# Ravindra Kumar Singh & Anr v. Union of India & Ors

- **Citation:** (2019) 3 ILRA 1370
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2019-09-19
- **Case number:** Writ C No. 42225 of 2014
- **Bench:** Pradeep Kumar Singh Baghel, Piyush Agarwal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ravindra-kumar-singh-anr-v-union-of-india-ors-44674
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

A. Civil Law-National Highways Act, 1956 -
Section 3-H (4) - Land Acquisition - Dispute
of share in Property - In the event any
dispute arose between parties in respect of
their
share
in
the
property
and
consequently
in
the
amount
of
compensation, it is obligatory on the
competent authority to refer the matter to
the Civil Court for the apportionment of the
shares of the co-sharers. (Para 20)
B. National Highways Act, 1956 - Section 3GObject- Security against unnecessary and
protracted
litigation
-
Legislature
3 All. Ravindra Kumar Singh & Anr. Vs. Union of India & Ors.
1371
has taken care that entire acquisition
proceeding
may
be
completed
as
expeditiously
as
possible
and
unnecessary litigation be avoided and at
the same time the interest of the land
owner has also been taken care of -
Scheme of the Act has been designed to
ensure that amount of compensation be
paid to owner of the land without
protracted litigation - Section 3G (5)
provides for arbitration. It clearly shows
the
intention
of
legislature
for
expeditious
payment
of
the
compensation to the owners. (Para 21)

C. National Highways Act, 1956 - Section
76-A - Power of Review - Determination
of Compensation by competent authority
- Power of review is not an inherent
power. It has to be conferred by the
statute
by
an
express
or
specific
provision - National Highways Act, 1956
does not empower the Collector to
review an order passed by him under
Section 76-A - In the absence of any
power of review, the Collector could not
subsequently reconsider his previous
decisions - Hence, the order of review is
without jurisdiction. (Para 31, 32 & 34)

Writ petition allowed (E-1)
Case law relied: -

## Text

1370 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the Inquiring Officer or Officers does not
appeal to the Disciplinary Authority. The
Disciplinary
Authority
has
enough
powers to reconsider the evidence itself
and come to its own conclusion under
Rule 9.

13. In our view the rules do not
contemplate an action such as was taken
by the Collector on February 13, 1962. It
seems to us that the Collector, instead of
taking
responsibility
himself,
was
determined to get some officer to report
against the appellant. The procedure
adopted was not only not warranted by
the rules but was harassing to the
appellant." (Emphasis supplied) and
allowed the appeal of K.R. Deb.

23. It can be seen from the
above that the normal rule is that there
can be only one Enquiry. This Court has
also recognized the possibility of a
further Enquiry in certain circumstances
enumerated
therein.
The
decision
however makes it clear that the fact that
the Report submitted by the Enquiring
Authority is not acceptable to the
disciplinary authority, is not a ground
for completely setting aside the enquiry
report and ordering a second Enquiry."

29. Though in the above judgment
this Court was interpreting a particular
rule but where there is no rule, it is all the
more necessary to first set aside earlier
enquiry before proceeding for fresh
enquiry. Thus, in view of the above legal
position and even otherwise on findings
as we have discussed in detail, the order
dated 2.6.2008 unsustainable and the
same is, accordingly quashed.

30. It is, however, left open for the
respondents to consider the reply, audit
report and vouchers submitted by the
petitioners in respect of the work against
which in the first inquiry report it was
found that Rs.44,194/- was spent. For rest
of
the
charges,
the
matter
stands
concluded and is not permitted to be
reopened.

31. In view of the above, the writ
petition is allowed to the above extent.
----------

(2019)11ILR A1370

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 19.09.2019

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE PRADEEP KUMAR SINGH
BAGHEL, J.
THE HON'BLE PIYUSH AGARWAL, J.

Writ C No. 42225 of 2014

Ravindra Kumar Singh & Anr.
 ...Petitioners
Versus
Union of India & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri S. Shekhar, Sri Prakher Tandon, Sri
V.K. Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., A.S.G.I., Sri Devendra Kumar, Sri
M.C. Tripathi

A. Civil Law-National Highways Act, 1956 -
Section 3-H (4) - Land Acquisition - Dispute
of share in Property - In the event any
dispute arose between parties in respect of
their
share
in
the
property
and
consequently
in
the
amount
of
compensation, it is obligatory on the
competent authority to refer the matter to
the Civil Court for the apportionment of the
shares of the co-sharers. (Para 20)
B. National Highways Act, 1956 - Section 3GObject- Security against unnecessary and
protracted
litigation
-
Legislature
3 All. Ravindra Kumar Singh & Anr. Vs. Union of India & Ors.
1371
has taken care that entire acquisition
proceeding
may
be
completed
as
expeditiously
as
possible
and
unnecessary litigation be avoided and at
the same time the interest of the land
owner has also been taken care of -
Scheme of the Act has been designed to
ensure that amount of compensation be
paid to owner of the land without
protracted litigation - Section 3G (5)
provides for arbitration. It clearly shows
the
intention
of
legislature
for
expeditious
payment
of
the
compensation to the owners. (Para 21)

C. National Highways Act, 1956 - Section
76-A - Power of Review - Determination
of Compensation by competent authority
- Power of review is not an inherent
power. It has to be conferred by the
statute
by
an
express
or
specific
provision - National Highways Act, 1956
does not empower the Collector to
review an order passed by him under
Section 76-A - In the absence of any
power of review, the Collector could not
subsequently reconsider his previous
decisions - Hence, the order of review is
without jurisdiction. (Para 31, 32 & 34)

Writ petition allowed (E-1)
Case law relied: -

1. Chandra Bhan Singh Vs Latafat Ullah Khan
AIR 1978 SC 1814.

2.
Kuntesh
Vs
Management,
H.K.
Mahavidyalaya, Sitapur AIR 1987 SC 2186.
3. Patel Chunibhai Dajibha Vs Narayanrao
Khanderao Jambekar (1965) 2 SCR 328 : AIR
1965 SC 1457.
4.
Kalabharati
Advertising
Vs
Hemant
Vimalnath Narichania (2010) 9 SCC 437.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Pradeep Kumar
Singh Baghel, J. &
Hon'ble Piyush Agarwal, J.)

1. This Writ Petition takes exception
of an Order dated 05.06.2014 passed by
the Competent Authority, the respondent
No. 2 under the provisions of The
National Highways Act, 1956 (for short
'the Act' ).

2. The brief facts which are
necessary to dispose of this Writ Petition
are recapitulated as under.

3. Petitioners are two in number
they are real brothers. Their grievance is
that Khasra No. 21, Gata No. 435/1.951
hectare in village Hatisa Tehsil Hathras,
was
their
ancestral
property.
Their
grandfather Laxman Singh was recorded
tenure holder. He had four sons, Heera
Singh, Megha Singh, Kalyan Singh and
Babu Singh. Both the Petitioner are sons
of Babu Singh. Heera Singh and kalyan
singh died issueless.

4. The said plot was acquired under
the provisions of the Act for widening of
National Highway No.93 between 0.000
to KM 79.00 ( Agra-Aligarh Division).

5. On 6.08.2011, the Central
Government made a notification under
Section 3-A(1) in two local newspapers
inviting objections , if any, from any
person interested in the land mentioned in
the Notification.

6. The Competent authority received
a large number of objections. After
disposing them a report was sent to the
Central Government. On 4.07.2012, the
Central
Government
published
a
Notification in the official Gazette under
section 3 D of the Act declaring that land
has been acquired for the road widening
and it came to vest in the Central
1372 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
government free from all encumbrances a
charges.

7.

The
competent
Authority
thereafter proceeded to determine the
compensation in terms of sub section (4)
of section 3 G of the Act. A notification
was issued in two local newspapers by the
competent
authority.
The
competent
Authority vide order dated 01.03.2013
has determined the compensation. The
order is on the record.

8. Dissatisfied with the Award the
Claimants moved the applications under
Sub Section (5) of section 3G the Act.
The
arbitrator
by his
order
dated
17.8.2013 affirmed the award of the
competent authority. He held that the
compensation for agricultural land shall
be awarded at the rate of Rs 625 sq. m .
and commercial land at the circle rate
prevailing in August 2011.

9. It is stated that the dispute arose
amongst the petitioners and their Cousin
Brothers who are co sharer in respect of
shares of Heera Singh and Kalyan Singh
who died issueless. They filed objections
for the apportionment of their share. In
their objection they pointed out that
several litigation is pending in revenue
courts for their claim. Thus they made the
prayer that compensation be not be paid
to any party till the decisions of Revenue
courts where the matters are pending.

10. Mr. Ravindra Kumar Singh and
another, the petitioners herein , filed a Writ
Petition No. 68135 of 2013, which was
disposed of by a Division Bench of this Court
on 21.2.2014, with the consent of parties.

11. Pursuant to the orderof this
Court dated 21.2.2014, the matter was
sent to the competent authority for release
of the undisputed amount amongst the
petitioners and other co-owners, however,
by the impugned order, the competent
authority has reopened the matter on the
merit
and
has
re
determined
the
compensation changing the nature of land
from commercial to agricultural by a nonspeaking and skeletal order.

12. We have heard learned counsel
for the petitioner, Mr. V. K. Singh, learned
Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Prakher
Tandon, and learned Standing Counsel for
the State.

13. It is contended on behalf of the
petitioners that the competent authorityrespondent No. 2 does not have any
authority to review his own order as the
Act does not confer any power of review
upon the competent authority.

14. Elaborating his submission it
was urged that once an award has become
final, the competent authority has no
power to reopen the entire issue on
merits. It was strenuously submitted by
learned Senior Advocate that the Division
Bench passed the order dated 21.2.2014
with the consent of parties whereby a
direction was issued to the competent
authority
to
release
the
undisputed
amount. The competent authority was
bound to release undisputed amount as
per direction issued by the Division
Bench. But the competent authority has
misdirected itself by reopening the entire
issue on merits contrary to the direction
of the Division Bench of this Court.

15. Learned Standing Counsel
submits that the competent authority
found
that
earlier
demand
of
the
compensation on the basis of nature of
3 All. Ravindra Kumar Singh & Anr. Vs. Union of India & Ors.
1373
land was incorrect, hence, he was justified
to reopen the entire issue. However,
learned Standing Counsel has very fairly
submitted that statute of the Highways
Act does not confer any power upon the
competent authority to review his own
order.

16. Mr. Singh has placed reliance
upon the judgments of the Supreme Court
rendered in Chandra Bhan Singh vs.
Latafat Ullah Khan1, and Kuntesh v.
Management,
H.K.
Mahavidyalaya,
Sitapur2.

17. We have heard the learned
counsel for the parties and have perused
the material on record.

18. Indisputably, the petitioner's
father was one of the co- sharer of the
land and his title has not been challenged
in the proceedings. The only dispute was
in respect of the apportionment of the
four co-owners. The said issue was
referred under sub section (4) of Section
3-H of the Act.

19. At this stage it would be
advantageous to set out Section 3-H (4) of
the Act .It reads thus:

"3-H(4) If any dispute arises as
to the apportionment of the amount or
any part thereof or to any person to whom
the same or any part thereof is payable,
the competent authority shall refer the
dispute to the decision of the principal
civil court of original jurisdiction within
the limits of whose jurisdiction the land is
situated."

20. As can be seen in the event of
any dispute arose between parties in
respect of their share in the property and
consequently
in
the
amount
of
compensation the said provision makes it
obligatory on the competent authority to
refer the matter to the Civil Court for the
apportionment of the shares of the cosharers. We do not find it appropriate to
advert
the
said
issue
in
present
proceedings. Concededly, the said dispute
is still pending before the District Judge.

21. The scheme of the Act provides
different
stages
for
acquisition,
determination
and
payment
of
the
compensation to the land owner . A
combined reading of the Section 3A ,3B
,3C, 3D, 3E ,3 G and 3 H shows that
though the provisions of the land
Acquisition Act is not applicable but the
Legislature has taken care that entire
acquisition proceeding may be completed
as
expeditiously
as
possible
and
unnecessary litigation be avoided. At the
same time the interest of the land owner
has also been taken care of. The scheme
of the act has been designed to ensure that
amount of compensation be paid to owner
of the land without protracted litigation.
The sub section (5) of section 3G which
provides the Arbitration, clearly shows
the intention of legislature for expeditious
payment of the compensation to the
owners. Section 3G itself cast an duty on
the competent authority to safeguard the
interest of all the stake holders.

22. It is apposite to note that the
aforesaid sections have been inserted by
an amendment Act 16 of 1997(w.e.f.
24.01.197).

23. It is material to note that the
petitioners have approached this Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India for a direction to the competent
authority
to
release
the
undisputed
1374 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
amount. The parties concerned stated
before the Division Bench that appending
determination of the share under Section
3 H (4) by competent Civil Court, the
competent authority be directed to release
the payment of 1/4 share each to the
petitioners as well as to respondent nos. 4
to 9. Thus, the Division Bench having
recorded the consent of the parties,
directed the competent court to release the
undisputed amount.

24. Relevant part of the judgment of
the Division Bench reads thus:

"Learned counsel for the parties
are
at
agreement
that
pending
determination of the share under Section
3 H (4) by competent Civil Court the
competent authority be directed to release
the payment of 1/4 share each to the
petitioners as well as to respondent nos. 4
to 9.

In view of above the competent
court is directed to make the payment of
1/4 compensation to both the petitioners
jointly and 1/4 to respondent nos. 4 to 9
jointly.

The payment of rest of the
compensation i.e. balance 1/2 shall be
made as per order of the Civil Court
under Section 3H(4). We further observed
that the payment in so far as the
descendants of Megha Singh respondent
nos. 4 to 9 are concerned be made as per
their entitlement. The rest 1/2 of the
compensation shall be deposited in an
interest bearing account in a nationalized
Bank.

With these observations, the
present petition is disposed of."

25. The order unmistakably shows
that there was a clear direction to the
competent
authority
to
release
the
undisputed amount. The Court has not
given any room for redetermination of the
compensation
amount
which
was
determined earlier by the competent
authority which was affirmed by the
Arbitrator. Suffice to say that the order
was passed after hearing all the parties
with their consent.

26. After the Division Bench passed
the aforesaid order dated 21.2.2014, the
competent authority has reopened the
entire matter and changed the basis of
determination
of
the
compensation
regarding commercial use of the land by
recording a finding contrary to the Award
which had attained finality.

27. Regard being had to the fact that
the competent authority in its order dated
3.12.1013 has decided petitioners claim
as Claim Number 4. In his order he has
determined the compensation on the basis
of circle rate prevalent on 01.08.2010.
Accordingly he found that market value
of commercial land was Rs 4000 sq.m (Rs
4,00,00,000.0 in the words, Four Crore
per Hectare) and Agricultural land at the
rate of Rs 300 sq.m( Rs. 30,00,000, in the
words, Thirty lacs per Hectare)

28. The Arbitrator has not reversed
the order rather it has affirmed the award
and enhanced the compensation in respect
of Agricultural land.

29. Worthy of mention here is that
chart appended with the order of
Arbitrator's order clearly mentions the
amount of compensation awarded to the
petitioners

30. The question, therefore, that
falls for consideration is whether if the
competent authority has the authority to
3 All. Ravindra Kumar Singh & Anr. Vs. Union of India & Ors.
1375
review the order which has attained the
finality.

31. We find unbroken line of
authority to the effect that power of
review is not an inherent power .It needs
to be conferred by the statute by express
or specific provision. In absence of any
such power the order simply becomes
without jurisdiction. The legal position in
this regard is much too well settled to
require any reiteration. We may in this
regard gainfully refer to the decision of
the Supreme Court in Patel Chunibhai
Dajibha
v.
Narayanrao
Khanderao
Jambekar3.

32. The Act does not empower the
Collector to review an order passed by
him under Section 76-A. In the absence of
any power of review, the Collector could
not subsequently reconsider his previous
decisions and hold that there were
grounds for annulling or reversing the
Mahalkari's order. The subsequent order
dated February 17, 1959 reopening the
matter was illegal, ultra vires and without
jurisdiction. The High Court ought to
have quashed the order of the Collector
dated February 17, 1959 on this ground.

33. The said judgement has been
consistently followed by the Supreme
Court, in Kalabharati Advertising v.
Hemant Vimalnath Narichania4 the
Supreme Court has made the following
observation:

"Review in absence of statutory
provisions

12. It is settled legal proposition
that unless the statute/rules so permit, the
review application is not maintainable in
case of judicial/quasi-judicial orders. In
the absence of any provision in the Act
granting an express power of review, it is
manifest that a review could not be made
and the order in review, if passed, is ultra
vires, illegal and without jurisdiction.
(Vide
Patel
Chunibhai
Dajibha
v.
Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar and
Harbhajan Singh v. Karam Singh.)

13. In Patel Narshi Thakershi v.
Pradyuman Singhji Arjunsinghji, Major
Chandra Bhan Singh v. Latafat Ullah
Khan4, Kuntesh Gupta (Dr.) v. Hindu
Kanya Mahavidyalaya, State of Orissa v.
Commr. of Land Records and Settlement6
and Sunita Jain v. Pawan Kumar Jain this
Court held that the power to review is not
an inherent power. It must be conferred by
law either expressly/specifically or by
necessary implication and in the absence
of any provision in the Act/Rules, review
of an earlier order is impermissible as
review
is
a
creation
of
statute.
Jurisdiction of review can be derived only
from the statute and thus, any order of
review in the absence of any statutory
provision for the same is a nullity, being
without jurisdiction."

34. Applying the said principle, we
find that the competent authority has
traveled beyond its jurisdiction to review
its own order. He has ventured to sit over
the order by his predecessor in reopening
the Award. Hence, in the absence of any
power of review, impugned order passed
by the competent authority in the present
case is without jurisdiction.

35. In view of the above, the order
passed by the competent authority dated
05.06.2014 needs to be set aside and it is
accordingly set aside.

36. We direct the competent
authority to comply with the directions of
the Division Bench passed in Writ
1376 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Petition No. 68135 of 2013 wherein a
direction has been issued to release the
undisputed amount amongst the coowners in terms of the chart appended to
the order of Arbitrator.

37. With the aforesaid observations
present writ petition is allowed.
----------

(2019)11ILR A1376

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 21.08.2019

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE RAMESH SINHA, J.
THE HON'BLE AJIT KUMAR, J.

Writ C No. 42911 of 2008

Ranjeet ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri A. Kumar Singh, Smt. D. Gupta

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

A. Constitution of India - Art. 14 -
Natural Justice - Cancellation - Fair price
shop - No discussion of reply of the
petitioner - Every administrative action
and administrative enquiry should result
in an order passed on reasons indicative
of the application of mind, by the
authority - No full-fledged inquiry -
cancellation
order
deserves
to
be
quashed. (Para 11 & 17)

B. Scope of Writ - Non-disclosure of
facts - Disclosure of criminal case is not
required when fair price shop license is
granted earlier to such criminal case.
(Para 18 & 19)

Writ Petition allowed (E-1)
Case law relied: -
1. Rashmi Metaliks Ltd. & anr. Vs Kolkata
Metropolitan Development Authority & ors.
(2013) 10 SCC 95.
2. T.P. Senkumar. IPS Vs Union of India & ors.
(2017) 6 SCC 801.

3. Mangalam Organics Ltd. Vs Union of India
(2017) 7 SCC 221.
4. Puran Singh Vs St. of U.P. (Writ Petition
no. 55845 of 2009, decided on 19/12/2011).
(Delivered by Hon'ble Ramesh Sinha, J.
Hon'ble Ajit Kumar, J.)

1. Heard Sri A. Kumar Singh,
learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri
S.N. Shukla, learned Standing Counsel
for the State respondents.

2. By means of this writ petition
under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, the petitioner has approached this
Court for quashing the order dated
31.07.2008 by which the fair price shop
license of the petitioner has been
cancelled on the ground that there were
two criminal cases pending against the
petitioner bearing Case Crime No. 183 of
2008, under Sections 452/ 323, 504, 506
IPC and one Non-Cognizable Report (for
short 'NCR') No. 98 of 2007, under
Sections 323, 504, 506 IPC.

3. Initially writ petition was
entertained by a Division Bench of this
Court vide order dated 21.08.2008 and
this Court while noticing the argument of
learned counsel for the petitioner that the
offences that were though criminal in
nature but were petty offences and should
not have formed the basis of cancellation
of fair price shop license, stayed the effect
and operation of the impugned order
31.07.2008.