# Ranveer Singh v. Union of India & Ors

- **Citation:** (2021) 6 ILRA 556
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2021-05-24
- **Case number:** Writ -A No. 5985 of 2015
- **Bench:** J.J. Munir
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ranveer-singh-v-union-of-india-ors-47130
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

A. Service Law - Dismissal - Disciplinary
Inquiry - Procedural flaw in Departmental
Inquiry
-
In
a
departmental
proceedings/domestic inquiry involving a
major penalty, mere documents produced
before
the
Inquiry
Officer
by
the
6 All. Ranveer Singh Vs. Union of India & Ors.
557
Presenting Officer for the establishment,
without being proved by parole evidence
of
relevant
witnesses,
are
not
documentary evidence that can be read
against the charged employee. They are
just
idle
papers,
from
which
no
conclusion could be drawn. They are no
evidence at all. The employee has a right to
cross-examine such establishment witnesses
when they do appear. (Para 19, 23)

B. Principles of Natural Justice - The
departmental
proceedings
are
quasi
judicial proceedings. The Inquiry Officer
functions as quasi judicial officer. He is
not merely a representative of the
department.
He
has
to
act
as
an
independent and impartial officer to find out
the truth. (Para 24)

C. Even if an employee prefers not to
participate in enquiry the department
has to establish the charge against the
employee by adducing oral as well as
documentary evidence. (Para 24)

In the present case, a perusal of the inquiry
report does suggest that dates were fixed by
the Inquiry Officer, where proceedings were
held, but in those proceedings, no witness
appeared
on
behalf
of
the
employer
/establishment to prove whatever documents
were presented by the Presenting Officer. The
Presenting Officer was certainly not a witness.
He could not prove those papers and turn
them into documents. The Inquiry Officer also
could not draw conclusions from idle papers,
which, apparently, he did, acting more like an
officer of the Employer-Bank, rather than
discharging the role of an impartial arbiter
between the employer and the employee
inquiring into the charges. (Para 20)

Writ petition allowed with costs. (E-3)

Precedent followed:

## Text

556 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

19. Regulation 103 of the Regulations
as it stands, ''married daughter' is not entitled
for appointment on compassionate ground.

20. Learned counsel for the petitioner
submits that the "member of family" in
Regulation
103,
includes
"unmarried
daughter and widowed daughter", but it does
not include "married daughter" in the like
manner as the expression ''family' was
defined under Rule 2 (c) (iii) of the Rules,
1974, and consequently, the benefit of the
judgment of this Court in the cases of Smt.
Vimla
Srivastava
(supra)
and
Manjul
Srivastava (supra) deserves to be extended to
the petitioner on the same reasoning and the
ratio as laid down in those judgments by
holding that the "married daughter" is also
included
in
Regulation
103
of
the
Regulations in the definition of "member of
family".

21. The submission of Shri Arun Kumar
Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner that
applying the ratio of the Division Bench
judgment in Smt. Vimla Srivastava (supra),
''married daughter' may also be considered to
be included in ''member of family' in
Regulation 103 deserves no consideration in
this writ petition, for the reason, that in Smt.
Vimla
Srivastava
(supra)
there
was
challenge to the vires of Rule 2(c) of the
Rules, 1974. In the present case there is no
challenge to the vires of Regulation 103 of
the Regulations as regards definition of
''member of family'.

22. Further, this court finds that in
Sunita Bhadauriya Vs. State of U.P. &
others, (2006) 1 UPLBEC 754 (DB) Rule2(c) of the Rules, 1974, was challenged on
the ground of being ultra vires Articles 14
and 39(a) of the Constitution of India, as the
definition of ''family' did not include ''married
daughter'. Such challenge was negatived by
the Division Bench of this Court. The
judgment in Sunita Bhadauriya (supra) was
not noticed by the coordinate Bench in Smt.
Vimla Srivastava(supra), which took a
contrary view.

23. Learned counsel for the petitioner
prays that the petitioner may be granted
liberty to file fresh writ petition with better
particulars
making
appropriate
prayers
including the prayer to challenge the vires of
Regulation 103 of the Regulations.

24. Liberty as prayed is granted, if so
advised.

25. With the aforesaid, but in view of
the liberty granted, this writ petition is
disposed of finally.
----------
(2021)06ILR A556
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 24.05.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.

Writ -A No. 5985 of 2015

Ranveer Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
Union of India & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Prahlad Kumar Khare, Sri P. Khare, Sri Ram
Kirit Singh, Sri Ram Kirit Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
A.S.G.I., Sri Bhanu Pratap Singh, Sri D. Vaish,
S.C.

A. Service Law - Dismissal - Disciplinary
Inquiry - Procedural flaw in Departmental
Inquiry
-
In
a
departmental
proceedings/domestic inquiry involving a
major penalty, mere documents produced
before
the
Inquiry
Officer
by
the
6 All. Ranveer Singh Vs. Union of India & Ors.
557
Presenting Officer for the establishment,
without being proved by parole evidence
of
relevant
witnesses,
are
not
documentary evidence that can be read
against the charged employee. They are
just
idle
papers,
from
which
no
conclusion could be drawn. They are no
evidence at all. The employee has a right to
cross-examine such establishment witnesses
when they do appear. (Para 19, 23)

B. Principles of Natural Justice - The
departmental
proceedings
are
quasi
judicial proceedings. The Inquiry Officer
functions as quasi judicial officer. He is
not merely a representative of the
department.
He
has
to
act
as
an
independent and impartial officer to find out
the truth. (Para 24)

C. Even if an employee prefers not to
participate in enquiry the department
has to establish the charge against the
employee by adducing oral as well as
documentary evidence. (Para 24)

In the present case, a perusal of the inquiry
report does suggest that dates were fixed by
the Inquiry Officer, where proceedings were
held, but in those proceedings, no witness
appeared
on
behalf
of
the
employer
/establishment to prove whatever documents
were presented by the Presenting Officer. The
Presenting Officer was certainly not a witness.
He could not prove those papers and turn
them into documents. The Inquiry Officer also
could not draw conclusions from idle papers,
which, apparently, he did, acting more like an
officer of the Employer-Bank, rather than
discharging the role of an impartial arbiter
between the employer and the employee
inquiring into the charges. (Para 20)

Writ petition allowed with costs. (E-3)

Precedent followed:

1. Roop Singh Negi Vs P.N.B. & ors., (2009) 2
SCC 570 (Para 23)

2. St. of U.P. Vs Aditya Prasad Srivastava & anr.,
2017 (2) ADJ 554 (DB) (LB) (Para 24)

Present writ petition assails orders dated
16.07.2014 and 29.12.2014, passed by
Chief Manager, Punjab National Bank and
Circle Head/Appellate Authority, Punjab
National
Bank,
Circle
Office,
Pilibhit
Bypass, Bareilly respectively.

(Delivered by Hon'ble J.J. Munir, J.)

1. Heard Mr. Ram Kirti Singh,
learned Counsel for the petitioner. No one
appears on behalf of respondent nos. 2 and
3.

2. The petitioner is an employee of
the Punjab National Bank. He is a
promotee to the Clerical cadre from the
Class-IV cadre. He was served with two
charge-sheets, separated approximately by
a year in point of time, to wit, one dated
25.03.2004 and the other dated 08.04.2005.
The charge-sheet dated 25.03.2004 shall
hereinafter be called as the 'first chargesheet'. The first charge-sheet, in substance,
carries a charge to the effect that the
petitioner,
by
his
application
dated
07.08.1987
addressed
to
the
Bank
Manager,
Branch
Shekhupur,
District
Badaun,
claimed
himself
to
be
a
matriculate and on that basis, claimed
officiating appointment to a post in ClassIII and other benefits, attached to a post in
that cadre. Subsequently, the petitioner
participated in the departmental promotion
examination held by the Bank for the
purpose of promoting eligible Class-IV
employees
to
the
Class-III
cadre,
representing himself to be a matriculate. It
is said in the charge sheet that it has been
found by the Bank that the High School
mark-sheet relied upon by the petitioner is
forged, and that he secured promotion to a
Class-III post by playing fraud on the
Bank. The charge-sheet under reference
indicates this act to fall within the
definition
of
''gross
misconduct'
in
558 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
accordance with paragraph (m) of the
bipartite settlement dated 10.04.2002.

3. The petitioner was asked to put in
his reply within ten days. The petitioner
filed a reply/written statement dated
10.05.2004,
addressed
to
the
Senior
Regional Manager, Punjab National Bank,
through proper channel. It appears that not
much was done on the first charge-sheet by
the Bank after the petitioner had put in his
reply/written statement, last mentioned.
The record shows that this charge-sheet
was based on a complaint made by one
Smt. Premwati,
claiming
to be
the
petitioner's wife, who had complained
against him to the Bank vide complaint
dated 19.01.2004, inter alia carrying
allegations of the petitioner marrying three
other women after her, besides reporting
the fact that the petitioner had secured
promotion to the Class-III cadre, relying on
a forged High School mark-sheet. Smt.
Premwati, last mentioned, did not rest
content with reporting the matter to the
respondent-Bank. Complaining of inaction
on the Bank's part, she instituted a writ
petition before this Court, being Civil Misc.
Writ Petition no. 40337 of 2004, seeking a
direction to the Bank to conclude the
inquiry and terminate services of the
petitioner on the basis of her complaint
dated 19.01.2004, after due inquiry.

4. This Court vide judgment and order
dated 27.10.2005, disposed of the writ
petition with a direction to the Bank to
conduct an inquiry into the complaint laid
by the petitioner's wife, that is to say, Smt.
Premwati, "dated 24.07.1978 (sic)" within
four months from the date of the said
judgment. It was also ordered that the
competent authority will also get a copy of
the Mark Sheet produced by the petitioner
verified from the Uttar Pradesh Board of
High School and Intermediate Education,
Allahabad
before
arriving
at
any
conclusion.

5. It is averred by the petitioner in
paragraph nos. 13 and 15 of the writ
petition that during this period of time,
there was some difference, personal in
nature, between the petitioner and the
Branch Manager, that led to the issue of
another
charge-sheet
to
him,
dated
08.04.2005. Here, the petitioner was
charged
with
embezzlement
/misappropriation of a sum of Rs. 83,940/-,
that was deposited by one Pawan Mishra
and another Meera Jaiswal, but not credited
to their account. It was said that a cash
deposit slip was issued by the petitioner to
the account holder, but no entry was made
thereof in the cash book or credited to the
customer's account. This charge-sheet dated
08.04.2005 shall hereinafter be referred to
as the 'second-charge sheet'.

6. There is little quarrel about the
course of proceedings emanating from the
second charge-sheet. The petitioner denied
the charges and a departmental inquiry
followed. The petitioner was held guilty by
the Inquiry Officer and a show-cause notice
was issued to the petitioner on 03.04.2006
by
the
Disciplinary
Authority.
The
petitioner answered the show-cause notice.
The Disciplinary Authority did not find the
petitioner's reply to the show cause
satisfactory, and passed an order dated
24.04.2006, dismissing the petitioner from
service. This order was affirmed by the
Appellate Authority on a department appeal
carried by the petitioner vide order dated
13.09.2006.

7. The petitioner challenged this
dismissal from service and its affirmation
in appeal by the respondents founded on
6 All. Ranveer Singh Vs. Union of India & Ors.
559
the second charge sheet through Writ - A
no.63874 of 2006, that was instituted
before this Court. The writ petition was
heard and allowed by this Court vide
judgment and order dated 06.01.2012,
holding proceedings to be procedurally
flawed. This Court quashed the show-cause
notice dated 03.04.2006, the order of
dismissal from service dated 24.04.2006
and the appellate order dated 13.09.2006.
Further, a mandamus was issued, directing
the respondents to reinstate the petitioner in
service. However, liberty was given to the
respondents, if they intended to do so, to
hold a fresh inquiry, attended with a remark
that anything said in the judgment shall not
affect the outcome of the fresh inquiry.

8. The respondents, as it appears from
the averments carried in the writ petition
and the affidavits exchanged here, did not
initially comply with the orders of the
learned Single Judge, who allowed Writ -
A No. 63874 of 2006, ordering the
petitioner's
reinstatement
in
the
proceedings arising from the second-charge
sheet. Rather, they carried a Special Appeal
to the Division Bench of this Court, about
which there is not much detail available on
record. However, learned Counsel for the
petitioner points out that it was decided in
the year 2018 and rejected. In any case, to
the issue involved here, that is not of much
consequence. It, however, needs to be
noticed that the respondents did not readily
comply with the judgment and order of the
learned Single Judge in Writ - A no. 63874
of 2006, dated 06.01.2012, compelling the
petitioner to prefer Contempt Application
(Civil) no. 1708 of 2012. This was disposed
of in terms of an order dated 16.04.2012.
Now, after the contempt proceedings, the
respondents reinstated the petitioner in
service on a temporary basis vide order
dated 13.05.2012.

9. What is somewhat intriguing is the
fact that the respondents did not take
advantage of the liberty given by this
Court, to take proceedings afresh against
the petitioner, founded on the second
charge-sheet,
that
carried
a
charge
regarding embezzlement. This Court must
remark that it is always open to an
employer to take proceedings afresh, where
earlier proceedings and the resultant order
have
been
quashed
on
grounds
of
procedural irregularity, or not to do so. But
here,
the
respondents
chose
to
put
proceedings, or so as to speak, proceedings
afresh on the basis of the second chargesheet in limbo, and instead, opted to
proceed with the first charge sheet vide
order dated 06.07.2012. Again, there is no
inherent illegality about this course of
action adopted by the respondents. But, it
does lead one to wonder if the decision to
elect pursuing the first-charge sheet came
about, because the respondents thought that
they had better evidence forthcoming to
support the charge there than that available
to establish the charges carried in the
second-charge sheet.

10. Be that as it may, the petitioner
says that it shows bias and premeditation
against him, where the respondents wish to
get rid of the petitioner at any cost. This
Court is not minded to go into that issue.
The order dated 06.07.2012 does show that
after the petitioner had submitted his
reply/written statement to the first chargesheet, departmental inquiry was initiated
thereon with all seriousness after some six
years, because proceedings on the said
charge sheet had not gone beyond the
appointment of an Inquiry Officer on
16.01.2006 despite orders of this Court
dated 27.10.2005 passed in Writ Petition
no. 40337 of 2004, ordering the inquiry on
the first charge-sheet to be concluded
560 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
within a period of four months. Again, as
said earlier, it is no less intriguing that after
a long period of torpidity, the first chargesheet was brought into action by the
respondents, so much so, that the order
dated 06.07.2012 directs the Inquiry
Officer
appointed
in
the
matter
to
commence the inquiry immediately and
after fixing the matter for a preliminary
hearing, regular proceedings be undertaken
on a day-to-day basis. The Disciplinary
Authority further directed the Inquiry
Officer to conclude the inquiry within a
period of three months and to submit his
report in quadruplicate.

11.

It
is
true
that
however
inexplicable the course or the wisdom of
proceedings might be, no inference of bias
can
per
se
be
drawn
from
these
circumstances or the circumstances taken in
their entirety. It was the petitioner's defence
before the Inquiry Officer that he never
applied as a matriculate candidate, seeking
promotion from the Class-IV cadre to the
Clerical cadre. Learned Counsel for the
petitioner has drawn this Court's attention
towards the HRD Division Circular no. 341
dated 06.09.2006 issued by the Punjab
National Bank, Head Office, New Delhi,
annexed as Annexure no.1 to the writ
petition,
that
clearly
postulates
six
categories of eligible persons, who could sit
the departmental promotion examination.
Attention of the Court is drawn towards the
sixth category of Class-IV employees, who
are Peons, Cash Peons, Bill Collectors,
Head Peons or those having composite
designation like Peon-cum-Daftry or Peoncum-Bill Collector, or Daftry-cum-Bill
Collectors
etc.,
where
the
minimum
eligibility is that the candidate should have
passed his 8th standard examination from a
recognized institution and put in not less
than 8 years' service on 15.10.2006. This
was the position in the earlier promotion
circulars too, including the one for the year
2001,
when
the
petitioner
sat
and
succeeded in the departmental promotion,
earning promotion on a regular basis to a
Class III post.

12. Learned Counsel for the petitioner
points out that there is no issue between
parties that the petitioner joined service of
the respondents in the Class-IV cadre as a
Peon on 01.02.1984 and was, therefore,
eligible
to
apply
for
departmental
promotion examination on the basis of his
Class VIII qualification that he held. It is
said that the petitioner never represented
that he was a matriculate. It is urged on
behalf of the petitioner that there are
multiple circumstances that would indicate
that he never made the application dated
07.08.1987, seeking promotion to the
Class-III cadre, on the basis of being a
matriculate.

13. Amongst others, attention of this
Court is drawn towards the fact that in the
event the petitioner had applied to sit the
departmental examination as a matriculate
candidate,
his
computerized
service
record/history-sheet, a copy of which is
annexed as Annexure no.12 to the writ
petition, would not show his educational
qualification
"below
matric".
This
computerized record was drawn up in the
year
2006,
whereas
the
petitioner,
according to the charge laid against him,
moved
applications
for
officiating
promotion on 13.03.1997, followed by
another on 15.12.1998, and finally on
12.10.2001, seeking to sit in the regular
promotion examination. It is urged that if in
any of those applications, the petitioner had
claimed his educational qualification to be
upgraded to that of a matriculate and
annexed his matriculation mark-sheet, his
6 All. Ranveer Singh Vs. Union of India & Ors.
561
matriculate qualification would reflect in
the computerized service record/historysheet drawn up in the year 2006.

14. It is argued by the learned
Counsel for the petitioner that these facts of
their own show that the application dated
07.08.1987 and the other applications
claiming promotion thereafter, staking
claim for regular promotion on the basis
that the petitioner was a matriculate, are
introductions to the record falsely made,
together with xerox copies of some High
School mark-sheets. It is also pointed out
that on a perusal of the application dated
07.08.1987, which is one of the star
documents relied upon by the establishment
at the inquiry, a grave suspicion arises on
account of the fact that it is scripted on a
letterhead of the employers, meant for
inter-office correspondence, which a ClassIV
employee
making
an
application
seeking promotion, is not authorized to use
nor can be expected to use for the purpose
of writing his application, seeking to apply
for promotion. To add to these vitiating
circumstances about this document is the
fact that the application or the annexed
mark-sheet were never produced in original
by the Bank. To the contrary, the
Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate
Authority have placed burden upon the
petitioner to produce the original marksheet annexed to the application, which the
petitioner says he never owned or ever
lodged the application dated 07.08.1987,
seeking officiating promotion. It has been
pointed out by the learned Counsel for the
petitioner that the respondents possibly
secured a copy of the application dated
07.08.1987, along with some bogus copies
of matriculation mark-sheets attributed to
be those annexed by the petitioner, from
the Police, in connection with an FIR
registered against the petitioner by Smt.
Premwati, who had supplied all these bogus
documents to the Investigating Agency, in
order to frame the petitioner. It is for the
said reason that the original application
dated 07.08.1987 or the other applications
made, seeking promotion, were never
produced as documents in original, but only
photostat copy thereof.

15. It is also argued by the learned
Counsel for the petitioner that at the
inquiry, no witness for the establishment
has been examined to prove the charges.
Smt. Premwati, who laid the complaint
dated 09.01.2004 against the petitioner,
giving rise to the first charge-sheet, was
never examined as witness. If for some
reason her attendance could not be secured,
it is urged that no other witness for the
establishment, who had received the
petitioner's application seeking promotion
to the Class-III cadre annexed with the
High
School
mark-sheet,
has
been
examined, in order to prove that in fact, the
petitioner presented the application dated
07.08.1987 along with the original marksheets
photostat
copies
whereof
are
enclosed. Dilating on this limb of his
submission,
learned
Counsel
for
the
petitioner says that it is imperative in a
departmental inquiry relating to a charge
involving gross misconduct, which may
lead to the imposition of a major penalty
that
witnesses
on
behalf
of
the
establishment be examined to prove the
charges; else a charge of this kind in the
absence
of
witnesses
proving
the
documents by oral evidence, cannot be
sustained by the Inquiry Officer, just going
through papers, that are not proved.

16. Since no one had appeared for the
Bank, this Court has looked into the
respondents' stand taken in the counter
affidavit carefully. It is urged there that the
562 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
applications
made
by
the
petitioner,
seeking promotion and annexed marksheets, that have been verified by the Board
of
High
School
and
Intermediate
Education, both appear to be forged
documents, which clearly establish the
charge that the petitioner had sat in the
promotion examination, misrepresenting
his status as a matriculate. It is further
urged that the original mark-sheets would
be in the petitioner's possession, inasmuch
as they were returned by the Bank after the
application was moved. The originals are
returned to the employee concerned. In this
connection,
this
Court
has
perused
paragraph no. 35 of the counter affidavit. It
is further stated in the counter affidavit that
the petitioner declared himself to be a
matriculate while applying for promotion
and
appeared
in
the
departmental
promotion
examinations
supported
by
mark-sheets in the years 1989, 1993, 1994,
1997, 1998, 2000 and 2001. It is said that
his identity card showed him to be a
matriculate as did his bio-data form filled
in his own handwriting. It is also said that
the petitioner has not disputed his signature
on the photostat copy of the application
seeking promotion, though not the contents
of the application. The stand of the
respondent Bank, therefore, is that in the
face of these documents, it was not at all
required of the Bank to examine any
witness to prove the charge. The papers
speak for themselves.

17. I have considered the case made
out by both parties and carefully perused
the record.

18. Clearly, in the opinion of this
Court, it is not a case where the petitioner
has admitted his guilt or accepted the
charge. The fact that the written statement
put in by the petitioner initially does not
make a specific traverse in the precise
terms of the charge, is something expected
of a layman, howsoever educated he might
be. The reply indicates a good enough
denial of the charge; there is no admission
of it. This Court does not wish to comment
on the veracity of the papers relied upon by
the establishment to prove the charge,
because it is not the province of this Court
to re-assess evidence as if it were a Court
of Appeal. Nevertheless, it is certainly the
jurisdiction and the duty of this Court to
ensure that the decision-making process
conforms to the essential requirement of a
fair procedure accepted by the law.

19. It is by now well nigh settled that
in a departmental proceedings/domestic
inquiry involving a major penalty, the
charge or the charges against an employee
have to be established by the employers,
not by laying papers alone before the
Inquiry
Officer,
but
also
examining
witnesses to prove those papers, that would
turn them into documentary evidence,
readable against the employee. Of course,
the employee has a right to cross-examine
such establishment witnesses when they do
appear. Mere documents produced before
the Inquiry Officer by the Presenting
Officer for the establishment, without being
proved by parole evidence of relevant
witnesses, are not documentary evidence
that can be read against the charged
employee. They are just idle papers, from
which no conclusion could be drawn. They
are no evidence at all.

20. In the present case, a perusal of
the inquiry report does suggest that dates
were fixed by the Inquiry Officer, where
proceedings were held, but in those
proceedings, no witness appeared on behalf
of the employer/establishment to prove
whatever documents were presented by the
6 All. Ranveer Singh Vs. Union of India & Ors.
563
Presenting Officer. The Presenting Officer
was certainly not a witness. He could not
prove those papers and turn them into
documents. The Inquiry Officer also could
not draw conclusions from idle papers,
which, apparently, he did, acting more like
an officer of the Employer-Bank, rather
than discharging the role of an impartial
arbiter between the employer and the
employee inquiring into the charges.
Inquiry Officers, who are invariably
officers of the establishment, like in the
present case, must remember that in their
role of an inquiry officer, they do not serve
their employers. They have to require the
Presenting Officer, who represents the
employers, to establish the charges against
the charge-sheeted employee by the civil
standard
or
by
preponderance
of
probability. In doing that, the Presenting
Officer has to lead both oral and
documentary evidence, particularly where
the charge may entail imposition of a major
penalty.

21. In the present case, no witness had
appeared for the establishment to prove as
to who received the application dated
07.08.1987 from the petitioner, seeking
officiating promotion to a Class-III post,
where he purportedly claimed to be a
matriculate. If that establishment witness
had appeared, he would most certainly have
been asked by the defence assistant or the
petitioner as to why the photostat copies of
the two mark-sheets attached did not bear
the petitioner's signature, assuming that the
originals were returned to the petitioner. It
is urged on behalf of the respondents that
there could be many other questions asked
of the establishment witnesses even by the
Inquiry Officer.

22. This Court, though by no means
intending to comment on the veracity of
mere papers that were placed before the
Inquiry Officer, is constrained to wonder
what could have led the petitioner to annex
two mark-sheets, relating to his High
School Examination from the same Board.
Assuming that both mark-sheets are forged,
one would serve the petitioner's purpose;
two mark-sheets would be suicidal. The
Inquiry Officer has not at all bestowed
consideration to this facet of the matter; nor
have the Disciplinary Authority or the
Appellate Authority. It is expected that now
they would, should they choose to proceed
afresh on the first charge-sheet.

23. Reverting to the issue about the
procedural flaw in the departmental inquiry
held, it is certainly there, in the absence of
these documents being proved by the
parole evidence of relevant witnesses. The
Inquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority
and the Appellate Authority, have all
looked into papers that do not qualify for
evidence in a departmental inquiry on a
charge
entailing
major
penalty.
The
conclusions of the Inquiry Officer, the
Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate
Authority are, therefore, all vitiated. In
support
of
the
principle
that
in
a
departmental inquiry, the establishment
must prove the charges by examining
witnesses, in whose absence mere papers
cannot be looked into by the Inquiry
Officer, there is guidance of the Supreme
Court in Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab
National Bank and others, (2009) 2 SCC
570, which read:

"14. Indisputably, a departmental
proceeding is a quasi-judicial proceeding.
The enquiry officer performs a quasijudicial function. The charges levelled
against the delinquent officer must be
found to have been proved. The enquiry
officer has a duty to arrive at a finding
564 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
upon taking into consideration the materials
brought on record by the parties. The
purported
evidence
collected
during
investigation by the investigating officer
against all the accused by itself could not
be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary
proceeding. No witness was examined to
prove
the
said
documents.
The
management witnesses merely tendered the
documents and did not prove the contents
thereof. Reliance, inter alia, was placed by
the enquiry officer on the FIR which could
not have been treated as evidence."

24. To the same end, there is an
eloquent statement of the law to be found
in a Division Bench decision of this Court
in State of U.P. v. Aditya Prasad
Srivastava and another, 2017 (2) ADJ
554 (DB) (LB). In State of U.P. vs.
Aditya Prasad Srivastava, where it has
been held:

"17.
It
is
trite
law
that
the
departmental proceedings are quasi judicial
proceedings. The Inquiry Officer functions
as quasi judicial officer. He is not merely a
representative of the department. He has to
act as an independent and impartial officer
to find out the truth. The major punishment
awarded to an employee visit serious civil
consequences and as such the departmental
proceedings ought to be in conformity with
the principles of natural justice. Even if, an
employee prefers not to participate in
enquiry the department has to establish the
charge against the employee by adducing
oral as well as documentary evidence. In
case charges warrant major punishment
then the oral evidence by producing the
witnesses is necessary."

 (Emphasis by Court)

25. In view of the fact that this Court
has found the Inquiry Officer to have held
the petitioner guilty, merely on the basis of
papers laid before him by the Presenting
Officer,
without
any
witness
being
examined on behalf of the establishment to
prove those papers turning them into
documentary evidence, the findings of the
Inquiry Officer cannot be sustained. For the
same reason, the impugned order passed by
the
Disciplinary
Authority
and
its
affirmation in Appeal must fall. This Court
must add that there are some extreme
oddities
in
evidence,
to
which
the
Disciplinary Authority and the Inquiry
Officer must bestow due consideration.
These have been pointed out during the
course of this judgment. This course has
been adopted by this Court not in any
manner to fetter an independent evaluation
of evidence by the Inquiry Officer and by
the Disciplinary Authority, but to serve as
some guidance, so that no perversity may
creep in, into the conclusions of the Inquiry
Officer or the Disciplinary Authority,
should
the
respondents
choose
take
proceedings afresh. It would be open to the
respondents to hold proceedings afresh
from the stage where the first charge sheet
was served and its reply/written statement
was put in by the petitioner. The entire
inquiry would have to be undertaken
afresh, in case the respondents elect to
pursue that course of action. In doing that,
the respondents shall bear in mind the
guidance in this judgment.

26. It is clarified that this Court by
these concluding remarks should not be
understood to mean that the respondents
are under a mandate to take fresh
proceedings against the petitioner. Rather,
the respondents should bear in mind that
the petitioner has now a short time to
superannuate, which may be one of the
considerations
to
weigh
with
the
respondents choosing to pursue fresh
6 All. State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Jai Prakash & Anr.
565
proceedings or not. Whichever way it be,
the decision to take fresh proceedings or
not to do so, would ultimately rest with the
respondents.

27. In the result, this writ petition
succeeds and is allowed with costs. The
impugned order dated 16.07.2014 passed by
the Chief Manager, Punjab National Bank,
Circle Office, Pilibhit Bypass, Bareilly and
the appellate order dated 29.12.2014 passed
by the Circle Head/Appellate Authority,
Punjab National Bank, Circle Office, Pilibhit
Bypass, Bareilly are hereby quashed. The
respondents are ordered to forthwith reinstate
the petitioner in service and pay him current
salary regularly. In case, the respondents do
not elect to initiate fresh proceedings arising
out of first charge sheet, the consequential
benefits shall also become payable. However,
in case fresh proceedings are taken, the
consequential
monetary
benefits
would
depend
upon
the
outcome
of
those
proceedings.

28. Let this order be communicated to
the Chief Manager, Punjab National Bank,
Circle Office, Pilibhit Bypass, Bareilly and
the Circle Head/ Appellate Authority, Punjab
National Bank, Circle Office, Pilibhit Bypass,
Bareilly by the Joint Registrar (Compliance).
----------
(2021)06ILR A565
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 16.06.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SANJAY YADAV, C.J.
THE HON'BLE PRAKASH PADIA, J.

Special Appeal (D) 41 of 2021

State of U.P. & Ors. ...Appellants
Versus
Jai Prakash & Anr. ...Respondents
Counsel for the Appellants:
Sri Subhash Rathi

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Siddharth Khare

A. Education/Service Law - Appointment -
U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 -
Regulation 101 - U.P. High Schools And
Intermediate Colleges (Payment Of Salaries
Of Teachers And Other Employees) Act,
1971 - A single post of Class-III employee in
the institution (Intermediate College), could
only be filled up by promotion. In view of this,
it is only the claim of promotion which has to be
considered and not the claim of direct recruitment
which has been done by the learned Single Judge
in the present case. (Para 10, 11, 12)

B. It is well-settled that the powers in
writ jurisdiction should not be exercised
to set aside one illegal order to restore
another illegal order - The Regional Level
Committee while passing the order dated
05.10.2014 has not taken into consideration
the fact that the entire selection process of
petitioner/respondent has already been set
aside by this Court and has proceeded to
examine the claim of petitioner as the
petitioner/respondent
was
appointed
after
following the procedure prescribed under the
Act & Regulations framed there under. The
reason given in the order dated 05.12.2014,
which was impugned in the writ petition,
although are not tenable in law, but since the
selection process for the post of clerk was
quashed by this Court by order dated
21.9.2010, the order impugned in the present
appeal dated 3.3.2020 is not tenable and is
hereby set aside. (Para 16, 17)

The appointment of petitioner/respondent, if
allowed, will amount allowing a person to be
appointed without following procedure of law as
the
selection
process
of
the
petitioner/
respondent has already been quashed by this
Hon'ble Court. This is not permissible in exercise
of power conferred under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. (Para 19)

Special Appeal allowed. (E-3)

Precedent followed: