# Ratan Buildtech Pvt. Ltd v. Anil Kumar

- **Citation:** (2026) 2 ILRA 1367
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-02-18
- **Case number:** Special Appeal No. 28 of 2026
- **Bench:** Arun Bhansali, C.J. Jaspreet Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ratan-buildtech-pvt-ltd-v-anil-kumar-54144
- **Pages:** 11

## Text

2 All. Ratan Buildtech Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Anil Kumar
1367

(ii) Matrimonial Petition No.2130 of 2023, pending before the Court of Additional
Family Court No. 5, Ghaziabad, is hereby withdrawn and transferred to the Court of competent
jurisdiction at Agra.

(iii) The Court at Ghaziabad shall transmit the entire original record of the case to the
transferee court within a period of fifteen days from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this
order.

(iv) The transferee Court shall proceed with the matter from the stage at which it is
transferred and shall endeavour to decide the same expeditiously, in accordance with law.
----------
(2026) 2 ILRA 1367
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 18.02.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ARUN BHANSALI, C.J.
THE HON'BLE JASPREET SINGH, J.

Special Appeal No. 28 of 2026

Ratan Buildtech Pvt. Ltd. ...Appellant
Versus
Anil Kumar ...Respondent

Issue(s) for consideration
 Whether special appeal is maintainable against an order passed u/s 58 of the Real Estate (Regulation and
Development) Act, 2016, before the Division Bench?

Headnotes
A. Real Estate Law - Civil Procedural Law - Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016:
Section 58 - Tribunals which are set up in an organised State for the Administration of Justice
are courts and have been described as bodies of men which are appointed to decide
controversies arising under certain special laws. The procedure before the Tribunal and Courts
may differ but the functions are not essentially different. Further, it depends on a particular Act
whether the functions of a particular Tribunal are akin to those of the courts which provide for
the basic administration of justice. (Para 24)

When Company Law Board ('CLB') exercised its powers, it exercised its quasi-judicial power as original
authority, it may not be a court but it has all the trappings of a court. Therefore, CLB, while exercising its
original jurisdiction passed the order and against that order, appeal lies to the learned Single Judge of the
High Court and thereafter no further appeal could be filed. (Para 15)

In the present case, the proceedings were initiated before the Real Estate Adjudicating Officer u/s 31 of the
Act, 2016. A bare perusal of provisions reveals that the Act, 2016 provides for a complete machinery for
adjudication of disputes between promoters and allottees or the real estate agents. The Adjudicating Officer
u/s 35 has the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the CPC, 1908 and the Appellate Tribunal u/s
53(4) has same powers as are vested in civil courts under the CPC in respect of the matters enumerated in
1368 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the said sub-section, and sub-section (5) provides that all proceedings before the Appellate Tribunal shall be
deemed to be judicial proceedings and Appellate Tribunal shall be deemed to be civil court for the purpose of
certain provisions of IPC and CrPC respectively. (Para 16 to 20)

The appellate provision u/s 58 of the Act, 2016 provides for appeal from the order of the Appellate Tribunal to
the High Court. (Para 21)

B. A comparison of provisions of Section 10E(4C) and (4D) of the Companies Act, 1956 with
provisions of Section 53 of the Act, 2016 dealing with powers of the Appellate Tribunal, would
reveal that the same are almost in identical terms, wherein both the CLB and the Tribunal have
been deemed to be civil court and proceedings before them to be judicial proceedings. Further,
the power of review along with their orders being executable, are also identical in nature. Therefore, it can
safely be concluded that the UPREAT has trappings of the court similar to the CLB and, thereby no special
appeal would be maintainable against an order passed u/s 58 of the Act, 2016 before the Division Bench.
(Para 26, 27)

C. Recently the Calcutta High Court in Glorious Investment Limited Vs. Dunlop International Limited & Ors.
(infra), has come to the conclusion that Letters Patent appeal against judgment of learned Single
Judge sitting in the Intellectual Property Rights Division under the Trade Marks Act, 1999 would
not be maintainable. (Para 30)

The present appeal u/Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules, 1952 against order passed by learned Single Judge on
an appeal u/s 58 of the Act, 2016, would be barred u/s 100-A CPC. (Para 31)

Special appeal dismissed. (E-4)

Case Law Cited
1. Sheet Gupta Vs. State of U.P. & others, AIR 2010 All 46 (FB) (Para 8)
2. Kamal Kumar Dutta & Anr. Vs. Ruby General Hospital Ltd. & Ors., (2006) 7 SCC 613 (Para 11)
3. Promoshirt SM SA Vs. Armassuisse & Anr., 2023:DHC:6352-DB (Para 12)
4. Kihoto Hollohan Vs. Zachillhu & Ors., 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651 (Para 22)
5. State of Gujarat & Anr. Vs. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal Bar Association & Anr., (2012) 10 SCC 353 (Para 23)
6. Glorious Investment Limited Vs. Dunlop International Limited & Ors., 2025 SCC Online Cal 8647 (Para 30)

List of Acts
 Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

List of Keywords
Real estate, regulation, development, maintainable, special, appeal.

Appearances for Parties
For Appellant(s): Sudeep Kumar (Sr. Adv.), Mahima Pahwa, Shreshth Srivastava, Alok Kumar Mishra,
Prashant Kumar Singh
For Respondent(s): Shivendra Rao

(Delivered by Hon'ble Arun Bhansali, C.J.)

1. This special appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952
('Rules, 1952') is directed against order dated 04.09.2025 passed in RERA Appeal No. 72 of 2025,
whereby learned Single Judge dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant against judgment dated
14.05.2025 passed by the U.P. Real Estate Appellate Tribunal, Lucknow ('UPREAT').
2 All. Ratan Buildtech Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Anil Kumar
1369

2. The facts, in brief, may be noticed thus:

3. The respondent made a booking in the project of the appellant and was allotted a
flat/apartment and a builder buyer agreement was executed between the parties in which the
expected offer of possession was in December 2019. On account of the delay, the respondent made
a complaint for grant of compensation under the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act,
2016 ('Act, 2016') before the Adjudicating Officer at Gautam Buddha Nagar. The appellant filed
objections to the complaint and raised preliminary objections with regard to the absence of
jurisdiction.

4. The Adjudicating Officer, by order dated 10.02.2023, granted certain reliefs to the
respondent. The appellant assailed the judgment and order dated 10.02.2023 by filing appeal before
the UPREAT. The UPREAT, by its judgment and order dated 14.05.2025, quashed and set aside
the order dated 10.02.2023 passed by the Adjudicating Officer and substituted the same by its own
directions for payment of delayed interest on the deposited amount.

5. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant filed appeal under Section 58 of the Act, 2016 before the
learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge, after hearing the parties, dismissed the appeal.

6. Aggrieved of the order passed by the UPREAT and the learned Single Judge, the present
appeal has been filed.

7. The appeal was initially reported to be barred by limitation by the office which delay has
been condoned by order dated 19.01.2026.

8. When the appeal came up before the Court for admission, a preliminary objection was
raised by counsel for the respondent that special appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules,
1952 was not maintainable. Reliance was placed on the judgment of a Full Bench of this Court in
Sheet Gupta Vs. State of U.P. & others: AIR 2010 All 46 (FB).

9. Learned counsel for the respondent made submissions that from a plain reading of
provisions of Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules, 1952, it is very clear that a special appeal from the
judgment passed by one Judge in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, in respect of a decree or
order made by a Court subject to the superintendence of the Court will not lie, as has been laid
down by judgment in the case of Sheet Gupta (supra) as well and as neither the adjudicating
authority nor the Tribunal are a court, therefore, the appeal deserves to be dismissed as not
maintainable.

10. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant made submissions that judgment in the case of
Sheet Gupta (supra) as well as provisions of Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules, 1952 do not bar
filing of the appeal against judgment impugned, inasmuch as the restriction is 'in respect of a
decree or order made by a Court subject to the superintendence of the Court' and that the judgment
impugned before the learned Single Judge was of the Tribunal and not Court and therefore, the plea
raised in this regard has no substance.
1370 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

11. Learned counsel for the appellant was confronted with the law laid down by Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Kamal Kumar Dutta & Anr. Vs. Ruby General Hospital Ltd. & Ors.: (2006)
7 SCC 613, wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court, based on provisions of Section 100-A CPC, came to
the conclusion that special appeal, irrespective of the provisions of Letters Patent of a particular
High Court, would not be maintainable.

12. Counsel for the appellant made detailed submissions placing all his emphasis on a
Division Bench judgment of Delhi High Court in Promoshirt SM SA Vs. Armassuisse & Anr.:
2023:DHC:6352-DB and submitted that the Division Bench of Delhi High Court in the said case,
has thoroughly considered the effect and implication of judgment in the case of Kamal Kumar
Dutta (supra) and in a case where the special appeal was filed against a judgment of learned Single
Judge under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, it was held that such an appeal would be
maintainable. Based on the said judgment, it was sought to be emphasised that the appeal would
not be barred under Section 100-A CPC.

13. We have considered the submissions made by counsel for the appellant and have perused
the judgments in the case of Kamal Kumar Dutta (supra) and Promoshirt (supra).

14. It would be appropriate to notice that Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kamal
Kumar Dutta (supra), in a case where Special Leave Petition was filed from judgment of a Single
Judge passed under Section 10F of the Companies Act, 1956, wherein an objection was raised that
Letters Patent appeal was maintainable before Division Bench of the High Court and therefore, the
Special Leave Petition should not be entertained, came to the following conclusion:

'21. But after the amendment the power which was being exercised under Sections 397
and 398 of the Act by the learned Single Judge of the High Court is being exercised by CLB under
Section 10-E of the Act. Appeal against the order passed by CLB, lies to the High Court under
Section 10-F of the Act. Therefore, the position which was obtaining prior to the amendment in
1991 was that from any order passed by the Single Judge exercising the power under Sections 397
and 398 of the Act, the appeal used to lie before the Division Bench of the High Court. But after
the amendment the power has been given to CLB and appeal has been provided under Section 10-F
of the Act. Thus, Part 1-A was inserted by the amendment with effect from 1.1.1964. But the
constitution of the Company Law Board and the power to decide application under Sections 397
and 398 of the Act was given to CLB with effect from 31.5.1991 and appeal was provided under
Section 10-F of the Act with effect from 31.5.1991. Therefore, on reading of Sections 10-E, 10-F,
397 and 398 of the Act, it becomes clear that it is a complete code that applications under Sections
397 and 398 the Act shall be dealt with by CLB and the order of CLB is appealable under Section
10-F of the Act before the High Court. No further appeal has been provided against the order of the
learned Single Judge. Mr. Nariman, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents submitted that an
appeal is a vested right and, therefore, under clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Calcutta High
Court, the appellants have a statutory right to prefer appeal irrespective of the fact that no appeal
has been provided against the order of the learned Single Judge under the Act. In this connection,
learned counsel invited our attention to a decision of this Court in Garikapatti Veeraya v. N.
Subbiah Choudhury and in that it has been pointed out that the appeal is a vested right. The
majority took the view that the appeal is a vested right. It was held as follows: (SCR p.488)
2 All. Ratan Buildtech Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Anil Kumar
1371

'... that the contention of the applicant was well-founded, that he had a vested right of
appeal to the Federal Court on and from the date of the suit and the application for special leave
should be allowed.

The vested right of appeal was a substantive right and, although it could be exercised
only in case of an adverse decision, it was governed by the law prevailing at the time of
commencement of the suit and comprised all successive rights of appeal from court to court, which
really constituted one proceeding. Such a right could be taken away only by a subsequent
enactment either expressly or by necessary intendment."

22. So far as the general proposition of law is concerned that the appeal is a vested right
there is no quarrel with the proposition but it is clarified that such right can be taken away by a
subsequent enactment either expressly or by necessary intendment. Parliament while amending
Section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, by amending Act 22 of 2002 with effect from
1.7.2002, took away the Letters Patent power of the High Court in the matter of appeal against an
order of the learned Single Judge to the Division Bench. Section 100-A of the Code of Civil
Procedure reads as follows:

'100-A. No further appeal in certain cases.-Notwithstanding anything contained in any
Letters Patent for any High Court or in any other instrument having the force of law or in any other
law for the time being in force, where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is
heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie from the judgment
and decree of such Single Judge."

23. Therefore, where appeal has been decided from an original order by a Single Judge,
no further appeal has been provided and that power which used to be there under the Letters Patent
of the High Court has been subsequently withdrawn. The present order which has been passed by
CLB and against that an appeal has been provided before the High Court under Section 10-F of the
Act, that is an appeal from the original order. Then in that case no further letters patent appeal shall
lie to the Division Bench of the same High Court. This amendment has taken away the power of the
Letters Patent in the matter where learned Single Judge hears an appeal from the original order.
Original order in the present case was passed by CLB exercising the power under Sections 397 and
398 of the Act and appeal has been preferred under Section 10-F of the Act before the High Court.
Learned Single Judge having passed an order, no further appeal will lie as Parliament in its wisdom
has taken away its power. Learned counsel for the respondents invited our attention to a letter from
the then Law Minister. That letter cannot override the statutory provision. When the statute is very
clear, whatever statement by the Law Minister made on the floor of the House, cannot change the
words and intendment which is borne out from the words. The letter of the Law Minister cannot be
read to interpret the provisions of Section 100-A. The intendment of the legislature is more than
clear in the words and the same has to be given its natural meaning and cannot be subject to any
statement made by the Law Minister in any communication. The words speak for themselves. It
does not require any further interpretation by any statement made in any manner. Therefore, the
power of the High Court in exercising the Letters Patent in a matter where a Single Judge has
decided the appeal from the original order, has been taken away and it cannot be invoked in the
present context. There are no two opinions in the matter that when CLB exercised its power under
1372 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Sections 397 and 398 of the Act, it exercised its quasi-judicial power as original authority. It may
not be a court but it has all the trapping of a court. Therefore, the CLB while exercising its original
jurisdiction under Sections 397 and 398 of the Act passed the order and against that order appeal
lies to the learned Single Judge of the High Court and thereafter no further appeal could be filed.'

15. Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that when Company Law Board ('CLB') exercised its
powers, it exercised its quasi-judicial power as original authority, it may not be a court but it has all
the trappings of a court. Therefore, CLB, while exercising its original jurisdiction passed the order
and against that order, appeal lies to the learned Single Judge of the High Court and thereafter no
further appeal could be filed.

16. In the present case, the proceedings were initiated before the Real Estate Adjudicating
Officer under Section 31 of the Act, 2016. Section 35 of the Act, 2016 deals with powers of officer
to call for information, conduct investigations and Section 36 thereof grants power to issue interim
orders, Section 37 confers the power to issue directions and Section 38 confers the power to impose
penalty or interest. Section 39 gives power for rectification of orders and Section 40 provides for
procedure for recovery of interest or penalty or compensation and enforcement of orders.

17. Section 44 of the Act, 2016 provides for appeals to the Appellate Tribunal against the
decision of the Adjudicating Officer. The powers of the Appellate Tribunal are enumerated in
Section 53, which reads as under:

'53. Powers of Tribunal.'(1) The Appellate Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure
laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) but shall be guided by the principles of
natural justice.

(2) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Appellate Tribunal shall have power to
regulate its own procedure.

(3) The Appellate Tribunal shall also not be bound by the rules of evidence contained in
the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872).

(4) The Appellate Tribunal shall have, for the purpose of discharging its functions under
this Act, the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5
of 1908) in respect of the following matters, namely:

(a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath;

(b) requiring the discovery and production of documents;

(c) receiving evidence on affidavits;

(d) issuing commissions for the examinations of witnesses or documents;

(e) reviewing its decisions;
2 All. Ratan Buildtech Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Anil Kumar
1373

(f) dismissing an application for default or directing it ex parte; and

(g) any other matter which may be prescribed.

(5) All proceedings before the Appellate Tribunal shall be deemed to be judicial
proceedings within the meaning of Sections 193, 219 and 228 for the purposes of Section 196 of
the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), and the Appellate Tribunal shall be deemed to be civil court
for the purposes of Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of
1974).'

18. Further, under Section 57 of the Act, 2016, orders passed by the Appellate Tribunal are
executable as a decree, which provision reads as under:

'57. Orders passed by Appellate Tribunal to be executable as a decree.-(1) Every
order made by the Appellate Tribunal under this Act shall be executable by the Appellate Tribunal
as a decree of civil court, and for this purpose, the Appellate Tribunal shall have all the powers of a
civil court.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the Appellate Tribunal may
transmit any order made by it to a civil court having local jurisdiction and such civil court shall
execute the order as if it were a decree made by the court.'

19. Against an order passed by the Appellate Tribunal, the appeal lies to the High Court under
Section 58, which reads as under:

'58. Appeal to High Court.- (1) Any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the
Appellate Tribunal, may, file an appeal to the High Court, within a period of sixty days from the
date of communication of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal, to him, on any one or
more of the grounds specified in Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908):

Provided that the High Court may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period
of sixty days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring
the appeal in time.

Explanation.'The expression 'High Court' means the High Court of a State or Union
Territory where the real estate project is situated.

(2) No appeal shall lie against any decision or order made by the Appellate Tribunal with
the consent of the parties.'

20. A bare perusal of above provisions reveals that the Act, 2016 provides for a complete
machinery for adjudication of disputes between promoters and allottees or the real estate agents.
The Adjudicating Officer under Section 35 has the same powers as are vested in a civil court under
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the Appellate Tribunal under Section 53(4) has same powers
as are vested in civil courts under the CPC in respect of the matters enumerated in the said sub-
1374 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
section, and sub-section (5) provides that all proceedings before the Appellate Tribunal shall be
deemed to be judicial proceedings and Appellate Tribunal shall be deemed to be civil court for the
purpose of certain provisions of IPC and CrPC respectively.

21. The appellate provision under Section 58 of the Act, 2016 provides for appeal from the
order of the Appellate Tribunal to the High Court.

22. In Kihoto Hollohan Vs. Zachillhu & Ors: 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court observed as under:

'98. But then is the Speaker or the Chairman acting under Paragraph 6(1) a Tribunal? "All
tribunals are not courts, though all courts are tribunals". The word "courts" is used to designate
those tribunals which are set up in an organised State for the Administration of Justice. By
Administration of Justice is meant the exercise of judicial power of the State to maintain and
uphold rights and to punish "wrongs". Whenever there is an infringement of a right or an injury, the
courts are there to restore the vinculum juris, which is disturbed. (See Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd.
v. Shyam Sundar Jhunjhunwala: (1962) 2 SCR 339. In that case Hidayatullah, J. said: (SCR p. 362)

"...By 'courts' is meant courts of civil judicature and by 'tribunals', those bodies of men
who are appointed to decide controversies arising under certain special laws. Among the powers of
the State is included the power to decide such controversies. This is undoubtedly one of the
attributes of the State, and is aptly called the judicial power of the State. In the exercise of this
power, a clear division is thus noticeable. Broadly speaking, certain special matters go before
tribunals, and the residue goes before the ordinary courts of civil judicature. Their procedures may
differ, but the functions are not essentially different. What distinguishes them has never been
successfully established. Lord Stamp said that the real distinction is that the courts have 'an air of
detachment'. But this is more a matter of age and tradition and is not of the essence. Many
tribunals, in recent years, have acquitted themselves so well and with such detachment as to make
this test insufficient."

23. Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Gujarat & Anr. Vs. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal Bar
Association & Anr.: (2012) 10 SCC 353, has dealt with the aspect in the following manner:

'18. Tribunals have primarily been constituted to deal with cases under special laws and
to hence provide for specialised adjudication alongside the courts. Therefore, a particular Act/set of
rules will determine whether the functions of a particular Tribunal are akin to those of the courts,
which provide for the basic administration of justice. Where there is a lis between two contesting
parties and a statutory authority is required to decide such dispute between them, such an authority
may be called as a quasi-judicial authority i.e. a situation where, (a) a statutory authority is
empowered under a statute to do any act; (b) the order of such authority would adversely affect the
subject; and (c) although there is no lis or two contending parties, and the contest is between the
authority and the subject; and (d) the statutory authority is required to act judicially under the
statute, the decision of the said authority is a quasi-judicial decision. An authority may be described
as a quasi-judicial authority when it possesses certain attributes or trappings of a 'court', but not all.
2 All. Ratan Buildtech Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Anil Kumar
1375
In case certain powers under CPC or CrPC have been conferred upon an authority, but it has not
been entrusted with the judicial powers of State, it cannot be held to be a court.'

24. From the above judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is apparent that Tribunals which
are set up in an organised State for the Administration of Justice are courts and have been described
as bodies of men which are appointed to decide controversies arising under certain special laws.
The procedure before the Tribunal and Courts may differ but the functions are not essentially
different. Further, it depends on a particular Act whether the functions of a particular Tribunal are
akin to those of the courts which provide for the basic administration of justice.

25. The powers of CLB, which were the subject matter before Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case of Kamal Kumar Dutta (supra), inter alia under Section 10E(4C) and (4D) of the Companies
Act, 1956, provided as under:

"10E. Constitution of Board of Company Law Administration.-

' ...

(4C) Every Bench referred to in sub-section (4B) shall have powers which are vested in a
Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), while trying a suit, in respect of the
following matters, namely :-

(a) discovery and inspection of documents or other material objects producible as
evidence;

(b) enforcing the attendance of witnesses and requiring the deposit of their expenses;

(c) compelling the production of documents or other material objects producible as
evidence and impounding the same;

(d) examining witnesses on oath;

(e) granting adjournments;

(f) reception of evidence on affidavits.

(4D) Every Bench shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for the purposes of section 195 and
Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), and every proceeding before
the Bench shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228
of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) and for the purpose of section 196 of that Code.'

26. As would be seen, the emphasis of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kamal Kumar
Dutta (supra) for applicability of provisions of Section 100-A CPC was that the CLB has all the
trappings of a court.
1376 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

27. A comparison of provisions of Section 10E(4C) and (4D) of the Companies Act, 1956
with provisions of Section 53 of the Act, 2016 dealing with powers of the Appellate Tribunal,
would reveal that the same are almost in identical terms, wherein both the CLB and the Tribunal
have been deemed to be civil court and proceedings before them to be judicial proceedings.
Further, the power of review along with their orders being executable, are also identical in nature.
Therefore, it can safely be concluded that the UPREAT has trappings of the court similar to the
CLB and therefore, the ratio of Kamal Kumar Dutta (supra) would apply with all force to the
present case as well, thereby no special appeal would be maintainable against an order passed
under Section 58 of the Act, 2016 before the Division Bench.

28. So far as the Division Bench judgment in the case of Promoshirt (supra), heavily relied on
by counsel for the appellant is concerned, one of the considerations for coming to the conclusion
regarding maintainability of appeal and for distinguishing the judgment in the case of Kamal
Kumar Dutta (supra) can be noticed in para 58, which reads as under:

'58. In Kamal Kumar Dutta the Supreme Court came to conclude that Section 100-A of
the Code would bar a further appeal in terms of a letters patent provision since it found that while
the erstwhile Company Law Board may not be a court it had all the trappings thereof. We in this
regard bear in mind the provisions of Section 10E (4D) of the Companies Act, 1956, which had
ordained that all proceedings before the Company Law Board would be deemed to be judicial
proceedings albeit for the limited purposes indicated therein. We note that similar is the position
which prevails under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 with Section 169 thereof, prescribing that the
Motor Vehicle Claims Tribunal shall be deemed to be a civil court for purposes enumerated
therein. It is also relevant to note that the Intellectual Property Appellate Board, as it existed prior
to the promulgation of the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021 had been clothed with an identical status
by virtue of Section 92. The decisions that thus came to be rendered in Kamal Kumar Dutta,
Gandla Pannala Bhulaxmi, Rouf Ahmad Zaroo and United India Insurance all emanated from
special statutes with a deeming provision. The decision of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court
in Kesava Pillai Sreedharan Pillai arose out of proceedings instituted under the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 and the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 whose distinguishing characteristics have already been
explained hereinabove.'

29. The Division Bench attempted to distinguish the judgment on the ground that in case of
CLB, there is a deeming provision under Section 10E(4D) of the Companies Act, 1956, quoted
herein before, which features distinguish the case. In view of the fact that such deeming provisions,
as existed in Section 10E(4D) of the Companies Act, 1956, are available under Section 53 of the
Act, 2016, the judgment as such would have no application to the present case.

30. Besides the above, recently the Calcutta High Court in Glorious Investment Limited Vs.
Dunlop International Limited & Ors.: 2025 SCC Online Cal 8647, has dissented with the view
taken in the case of Promoshirt (supra) and has come to the conclusion that Letters Patent appeal
against judgment of learned Single Judge sitting in the Intellectual Property Rights Division under
the Trade Marks Act, 1999 would not be maintainable.
2 All. S.B.I. Stressed Assets Recovery Branch Thru. Chief Manager Vs. M/s G.S.M. Bricks & Tiles & Ors.
1377

31. In view of above discussion, we are firmly of the opinion that the present appeal under
Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules, 1952 against order passed by learned Single Judge on an appeal
under Section 58 of the Act, 2016, would be barred under Section 100-A CPC.

32. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed as not maintainable.
----------
(2026) 2 ILRA 1377
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 23.02.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAJAN ROY, J.
THE HON'BLE ABDHESH KUMAR CHAUDHARY, J.

Special Appeal No. 48 of 2026

S.B.I. Stressed Assets Recovery Branch Thru. Chief Manager ...Appellant
Versus
M/s G.S.M. Bricks & Tiles & Ors. ...Respondent

Issue(s) for consideration
 Whether in the present case, learned Single Judge Bench of this Court could exercise its jurisdiction u/Articles
226/227 of the Constitution of India?

Headnotes
A. Debt Recovery Law - Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement
of Security Interest Act, 2002: Section 17(3), 18 - It is well-settled that ordinarily relief
u/Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India is not available if an efficacious alternative
remedy is available to any aggrieved person. (Para 22)

B. The writ petition could not have been allowed on the very first day without giving any
opportunity to the appellant-bank to file any counter affidavit and also that learned Single Judge
Bench did not have jurisdiction to decide a matter u/Article 227 of the Constitution of India on
the date on which the writ petition was listed before him.

According to the roster determined by Hon'ble the Chief Justice of this Court on 31.07.2025, the jurisdiction of
entertaining petitions u/Article 227 of the Constitution of India and exercising such powers was not vested
with the learned Single Judge Bench rather these matters were assigned to two Courts i.e. Court No. 5 and 7,
but, Court No. 5 had such jurisdiction only in respect of specified matters under which an order passed by the
DRT would not fall, therefore, such powers remained only with Court No. 7, whereas, the learned Single
Judge Bench has passed the order while sitting in Court No. 6. (Para 23, 24)

Therefore, the order passed by the learned Single Bench is in the teeth of the law, is without jurisdiction and
is unsustainable on the reasons given for entertaining the writ petition in spite of availability of a statutory
remedy u/s 18 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, the same is liable to be quashed. (Para 25)

The respondent nos. 1 to 3 are at liberty to prefer an appeal u/s 18 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 and seek such
reliefs as may be permissible in law.