# Ravi Singhal & Ors v. Rajeev Goyal & Ors

- **Citation:** (2015) 2 ILRA 893
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2015-08-13
- **Case number:** First Appeal No. 287 of 2005
- **Bench:** Sudhir Agarwal, Brijesh Kumar Srivastava-Ii
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ravi-singhal-ors-v-rajeev-goyal-ors-43231
- **Pages:** 4

## Headnote

C.P.C.-Section 96-Practice and Procedurewhere Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try
the suit-only way open to returned the
plaint for presentation before appropriate
Court/Authority-but can not either dismiss
or pass any order affecting rights of parties
on merit-appeal partly allowed.
Held: Para-11
In view of above exposition of law and
considering the fact that Court below has
correctly came to the conclusion that in
respect
to
orders
passed
under
the
provisions of Act, 1972, Civil Court in a suit
under Section 9 C.P.C., has no jurisdiction to
declare
orders
passed
by
competent
authority under Act, 1972 illegal, it had not
authority to proceed to decide other issues
on merits. In our view, the Court below has
rightly held that it had no jurisdiction to try
the suit. In these circumstances, the only
way open to it was to return the plaint
instead of proceeding to decide other issues
on merits and dismiss the suit.

## Text

2 All] Ravi Singhal & Ors. Vs. Rajeev Goyal & Ors.
893
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 13.08.2015
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SUDHIR AGARWAL, J.
THE HON'BLE BRIJESH KUMAR
SRIVASTAVA-II, J.
First Appeal No. 287 of 2005
Ravi Singhal & Ors.
 ...Appellants
Versus
Rajeev Goyal & Ors.
Defendants
Counsel for the Appellants:
Sri Shailendra Kumar Johri, Sri Kshitij
Shailendra
Counsel for the Defendants:
--
C.P.C.-Section 96-Practice and Procedurewhere Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try
the suit-only way open to returned the
plaint for presentation before appropriate
Court/Authority-but can not either dismiss
or pass any order affecting rights of parties
on merit-appeal partly allowed.
Held: Para-11
In view of above exposition of law and
considering the fact that Court below has
correctly came to the conclusion that in
respect
to
orders
passed
under
the
provisions of Act, 1972, Civil Court in a suit
under Section 9 C.P.C., has no jurisdiction to
declare
orders
passed
by
competent
authority under Act, 1972 illegal, it had not
authority to proceed to decide other issues
on merits. In our view, the Court below has
rightly held that it had no jurisdiction to try
the suit. In these circumstances, the only
way open to it was to return the plaint
instead of proceeding to decide other issues
on merits and dismiss the suit.
(Delivered by Hon'ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.)
1. Heard Sri Kshitij Shailendra,
learned counsel for appellant and perused
the record. None appeared on behalf of
respondents, though the case has been
called in revised. In the circumstances, we
proceed ex-parte to decide the appeal.
2.
This appeal under Section 96 of
Code of Civil Procedure has arisen from
judgment and decree dated 31.1.2005 passed
by Sri Dharam Singh, Additional District
Judge, Court No. 3, Moradabad in Original
Suit No. 617 of 2003.
3. The only point for determination for
adjudicating this appeal is whether the Court
below, when decided issue regarding
jurisdiction holding that it has no jurisdiction
to try the suit, whether could have proceeded
to adjudicate other issues on merits and after
deciding the same on merits, can pass a
judgment and decree of dismissal of suit.
4. Brief facts giving rise to the
present dispute are as under.
5. Plaintiffs-appellants instituted the
aforesaid suit seeking a permanent
injunction against defendants restraining
them from interfering into possession of
plaintiffs in respect to property in dispute,
detailed and described in para 1, 2 and 6
of the plaint, on the basis of proceeding of
P.A. Case No. 7 of 2001 (Kusum Lata Vs.
Doris) and Execution Case No. 15 of
2001 before the Trial Court. Following 11
issues were formulated:
"(1) Whether the defendant Smt.
Doris Herald Meyer executed statement
on 29.1.88 in favour of Abdul Haq and
Abdul Haq on the basis of the said
statement executed sale deed on 2.8.2003
in respect of the constructions standing
thereon and the land of 358.42 sq.M. In
favour of plaintiffs, as alleged in the
plaint?
894
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
(2) Whether the plaintiffs are leasee
of 1453.60 sq.M. Land through registered
lease deed dated 2.8.2003?
(3) Whether the ex parte order
passed in petition No. 7 of 2001 of U.P.
Act No. 13/72 is illegal and void, which is
passed in favour of defendants No. 1 to 3
being in favour of defendants No. 1 to 3
being the heir of Sanjay Goyal and
defendants want to evict the plaintiffs in
Execution Case no. 15/01 on the basis of
the said order, who are bona fide
purchasers for the value?
(4) Whether late Chunna had let out
the property on 31.5.1920 detailed in
para 10 of W.S. to late A.D. Meyer for 10
years for raising constructions thereon,
which later on extended on 2.6.1933 upto
the year 1943 and it was agreed that after
termination of tenancy constructions shall
be removed otherwise on the basis of the
written statement of Smt. Doris Herald
Meyer dated 3.4.1937 and according to
the provision of T.P. Act and section 29/A
of U.P. Act 13, 72, lessor/owner shall
become the owner of the constructions
also?
(5)
Whether
there
is
no
any
compound of Ram Kumar Singhal and
Abdul
Haq
defendant
has
got
unauthorised possession of the land of
defendants no. 1 to 3, as alleged in para
11 of the w.s. and the suit is bad for nonjoinder of Ram Kumar Singhal and
Jamila Khatoon?
(6) Whether there is any power of
attorney in favour of Abuld Haq and in
the title of suit, Abdul Haq defendant is
wrongly shown the power of attorney
holder?
(7) Whether the statement in favour
of Abdul Haq is not registered nor it
bears signatures of Smt. Doris Herald
Meyer nor it has any signatures of the
witnesses and the seal of the Notary is
forged
because
Government
of
Switzerland uses Monogram of Notary?
(8) Whether Abdul Haq is not the
Proprietor of the Alpex Traders and
unauthorised
has
shown
him
as
proprietor of the Alpex Traders?
(9) Whether the suit is time barred?
(10) Whether the Civil Court has no
jurisdiction to try the suit?
(11) To what relief, if any, are the
plaintiffs entitled?
6.
As noted above, Issue No. 10
relates to very jurisdiction of the Civil Court
to try the aforesaid suit. This issue has been
decided by the Court below along with
Issue No. 3 holding that Civil Court has no
jurisdiction to try the suit and proceedings
under U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of
Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972
(hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1972") and
any order passed therein or in execution on
account of the order passed therein, cannot
be challenged in Civil Court. Having said
so, Court below then proceeded further to
decide other issues on merits and thereafter
dismissed suit vide impugned judgment and
decree.
7. Learned counsel for appellants
submitted that once the Court finds that it
has no jurisdiction to try the suit, it should
have
returned
plaint
and
had
no
jurisdiction to dismiss the suit or proceed
to decide the suit on merits and to that
extent, judgment of Court below is nullity
and without jurisdiction. He placed
reliance on Supreme Court decision in
R.S.D.V. Finance Co. Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shree
Vallabh Glass Works Ltd. AIR 1993 SC
2094, a Single Judge judgment of this
Court in Ram Swaroop Vs. Kalicharan
1995 (2) ARC 370 and Bombay High
Court's decision in Shreyans Industries
Vs. State of U.P. 2004 (2) ICC 773.
2 All] Ravi Singhal & Ors. Vs. Rajeev Goyal & Ors.
895
8. The Apex Court in R.S.D.V.
Finance Co. Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shree Vallabh
Glass Works Ltd (supra) has observed in
para 7 as under:
"The Division Bench was totally
wrong in passing an order of dismissal of
the suit itself when it had arrived at the
conclusion that the High Court had no
jurisdiction to try the suit. The only
course
to
be
adopted
in
such
circumstances was to return the plaint for
presentation to the proper Court and not
to dismiss the suit."
9. Similarly, in Ram Swaroop Vs.
Kalicharan (supra), the Court held:
"Obviously, once it is found by the
appellate court that the trial Court lacked
jurisdiction to entertain the suit any
further adjudication upon merit of other
issues by it would be without jurisdiction
and nullity.
The lower appellate court has
categorically found that the revenue court
alone had jurisdiction to take cognizance
of the suit and it was not cognizable by
the trial Court, namely, the Court of
Munsif. After this finding and conclusion,
only course open to the lower appellate
court was to direct, after setting aside the
decree and judgment of the trial court, the
return of the plaint for presentation to the
revenue court. It acted illegally in
adjudicating upon other issues on merit
and dismissing the suit." (emphasis
added)
10. Similar view was taken in
Shreyans Industries Vs. State of U.P.
(supra), observing:
"Once the Court comes to the
conclusion that it has no jurisdiction to
entertain the suit, the only course open to the
Court is to return the plaint to the plaintiff to
be presented in the competent Court and any
finding recorded on merits of the matter
would be of no consequence. If plaint is
returned for want of jurisdiction and the
same Court also records findings on merits,
such findings are without jurisdiction and
null and void."
11. In view of above exposition of
law and considering the fact that Court
below
has
correctly
came
to
the
conclusion that in respect to orders passed
under the provisions of Act, 1972, Civil
Court in a suit under Section 9 C.P.C., has
no jurisdiction to declare orders passed by
competent authority under Act, 1972
illegal, it had not authority to proceed to
decide other issues on merits. In our view,
the Court below has rightly held that it
had no jurisdiction to try the suit. In these
circumstances, the only way open to it
was to return the plaint instead of
proceeding to decide other issues on
merits and dismiss the suit.
12. In view of above, the appeal is
allowed partly. The findings of Trial
Court on issues, other than Issue No. 3
and 10, are hereby set aside. The
impugned judgment and decree dated
31.1.2005 is modified to the extent that
since original Suit No. 617 of 2003, in
view of the finding recorded on issues no.
3 and 10, was not triable by Civil Court,
the plaint shall be returned to plaintiffs for
being presented in the Court of competent
jurisdiction.
13. There shall be no order as to
costs.
--------
896
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 20.08.2015
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE DR. DHANANJAYA YESHWANT
CHANDRACHUD, C.J.
THE HON'BLE SHRI NARAYAN SHUKLA, J.
Special Appeal Defective No. 360 of 2015
State of U.P. & Ors.
 ...Appellants
Versus
Ramesh Chandra Tiwari & Ors.
...Respondents
Counsel for the Appellants:
C.S.C.
Counsel for the Respondents:
Manoj Kumar Dwivedi
U.P. Basic Education Act-Rule 29-Age of
superannuation-by
G.O.
15.10.2014academic session 2015-16-start from April to
March 2016-such teachers retiring between
mid session of academic session- entitled to
continue
upto
31.03.2016-G.O.-15.06.15
being contrary to proviso of Rule 29-quashed.
Held: Para-11
On the facts of the present special appeal,
the dates of superannuation of the four
respondent teachers would respectively be
1 June 2015, 27 May 2015, 4 June 2015 and
30 June 2015. All these teachers worked in
academic session 2015-16 commencing
from 1 April 2015 in the normal course,
without taking the benefits of the proviso to
Rule 29. Since the dates of their retirement
fell in the midst of the academic session,
they would plainly be entitled to continue in
service until the end of the academic
session, as envisaged in the proviso to Rule
29.
The
Secretary,
Basic
Education,
Government of U P, who decided upon the
issue on 15 June 2015 has taken a view
clearly contrary to the mandate of the
proviso to Rule 29.
Case Law discussed:
Special Appeal (D) No. 492 of 2015; Special
Appeal No. 483 decided on 24 July 2015;
Special Appeal No. 227 of 2015, decided on 9
June 2015.
(Delivered by Hon'ble DR. D.Y. Chandrachud,
C.J.)
1.
The respondents, who are the
original petitioners in writ proceedings
instituted before the learned Single Judge
under Article 226 of the Constitution, are
working as Assistant Teachers or, as the
case may be, Head Masters of primary
institutions conducted and managed by
the Uttar Pradesh Basic Education Board
at
Allahabad.
The
institutions
are
recognized under the Uttar Pradesh Basic
Education Act, 19721. The Uttar Pradesh
Basic Education Teachers Service Rules,
19812 framed
under the
Act,
are
applicable to teachers of primacy schools.
Rule 29 provides as follows:
"29. Age of superannuation.- Every
teacher shall retire from service in the
afternoon of the last day of the month in
which he attains the age of 62 years:
Provided that a teacher who retires
during an academic session (July 1 to
June 30) shall continue to work till the
end of the academic session, that is, June
30 and such period of service will be
deemed
as
extended
period
of
employment."
2. For convenience of reference, we
are referring to the parties by their
description in the original writ petition.
The dates of birth of the four petitioners
are respectively 1 June 1953, 27 May
1953, 4 June 1953 and 30 June 1953.
Consequently, the dates of retirement of
the four teachers on attaining the age of
superannuation of 62 years were 1 June