# Ratan Buildtech Private Limited v. Anil Kumar

- **Citation:** (2025) 9 ILRA 1267
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-09-04
- **Case number:** RERA Appeal No. 72 of 2025
- **Bench:** Pankaj Bhatia
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ratan-buildtech-private-limited-v-anil-kumar-53872
- **Pages:** 23

## Headnote

under Section 18(1)(a) of the Real Estate
(Regulation and Development) Act, 2016,
without conducting a separate adjudicatory
inquiry, and whether such grant of interest is
automatic and mechanical upon admitted
delay in handing over possession.
(ii)
Whether
the
Appellate
Tribunal
was
empowered, under Section 44(6) read with
Section 53(1) of the RERA Act, to itself
award interest after setting aside the order of
the Adjudicating Officer.
(iii) Whether the amount deposited by the
promoter as pre-deposit under Section
43(5)
of
the
RERA
Act
could
be
appropriated towards satisfaction of the
interest awarded, or whether it was merely a
security for maintaining the appeal.
(iv) Whether an appeal under Section 58 of
the RERA Act would lie before the High Court
against an order of the Appellate Tribunal
granting
interest
under
Section
18(1),
particularly where the facts relating to delay and
possession were admitted.

Headnotes
Real Estate (Regulation and Development)
Act, 2016 - ss.18(1)(a), 43(5), 44(6), 53,
58 - Delayed possession - Interest -
Nature
of
liability
-
Statutory
consequence
-
Powers
of
Appellate
1268 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Tribunal - Pre-deposit - Adjustment -
Rule 15 U.P. RERA Rules - Drafting
mistake - Direction to Draftsman -
Appeal to High Court - Substantial
question of law - What constitutes-All
appeals dismissed.

Held:
Section 18(1)(a) of the Real Estate (Regulation
and Development) Act, 2016 creates a statutory
liability upon the promoter to pay interest for
every month of delay till handing over
possession where the allottee elects to continue
with the project. Where the date of completion
stipulated in the agreement and the actual date
of offer of possession are admitted, entitlement
to interest follows as a direct statutory
consequence, leaving no adjudicatory discretion
either with the Authority or the Tribunal. [Paras
26-30]

The Court authoritatively held that the words
"as the case may be" occurring in Section
18(1)(a) do not introduce any element of
discretion or conditionality, but merely refer to
the two contingencies contemplated by the
provision itself. The right to interest under
Section 18(1)(a) is automatic, compensatory in
nature, and distinct from compensation, which
alone requires adjudication by the Adjudicating
Officer. [Paras 27-29]
On the scope of appellate powers, it was held
that the Real Estate Appellate Tribunal, while
exercising jurisdiction under Section 44(6) read
with Section 53, is competent to pass such
orders as the authority below could have
passed. Where entitlement to interest is
determinable on admitted and undisputed facts,
the Tribunal is legally empowered to grant
interest itself instead of remanding the matter,
and such exercise does not suffer from
jurisdictional infirmity. [Paras 31-32]

With respect to Section 43(5), the Court held

## Text

_Characters 0–39,584 of 79,514. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39584 for what follows._

9 All. Ratan Buildtech Private Limited Vs. Anil Kumar
1267
revisionist did not commit any act against
the victim with the knowledge that she
belonged to Scheduled Caste. On the
contrary, the victim has admitted that she
was in a consenting relationship with the
revisionist. She has further not made
any allegation that the alleged act was
committed against her on account of her
caste. She has admitted knowing the
mobile
number
of
revisionist
and
talking to him. Since under Sections-
363 and 366 IPC, thereis no minimum
sentence provides and care comes in the
4th category of cases defined in Shilpa
Mittal (Supra). Hence, the revisionist
cannot be said to have committed any
heinous offence. At the most he
committed a serious offence as per the
dictum of Apex Court in the case of
Shilpa
Mittal
(Supra)
considered
hereinabove. Therefore, the trial of the
revisionist is required to be conducted
as per Section 14(5)(e) of the Juvenile
Justice
(Care
and
Protection
of
Children) Act, 2015.

10.The impugned orders are hereby set
aside.

11.The
criminal
revision
is
accordingly, allowed.

12. The record of this case shall be
sent to the Juvenile Justice Board, Jhansi
where the revisionist shall be tried as an
accused implicated for committing the
serious offence.

13. The office is directed to return the
lower court record to the court concerned
forthwith along with copy of this order.
----------
(2025) 9 ILRA 1267
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 04.09.2025
BEFORE

THE HON'BLE PANKAJ BHATIA, J.

RERA Appeal No. 72 of 2025
Connected With
RERA Appeal No. 18 of 2025
and other connected cases

Ratan Buildtech Private Limited
 ...Appellant
Versus
Anil Kumar ...Respondent

Counsel for the Appellant:
Prashant Kumar Singh, Sudeep Kumar

Counsel for the Respondent:

Issue for Consideration
(i) Whether the Real Estate Appellate Tribunal
was justified in granting delayed interest
under Section 18(1)(a) of the Real Estate
(Regulation and Development) Act, 2016,
without conducting a separate adjudicatory
inquiry, and whether such grant of interest is
automatic and mechanical upon admitted
delay in handing over possession.
(ii)
Whether
the
Appellate
Tribunal
was
empowered, under Section 44(6) read with
Section 53(1) of the RERA Act, to itself
award interest after setting aside the order of
the Adjudicating Officer.
(iii) Whether the amount deposited by the
promoter as pre-deposit under Section
43(5)
of
the
RERA
Act
could
be
appropriated towards satisfaction of the
interest awarded, or whether it was merely a
security for maintaining the appeal.
(iv) Whether an appeal under Section 58 of
the RERA Act would lie before the High Court
against an order of the Appellate Tribunal
granting
interest
under
Section
18(1),
particularly where the facts relating to delay and
possession were admitted.

Headnotes
Real Estate (Regulation and Development)
Act, 2016 - ss.18(1)(a), 43(5), 44(6), 53,
58 - Delayed possession - Interest -
Nature
of
liability
-
Statutory
consequence
-
Powers
of
Appellate
1268 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Tribunal - Pre-deposit - Adjustment -
Rule 15 U.P. RERA Rules - Drafting
mistake - Direction to Draftsman -
Appeal to High Court - Substantial
question of law - What constitutes-All
appeals dismissed.

Held:
Section 18(1)(a) of the Real Estate (Regulation
and Development) Act, 2016 creates a statutory
liability upon the promoter to pay interest for
every month of delay till handing over
possession where the allottee elects to continue
with the project. Where the date of completion
stipulated in the agreement and the actual date
of offer of possession are admitted, entitlement
to interest follows as a direct statutory
consequence, leaving no adjudicatory discretion
either with the Authority or the Tribunal. [Paras
26-30]

The Court authoritatively held that the words
"as the case may be" occurring in Section
18(1)(a) do not introduce any element of
discretion or conditionality, but merely refer to
the two contingencies contemplated by the
provision itself. The right to interest under
Section 18(1)(a) is automatic, compensatory in
nature, and distinct from compensation, which
alone requires adjudication by the Adjudicating
Officer. [Paras 27-29]
On the scope of appellate powers, it was held
that the Real Estate Appellate Tribunal, while
exercising jurisdiction under Section 44(6) read
with Section 53, is competent to pass such
orders as the authority below could have
passed. Where entitlement to interest is
determinable on admitted and undisputed facts,
the Tribunal is legally empowered to grant
interest itself instead of remanding the matter,
and such exercise does not suffer from
jurisdictional infirmity. [Paras 31-32]

With respect to Section 43(5), the Court held
that the pre-deposit made by the promoter
for entertainment of the appeal is not a mere
procedural
security,
but
partakes
the
character of payment towards adjudicated
liability, subject to final outcome. Such
deposit can therefore be adjusted towards
satisfaction of interest liability, and refund
arises only in the event of success or excess
deposit. [Paras 33-38]
The Court examined in detail the scope of an
appeal under Section 58 of the RERA Act,
holding that such appeal is maintainable only on
substantial questions of law, analogous to
Section 100 C.P.C. It was categorically held that:
(i) questions relating to computation of interest
on admitted delay,
(ii) exercise of statutory powers by the Tribunal
on admitted facts, and
(iii) adjustment of statutory pre-deposit,
do not constitute substantial questions of law.
Re-agitation of settled statutory consequences
under the guise of a Section 58 appeal was held
to be impermissible. [Paras 39-42]

The Court further noticed that Rule 15 of the
Uttar Pradesh Real Estate (Regulation and
Development) Rules, 2016, as presently worded,
appears to suggest mandatory adjudication by
the Adjudicating Officer even in cases of
statutory interest under Section 18. Treating this
as a drafting mistake, and clarifying that it had
no bearing on the decision of the appeals, the
Court directed that the issue be placed before
the Draftsman for rectification. [Para 35]

In absence of any substantial question of law,
all appeals filed by the promoter as well as the
allottee were dismissed. [Para 43] (E-14)

Case Law Cited
Newtech Promoters and Developers Pvt.
Ltd. v. State of U.P., (2021) 18 SCC 1 -
relied on; Commissioner of Income Tax,
Bombay v. Walchand & Co. (P) Ltd., 1967
SCC
OnLine
SC
119
-
relied
on;
Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras v. S.
Chenniappa Mudaliar, (1969) 1 SCC 591 -
relied on; Subramaniam Shanmugham v.
M.L. Rajendran, (1987) 4 SCC 215 - relied
on; Mahindra & Mahindra Financial
Services Ltd. v. State of U.P., 2019 SCC
OnLine All 5336 - referred to; Harinagar
Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (2003)
11 SCC 40 - relied on; Axis Bank v. SBS
Organics Pvt. Ltd., (2016) 12 SCC 18 -
relied on; M/s Kut Energy Pvt. Ltd. v.
Punjab National Bank, (2020) 19 SCC 533
- relied on.

List of Acts / Statutes
Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act,
2016; Uttar Pradesh Real Estate (Regulation and
9 All. Ratan Buildtech Private Limited Vs. Anil Kumar
1269
Development) Rules, 2016; Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908.

List of Keywords
RERA Act; Section 18 interest; Delay in
possession;
Statutory
liability;
Powers
of
Appellate Tribunal; Pre-deposit under Section
43(5); Adjustment of deposit; Rule 15 U.P. RERA
Rules; Drafting error; Direction to Draftsman;
Section 58 appeal.

Case Arising From
Common judgment dated 14.05.2025 passed by
the Uttar Pradesh Real Estate Appellate Tribunal
in Appeal No. 438 of 2023 and connected
appeals, arising out of orders dated 10.02.2023
passed by the Adjudicating Officer, Uttar
Pradesh Real Estate Regulatory Authority,
Gautam Budh Nagar.

Appearance for Parties
For the Appellants: Sri Prashant Kumar Singh,
Sri Sudeep Kumar, Ms. Twinkle Rajpal
For the Respondents: Sri Manish Singh, Sri
Azhar Ikram, Sri Suryansh Narula, Ms. Anupama
Bhadauria, Ms. Surabhi Rawat

(Delivered by Hon'ble Pankaj Bhatia, J.)

SUO-MOTO

1. It was pointed out by the office that
on account of the inadvertence, the date of
the judgment was wrongly transcribed as
'August 04, 2025'.

2. Noticing the said ex-facie error in
recording of the date of judgment, same is
corrected. The date of the judgment shall
be shown and read as 'September 04, 2025'
instead of 'August 04, 2025'.

September 9, 2025

1. Heard Sri Sudeep Kumar along with
Mahima Pahwa and Sri Prashant Kumar
Singh, learned Counsels appearing on
behalf of the appellants and Sri Azhar
Ikram along with Sri Manish Singh, learned
Counsels appearing on behalf of the
respondents-allottee. Sri Azhar Ikram also
appears on behalf of the appellant-allottee
in RERA Appeal No.70 of 2025.

2. The RERA Appeal Defective
No.18; RERA Appeal Defective No.19 of
2025; RERA Appeal Defective No.20 of
2025 and RERA Appeal Defective No.25
of 2025 have been filed along with an
application for condonation of delay. The
cause
shown
are
sufficient.
The
applications for condonation of delay are
allowed. The delay in filing the appeals are
condoned.

3. All the abovesaid appeals arise out
of the same judgment passed by the U.P.
Real Estate Appellate Tribunal, as such, are
being decided by means of this common
judgment.

4. For the brevity, the facts as emerge
from the RERA Appeal No.72 of 2025 are
that the respondent was allotted an
apartment by the appellant at NOIDA
under a builder buyer agreement on
22.01.2019. It is stated that on 16.09.2022,
completion certificate was issued by the
Greater Noida Industrial Development
Authority in favour of the promoter. It is
further stated that on 11.10.2022, the
respondent filed a complaint for grant of
interest and compensation under Form-N
prescribed
under
The
Real
Estate
(Regulation and Development) Act, 2016
(hereinafter referred to as the RERA Act)
before the Adjudicating Officer, Uttar
Pradesh Real Estate Regulatory Authority
at
Gautam
Budhnagar.
In
the
said
complaint, the allegations of incorrect and
false information; delay in possession and
failure to discharge duties as per the Act,
Rules and Regulations were made. In the
said complaint, it is also stated that the
1270 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
possession was not provided as per the
agreement and the allegation of mental
harassment was also made and on these
grounds,
the
respondent
sought
compensation of Rs.6,00,000/-. The said
complaint/ application was resisted by the
appellant by filing an objection and the
objections were raised with regard to the
jurisdiction to grant delay interest or
compensation, which according to the
appellant could be done only by the
Regulatory Authority. After considering the
complaint
and
objections
filed,
the
compensation
was
awarded
by
the
Adjudicating Authority vide order dated
10.02.2023.
The
said
order
of
the
Adjudicating Authority was challenged by
the appellant in Appeal No.438 of 2023
before the Real Estate Appellant Tribunal
(hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal)
seeking quashing of the judgment dated
10.02.2023 on various grounds. It is stated
that the requirement of pre-deposit under
Section 43 of the RERA Act was also
fulfilled at the time of filing of the appeal.

5. From the perusal of the appeal
memo filed before the Tribunal, a copy
whereof is on record as Annexure-5 to the
RERA Appeal No.72 of 2025, what
transpires is that while filing the appeal,
one of the main grounds taken before the
Tribunal
was
that
the
interest
and
compensation has been awarded by the
Adjudicating
Authority,
whereas,
the
power to grant compensation for delay is
vested only with the Regulatory Authority
in terms of the judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Newtech
Promoters and Developers Pvt. Ltd. vs
State of U.P. (Civil Appeal No.6745-6749
of 2021). In paragraph 3 of the appeal filed
before the Tribunal, it was stated that the
grant of compensation was not justified as
the same was without jurisdiction and was
liable to be dismissed. In paragraph 6, it
was specifically stated that the allottee had
only the remedy to claim interest till the
handing over of the compensation and no
relief with regard to the compensation
could be granted. In paragraph 8, it was
specifically stated that the only remedy
available to the allottee was to claim
interest for the period of delay till such
time the possession was offered, which
authority is solely vested with Regulatory
Authority and not the Adjudicating Officer.
In paragraphs 13 and 14, the grant of
compensation was said to be bad in law and
in paragraph 23, it has been stated that in
the builder buyer agreement, the expected
date of offer was December, 2019 but the
same was subjected to delay including
COVID-19. In paragraph 29, it was
specifically
pleaded
that
the
term
mentioned in the builder buyer agreement
was not essence of the contract and only a
tentative time of completion of the project
along with extension clause was provided
indicating that the offer of possession was
subject to incidents of force majeure which
may adversely affect the delivery of
possession and there was no provision for
grant of any penal consequences. In
paragraph 31, it was admitted that the offer
of possession was sent for the first time on
13.10.2022.
In
paragraph
33,
the
jurisdiction of the Adjudicating Authority
was once again challenged. In paragraph
35, a ground has been taken that in the
official
website
of
the
RERA,
the
completion period of the project is
mentioned as 30.12.2020 and further
extension of one year was granted from
31.12.2019 to 30.12.2020 and the every
promoters has the right and privilege to get
the extension of one year as a matter of
right. A claim with regard to waiver of
interest for the COVID period was also
pleaded. It was admitted that an application
9 All. Ratan Buildtech Private Limited Vs. Anil Kumar
1271
was
also
moved before
the
RERA
Authority on 21.09.2021 for extension,
however, no orders were passed thereupon.
In short, the entire appeal was premised on
the ground that no compensation or interest
could
have
been
awarded
by
the
Adjudicating Authority.

6. The Tribunal after hearing the
parties proceeded to decide the issues, vide
order dated 14.05.2025, in between the
parties
including
the
question
of
jurisdiction as was raised by the appellant
in exercise of powers vested in the Tribunal
by virtue of Section 44(6) read with Section
53(1) of the RERA Act. Section 44(6) and
Section 53(1) reads as under:

"44. Application for settlement
of disputes and appeals to Appellate
Tribunal.

...

(6) The Appellate Tribunal may,
for the purpose of examining the legality or
propriety or correctness of any order or
decision
of
the
Authority
or
the
adjudicating officer, on its own motion or
otherwise, call for the records relevant to
disposing of such appeal and make such
orders as it thinks fit.

53. Powers of Tribunal.-(1) The
Appellate Tribunal shall not be bound by
the procedure laid down by the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) but shall
be guided by the principles of natural
justice."

7. On the basis of the abovesaid
powers, the Tribunal,on the basis of limited
arguments raised as are reflected from
order, decided the appeal vide order dated
14.05.2025 and set aside the order passed
by the Adjudicating Authority however,it
was decided that the respondent-allottee is
entitled to delay interest only w.e.f.
01.01.2020 to 13.10.2022 at MCLR + 1%
on the deposited amount except for the six
months 'force majeure' period on account
of Covid-19. It was further directed that the
amount so deposited as pre-deposit under
Section 43(5) of the RERA Act shall be
released in favour of the respondent after
verifying
whether
any
execution
proceedings is pending or not and in case
any execution is pending, the amount so
deposited
shall
be
remitted
to
the
Regulatory Authority. Aggrieved by the
order dated 14.05.2025, the present RERA
appeal being No.70 of 2025 has been
preferred by the appellant.

8. One of the respondents-allottee
preferred RERA Appeal No.70 of 2025
attacking the order by arguing that the
compensation could not have been refused
apart from interest.

9. It is admitted in between the parties
that in terms of the builder buyer agreement
executed in between the appellant and the
respondent on 22.01.2019, the date of
delivery of possession was indicated as
December, 2019. It is also admitted that the
completion certificate was received on
16.09.2022 and the letter for the allotment
was issued by the appellant on 13.10.2022.

10. It is argued by the Counsel for the
appellant that after issuance of the
completion certificate by the competent
authority, the appellant issued offer of
possession to the allottee on 13.10.2022 but
the respondent did not come forward for
execution of the lease deed. Subsequently,
the lease deed was executed on 15.02.2024
in between the promoter and the allottee. It
is also argued that the manner in which the
interest has been awarded by the Tribunal
is bad in law and further the pre-deposit for
preferring the appeal could not have been
1272 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
directed to be released in favour of the
respondent.

11. The Counsel for the appellant on
the basis of the written agreement also
argues that it is well settled that the
Adjudicating Officer has no jurisdiction to
grant interest as has been held by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Newtech Promoters and Developers (P)
Ltd. vs State of U.P.:(2021) 18 SCC 1.
Interest, according to the appellant can be
granted only by the Regulatory Authority
and not by the Adjudicating Authority. The
Counsel for the appellant further argues
that the order, which records that the
appellant has admitted about the delay in
delivery of the possession of the apartment,
is erroneous, inasmuch as, the admission on
the part of the appellant was only to the
effect that the apartment could not be
delivered to the allottee and not any
admission that they are liable to pay interest
and compensation. It is further argued that it
was incumbent upon the Tribunal to have
conducted an inquiry before directing for
payment of interest as has been done by
means of the impugned judgment. It is further
argued that no reasons have been recorded
while granting the interest and the Tribunal
has erred in directing the refund of money,
which was deposited as pre-deposit under
Section 43, which is primarily for the purpose
of satisfying the statutory requirement of
maintaining an appeal and cannot be
appropriated after the decision is made.
Reliance is also placed upon the provisions of
Section 44(6) of the RERA Act to argue that
even if the Tribunal had the power, it was
incumbent upon the Tribunal to hold fullfledged inquiry before granting interest which
has not been done.

12. The Counsel for the appellant
further argues that although the Tribunal is
vested with the power to pass such order as
thinks fit, however, the grant of interest is
subject to fulfilling the procedure and after
framing legal issues and after analyzing the
evidence. It is further argued that although
the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 would not apply, however, once the
Tribunal
is
of
the
view
that
the
Adjudicating Officer had no jurisdiction, it
was incumbent to frame issues itself and
then decide the same. In support of the
contention, the Counsel for the appellant
argues that the Hon'ble Supreme Court
while analyzing the phrase "to pass orders
as
it
thinks
fit"
in
the
case
of
Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay vs
Walchand & Co. (P) Ltd.:1967 SCC
OnLine SC 119 held as under:

"... It is necessary to emphasize
that though the Tribunal is not a court, it is
invested with judicial power to be exercised
in manner similar to the exercise of power
of an appellate court acting under the Code
of Civil Procedure. Authority to "pass such
orders thereon as it thinks fit" in Section
33(4) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, is not
arbitrary : the expression is intended to
define the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to
deal with and determine questions which
arise out of the subject-matter of the appeal
in the light of the evidence, and consistently
with the justice of the case. In the hierarchy
of authorities the Appellate Tribunal is the
final fact-finding body; its decisions on
questions of fact are not liable to be
questioned before the High Court. The
nature of the jurisdiction predicates that
the Tribunal will approach and decide the
case in a judicial spirit and for that
purpose it must indicate the disputed
questions before it with evidence pro and
con and record its reasons in support of the
decision. The practice of recording a
9 All. Ratan Buildtech Private Limited Vs. Anil Kumar
1273
decision without reasons in support cannot
but be severely deprecated."

13.
Similarly
in
the
case
of
Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras vs
S.
Chenniappa
Mudaliar,
Madurai:
(1969) 1 SCC 591 held as under:

"... The powers, functions and
duties of the Appellate Tribunal are set out
in Sections 28, 33, 35, 37, 48 and 66. For
our purpose reference may be made only to
Sections 33 and 66. Sub-sections (1) and
(2) of Section 33 give a right to the
assessee and the Commissioner to appeal
to the Appellate Tribunal against the order
passed
by
the
Appellate
Assistant
Commissioner within sixty days of the
communication of his order. Under subsection (2-A) the Tribunal can admit an
appeal after the expiry of sixty days if it is
satisfied that there was sufficient cause for
not presenting it within that period. Subsection (3) lays down the formalities in the
matter of the filing of an appeal. Subsection (4) is to the effect that the Appellate
Tribunal may, after giving both parties to
the appeal an opportunity of being heard,
pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit and
shall communicate any such orders to the
assessee and to the Commissioner. Subsection (5) deals with the changes to be
made in the assessment as a result of the
orders of the Appellate Tribunal. Subsection (6) makes the orders of the Tribunal
on appeal final, the only saving being with
reference to the provisions of Section 66.
Under that section the assessee or the
Commissioner can require the Appellate
Tribunal to refer to the High Court any
question of law arising out of the order of
the Appellate Tribunal and if the Tribunal
refuses to state the case on the ground that
no question of law arises the assessee or
the
Commissioner
can,
within
the
prescribed period, apply to the High Court
and the High Court can direct the
Appellate Tribunal to state the case and
make a reference. It is unnecessary to refer
to all the provisions of Section 66 except to
notice the power of the High Court to
decide the question of law which decision
has to be implemented by the Appellate
Tribunal.

7. The scheme of the provisions of
the Act relating to the Appellate Tribunal
apparently is that it has to dispose of an
appeal by making such orders as it thinks
fit on the merits. It follows from the
language of Section 33(4) and in particular
the use of the word "thereon" that the
Tribunal has to go into the correctness or
otherwise of the points decided by the
departmental authorities in the light of the
submissions made by the appellant. This
can only be done by giving a decision on
the merits on questions of fact and law and
not by merely disposing of the appeal on
the ground that the party concerned has
failed
to
appear.
As
observed
in
Hukumchand Mills Ltd. v. CIT, [(1967) 63
ITR 232 : 1966 SCC OnLine SC 171] the
word "thereon" in Section 33(4) restricts
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to the
subject-matter of the appeal and the words
"pass such orders as the Tribunal thinks
fit" include all the powers (except possibly
the power of enhancement) which are
conferred upon the Appellate Assistant
Commissioner by Section 31 of the Act. The
provisions contained in Section 66 about
making a reference on questions of law to
the High Court will be rendered nugatory if
any such power is attributed to the
Appellate Tribunal by which it can dismiss
an appeal, which has otherwise been
properly filed, for default without making
any order thereon in accordance with
Section 33(4). ...
1274 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

14. It is further argued that as far as
the grant of interest is concerned, Section
18 of RERA Act read with Rule 33 of The
Uttar Pradesh Real Estate (Regulation and
Development) Rules, 2016 (hereinafter
referred to as "RERA Rules") are relevant.
The said Section and Rule are quoted in
subsequent paragraph.

15. The Counsel for the appellant
further argues that the phrase "as the case
may be" used in Section 18 (1)(a) should be
interpreted to hold that grant of interest is
not a mechanical exercise rather it is
dependent on various factors as prescribed
under Section 72, which mandates for
inquiry to be conducted by the Regulatory
Authority and in absence of such exercise,
the impugned order passed by the Tribunal
granting interest for delayed period is
wholly impermissible. The phrase "as the
case may be" come up for consideration
before Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case
of Subramaniam Shanmugham vs M.L.
Rajendran: (1987) 4 SCC 215. In para 3
of the said judgment, Hon'ble Supreme
Court held as under:

"3. Justice Morris in Bluston &
Bramley Ltd. v. Leigh [(1950) 2 All ER 29,
35] explained that the phrase "as the case
may be" meant in the events that have
happened. Our attention was also drawn to
the expression "as the case may be" as
appearing in the Words and Phrases,
Permanent Edn. 4 page 596. The meaning
of the expression "as the case may be" is
what the expression says, i.e., as the
situation may be, in other words in case
there are separate and distinct units then
concept of need will apply accordingly.
Where, however, there is no such separate
and distinct unit, it has no significance.
There is no magic in that expression. The
expression "as the case may be" has been
properly
construed
in
the
judgment
mentioned hereinbefore."

16. The Counsel for the appellant
argues that the phrase "as the case may be"
in the present case ought to have been
considered keeping in view the obligations
of the promoters restricting the transfer
without issuance of completion certificate
which cannot be attributed to the appellant.
Reliance is also placed upon the judgment
in the case of Mahindra & Mahindra
Financial Services Limited vs State of
U.P.: 2019 SCC OnLine All 5336.

17. It is further argued by the Counsel
for the appellant that for preferring an
appeal, there is a prescription for deposit of
the amount so that the appeal can be
entertained. He argues that for interpreting
the word "entertained", the same has to be
read as "admitting to consideration" and is
not in a nature of the security and thus
could not have been released in favour of
the allottee as has been done by the
impugned order.

18. The Counsel for the respondent, on
the other hand, argues that the appeal has
been filed against an order of compromise
,wherein, the facts were admitted as
recorded by the Tribunal and the grant of
interest according to him is a mechanical
exercise in view of the prescriptions
contained in Section 18(1)(a) which does
not require any further exercise and thus
argument of the Promoter to that effect
deserves to be rejected. He places reliance
upon the judgment of this Court dated
18.11.2023 passed in RERA Appeal No.67
of
2023
(U.P.
Avas
Evam
Vikas
Parishad, Lucknow vs Dhruv Kumar
Chaturvedi) as well as on the judgment
dated
08.10.2020
passed
in
Writ-C
9 All. Ratan Buildtech Private Limited Vs. Anil Kumar
1275
No.13904 of 2020 (Vibhor Vaibhav
Infrahomes Pvt. Ltd. vs Union of India
& Ors.

19. This Court, vide order dated
28.04.2025, had admitted RERA Appeal(s)
No.41, 42, 43, 44 of 2025 and the RERA
Appeal Defective No.21 of 2025, now
renumbered as RERA Appeal No.45 of
2025, on the following questions of law:

(i).
Whether
the
Appellate
Tribunal was justified in granting delayed
interest for a period which is mentioned in
its impugned order dated 17.2.2025 para
18(ii) without making any determination
and without recording any reasons in
respect thereof?

(ii).
Whether
the
Appellate
Tribunal was justified in making a
direction as contained in para 18 (iii) of
the impugned order without considering the
fact that the deposit made in terms of
Section 43 (5) of the Act of 2016 is
primarily for the purposes of satisfying the
statutory requirement of maintaining the
appeal and in such circumstances, whether
the
pre
deposit
so
made
can
be
appropriated after the decision is made in
favour of the respondent for whom there
are separate provisions for execution in the
Act and in this light whether the execution
can be by passed by taking recourse to
issuing such a direction?

20. In the light of the arguments raised
by the respective parties, while admitting
the other appeals, two additional issues
were framed, which are as under:

(iii). Whether, an appeal would
lie against the grant of interest under
Section 18(1) of the RERA Act, granted on
the basis of admission in between the
parties?

(iv). Whether, grant of interest
requires any adjudication or can be
granted automatically as per Section 18(1)
of the RERA Act?

21. In the light of the submissions as
recorded above and the points determined,
it is essential to note the scheme of the
RERA Act. The Act in question was
enacted for regulation and promotion of the
real estate sector and for providing a
mechanism for dispute redressal. Chapter
III of the said RERA Act prescribes for
functions and duties of promoter; Chapter
IV provides for rights and duties of
allottees;
Chapter
V
prescribes
for
establishment of a Regulatory Authority
and functions thereof and Chapter VI
prescribes for establishing an Appellate
Tribunal and the powers of the said
Appellate Tribunal. In terms of the
powers conferred by the said RERA
Act, the Rule 2016 known as "The Uttar
Pradesh Real Estate (Regulation and
Development) Rules, 2016" has been
enacted, which prescribes the manner,
in which, the rate of interest is payable
by the promoters as prescribed under
Chapter V. The manner of exercise of
the Regulatory Authority is prescribed
in Chapter VI and the manner, in which,
the Appellate Tribunal decides the
appeals is prescribed under Chapter
VII. Thus from the object of the Act it
is clear that it is a socio beneficial
legislation ,one of the objects being to
protect the home buyers who do not
possess the bargaining powers while
entering into contracts with promoters
which are generally one sided.

22. Before adverting to decide the
points, it is essential to note Sections 2(za),
18, 19, 40, 43 of the RERA Act, which
reads as below:
1276 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

"2 (za). (za) "interest" means the
rates of interest payable by the promoter or
the allottee, as the case may be.

Explanation. - For the purpose of
this clause -

(i) the rate of interest chargeable
from the allottee by the promoter, in case of
default, shall be equal to the rate of interest
which the promoter shall be liable to pay
the allottee, in case of default;

(ii) the interest payable by the
promoter to the allottee shall be from the
date the promoter received the amount or
any part thereof till the date the amount or
part thereof and interest thereon is
refunded, and the interest payable by the
allottee to the promoter shall be from the
date the allottee defaults in payment to the
promoter till the date it is paid;

18. Return of amount and
compensation.-(1) If the promoter fails to
complete or is unable to give possession of
an apartment, plot or building-

(a) in accordance with the terms
of the agreement for sale or, as the case
may be, duly completed by the date
specified therein; or

(b) due to discontinuance of his
business as a developer on account of
suspension or revocation of the registration
under this Act or for any other reason,
he shall be liable on demand to the
allottees, in case the allottee wishes to
withdraw
from
the
project,
without
prejudice to any other remedy available, to
return the amount received by him in
respect of that apartment, plot, building, as
the case may be, with interest at such rate
as may be prescribed in this behalf
including compensation in the manner as
provided under this Act:

Provided that where an allottee
does not intend to withdraw from the
project, he shall be paid, by the promoter,
interest for every month of delay, till the
handing over of the possession, at such rate
as may be prescribed.

(2)
The
promoter
shall
compensate the allottees in case of any loss
caused to him due to defective title of the
land, on which the project is being
developed or has been developed, in the
manner as provided under this Act, and the
claim for compensation under this subsection shall not be barred by limitation
provided under any law for the time being
in force.

(3) If the promoter fails to
discharge any other obligations imposed on
him under this Act or the rules or
regulations
made
thereunder
or
in
accordance with the terms and conditions
of the agreement for sale, he shall be liable
to pay such compensation to the allottees,
in the manner as provided under this Act.

19.
Rights
and
duties
of
allottees.-(1) The allottee shall be entitled
to obtain the information relating to
sanctioned plans, layout plans along with
the
specifications,
approved
by
the
competent
authority
and
such
other
information as provided in this Act or the
rules and regulations made thereunder or
the agreement for sale signed with the
promoter.

(2) The allottee shall be entitled
to know stage-wise time schedule of
completion of the project, including the
provisions for water, sanitation, electricity
and other amenities and services as agreed
to between the promoter and the allottee in
accordance with the terms and conditions
of the agreement for sale.

(3) The allottee shall be entitled
to claim the possession of apartment, plot
or building, as the case may be, and the
association of allottees shall be entitled to
claim the possession of the common areas,
as per the declaration given by the
9 All. Ratan Buildtech Private Limited Vs. Anil Kumar
1277
promoter under sub-clause (C) of clause
(1) of sub-section (2) of Section 4.

(4) The allottee shall be entitled
to claim the refund of amount paid along
with interest at such rate as may be
prescribed
and
compensation
in
the
manner as provided under this Act, from
the promoter, if the promoter fails to
comply or is unable to give possession of
the apartment, plot or building, as the case
may be, in accordance with the terms of
agreement
for
sale
or
due
to
discontinuance of his business as a
developer on account of suspension or
revocation of his registration under the
provisions of this Act or the rules or
regulations made thereunder.

(5) The allottee shall be entitled
to have the necessary documents and plans,
including that of common areas, after
handing over the physical possession of the
apartment or plot or building as the case
may be, by the promoter.

(6) Every allottee, who has
entered into an agreement for sale to take
an apartment, plot or building as the case
may be, under Section 13, shall be
responsible to make necessary payments in
the manner and within the time as specified
in the said agreement for sale and shall pay
at the proper time and place, the share of
the registration charges, municipal taxes,
water and electricity charges, maintenance
charges, ground rent, and other charges, if
any.

(7) The allottee shall be liable to
pay interest, at such rate as may be
prescribed, for any delay in payment
towards any amount or charges to be paid
under sub-section (6).

(8) The obligations of the allottee
under sub-section (6) and the liability
towards interest under sub-section (7) may
be reduced when mutually agreed to
between the promoter and such allottee.

(9)
Every
allottee
of
the
apartment, plot or building as the case may
be, shall participate towards the formation
of an association or society or cooperative
society of the allottees, or a federation of
the same.

(10) Every allottee shall take
physical possession of the apartment, plot
or building as the case may be, within a
period of two months of the occupancy
certificate issued for the said apartment,
plot or building, as the case may be.

(11)
Every
allottee
shall
participate towards registration of the
conveyance deed of the apartment, plot or
building, as the case may be, as provided
under sub-section (1) of Section 17 of this
Act.

40. Recovery of interest or
penalty or compensation and enforcement
of order. etc. (1) If a promoter or an
allottee or a real estate agent, as the case
may be, fails to pay any interest or penalty
or compensation imposed on him, by the
adjudicating officer or the Regulatory
Authority or the Appellate Authority, as the
case may be, under this Act or the rules
and regulations made thereunder, it shall
be recoverable from such promoter or
allottee or real estate agent, in such
manner as may be prescribed as an arrears
of land revenue.

(2) If any adjudicating officer or
the Regulatory Authority or the Appellate
Tribunal, as the case may be, issues any
order or directs any person to do any act,
or refrain from doing any act, which it is
empowered to do under this Act or the
rules or regulations made thereunder, then
in case of failure by any person to comply
with order or direction, the same shall be
enforced, in such manner as may be
prescribed.

43. Establishment of Real Estate
Appellate Tribunal.-(1) The appropriate
1278 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Government shall, within a period of one
year from the date of coming into force of
this Act, by notification, establish an
Appellate Tribunal to be known as the
(name of the State/Union territory) Real
Estate Appellate Tribunal.

(2) The appropriate Government
may, if it deems necessary, establish one or
more benches of the Appellate Tribunal, for
various jurisdictions, in the State or Union
territory, as the case may be.

(3) Every bench of the Appellate
Tribunal shall consist of at least one
Judicial Member and one Administrative or
Technical Member.

(4) The appropriate Government
of two or more states or Union territories
may, if it deems fit, establish one single
Appellate Tribunal:

Provided
that,
until
the
establishment of an Appellate Tribunal
under
this
section,
the
appropriate
Government shall designate, by order, any
Appellate Tribunal Functioning under any
law for the time being in force, to be the
Appellate Tribunal to hear appeals under
the Act:

Provided further that after the
Appellate Tribunal under this section is
established, all matters pending with the
Appellate Tribunal designated to hear
appeals, shall stand transferred to the
Appellate Tribunal so established and shall
be heard from the stage such appeal is
transferred.

(5) Any person aggrieved by any
direction or decision or order made by the
Authority or by an adjudicating officer
under this Act may prefer an appeal before
the Appellate Tribunal having jurisdiction
over the matter: