure applicable to the disciplinary
proceedings here, would be one strictly
governed by Regulation 84 and its own
classification of punishments, vis-a-vis the
procedure to be followed in order to validly
inflict them. In this connection, reference
may be made to the guidance of the
Supreme Court in Special Leave Petition
(C) No.18983 of 2023, Bihar Rajya
Dafadar Chaukidar Panchayat (Magadh
Division) v. State of Bihar and others,
decided on 02.04.2025.

13. A perusal of Regulation 84(i) and
the proviso to Regulation 84(iii)(a) would
show that except for the penalty envisaged
under sub-Clauses (e), (f) and (g) of Clause
(i) of Regulation 84, it is not necessary to
take recourse to disciplinary proceedings.
Regulation 84(iii) also shows that all other
penalties envisaged under sub-Clauses (a) to
(d), except censure, can be imposed by the
issue of a show cause notice and giving
opportunity to the employee to reply. Here,
though the proceedings were set on course for
the award of a penalty envisaged under subClauses (e), (f) and (g) of Clause (i) of
Regulation 84, but what was awarded at the
end of all proceeding was a penalty covered
by sub-Clause (b) of Clause (i) of Regulation
84. This penalty under Regulation 84 could
be awarded by giving a show cause notice. A
perusal of the proceedings taken against the
petitioner
shows
that
he
was
given
opportunity and show cause notices at
various stages of the proceeding by the
Disciplinary Authority, and, in addition,
additional opportunity before the Inquiry
Officer under the more elaborate procedure
was also followed. The effect would be that
going by the class of penalty awarded to the
petitioner, there is no breach of procedure
envisaged.

14. A perusal of the impugned
order also shows that the petitioner was
given adequate opportunity to show cause
before the Disciplinary Authority. The
conclusion would, therefore, be that though
the disciplinary proceedings, that were
taken, were not held according to the
procedure envisaged for one of the
penalties the respondents possibly had in
mind, that is to say, the penalties governed
by sub-Clauses (e), (f) and (g) of Clause (i)
of Regulation 84, but for the penalty
actually awarded, that is to say, the
withholding of increments with cumulative
effect governed by sub-Clause (b) of
Clause (i) of Regulation 84, there was
indeed no breach of procedure.
6 All. Ranjeet Kumar Vs. The Registrar Corporative Societies & Ors.
145
15. The other point that was argued
is that the impugned order is vitiated
because it is non-speaking and does not
carry reasons, which too derogates from the
fairness of procedure and even the rules of
natural justice. Reference in this connection
may be made to Basudev Dutta v. State of
W.B. and others, 2024 SCC OnLine SC
3616, where the Supreme Court enunciated
the principle governing the point, involved
here, thus:

 "12.2. It is settled law that every
administrative or quasi-judicial order must
contain the reasons. Such reasons go a long
way in not only ensuring that the authority
has applied his mind to the facts and the
law, but also provide the grounds for the
aggrieved party to assail the order in the
manner known to law. In the absence of
any reasons, it also possesses a difficulty
for the judicial authorities to test the
correctness of the order or in other words,
exercise its power of judicial review. In this
context, it will be useful to refer to the
judgment of this Court in Kranti Associates
(P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan,(2010) 9
SCC 496: (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 852, wherein
after a detailed analysis of various
judgments, it was held as follows:

 "27. In Rama Varma Bharathan
Thampuram v. State of Kerala [(1979) 4
SCC 782 : AIR 1979 SC 1918] V.R.
Krishna Iyer, J. speaking for a three-Judge
Bench held that the functioning of the
Board was quasi-judicial in character. One
of
the
attributes
of
quasi-judicial
functioning is the recording of reasons in
support of decisions taken and the other
requirement is following the principles of
natural justice. The learned Judge held that
natural justice requires reasons to be
written for the conclusions made (see SCC
p. 788, para 14 : AIR p. 1922, para 14).
 28. In Gurdial Singh Fijji v. State
of Punjab [(1979) 2 SCC 368 : 1979 SCC
(L&S) 197] this Court, dealing with a
service matter, relying on the ratio in
Capoor [(1973) 2 SCC 836 : 1974 SCC
(L&S) 5 : AIR 1974 SC 87], held that
"rubber-stamp reason" is not enough and
virtually quoted the observation in Capoor
(supra), SCC p. 854, para 28, to the extent
that:

 "28. ... Reasons are the links
between the materials on which certain
conclusions are based and the actual
conclusions." (See AIR p. 377, para 18.)

 29. In a Constitution Bench
decision of this Court in H.H. Shri Swamiji
of Shri Amar Mutt v. Commr., Hindu
Religious and Charitable Endowments
Deptt. [(1979) 4 SCC 642 : 1980 SCC
(Tax) 16 : AIR 1980 SC 1] while giving the
majority judgment Y.V. Chandrachud, C.J.
referred to (SCC p. 658, para 29) Broom's
Legal Maxims (1939 Edn., p. 97) where the
principle in Latin runs as follows:

 "Cessante ratione legis cessat
ipsa lex."

 30. The English version of the
said principle given by the Chief Justice is
that: (H.H. Shri Swamiji case [(1979) 4
SCC 642 : 1980 SCC (Tax) 16 : AIR 1980
SC 1], SCC p. 658, para 29)

 "29. ... 'reason is the soul of the
law, and when the reason of any particular
law ceases, so does the law itself'." (See
AIR p. 11, para 29.)

 .........

 33. In Star Enterprises v. City
and Industrial Development Corpn. of
146 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Maharashtra Ltd. [(1990) 3 SCC 280] a
three-Judge Bench of this Court held that in
the present day set-up judicial review of
administrative action has become expansive
and is becoming wider day by day and the
State has to justify its action in various fields
of public law. All these necessitate recording
of reason for executive actions including the
rejection of the highest offer. This Court held
that disclosure of reasons in matters of such
rejection provides an opportunity for an
objective
review
both
by
superior
administrative heads and for judicial process
and opined that such reasons should be
communicated unless there are specific
justifications for not doing so (see SCC pp.
284-85, para 10).

 ...........

 46. The position in the United
States has been indicated by this Court in
S.N. Mukherjee [(1990) 4 SCC 594 : 1990
SCC (Cri) 669 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 242 :
(1991) 16 ATC 445 : AIR 1990 SC 1984] in
SCC p. 602, para 11 : AIR para 11 at p. 1988
of the judgment. This Court held that in the
United States the courts have always insisted
on the recording of reasons by administrative
authorities in exercise of their powers. It was
further held that such recording of reasons is
required as "the courts cannot exercise their
duty of review unless they are advised of the
considerations underlying the action under
review". In S.N. Mukherjee [(1990) 4 SCC
594 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 669 : 1991 SCC (L&S)
242 : (1991) 16 ATC 445 : AIR 1990 SC
1984] this Court relied on the decisions of the
US Court in Securities and Exchange
Commission v. Chenery Corpn. [87 L.Ed.
626 : 318 US 80 (1943)] and Dunlop v.
Bachowski [44 L.Ed.2d 377 : 421 US 560
(1975)] in support of its opinion discussed
above.

 47.
Summarising
the
above
discussion, this Court holds:

 (a) In India the judicial trend has
always been to record reasons, even in
administrative decisions, if such decisions
affect anyone prejudicially.

 (b) A quasi-judicial authority
must record reasons in support of its
conclusions.

 (c) Insistence on recording of
reasons is meant to serve the wider
principle of justice that justice must not
only be done it must also appear to be done
as well.

 (d) Recording of reasons also
operates as a valid restraint on any
possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and
quasi-judicial
or
even
administrative
power.

 (e)
Reasons
reassure
that
discretion has been exercised by the
decision-maker on relevant grounds and by
disregarding extraneous considerations

 (f) Reasons have virtually become
as indispensable a component of a
decision-making process as observing
principles of natural justice by judicial,
quasi-judicial and even by administrative
bodies.

 (g) Reasons facilitate the process
of judicial review by superior courts.

 (h) The ongoing judicial trend in
all countries committed to rule of law and
constitutional governance is in favour of
reasoned decisions based on relevant facts.
This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial
6 All. Ranjeet Kumar Vs. The Registrar Corporative Societies & Ors.
147
decision-making justifying the principle
that reason is the soul of justice.

 (i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial
opinions these days can be as different as
the judges and authorities who deliver
them. All these decisions serve one common
purpose which is to demonstrate by reason
that the relevant factors have been
objectively considered. This is important
for sustaining the litigants' faith in the
justice delivery system.

 (j) Insistence on reason is a
requirement
for
both
judicial
accountability and transparency.

 (k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial
authority is not candid enough about
his/her decision-making process then it is
impossible to know whether the person
deciding is faithful to the doctrine of
precedent
or
to
principles
of
incrementalism.

 (l)
Reasons
in
support
of
decisions must be cogent, clear and
succinct. A pretence of reasons or "rubberstamp reasons" is not to be equated with a
valid decision-making process.

 (m) It cannot be doubted that
transparency is the sine qua non of
restraint on abuse of judicial powers.
Transparency in decision-making not only
makes the judges and decision-makers less
prone to errors but also makes them subject
to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in
Defence of Judicial Candor [(1987) 100
Harvard Law Review 731-37]).

 (n) Since the requirement to
record reasons emanates from the broad
doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the
said requirement is now virtually a
component of human rights and was
considered
part
of
Strasbourg
Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija v. Spain
[(1994) 19 EHRR 553] EHRR, at 562 para
29 and Anya v. University of Oxford [2001
EWCA Civ 405 (CA)], wherein the Court
referred to Article 6 of the European
Convention
of
Human
Rights
which
requires, "adequate and intelligent reasons
must be given for judicial decisions".

 (o)
In
all
common
law
jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in
setting up precedents for the future.
Therefore,
for
development
of
law,
requirement of giving reasons for the
decision is of the essence and is virtually a
part of "due process"."

16. A perusal of the impugned
order in this case shows that though the
order does speak a lot of the various steps
of procedure about how and at what point
of time which notice was given to the
petitioner and by what authority, there is no
mention by as much as a whisper of how
the Secretary/ Chief Executive Officer of
the Bank, or for that matter, the real
decision
maker,
the
Committee
of
Management of the Bank, considered the
charges, the petitioner's defence against
these and by what reasoning did they
conclude all the charges proved against the
petitioner. In the absence of a discussion on
the particulars of the three charges, the
petitioner's defence and reasons to conclude
why the charges were held proved, the
underlying decision of the Committee of
Management, as expressed in the impugned
order passed by the Secretary/ Chief
Executive Officer of the Bank, is certainly
violative of natural justice. The order,
despite being verbose on other details,
maintains critical silence on what went on
in the mind of the decision makers to
148 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
conclude that the charges against the
petitioner are proved by the requisite
standard of preponderant probability.

17. It is on this short ground alone
that we think that the impugned order ought
be quashed and the matter sent back to the
respondents to pass a fresh order after
considering the petitioner's reply, of course,
granting him further opportunity to file a
supplementary reply with such papers as he
desires and hearing him personally afresh,
as done earlier. We think that personal
hearing is necessary before the Disciplinary
Authority because the earlier decision was
taken after hearing the petitioner, and the
incumbents in office might have changed
or else their memories faded with the lapse
of time.

18. No other point was raised.

19. In the result, this writ petition
succeeds and is allowed. The impugned
order dated 28.02.2023 passed by the
Secretary/ Chief Executive Officer of the
Bank is hereby quashed. It will be open to
the respondents to pass an order afresh after
affording necessary opportunity of hearing
to
the
petitioner,
but
deciding
the
disciplinary matter now by a reasoned and
speaking order on the merits of the charges,
bearing in mind the guidance in this
judgment. It is further ordered that in
passing the order afresh, should the
Disciplinary Authority reach conclusions
against the petitioner, a punishment higher
than that awarded by the impugned order
shall not be imposed.

20. There shall be no order as to
costs

21. Let a copy of this judgment be
communicated
to
the
Registrar,
Cooperative Societies, U.P., Lucknow, the
Chairman, Committee of Management,
District
Cooperative
Bank
Limited,
Bareilly and the Secretary/ Chief Executive
Officer, District Cooperative Bank Limited,
Bareilly by the Registrar (Compliance).
----------
(2025) 6 ILRA 148
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 13.06.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.

Writ - A No. 19578 of 2024

Rakesh Kumar ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Archana Singh, Shreeprakash Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.,Ravindra Singh

A. Civil Law - Constitution of India, 1950 -
Article
226-Uttar
Pradesh
Cane
Cooperative
Service
Regulations,1975Regulations 68 and 69-The petitioner
challenged
disciplinary
order
dated
11.03.2022
passed
by
the
cane
commissioner, U.P. imposing the penalties
of
withholding
two
increments
with
cumulative effect, proportionate recovery
of loss and censure and appellate order
dated
24.09.2024
affirming
the
disciplinary action-The charges against
the petitioner, a Cashier at a Cane
Cooperative Society related to alleged
negligence leading to a financial loss of
Rs. 75 lakhs-A department inquiry was
conducted, wherein the Inquiry Officer
found the petitioner guilty -The court
found that the inquiry violated mandatory
procedural safeguards under Regulations
68 and 69 of the Regulations 1975-No
witnesses were examined, and no oral or