# Ravindra Kumar Yadav v. State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2024) 5 ILRA 1846
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-05-27
- **Case number:** Application U/S 482 No. 2491 of 2024
- **Bench:** Shamim Ahmed
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ravindra-kumar-yadav-v-state-of-u-p-anr-51896
- **Pages:** 15

## Headnote

Civil Law - Negotiable Instrument Act,1881
- Section 147-Application filed to compound the
offence u/s 138 NI Act and to quash the
impugned judgment whereby Applicant has been
convicted u/s 138 NI Act-sec. 147 N.I.Act -
parties have settled the dispute amicably-the said
Act is at liberty to compound the matter at any
stage-compounding of the offence may be
released by invoking sec.482 Cr.P.C. read with
Article 226 of the Constitution of India-no bar.

Application allowed. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

_Characters 0–39,850 of 51,078. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39850 for what follows._

1846 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
grievances. Thus, no interference is required
by this Court to entertain the instant
application moved under Section 407
Cr.P.C. and the same is liable to be rejected.

6. The present application is,
accordingly, rejected.
----------
(2024) 5 ILRA 1846
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 27.05.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SHAMIM AHMED, J.

Application U/S 482 No. 2491 of 2024

Ravindra Kumar Yadav ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicant:
Veer Bahadur La Srivasta, Alok Kumar
Mishra, Chandan Srivastava

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
G.A., Dharmendra Gupta

Civil Law - Negotiable Instrument Act,1881
- Section 147-Application filed to compound the
offence u/s 138 NI Act and to quash the
impugned judgment whereby Applicant has been
convicted u/s 138 NI Act-sec. 147 N.I.Act -
parties have settled the dispute amicably-the said
Act is at liberty to compound the matter at any
stage-compounding of the offence may be
released by invoking sec.482 Cr.P.C. read with
Article 226 of the Constitution of India-no bar.

Application allowed. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:

1. Damodar S. Prabhu Vs Sayed Babalal H 2010
(2) SCC (Cri) 1328

2. M/s Meters and Instruments Pvt. Ltd. & anr. Vs
Kanchan Mehta, 2017 (7) Supreme 558
3. Kripal Singh Pratap Singh Ori Vs Salvinder Kaur
Hardip Singh , 2004 Crl. L. J. 3786

4. Vinay Devanna Nayak Vs Ryot Seva Sahkari
Bank Limited, AIR 2008 SC 716

5. Tanveer Aquil Vs St. of M.P. & anr. (19990)
Supp SCC 63

6. Narinder Singh Vs St. of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC
466

7. Rajinder Prasad Vs Bashir & ors.; AIR 2001 SC
3524

8. Krishan Vs Krishnaveni, (1997) 4 SCC 241

9. S.W. Palankattkar & ors. Vs St. of Bihar, 2002
(44) ACC 168

10.
Municipal
Corporation,
Indore
Vs
Ratnaprabha (AIR 1977 SC 308)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Shamim Ahmed, J.)

1. Heard Sri Veer Bahadur Lal
Srivastava,
learned
counsel
for
the
applicant, Sri Ashok Srivastava, learned
A.G.A. for the State opposite party no.1 and
Sri Dharmendra Gupta, learned counsel for
the opposite party no.2

2. The instant application under section
482 Cr. P.C. has been filed with the prayer to
compound the offence committed by the
applicant under Section 138 of the
Negotiable
Instrument Act,
1881
in
Complaint Case No.7097 of 2017, Police
Station
Talkatora,
District
Lucknow
(Sanchetna
Financial
Services
Private
Limited Vs. Ravindra Kumar Yadav) and
further to quash the impugned judgment and
order dated 07.04.2021 passed by learned
Court of Additional Court No.3 (N.I. Act),
Lucknow, whereby the applicant has been
convicted under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 and has
been directed to undergo imprisonment for
5 All. Ravindra Kumar Yadav Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1847
two years alongwith fine of Rs.45,00,000/-
and in case of default of payment of fine, the
applicant has been directed to undergo
additional simple imprisonment for a period
of
one
and
half
year. A
sum
of
Rs.38,00,000/- was directed to be paid to the
complainant as damages.

3. The facts of the case, in brief, are
that the applicant had taken a sum of
Rs.30,00,000/- as loan from the opposite
party no.2 and became defaulter in paying
the installment.

4. Thereafter, the applicant agreed to
pay the entire dues to the opposite party no.2
and had issued cheque bearing No.000034
dated 05.09.2017 of Kotak Mahindra Bank,
Vishal Khand, Gomti Nagar, Lucknow for
Rs.27,60,000/-, however, when the same
was presented by the opposite party no.2, it
got dishonored with the reason "Funds
Insufficient".

5. Thereafter, the opposite party no.2
filed a Complaint Case No.7097 of 2017,
under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instrument Act, 1881, Police Station
Talkatora, District Lucknow. After the
completion of trial, the trial court has
convicted the applicant vide judgment and
order dated 07.04.2021 and sentenced him
for a period of two years alongwith fine of
Rs.45,00,000/- and in case of default of
payment of fine, the applicant has been
directed to undergo additional simple
imprisonment for a period of one and half
year. A sum of Rs.38,00,000/- was directed
to be paid to the complainant as damages.

6. Thereafter, the applicant has
preferred a Criminal Appeal No.165 of 2021
against the impugned judgment and order
dated 07.04.2021 passed by the learned
Additional Court No.3 (N.I. Act), Lucknow,
however, the same was dismissed by means
of judgment and order dated 16.01.2024
passed by the learned Additional Sessions
Judge, Court No.3, Lucknow and the
applicant was directed to surrender before
the learned trial court on 07.02.2024 to
undergo sentence.

7. The applicant had already deposited
Rs.9,00,000/- before the learned Additional
Court No.3 (N.I. Act), Lucknow in
compliance of the order passed by learned
Sessions Judge, Lucknow during the hearing
of Criminal Appeal No.165 of 2021.

8. Thereafter, the applicant had
preferred a Criminal Revision before this
Court bearing Criminal Revision No.104 of
2024, which too got dismissed at the
admission
stage
vide
order
dated
08.02.2024.

9. Learned counsel for the applicant
submits that the applicant has surrendered
himself before the learned trial court on
07.02.2024 in compliance of the judgment
and order dated 16.01.2024 passed by the
court of learned Additional Sessions Judge,
Court No.3, Lucknow in Criminal Appeal
No.165 of 2021 and now he is languishing
in jail in connection with the aforesaid case.

10. Learned counsel for the applicant
further submits that after the rejection of
Criminal Revision No.104 of 2024, both the
parties have entered into compromise and a
written
compromise
agreement
dated
07.03.2024 has been prepared to the effect
that the instant matter shall be settled in
accordance with the terms and conditions as
contained therein.

11. Learned counsel for the applicant
further submits that the applicant is ready to
make
payment
of
Rs.38,00,000/-
in
1848 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
accordance with the terms and conditions as
contained
in
the
compromise
dated
07.03.2024.
He
further
submits
that
Rs.20,00,000/- has been received by the
opposite party no.2 through Demand Draft
No.253932 dated 07.03.2024 of Yes Bank
Ltd., Gomti Nagar, Lucknow.

12. With this background, learned
counsel for the applicant has submitted that
this petition has been filed on 12.03.2024 on
the basis of changed circumstances with the
prayer to compound the offence. Learned
counsel further submits that this Hon'ble
Court may invoke its inherent power under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. so that ends of justice
could be secured as the object of 'N. I. Act'
is primarily compensatory and not punitive
and moreover Section 147 of 'N.I. Act'
would have an overriding effect on section
320 Cr.P.C. irrespective of which stage the
parties are compromising with the kind
leave of this Hon'ble Court.

13. In support of his arguments,
learned counsel for the applicant has
submitted that in the case of Damodar S.
Prabhu vs. Sayed Babalal H reported at
2010 (2) SCC (Cri) 1328, the Hon'ble Apex
Court had formulated the guidelines for
compounding the offence under section 138
N.I. Act wherein in para 21, it was pleased
to observe as under :

"With regard to the progression of
litigation in cheque bouncing cases, the
learned Attorney General has urged this
Court to frame guidelines for a graded
scheme of imposing costs on parties who
unduly delay compounding of the offence. It
was submitted that the requirement of
deposit of the costs will act as a deterrent for
delayed composition, since at present, free
and easy compounding of offences at any
stage, however belated, gives an incentive to
the drawer of the cheque to delay settling the
cases for years. An application for
compounding made after several years not
only results in the system being burdened but
the complainant is also deprived of effective
justice. In view of this submission, we direct
that the following guidelines be followed:-
THE GUIDELINES

(i) In the circumstances, it is
proposed as follows:

(a) That directions can be given
that the Writ of Summons be suitably
modified making it clear to the accused that
he
could
make
an
application
for
compounding of the offences at the first or
second hearing of the case and that if such
an application is made, compounding may
be allowed by the court without imposing
any costs on the accused.

(b) If the accused does not make
an
application
for
compounding
as
aforesaid, then if an application for
compounding is made before the Magistrate
at a subsequent stage, compounding can be
allowed subject to the condition that the
accused will be required to pay 10% of the
cheque amount to be deposited as a
condition for compounding with the Legal
Services Authority, or such authority as the
Court deems fit.

(c) Similarly, if the application for
compounding is made before the Sessions
Court or a High Court in revision or appeal,
such compounding may be allowed on the
condition that the accused pays 15% of the
cheque amount by way of costs.

(d) Finally, if the application for
compounding is made before the Supreme
Court, the figure would increase to 20% of
the cheque amount."

14. Learned counsel for the applicant
also submitted that in the case of M/s
Meters and Instruments Private Limited
and another vs. Kanchan Mehta reported
5 All. Ravindra Kumar Yadav Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1849
at 2017 (7) Supreme 558 Hon'ble the Apex
Court in para 18, was pleased to observe as
under :

i) Offence under Section 138 of the
Act is primarily a civil wrong. Burden of
proof is on accused in view presumption
under Section 139 but the standard of such
proof is "preponderance of probabilities".
The same has to be normally tried
summarily as per provisions of summary
trial under the Cr.P.C. but with such
variation as may be appropriate to
proceedings under Chapter XVII of the Act.
Thus read, principle of Section 258 Cr.P.C.
will apply and the Court can close the
proceedings and discharge the accused on
satisfaction that the cheque amount with
assessed costs and interest is paid and if
there is no reason to proceed with the
punitive aspect.

(ii)The object of the provision
being primarily compensatory, punitive
element being mainly with the object of
enforcing
the
compensatory
element,
compounding at the initial stage has to be
encouraged but is not debarred at later
stage subject to appropriate compensation
as may be found acceptable to the parties or
the Court.

(iii)Though compounding requires
consent of both parties, even in absence of
such consent, the Court, in the interests of
justice,
on
being
satisfied
that
the
complainant has been duly compensated,
can in its discretion close the proceedings
and discharge the accused.

(iv)Procedure for trial of cases
under Chapter XVII of the Act has normally
to be summary. The discretion of the
Magistrate under second proviso to Section
143, to hold that it was undesirable to try the
case summarily as sentence of more than
one year may have to be passed, is to be
exercised after considering the further fact
that
apart
from
the
sentence
of
imprisonment, the Court has jurisdiction
under Section 357(3) Cr.P.C. to award
suitable compensation with default sentence
under Section 64 IPC and with further
powers of recovery under Section 431
Cr.P.C. With this approach, prison sentence
of more than one year may not be required
in all cases.

(v)
Since
evidence
of
the
complaint can be given on affidavit, subject
to the Court summoning the person giving
affidavit and examining him and the bank's
slip being prima facie evidence of the
dishonor of cheque, it is unnecessary for the
Magistrate
to
record
any
further
preliminary
evidence.
Such
affidavit
evidence can be read as evidence at all
stages of trial or other proceedings. The
manner of examination of the person giving
affidavit can be as per Section 264 Cr.P.C.
The scheme is to follow summary procedure
except where exercise of power under
second proviso to Section 143 becomes
necessary, where sentence of one year may
have to be awarded and compensation under
Section 357(3) is considered inadequate,
having regard to the amount of the cheque,
the financial capacity and the conduct of the
accused or any other circumstances.

15. Learned counsel for the applicant
further submitted that the application under
section 482 Cr.P.C. is maintainable after the
dismissal of the revision on merit. To
support of this arguments, he has relied upon
the judgment of Gujarat High Court in the
case of Kripal Singh Pratap Singh Ori vs.
Salvinder Kaur Hardip Singh reported at
2004 Crl. L. J. 3786 wherein, the Gujarat
High Court was pleased to observe as
under:-

"16.I
have
considered
the
decisions cited by the learned counsel for
1850 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the respective party and some other
decisions of the Apex Court and I do not
think it necessary to enlist those decisions
which are taken into consideration for the
purpose of the present proceedings. But
ultimately one balanced principle has
emerged that the petitions invoking inherent
powers under section 482 Cr.P.C. after
dismissal/disposal or revision application
under section 397 Cr.P.C. read with section
401 Cr.P.C., are not maintainable by the
same party, more so when no special
circumstances are made out. The gist of this
ratio is reflected in the decision reported in
AIR 2001 SC 3524 in the case of Rajinder
Prasad vs. Bashir and ors. It was contended
before the Apex Court that as the earlier
revision petition filed by the accused
persons under section 397 of the Code has
been rejected by the High Court vide order
dated 13.7.1990, they had no right to file the
petition under section 482 of the Code with
prayer for QUASHING the same order.
While dealing with the above contention the
Apex Court observed that, "...We do not
agree with the arguments of the learned
counsel for the respondents that as the
earlier application had been dismissed as
not pressed, the accused had acquired a
right to challenge the order adding the
offence under section 395 of the Code ..."
(i.e. IPC) It is further observed that, "We are
of the opinion that no special circumstances
were spelt out in the subsequent application
for invoking the jurisdiction of the High
Court under Section 482 of the Code and the
impugned order is liable to be set aside on
this ground alone."

17. So can be legitimately argued
and inferred and held that in all cases where
the petitioners are able to satisfy this court
that there are special circumstances which
can be clearly spelt out , subsequent
application invoking INHERENT powers
under section 482 Cr.P.C. can be moved and
cannot be thrown away on the technical
argument as to its sustainability. The apex
court in case of Rajendra Prasad (supra)
was dealing with a case related to first part
of section 482 Cr.P.C. but, when it comes to
third part, the approach should remain more
pragmatic and indirect relegation to
Supreme Court, if legally possible, can be
prevented.

31. In the circumstances, it is
hereby declared that the compromise
arrived between the parties to this litigation
out of court is accepted as genuine and the
order of conviction and sentence passed by
the learned JMFC, Vadodara and confirmed
in appeal by the learned Sessions Judge,
Fast Track Court, Vadodara, therefore, on
the given set of facts are hereby quashed and
set aside as this court intends, otherwise to
secure the ends of justice as provided under
section 482 Cr.P.C. Obviously the order
disposing Revision Application would not
have any enforceable effect.

16. Learned counsel for the applicant
has also relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble
the Apex Court in the case of Vinay
Devanna Nayak vs. Ryot Seva Sahkari
Bank Limited reported at AIR 2008 SC
716 wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court was
pleased to observe as under :

"18. Taking into consideration
even the said provision (Section 147) and
the primary object underlying Section 138,
in our judgment, there is no reason to refuse
compromise between the parties. We,
therefore, dispose of the appeal on the basis
of the settlement arrived at between the
appellant and the respondent.

19. For the foregoing reasons the
appeal deserves to be allowed and is
accordingly allowed by holding that since
the matter has been compromised between
the parties and the amount of Rs.45,000/-
5 All. Ravindra Kumar Yadav Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1851
has been paid by the appellant towards full
and final settlement to the respondent-bank
towards its dues, the appellant is entitled to
acquittal. The order of conviction and
sentence recorded by all courts is set aside
and he is acquitted of the charge levelled
against him."

17. Learned counsel for the applicant
has
argued
that
the
law
regarding
compounding of offences under the N.I. Act
is very clear and is no more res integra and
the offences under the N. I. Act can be
compounded even at any stage of the
proceedings. He submits that in terms of the
aforesaid law laid down by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court, the parties may be permitted
to compound the offence and the conviction
of the petitioner be set aside.

18. Per-contra, learned AGA for the
State
has
vehemently
opposed
the
submissions made by the learned counsel for
the applicant and submitted that the instant
application under section 482 Cr.P.C. is not
maintainable as the applicant has already
been convicted by the learned trial court and
the conviction order has been upheld by the
appellate court and by this Hon'ble Court in
the revision. Learned AGA has submitted
that the present application under section
482 Cr.P.C. is not maintainable as the High
Court has dismissed the revision application
on merits. It is further submitted that in view
of the provisions of Sub-section (6) of
Section 320 Cr.P.C. and the observations
made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case of Tanveer Aquil vs. State of M.P. and
another (19990) Supp SCC 63, the parties
should be relegated to the Hon'ble Apex
Court to initiate appropriate proceedings to
get the actual affect of compromise arrived
at between the parties. In the case of
Tanveer Aquil (supra), the appellant was
convicted under section 324 I.P.C. and was
ordered to suffer rigorous imprisonment for
one year and to pay a fine of Rs.500/-. After
the pronouncement of the judgment by the
High Court, the learned Counsel appeared
and pleaded for an opportunity of hearing
and at that stage the High Court again heard
the matter and added a postscript in the
judgment confirming the conviction and
sentence. The petitioner thereafter had
moved the High Court for a compromise to
compound the offence. It was submitted to
the High Court that the accused has paid a
sum of Rs.3,500/- to the complainant and the
learned Counsel for the complainant
confirmed of having received the amount of
Rs. 3,500/- in token of the compromise
arrived between the parties. In Para 1 of the
cited decision the Apex Court has observed
that ".......... but the High Court did not and
indeed could not take into consideration that
application since it has deposed of the
matter already."

19. Learned AGA has also submitted
that when this Court has already rejected the
revision application on merits, whether the
parties or any one of them can be permitted
to place compromise and to get an order of
acquittal from the very Court, is the
question. Therefore, in more than one
decisions, the Hon'ble Apex Court has
observed that the petition invoking inherent
powers under section 482 Cr.P.C. is not
maintainable when the earlier revision
application filed under Section 397 Cr.P.C.
read with Section 401 Cr.P.C. seeking same
or similar relief, when dismissed on merit,
or has not pressed. However, in the same
way the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed in
more than one cases that such petitions,
though otherwise, are not maintainable, can
even
be
entertained
when
special
circumstances
are
made
out.
These
observations are in reference to third part of
Section 482 of Cr. P.C. Learned AGA has
1852 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
submitted that the present case is nothing but
a gross misuse of the process of the law.
There is no ground available to the applicant
for invoking the inherent power under
section 482 Cr.P.C. for compounding the
sentence on the basis of the compromise as
filed
by
the
applicant. The
present
application is devoid of any merit hence it is
to be dismissed.

20. I have heard the learned counsel for
the parties and carefully perused the
compromise arrived at between the parties
and other materials on record.

21. Considering the facts as narrated
above, the following two questions arise for
consideration -

Whether an order passed by the
High Court in the criminal revision petition
confirming the conviction can be nullified by
the High Court in a petition filed under
section 482 Cr.P.C. noticing subsequent
compromise of the case by the contesting
parties ?

22. Before answering the aforesaid
questions as framed, I shall examine the
relevant provisions of the Cr.P.C. as well the
Negotiable Instrument Act. I may extract the
Section 320 Cr.P.C., Section 147 of the
Negotiable Instrument Act and Section 482
Cr.P.C.

Section 320 Cr.P.C. - Compounding
of Offences -

1) The offences punishable under
the sections of the Indian Penal Code (45 of
1860), specified in the first two columns of
the
Table
next
following
may
be
compounded by the persons mentioned in
the third column of that Table -

2) The offences punishable under
the Sections of the Indian Penal Code (45 of
1860), specified in the first two columns of
the Table next following may, with the
permission of the Court before which any
prosecution for such offence is pending be
compounded by the persons mentioned in
the third column of that Table -

3)
When
any
offence
is
compoundable under this section, the
abetment of such offence or an attempt to
commit such offence (when such attempt is
itself an offence) may be compounded in
like manner.

4) (a) When the person who would
otherwise be competent to compound an
offence under this section is under the age of
eighteen years or is an idiot or a lunatic, any
person competent to contract on his behalf
may, with the permission of the Court,
compound such offence.

(b) When the person who would
otherwise be competent to compound an
offence under this section is dead, the legal
representative, as defined in the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) of such
person may, with the consent of the Court,
compound such offence.

5) When the accused has been
committed for trial or when he has been
convicted and an appeal is pending, no
composition for the offence shall be allowed
without the leave of the Court to which he is
committed, or as the case may be, before
which the appeal is to be heard.

6) A High Court or Court of
Session acting in the exercise of its powers
of revision under Section 401 may allow any
person to compound any offence which such
person is competent to compound under this
section.

7)
No
offence
shall
be
compounded if the accused is, by reason of
a previous conviction, liable either to
5 All. Ravindra Kumar Yadav Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1853
enhanced punishment or to a punishment of
a different kind for such offence.

8) The composition of an offence
under this section shall have the effect of an
acquittal of the accused with whom the
offence has been compounded.

9)
No
offence
shall
be
compounded except as provided by this
section.

Section
147
of
the
Negotiable
Instrument Act :'

"Notwithstanding
anything
contained
in
the
Code
of
Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), every offence
punishable
under
this Act
shall
be
compoundable."

Section 482 Cr.P.C. :

Saving of inherent powers of High
Court. Nothing in this Code shall be deemed
to limit or affect the inherent powers of the
High Court to make such orders as may be
necessary to give effect to any order under
this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process
of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends
of justice.

23. I have to refer the compromise
deed which is on the record for proper
adjudication :-

lqygukek

johUnz dqekj ;kno iq= Jh f'ko dqekj ;kno
fuoklh&xzke /kkok etjs] befy;k Fkkuk&fpugV]
y[kuÅ }kjk HkkbZ lanhi ;kno iq= Jh f'ko dqekj
fuoklh&nsok jksM ih0,0lh0 QkeZ [k.Md] y[kuÅA

izFke i{k

,oe~

lapsruk QkbusfU'k;y izkbosV fyfeVsM }kjk
Mk;jsDVj fouksn dqekj jk;] irk&jftLVMZ vkfQl 'kki
ua0&3 VkbZi&,l&02] lh0,l0lh0&5] vofUrdk
jksfg.kh] ubZ fnYYkh o dEikm.M vkWfQl ch&348@3]
jktkthiqje Fkkuk&rkydVksjk] ftyk y[kumA

f}rh; i{k

ge nksuksa mHk; i{k fuEufyf[kr 'krksZa ij
ikcUn gksrs gSa%&

1- ;g fd izFke i{k us f}rh; i{k ls :0
30]00]000@& 1⁄4:i;s rhl yk[k ek=1⁄2 dk yksu izkIRk
fd;k Fkk] ftlds fdLrksa ds Hkqxrku esa pwd gksus ij
izFke i{k us cps gq, yksu /kujkf'k ds iw.kZ Hkqxrku gsrq ,d
psd la0&000034 fnukafdr 05-09-2017 dks /kujkf'k :0
27]60]000@& 1⁄4:i;s lRrkbZl yk[k lkB gtkj1⁄2 ds
Hkqxrku gsrq f}rh; i{k ds i{k esa tkjh fd;k FkkA

2- ;g fd izFke i{k }kjk tkjh fd;s x;s
mDr psd dks f}Rkh; i{k us Hkqxrku gsrq cSad esa izLrqr
fd;k tks fd "FUNDS INSUFFICIENT" dh
fVIi.kh ds lkFk vuknfjr gks dj f}rh; i{k dks okil
izkIRk gks x;kA

3- ;g fd psd vuknfjr gksus ds mijkUr
f}rh; i}k us izFke i{k ds fo:) ,d okn vUrxZr
/kkjk&138 ,u-vkbZ-,DV ds rgr ekuuh; U;k;ky; ds
le{k nkf[ky fd;k x;k] ftls U;k;ky; Jheku
vfrfjDr U;k;ky; d{k la0&3] y[kuÅ }kjk fnukad
07-04-2021 dks fu.khZr djrs gq, fuEu vkns'k ikfjr
fd;k x;k%& **fl) nks"kh johUnz dqekj ;kno dks ijdzkE;
fy[kr vf/kfu;e&1881 dh /kkjk&138 ds v/khu
n.Muh; vijk/k dkfjr djus ds fy, nks o"kZ ds lk/kkj.k
dkjkokl dh ltk rFkk :0 45]00]000@&1⁄4:i;s
iSarkfyl yk[k ek=1⁄2 vFkZn.M dh ltk ls nf.Mr fd;k
tkrk gSA vFkZn.M u vnk djus dh n'kk esa fl)
nks"kh ,d o"kZ N% ekg ds lk/kkj.k dkjkokl ds vfrfjDr
ltk HkqxrsxkA vFkZn.M dh /kujkf'k esa ls 38]00]000@&
1⁄4:i;s vM+rhyl yk[k ek=1⁄2 ifjoknh dks izfrdj ds :i
esa Hkqxrku fd;s tk;saxsA **

4- ;g fd izFke i{k us mijksDr fu.kZ; ,oa
vkns'k fnukafdr 07-04-2021 ds fo:) ekuuh; l=
U;k;k/kh'k y[kuÅ ds le{k vihy la[;k&165@2021
izLrqr fd;k] tks fd U;k;ky; Jheku~ vij ,oa l=
U;k;k/kh'k] d{k la[;k&3 y[kuÅ }kjk ikfjr fu.kZ; ,oa
vkns'k fnukafdr 16-01-2024 ds ek/;e ls fujLr dj nh
x;h rFkk izFke i{k fu.kZ; ,oa vkns'k fnukafdr 16-012024 ds vuqikyu esa fnukad 07-02-2024 dks vkRe
leiZ.k dj ftyk dkjkxkj y[kuÅ esa fu:) gSA

5- ;g fd mijksDr vihy esa ekuuh; l=
U;k;k/kh'k] y[kuÅ }kjk ikfjr vkns'k ds vuqikyu esa
izFke i{k }kjk :0 9]00]000@& 1⁄4:i;s ukS yk[k ek=1⁄2
fopkj.k U;k;ky; esa tek fd;k tk pqdk gSA

6- ;g fd izFke i{k us U;k;ky; Jheku~
vij l= U;k;k/kh'k] d{k la0&3] y[kuÅ }kjk ikfjr
mijksDr fu.kZ; ,oa vkns'k fnukafdr 16-01-2024 ds
fo:) ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; ds le{k ,d vkijkf/kd
fuxjkuh la[;k&04@2024 ;ksftr fd;k Fkk tks fd
1854 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
vkns'k fnuakfdr 08-02-2024 ds ek/;e ls fujLr dj
fn;k x;kA

7- ;g fd izFke i{k f}rh; i{k dks dqy
/kujkf'k :0 38]00]000@& 1⁄4:i;s vM+rhl yk[k ek=1⁄2
Hkqxrku djus dks rS;kj gSA

8- ;g fd izFke i{k f}rh; i{k dks fuEu
izdkj ls Hkqxrku djsxk%&

(i) fMek.M MakQ~V la0&253931 fnukafdr
06-03-2024 ,oa fMek.M MakQ~V la[;k&253932 fnukafdr
07-03-2024] ;l cSad fyfeVsM]xkserh uxj] y[kuÅ ds
ek/;e ls :0 20]00]000@& 1⁄4:i;s chl yk[k ek=1⁄2 bl
lqygukek ds fu"iknu ds le; f}rh; i{k dks iznku
dj jgk gSA

(ii) cdk;k /kujkf'k :0 18]00]000@&
1⁄4vV~Bkjg yk[k ek=1⁄2 esa ls :0 9]00]000@& 1⁄4:i;s ukS
yk[k1⁄2 tks fd fopkj.k U;k;ky; esa nkSjku fopkj.k vihy
izFke i{k }kjk tek fd;k x;k Fkk dks f)rh; i{k vius
i{k esa voeqDr djk;sxk vkSj :0 9]00]000@& 1⁄4:i;s
ukS yk[k1⁄2 izFke i{k ftyk dkjkxkj y[kuÅ ls fjgk gksus
ds ,d ekg ds Hkhrj tfj;s fMek.M MakQ~V f}rh; i{k
dks vnk djsxkA ;fn fdUgha dkj.kksa ls fopkj.k U;k;ky;
esa tek /kujkf'k :0 9]00]000@&f}rh; i{k ds i{k esa
voeqDr ugha gksrk gSA rks mDr :0 9]00]000@& dk
Hkh Hkqxrku izFke i{k }kjk f}Rkh; i{k dks mlh le;
fd;k tk;sxkA

9- ;g fd f}rh; i{k Hkh mijksDr Hkqxrku
izkIr djds bl vkfFkZd fookn dks fuiVkus gsrq rS;kj
gSA

10- ;g fd izFke i{k ,oa f}rh; i{k ds
e/; vc dkbZ fookn 'ks"k ugha jg x;k gSA

11- ;g fd mHk; i{k bl ckr ls lger gS
fd os iz'uxr vkfFkZd fookn ds lEcU/k esa u rks ,d
nwljs ds fo:) dgha dksbZ f'kdk;r ntZ djk;saxs vkSj u
gh ,d nwljs ds fo:) U;k;ky; vFkok l{ke
vf/kdkjh@izkf/kdkjh ds le{k dksbZ dk;Zokgh lafLFkr
djsaxsA
;fn
Hkfo";
esa
muds
}kjk
dksbZ
f'kdk;r@dk;Zokgh lafLFkr dh tkrh gS rks og
f'kdk;r@dk;Zokgh bl lqygukesa ds 'krksZa ds v/khu
'kwU; ekus tk;saxsA

12- ;g fd nksuksa i{k bl lqygukesa ds 'krksZa
ds v/khu iz'uxr fookn dks lekIr djus ,oa fopkj.k
U;k;y; }kjk ikfjr fu.kZ; o vkns'k fnukafdr 07-042021 rFkk vij l= U;k;k/kh'k] d{k la0&3]
y[kuÅ }kjk ikfjr fu.kZ; ,oa vkns'k fnukafdr 16-012021 dks vfHk[kf.Mr fd;s tkus gsrq ;kfpdk nkf[ky o
fuLrkj.k djkus esa ,d nwljs dks lg;ksx djsaxsA

vr,o ;g lqygukek ge mHk; i{kksa us lksp
le>dj fcuk fdlh tksj ncko ;k uktk;t o LoLFk
fpRr eu ls le{k xokgku vius&vius gLrk{kj cukdj
rLnhd fd;k tks fd izek.k gks vkSj le; ij dke vkosA

24. It is well settled that inherent
powers under section 482 Cr.P.C. can be
exercised only when no other remedy is
available to the litigant and nor a specific
remedy is provided by the statute. It is also
well settled that if an effective alternative
remedy is available, the High Court will not
exercise its inherent power under this
section, specially when the applicant may
not have availed of that remedy.

25. Inherent powers under Section 482
of Cr.P.C. include powers to quash FIR,
investigation or any criminal proceedings
pending before the High Court or any Courts
subordinate to it and are of wide magnitude
and ramification. Such powers can be
exercised to secure ends of justice, prevent
abuse of the process of any court and to
make such orders as may be necessary to
give effect to any order under this Code,
depending upon the facts of a given case.
The court can always take note of any
miscarriage of justice and prevent the same
by exercising its powers u/s 482 of Cr.P.C.
These powers are neither limited nor
curtailed by any other provisions of the
Code. However, such inherent powers are to
be exercised sparingly and with caution.

26. The High Courts in deciding
matters under Section 482 should be guided
by following twin objectives, as laid down
in the case of Narinder Singh vs. State of
Punjab (2014) 6 SCC 466:

i. Prevent abuse of the process of
the court.

ii. Secure the ends of justice.

iii. To give effect to an order under
the Code.
5 All. Ravindra Kumar Yadav Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1855

27. In the instant case, it is true that this
Court had dismissed the criminal revision
and upheld the conviction and sentence
passed by the court below but it cannot be
lost sight of the fact that this Court has the
power to intervene in exercise of the powers
vested under section 482 Cr.P.C. only with a
view to do the substantial justice or to avoid
miscarriage and the spirit of the compromise
arrived at between the parties. This is
perfectly justified and legal too.

28. I have considered the judgments
cited by the learned counsel for the applicant
as well as by the learned Counsel for the
State and other decisions of the Hon'ble
Apex Court and I do not think it necessary
to enlist those decisions which are taken into
consideration for the purpose of the present
proceedings.

29. In the instant case, the applicant is
invoking the inherent power as vested under
section 482 Cr.P.C. after the dismissal of the
revision petition under section 397 Cr.P.C.
read with section 401 Cr.P.C. In this
circumstances, I have to examine the
maintainability of the present application
under section 482 Cr.P.C. and also to
examine as to whether for entertaining the
aforesaid
application,
any
special
circumstances are made out or not. The gist
of the ratio is reflected in the decision of the
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rajinder
Prasad vs. Bashir and Others; AIR 2001
SC 3524. In that case, it was contended
before the Apex Court that as per the earlier
revision filed by the accused persons under
section 397 of the Code has been rejected by
the High Court vide order dated 13.05.1990,
they had no right to file the application
under section 482 Cr.P.C. with the prayer for
quashing the same order. While dealing with
the above contention, the Apex Court
observed as under:-

"We are of the opinion that no
special circumstances were spelt out in the
subsequent application for invoking the
jurisdiction of the High Court under section
482 of the Code and the impugned order is
liable to be set aside on this ground alone."

So it can be legitimately argued
and inferred and held that in all cases where
the applicants are able to satisfy this court
that there are special circumstances which
can be clearly spelt out, subsequent
application invoking inherent powers under
section 482 Cr.P.C. can be moved and
cannot be thrown away on the technical
argument as to its sustainability.

30. In the case of Krishan Vs.
Krishnaveni, reported in (1997) 4 SCC
241, Hon'ble the Apex Court has held that
though the inherent power of the High Court
is very wide, yet the same must be exercised
sparingly and cautiously particularly in a
case where the applicant is shown to have
already invoked the revisional jurisdiction
under section 397 of the Code. Only in cases
where the High Court finds that there has
been failure of justice or misuse of judicial
mechanism or procedure, sentence or order
was not correct, the High Court may in its
discretion prevent the abuse of process or
miscarriage
of
justice
by
exercising
jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code.

31. In the case of S.W. Palankattkar
& others Vs. State of Bihar, 2002 (44)
ACC 168, it has been held by the Hon'ble
Apex Court that quashing of the criminal
proceedings is an exception than a rule. The
inherent powers of the High Court under
Section 482 Cr.P.C itself envisages three
circumstances under which the inherent
jurisdiction may be exercised:-(i) to give
effect an order under the Code, (ii) to
prevent abuse of the process of the court ;
(iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice.
1856 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
The power of High Court is very wide but
should be exercised very cautiously to do
real and substantial justice for which the
court alone exists.

32. For adjudicating the instant case,
the facts as stated hereinabove are very
relevant. Here, the applicant has attempted
to invoke the jurisdiction of this court vested
under section 482 Cr.P.C. The embargo of
sub section 6 of section 320 Cr.P.C. as
pointed out by learned AGA would not come
in the way so far as the relief prayed in this
application.

33. I am not in agreement that when the
adjudication of a criminal offence has
reached to the state of revisional level, there
cannot
be
any
compromise
without
permission of the court in all case including
the offence punishable under 'N.I. Act' or the
offence mentioned in Table-1 (one) can be
compounded only if High Court or Court of
Sessions
grants
permission
for
such
purpose. The Court presently, concerned
with an offence punishable under 'N.I. Act'.

34. It is evident that the permissibility
of the compounding of an offence is linked
to the perceived seriousness of the offence
and the nature of the remedy provided. On
this point I can refer to the following
extracts from an academic commentary
[Cited from : K.N.C. Pillai, R.V. Kelkar's
Criminal Procedure, 5th Edition :

"17.2 - compounding of offences
- A crime is essentially a wrong against the
society and the State. Therefore, any
compromise between the accused person
and the individual victim of the crime should
not absolve the accused from criminal
responsibility. However, where the offences
are essentially of a private nature and
relatively not quite serious, the Code
considers it expedient to recognize some of
them as compoundable offences and some
others as compoundable only with the
permission of the court..."

35. Section 147 of NI Act begins with
a non obstante clause and such clause is
being used in a provision to communicate
that the provision shall prevail despite
anything to the contrary in any other or
different legal provisions. So, in light of
the compass provided, a dispute in the
nature of complaint under section 138 of
N.I. Act, can be settled by way of
compromise irrespective of any other
legislation including Cr.P.C. in general
and section 320 (1)(2) or (6) of the Cr.P.C.
in particular. The scheme of section 320
Cr.P.C. deals mainly with procedural
aspects; but it simultaneously crystallizes
certain enforceable rights and obligation.
Hence, this provision has an element of
substantive legislation and therefore, it
can be said that the scheme of section 320
does not lay down only procedure; but
still, the status of the scheme remains
under a general law of procedure and as
per the accepted proposition of law, the
special law would prevail over general
law. For the sake of convenience, I would
like to quote the observations of Hon'ble
the Apex Court in the case of Municipal
Corporation, Indore vs. Ratnaprabha
reported in (AIR 1977 SC 308) which
reads as under :

"As has been stated, clause (b) of
section 138 of the Act provides that the
annual value of any building shall
"notwithstanding anything contained in any
other law for the time being in force" be
deemed to be the gross annual rent for which
the building might "reasonably at the time of
the assessment be expected to be let from
year
to
year"
While
therefore,
the
5 All. Ravindra Kumar Yadav Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1857
requirement of the law is that the reasonable
letting value should determine the annual
value of the building, it has also been
specifically provided that this would be so
"notwithstanding anything contained in any
other law for the time being in force". It
appears to us that it would be a proper
interpretation of the provisions of clause (b)
of Section 138 of the Act to hold that in a
case where the standard rent of a building
has been fixed under Section 7 of the
Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control
Act, and there is nothing to show that there
has been fraud or collusion, that would be
its reasonable letting value, but, where this
is not so, and the building has never been let
out and is being used in a manner where the
question of fixing its standard rent does not
arise, it would be permissible to fix its
reasonable rent without regard to the
provisions
of
the
Madhya
Pradesh
Accommodation Control Act, 1961. This
view will, in our opinion, give proper effect
to the non-obstante clause in clause (b) with
due regard to its other provision that the
letting value should be "reasonable"

36. The expression 'special law'
means a provision of law, which is not
applicable generally but which applies to
a particular or specific subject or class of
subjects. Section 41 of Indian Penal
Code stands on the same footing and
defines the phrase special law. In this
connection I would like to quote the well
accepted proposition of law emerging
from various observations made by the
Hon'ble
Apex
Court
in
different
decisions as a gist of the principle and it
can be summarised as under:

"When a special law or a
statute is applicable to a particular
subject, then the same would prevail
over a general law with regard to the
very subject, is the accepted principle in
the field of interpretation of statute."

37. In reference to offence under
section 138 of N.I. Act read with
section 147 of the said Act, the parties
are at liberty to compound the matter
at any stage even after the dismissal of
the
revision
application.