# Regional Manager, Central Bank of India v. Presiding Officer, Central Govt. Indus. Tribunal & Anr. Opp. Parties

- **Citation:** (2024) 3 ILRA 1932
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-03-06
- **Case number:** Writ-C No. 7313 of 2017
- **Bench:** Rohit Ranjan Agarwal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/regional-manager-central-bank-of-india-v-presiding-officer-central-govt-indus-51584
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

Civil Law - Constitution of India,1950Article 226-Industrial Disputes Act.1947Section 11A-the respondent no.2 was
appointed as clerk in central bank later
promoted,
during
his
service
some
misconduct was committed by him-the
disciplinary
authority
dismissed
the
respondent
no.2-the
misconduct
was
greater having caused loss to the bank-
however,
the
Tribunal
modified
punishment awarded to him-The court
held that Tribunal was not justified in
modifying the punishment awarded by the
disciplinary
authority
having
been
confirmed by the Appellate Authority as
well as by the Division Bench of the court
from that of dismissal to compulsory
retirement with superannuation benefitsTherefore
,
the
impugned
order
is
unsustainable in the eyes of law and the
same is set aside.(Para 1 to 30)

The writ petition is allowed. .(E-6)

List of cases cited:

## Text

1932 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of
India and, therefore, the Madarsa Act is
violative of the provision contained in
Article 246 (1) of the Constitution of India
and is unconstitutional to the said extent.

(F) CONCLUSION

99. In view of the foregoing
discussion, we hold that the Madarsa Act,
2004, is violative of the principle of
Secularism, which is a part of the basic
structure of the Constitution of India,
violative of Articles 14, 21 and 21-A of the
Constitution of India and violative of
Section 22 of the University Grants
Commission Act, 1956. Accordingly, the
Madarsa
Act,
2004
is
declared
unconstitutional. Further, we are not
deciding the validity of Section 1(5) of the
R.T.E. Act as we have already held the
Madarsa Act to be ultra vires and we are
also informed by learned counsel for both
the parties that in State of U.P. Vadik
Pathshalas do not exist.

100. Since there are large number of
Madarsas and Madarsa students in State of
U.P., the State Government is directed to
take steps forthwith for accommodating
these Madarsa students in regular schools
recognized under the Primary Education
Board and schools recognized under the
High School and Intermediate Education
Board of State of U.P. The State
Government for the said purpose shall
ensure that as per requirement sufficient
number of additional seats are created and
further if required, sufficient number of
new schools are established. The State
Government shall also ensure that children
between the ages of 6 to 14 years are not
left without admission in duly recognized
institutions.

101. The Writ-C No.6049 of 2023
stands allowed and Writ-A Nos.29324 of
2019, 3735 of 2012, 5548 of 2014, 3615 of
2020 and Writ-C No.481 of 2020, which
are placed before this Court on reference,
are returned to the appropriate Court.

102. We appreciate the assistance
given to us in the hearing of this matter by
all the learned counsel and Sri Anshuman
Singh Rathore, the petitioner of Writ-C
No.6049 of 2023, who also addressed the
Court in person. We also appreciate the
hard work and able assistance provided by
Sri Gaurav Mehrotra, Advocate, Sri
Madhukar Ojha, Advocate and Sri Akber
Ahmad, Advocate, learned Amici Curiae.
Sri Nandesh Verma, Sri Ankit Baranwal
and Sri Adarsh Mohan Nigam, Research
Associate/Law Intern have also contributed
by their in depth research.

Visit
http://elegalix.allahabadhighcourt.in/eleg
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Disclaimer
----------
(2024) 3 ILRA 1932
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 06.03.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ROHIT RANJAN AGARWAL, J.

Writ-C No. 7313 of 2017

Regional Manager, Central Bank of India
 ...Petitioner
Versus
Presiding Officer, Central Govt. Indus.
Tribunal & Anr. ...Opp. Parties
3 All. Regional Manager, Central Bank of India Vs. Presiding Officer, Central Govt. Indus.
 Tribunal & Anr.
1933
U7Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Vishnu Pratap

Counsel for the Opp. Parties:
C.S.C., Sri Atul Kumar I, Sri Indra Mani Tripathi

Civil Law - Constitution of India,1950Article 226-Industrial Disputes Act.1947Section 11A-the respondent no.2 was
appointed as clerk in central bank later
promoted,
during
his
service
some
misconduct was committed by him-the
disciplinary
authority
dismissed
the
respondent
no.2-the
misconduct
was
greater having caused loss to the bank-
however,
the
Tribunal
modified
punishment awarded to him-The court
held that Tribunal was not justified in
modifying the punishment awarded by the
disciplinary
authority
having
been
confirmed by the Appellate Authority as
well as by the Division Bench of the court
from that of dismissal to compulsory
retirement with superannuation benefitsTherefore
,
the
impugned
order
is
unsustainable in the eyes of law and the
same is set aside.(Para 1 to 30)

The writ petition is allowed. .(E-6)

List of cases cited:

1. SBI Vs Tarun Kumar Banerjee & ors. (2000)4
A.W.C 3304 SC: 2000) 8 SCC 12 (Para 3)

2. Tripura Gramin Bank & ors. Vs Tarit Baran
Roy & anr. (2001)2 AWC 1125 SC

3. Harinarayn Seet Vs Andhra Bank (2022)
LiveLaw AP 125

4. RSRTC Vs Gopal Singh (1998)2 SCT 277

5. Depot Manager, TSRTC Vs Mohd. Fakruddin
& ors. (2017)155 FLR 263

6. Management of Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd.
Bangalore Vs Mohd. Usman & anr. (1984) AIR
SC 321

7. Jitendra Singh Rathor Vs Shri Baidyanath
Ayurved Bhawan Ltd. & anr. (1984) AIR SC 976
8. Chairman & MD, United Commercial Bank &
ors. Vs P.C. Kakkar (2003) 4 SCC 364

9. Canara Bank Vs V.K.Awasthy (2005) 6 SCC
321,

(Delivered by Hon'ble Rohit Ranjan
Agarwal, J.)

1. Through this writ petition a
challenge has been made to the award dated
22.08.2016, published on 05.09.2016, by
the Central Government Industrial Tribunal
(CGIT)
cum
Labour
Court,
Kanpur
exercising power under Section 11A of
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter
called as "Act of 1947") modifying
punishment
of
dismissal
to that
of
compulsory retirement with superannuation
benefits.

2. Facts, giving rise to the present
petition, are that respondent No.2 late
R.P.Singh was appointed as a Clerk on
11.01.1971 in Central Bank of India. He
was promoted to the post of Special
Assistant
in
the
year
1992
with
retrospective effect since 1987. While
posted as Special Assistant at Extension
Counter of main branch, Aligarh at
Kshetriya Shri Gandhi Ashram (KSGA),
Aligarh during the period October, 2003 to
February, 2004, some misconduct was
committed by him. He was put under
suspension on 17.02.2004. A charge sheet
was served on 16.03.2004 alleging ten
charges against him, which are as under :

"CHARGE NO. 1
Current Account No 176 of M/s
Rajesh & Co. was opened with the address,
101, President, Railway Road, Aligarh,
which Sh. Singh has tempered with
malafide intention and ulterior motive as
7/107, Railway Road, Algarh.
CHARGE NO. 2
1934 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
On 8.10.2003 the account of M/s
Rajcsh & Co. was allowed to be closed for
which relevant record is not available in
the branch except an entry of Rs.2900/- in
C/D A/c 176. Ledger Folio No. 99. The
account was closed by payment through
cash for Rs.2900/ as noted in the ledger.
On perusal of the ledger folio it is
specific that Cheque Book was not issued in
the account and loose Cheque Book also
was not issued, payment was also not made
through pay slip/Banker's cheque/Debit
Note. Thus Sh. Singh has allowed the
closure of the account in unusual manner
violating Bank's rules to facilitate the
Account holder with obvious reason. ]
CHARGE NO. 3
The
account
opening
form,
signature card and debit voucher Dt.
8.10.2003 in C/D account 176 of M/s
Rajesh & Co. are not available in the
branch record. Sh. Singh has taken way all
these documents with malafide intention to
suppress his misdoings.
CHARGE NO. 4
On 9.10.2003 Sh. Rajesh Kisher
opened a HSS A/c No. 3825 and provided
copy of PAN Card, Driving Licence as
proof of identity and address. The date of
Birth as noted in PAN Cord and Driving
Licence
differs
which
Sh.
Singh
intentionally ignored to facilitate Sh.
Rajesh Kishor to commit the fraud with the
Bank. The address in account opening
application form, Driving Licence, letter of
thanks dated 09.10.2003 in the handwriting
of Mr. Rajesh Kishore and Receipt no.520
dated 09.10.2003 of Speed Post mention
the
address
of
Mr.
Rajesh
Kishore
differently, which Mr. Singh ignored to
notice with ulterior motive and rather
actively facilitated Mr. Rajesh Kishor to
open the account and commit fraud with
the Bank. Thus aforesaid facts speak loudly
the connivance of Mr. Singh with Mr
Rajesh Kishor in his design to defraud
Bank.
CHARGE NO. 5
Sh. Rajesh Kishor has given his
address as 101, President, Sadar Chungi
Ke Pass, Railway Road, Aligarh, which is
not the correct address. Sh. Singh being
local of Aligarh has failed to apply
ordinary prudence with malafide intention
to facilitate Sh. Rajesh Kishor to disappear
after committing the fraud.
CHARGE NO. 6
Sh Rajesh Kishor has opened the
account on 9.10.2003 and immediately
thereafter the deposited cheques of heavy
amount for collection as under:

AMOUNT
 DATE
OF
DEPOSIT
RS.160000/-

 14.10.2003
RS 310000/-

 4.12.2003
RS 320000/-

11.12.2003

Sh. Singh has forwarded all the
cheques for collection to B/o Panchkula,
Chandigarh
and
also
allowed
the
withdrawals
against
Central
Office
guidelines to be vigilant in the operation of
the account
All the cheques were drawn on
HDFC Bank and Sh. Singh failed to apply
his ordinary prudence to enquire the
purpose of collection in newly opened
account.
With all these collections, fraud has
been committed and the Bank has suffered
a loss of Rs 7.90 lac.
CHARGE NO. 7
With a deceit motive Sh. Singh has
used the Courier Service for collection of
aforesaid 3 (three) cheques while he was
using the Postal Service for sending the
Letter of Thanks. The intentions of Sh.
Singh were more grave as to find out that
Courier Service was not approved one.
3 All. Regional Manager, Central Bank of India Vs. Presiding Officer, Central Govt. Indus.
 Tribunal & Anr.
1935
CHARGE NO. 8
Sh. Singh with a malafide intention
has not issued Letter of Thanks to the
Introducer Sh. Jeet Pal Singh HSS A/c 3550
who has reportedly introduced the HSS
account 3825 of Sh. Rajesh Kishor Sh.
Singh has also not verified the signature of
Sh. Jeet Pal Singh.
Later on Sh. Jeet Pal Singh has
disowned his signature for introducing the
account. The Bank has lost an opportunity
to identify and locate Sh. Rajesh Kishor, the
Account holder has committed the fraud,
due to intentionally committed lapses on
the part of Sh. Singh.
CHARGE NO. 9
In HSS A/c 3825 of Sh. Rajesh
Kishor, the first cheque book was issued on
28.10.2003 containing 10 leaves, of which
3 cheques bearing No. 30682 to 30684
were returned due to insufficient funds in
the account on 13.11.2003.
Sh. Singh has issued second cheque
book of 25 leaves on 1.12.2003 ignoring
the material facts of returning of cheques
while the credit balance in the account was
only Rs.3829/-. Sh. Singh has issued second
cheque book containing 25 leaves while
cheque book of 10 leaves was available in
the branch. Sh. Singh has also ignored the
fact that all cheques from the first cheque
book were not presented for payment at the
branch. It clearly confirms Sh. Singh's
connivance with Sh. Rajesh Kishor in
whose account a fraud has committed for
Rs.7.90 lac and the Bank has suffered the
loss.
CHARGE NO. 10
Sh. Singh has acted in a deceitful
manner while issuing the Letter of Thanks
to Account holder HSS A/c 3825 Sh. Rajesh
Kishor wherein tempering is made in a
word written just before President in Letter
of Thanks Dt. 9.10.2003. The intention of
Sh. Singh is confirmed by Speed Post
Receipt No. 0520 Dt. 9.10.2003, wherein
address is noted 101, Hotel President. This
shows that Sh. Singh has knowingly opened
the account of a person not having
permanent address, collected cheques of
heavy amount and connived with Sh Rajesh
Kishor to commit a fraud of Rs.7.90 lac
and make loss to the Bank."

3. A reply was filed to the said
charges, after which an inquiry was
conducted.
The
disciplinary
authority
passed order of dismissal under Regulation
6(a) of Memorandum of Settlement of
Disciplinary
Action,
Procedure
for
Workmen dated 10.04.2002 dismissing the
petitioner from service on 20.10.2005. The
order was challenged before the Appellate
Authority who confirmed the same vide
order dated 09.01.2006. The order of
dismissal as well as appellate order were
challenged before the writ Court through
Writ Petition No.7726 of 2006 which was
dismissed vide order dated 16.02.2006.
Against the said order, Special Appeal
No.251 of 2006 was preferred which was
dismissed on 27.03.2006.

4. Thereafter, respondent No.2
raised an industrial dispute and the matter
referred to CGIT cum Labour Court,
Kanpur, which was registered as Industrial
Dispute No.24 of 2007. The dispute
referred to the Tribunal for adjudication
was,

"Whether
the
action
of
the
management of Central Bank of India,
Regional Office, Agra dismissing Sri R.P.
Singh son of Late Sri Kalyan Singh from
the bank services vide orer dated 20.10.05
of disciplinary authority and confirming the
same by appellate authority vide order
dated 09.01.06 is legal and fair? If not
1936 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
what relief the workman concerned is
entitled?"

5. CGIT, vide order impugned,
made an award modifying the punishment
of dismissal from service to that of
compulsory retirement from service with
superannuation benefits. Hence the present
writ petition.

6. Sri Vishnu Pratap, learned
counsel appearing for the petitioner-Bank
submitted that charges against respondent
No.2 were grave and serious and stood
proved in the disciplinary proceedings,
which stood affirmed by the order of
Appellate Authority. Both the orders of
disciplinary as well as appellate authorities
were subject matter of challenge before this
Court in writ petition and special appeal.
This Court found that inquiry conducted
was fair and charges do not appear to be
moon shine and, therefore, no interference
was required.

7. According to counsel for the
Bank, once the charges stood proved and it
was held that inquiry conducted was fair,
the Tribunal, while exercising power under
Section 11A of Act of 1947 could not have
modified the order of dismissal on the basis
of new material on record as proviso
clearly prohibits for the same. Moreover,
no reason has been assigned by the
Tribunal in modifying the punishment from
dismissal to compulsory retirement with
superannuation benefits except comparing
the punishment awarded to the codelinquent Surendra Kumar against whom
charges were not grave and serious.

8. Rliance has been placed upon a
decision of Apex Court in State Bank of
India vs. Tarun Kumar Banerjee and
others 2000 (4) A.W.C. 3304 (S.C.) :
(2000) 8 SCC 12 (Para 3), which is
extracted hereasunder :

"3. The Tribunal having held that
the domestic enquiry was fair and valid, the
scope of interference was very limited. This
Court in Workmen of Messrs. Firestone
Tyre and Rubber Company of India (P.)
Ltd. v. Management and others (1973) 3
SCR 587 stated the law as follows:
"32.
(1)
The
right
to
take
disciplinary action and to decide upon the
quantum
of
punishment
are
mainly
managerial functions, but if a dispute is
referred to a Tribunal, the latter has power
to see if action of the employer is justified.
(2)
Before
imposing
the
punishment, an employer is expected to
conduct a proper enquiry in accordance
with the provisions of the Standing Orders,
if applicable, and principles of natural
justice. The enquiry should not be an empty
formality.
(3) When a proper enquiry has
been held by an employer, and the finding
of misconduct is a plausible conclusion
flowing from the evidence adduced at the
said
enquiry,
the
Tribunal
has
no
jurisdiction to sit in judgment over the
decision of the employer as an appellate
body. The interference with the decision of
the employer will be justified only when the
findings arrived at in the enquiry are
perverse or the management is guilty of
victimisation, unfair labour practice or
mala fide.
(4) Even if no enquiry has been
held by an employer or if the enquiry held
by him is found to be defective, the Tribunal
in order to satisfy itself about the legality
and validity of the order, had to give an
opportunity to the employer and the
employee to adduce evidence before it. It is
open to the employer to adduce evidence
for the first time justifying his action, and it
3 All. Regional Manager, Central Bank of India Vs. Presiding Officer, Central Govt. Indus.
 Tribunal & Anr.
1937
is open to the employee to adduce evidence
contra.
(5) The effect of an employer not
holding an enquiry is that the Tribunal
would not have to consider only whether
there was a prima facie case. On the other
hand, the issue about the merits of the
impugned order of dismissal or discharge is
at large before the Tribunal and the latter,
on the evidence adduced before it, has to
decide for itself whether the misconduct
alleged is proved. In such cases, the point
about the exercise of managerial functions
does not arise at all. A case of defective
enquiry stands on the same footing as no
enquiry.
(6) The Tribunal gets jurisdiction to
consider the evidence placed before it for
the first time in justification of the action
taken only, if no enquiry has been held or
after the enquiry conducted by an employer
is found to be defective.
(7) It has never been recognised
that the Tribunal should straight away,
without anything more, direct reinstatement
of a dismissed or discharged employee,
once it is found that no domestic enquiry
has been held or the said enquiry is found
to be defective.
(8) An employer, who wants to
avail himself of the opportunity of adducing
evidence for the first time before the
Tribunal to justify his action, should ask for
it at the appropriate stage. If such an
opportunity is asked for, the Tribunal has
no power to refuse. The giving of an
opportunity to an employer to adduce
evidence for the first time before the
Tribunal is in the interest of both the
management and the employee and to
enable the Tribunal itself to be satisfied
about the alleged misconduct.
(9) Once the misconduct is proved
either in the enquiry conducted by an
employer or by the evidence placed before
a Tribunal for the first time, punishment
imposed cannot be interfered with by the
Tribunal except in cases where the
punishment is so harsh as to suggest
victimisation.
(10) In a particular case, after
setting aside the order of dismissal,
whether a workman should be reinstated or
paid compensation is, as held by this Court
in Panitole Tea Estate v. Workmen [(1971)
1 SCC 742], within the judicial discretion
of a Labour Court or Tribunal. The above
was the law as laid down by this Court as
on 15-12-1971, applicable to all industrial
adjudications arising out of orders of
dismissal or discharge."

9. According to learned counsel,
Tribunal has no jurisdiction to sit in
judgment over the decision of employer as
an appellate body and the interference with
the decision will only be justified in case
the finding is arrived that inquiry was
perverse or management is guilty of
victimization, unfair labour practice or
mala fides. The Tribunal can take into
evidence the documents placed before it for
the first time only when no enquiry has
been held or the inquiry held by the
employer is found defective.

10. Reliance has also been placed
upon a decision of Apex Court in Tripura
Gramin Bank and others vs. Tarit Baran
Roy and another 2001 (2) AWC 1125
(SC) and judgment of Andhra Pradesh
High Court in Harinarayn Seet vs.
Andhra Bank 2022 LiveLaw (AP) 125.

11. Sri Indra Mani Tripathi,
learned counsel appearing for legal heirs of
respondent No.2 submitted that respondent
No.2 was placed at the Extension Counter
and Surendra Kumar, the other delinquent
employee, who was at the main branch, had
1938 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
sent the advise to the Extension Counter
after passing FSCM(s) and on the basis of
the same, worker had no authority to
further verify the same except giving credit
of the amount of cheque. According to him,
both respondent No.2 as well as Surendra
Kumar were collectively responsible for
loss of Rs.7.90 lakhs while in the
disciplinary proceedings initiated against
Surendra Kumar, the disciplinary authority
has proposed punishment of discharge from
service but later on, in the final order
passed by the disciplinary authority,
punishment of reduction by two stages in
time scale of pay for a period of five years
was awarded.

12. According to counsel for
respondent No.2, once it was found that it
was a collective mistake of both respondent
No.2 and Surendra Kumar and the
punishment awarded was different, the
Tribunal, finding the punishment awarded
to respondent No.2 being disproportionate
to the gravity of charges, reduced the same
from dismissal to compulsory retirement
with superannuation benefits. Reliance has
been placed upon a Full Bench judgment of
Rajasthan High Court in Rajasthan State
Road Transport Corporation vs. Gopal
Singh 1998(2) SCT 277; decision of
Telangana and Andhra Pradesh High Court
in Depot Manager, TSRTC vs. Mohd.
Fakruddin and other 2017(155) FLR
263;
decisions
of
Apex
Court
in
Management of Hindustan Machine
Tools Ltd. Bangalore vs. Mohd. Usman
and another 1984 AIR (SC) 321 and
Jitendra
Singh
Rathor
vs.
Shri
Baidyanath Ayurved Bhawan Ltd. and
another 1984 AIR (SC) 976.

13. I have heard the respective
counsel for the parties and perused the
material on record.
14. The short question engaging
attention of the Court is, as to the power of
CGIT-cum-Labour Court under Section
11A of Act of 1947 in modifying the
punishment
of
dismissal
to that
of
compulsory retirement with superannuation
benefits in the facts of the case.

15. It is an admitted case that
respondent No.2 was an employee of the
Bank. He was posted at the Extension
Counter of the main branch at KSGA,
Aligarh during the period October, 2003 to
February, 2004. It is during this period that
respondent No.2 had opened current
account No.176 of M/s Rajesh & Company
and also HSS Account No.3825 of Rajesh
Kishore. It is during this period that three
cheques of Rs.1,60,000/- deposited on
14.10.2003; Rs.3,10,000/- deposited on
04.12.2003; and Rs.3,20,000/- deposited on
11.12.2003 were forwarded for collection
to branch office Panchkula, Chandigarh. An
amount of Rs.7,90,000/- was withdrawn.
Surendra Kumar, who was posted at branch
office Panchkula, had cleared these three
cheques without tallying the signatures.
When
the
matter
came
into
light,
respondent No.2 was posted as Special
Assistant at Regional Office Agra, firstly,
he was suspended and thereafter a charge
sheet containing ten charges were given to
him. On 28.09.2004, the charge sheet was
also issued to Surendra Kumar containing
one charge, which is as under :

Charge No. 1
While working as Special Assistant
at B/o Aligarh, Mr. Surendra Kumar has
passed the following FSCMs on the date
mentioned against the FSCM Nos without
tallying the signature of officials of B/o
Panchkula in the FSCM with the Specimen
Signature Album
FSCM NO.
3 All. Regional Manager, Central Bank of India Vs. Presiding Officer, Central Govt. Indus.
 Tribunal & Anr.
1939
Amount of FSCM
Date on which FSCM passed
23755
Rs.1,60,000/-
17.11.2003
23792
Rs. 3,10,000/-
20.12.2003
23797
Rs. 3,20,000/-
01.01.2004
Total
Rs. 7,90,000/-

The signatures of the officials of
B/o Panchkula on the above FSCMs are not
tallying with their signatures those given in
specimen signature album. Mr. Surendra
Kumar has passed the credit voucher of
FSCM No. 23792 for Rs.3,10,000/- but not
passed the manifold with obvious intention.
Mr. Surendra Kumar has also not ensured
the 2nd signature (counter signature) on all
the aforesaid manifolds as per bank's rules.
Later on B/o Panchkula has disowned the
manifolds and therefore bank has suffered a
loss of Rs.7,90,000/- due to negligence of
Mr.
Surendra
Kumar.
Thus Mr. Surendra Kumar is charged with
gross misconduct for the above acts under
para 5(j) of Memorandum of settlement on
Disciplinary
Action
Procedure
for
Workmen
Dt.
10.04.2002."
16. During the enquiry, charges stood
proved against respondent No.2 and the
disciplinary authority recommended for
dismissal which was approved and the
order
of
dismissal
was
passed
on
20.10.2005, which was affirmed by the
Appellate Authority on 09.01.2006. The
Division Bench of this Court in Special
Appeal No.251 of 2006 declined to
interfere in the matter and found that the
enquiry was conducted fairly and charges
so proved did not require any interference.
17. The Labour Tribunal also while passing
the order impugned had recorded a clear
finding to the effect that there was no
discrepancy in the enquiry as held against
the worker which was done in fair and
proper manner and the enquiry officer had
rightly arrived at the conclusion. The
Labour Tribunal further found charges
proved against worker. It is only in the light
of the punishment awarded to other codelinquent Surendra Kumar that the Labour
Tribunal proceeded to exercise power under
Section 11A and modified the punishment.
18. The
question,
which
arises
for
consideration by this Court is to the scope
and power of Labour Tribunal to interfere
in
the
punishment
awarded
by
the
disciplinary authority and modify the same
having been confirmed by the Division
Bench of this Court when no illegality,
perversity, victimization or unfair labour
practice has been found or recorded against
the
employer/petitioner.
19. Proviso to Section 11A of Act of 1947
clearly restricts the power of Labour Court,
Tribunal or National Tribunal in admitting
additional evidence or material, while
invoking power under Section 11A and the
entire scope of Labour Court rest on the
material on record. The satisfaction which a
Labour
Court,
Tribunal
or
National
Tribunal is to record while modifying the
order of discharge or dismissal is only on
the basis of material on record and no
external
aid
can
be
taken.
20. In Chairman and Managing Director,
United Commercial Bank and others vs.
P.C.Kakkar (2003) 4 SCC 364, the Apex
Court held that Court should not interfere
with administrative decision unless it is
illogical
or
suffers
from
procedural
impropriety. The punishment imposed by
the disciplinary authority or appellate
authority shocks the conscience of the
1940 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Court/Tribunal then only the order can be
interfered. Relevant paras 11, 12 and 13 of
the judgment are extracted hereas under :
"11. The common thread running through
in all these decisions is that the court
should not interfere with the administrator's
decision unless it was illogical or suffers
from
procedural
impropriety
or
was
shocking to the conscience of the court, in
the sense that it was in defiance of logic or
moral standards. In view of what has been
stated in Associated Provincial Picture
Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948)
1 KB 223 : (1947) 2 All ER 680 (CA) the
court would not go into the correctness of
the choice made by the administrator open
to him and the court should not substitute
its decision to that of the administrator. The
scope of judicial review is limited to the
deficiency in decision-making process and
not
the
decision.
12. To put it differently, unless the
punishment imposed by the disciplinary
authority or the Appellate Authority shocks
the conscience of the court/tribunal, there is
no scope for interference. Further, to
shorten litigation it may, in exceptional and
rare cases, impose appropriate punishment
by recording cogent reasons in support
thereof. In the normal course if the
punishment
imposed
is
shockingly
disproportionate it would be appropriate to
direct the disciplinary authority or the
Appellate Authority to reconsider the
penalty
imposed.
13. In the case at hand the High Court did
not record any reason as to how and why it
found
the
punishment
shockingly
disproportionate.
Even
there
is
no
discussion on this aspect. The only
discernible reason was the punishment
awarded in M.L. Keshwani case. As was
observed by this Court in Balbir Chand v.
Food Corpn. of India Ltd. (1997) 3 SCC
371 even if a co-delinquent is given lesser
punishment it cannot be a ground for
interference. Even such a plea was not
available to be given credence as the
allegations were contextually different."
21. The Court further held that a bank
officer is required to exercise higher
standards of honesty and integrity. He deals
with
money
of
depositors
and
the
customers. Every officer/employee of the
bank is required to take all possible steps to
protect the interests of the bank and to
discharge his duties with utmost integrity,
honesty, devotion and diligence and to do
nothing which is unbecoming of a bank
officer.
22. In Canara Bank vs. V.K.Awasthy (2005)
6 SCC 321, the Apex Court while dealing
with scope of interference with quantum of
punishment held that such interference
cannot be a routine matter and held as
under
:
"24. Lord Greene said in 1948 in the
famous
Wednesbury
case
[Associated
Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury
Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 : (1947) 2 All ER
680 (CA)] that when a statute gave
discretion to an administrator to take a
decision, the scope of judicial review
would remain limited. He said that
interference was not permissible unless one
or the other of the following conditions was
satisfied, namely, the order was contrary to
law,
or
relevant
factors
were
not
considered, or irrelevant factors were
considered; or the decision was one which
no reasonable person could have taken.
These
principles
were
consistently
followed in the UK and in India to judge
the validity of administrative action. It is
equally well known that in 1983, Lord
Diplock in Council for Civil Services
Union v. Minister of Civil Service [(1984)
3 All ER 935 : 1985 AC 374 : (1984) 3
WLR
1174]
(called
CCSU
case)
summarised the principles of judicial
3 All. Regional Manager, Central Bank of India Vs. Presiding Officer, Central Govt. Indus.
 Tribunal & Anr.
1941
review of administrative action as based
upon one or the other of the following viz.
illegality,
procedural
irregularity
and
irrationality. He, however, opined that
"proportionality"
was
a
"future
possibility"."
"27. In Union of India v. G. Ganayutham
(1997) 7 SCC 463 this Court summed up
the position relating to proportionality in
paras 31 and 32, which read as follows :
(SCC
pp.
478-80)
"31. The current position of proportionality
in administrative law in England and India
can
be
summarised
as
follows:
(1)
To
judge
the
validity
of
any
administrative order or statutory discretion,
normally the Wednesbury test is to be
applied to find out if the decision was
illegal
or
suffered
from
procedural
improprieties or was one which no sensible
decision-maker could, on the material
before him and within the framework of the
law, have arrived at. The court would
consider whether relevant matters had not
been taken into account or whether
irrelevant matters had been taken into
account or whether the action was not bona
fide. The court would also consider
whether the decision was absurd or
perverse. The court would not however go
into the correctness of the choice made by
the administrator amongst the various
alternatives open to him. Nor could the
court substitute its decision to that of the
administrator. This is the Wednesbury
[Associated Provincial Picture Houses v.
Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 :
(1947)
2 All
ER
680
(CA)]
test.
(2) The court would not interfere with the
administrator's decision unless it was illegal
or suffered from procedural impropriety or
was irrational - in the sense that it was in
outrageous defiance of logic or moral
standards. The possibility of other tests,
including proportionality being brought
into English administrative law in future is
not ruled out. These are the CCSU [(1984)
3 All ER 935 : 1985 AC 374 : (1984) 3
WLR
1174]
principles.
(3)(a) As per Bugdaycay [R. v. Secy. of
State for Home Deptt., ex p Bugdaycay,
1987 AC 514 : (1987) 1 All ER 940 (HL)],
Brind [(1991) 1 AC 696 : (1991) 1 All ER
720 : (1991) 2 WLR 588 (HL)] and Smith
[R. v. Ministry of Defence, ex p Smith,
(1996) 1 All ER 257 : 1996 QB 517 :
(1996) 2 WLR 305 (CA)] as long as the
Convention is not incorporated into English
law, the English courts merely exercise a
secondary judgment to find out if the
decision-maker could have, on the material
before him, arrived at the primary judgment
in
the
manner
he
has
done.
(3)(b) If the Convention is incorporated in
England making available the principle of
proportionality, then the English courts will
render primary judgment on the validity of
the administrative action and find out if the
restriction is disproportionate or excessive
or is not based upon a fair balancing of the
fundamental freedom and the need for the
restriction
thereupon.
(4)(a) The position in our country, in
administrative law, where no fundamental
freedoms as aforesaid are involved, is that
the courts/tribunals will only play a
secondary role while the primary judgment
as to reasonableness will remain with the
executive or administrative authority. The
secondary judgment of the court is to be
based on Wednesbury and CCSU principles
as stated by Lord Greene and Lord Diplock
respectively to find if the executive or
administrative authority has reasonably
arrived at the decision as the primary
authority.
(4)(b) Whether in the case of administrative
or executive action affecting fundamental
freedoms, the courts in our country will
apply the principle of 'proportionality' and
1942 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
assume a primary role, is left open, to be
decided in an appropriate case where such
action is alleged to offend fundamental
freedoms. It will be then necessary to
decide whether the courts will have a
primary role only if the freedoms under
Articles 19 and 21 etc. are involved and not
for
Article
14.
32. Finally, we come to the present case. It
is not contended before us that any
fundamental freedom is affected. We need
not therefore go into the question of
'proportionality'. There is no contention
that the punishment imposed is illegal or
vitiated by procedural impropriety. As to
'irrationality', there is no finding by the
Tribunal that the decision is one which no
sensible person who weighed the pros and
cons could have arrived at nor is there a
finding, based on material, that the
punishment is in 'outrageous' defiance of
logic. Neither Wednesbury nor CCSU tests
are satisfied. We have still to explain
'Ranjit Thakur [Ranjit Thakur v. Union of
India,
(1987)
4
SCC
611]."
(emphasis
in
original)
23. In State Bank of India (supra), Apex
Court had laid down the scope of
interference by the Tribunal. The Court
found that interference with the decision of
an employer will be justified only when the
findings arrived at in the inquiry are
perverse or management is guilty of
victimization, unfair labour practice or
mala fides. It was further held that the
Tribunal can only take into consideration
the evidence placed before it for the first
time in case no inquiry was held or after the
enquiry was conducted by the employer it
was
found
to
be
defective.
24. In the instant case, the Labour Tribunal
had categorically recorded in para 12 of its
judgment that whole inquiry proceedings
held against the delinquent employee was
in a fair and proper manner and the enquiry
officer has rightly come to the conclusion
that charges stood proved against the
worker. Once such finding was recorded by
the Tribunal, it had no power to proceed
further to modify the punishment awarded
from dismissal to that of compulsory
retirement with superannuation benefits.
25. The judgment of the Tribunal is against
the dictum of Apex Court not only in case
of State Bank of India (supra) but also in
other catena of judgments. Reliance placed
upon decision of disciplinary authority
awarding punishment to Surendra Kumar
cannot be taken into consideration in the
instant
case
while
modifying
the
punishment since the charges against both
the delinquent employees are different.
Moreover, ten serious charges have been
levelled against respondent No.2, while
only one charge was against Surendra
Kumar. The parity drawn by the Tribunal
cannot be justified at any cost. The Tribunal
sailed beyond its power vested under
Section
11A
of
the Act
of
1947.
26. The comparison drawn by the Tribunal
cannot be accepted looking to the gravity of
charges levelled against the two delinquent
employees of the Bank. The wisdom of the
disciplinary action of the bank cannot be
questioned as the charges are different.
Respondent No.2 was responsible for
opening the two accounts one being current
account No.176 of M/s Rajesh & Company
and the second account in the name of
Rajesh
Kishore
being
HSS Account
No.3825, while Surendra Kumar had only
cleared the cheques without tallying the
signature. The misconduct on the part of
respondent No.2 was greater having caused
loss
to
the
bank.
27. The Apex Court in case of P.C.Kakkar
(supra) held that a bank officer is required
to exercise higher standard of honesty and
integrity. The parity drawn by the Tribunal
does not come under the category that
3 All. Ritesh Agrawal Vs. Commissioner, Devi Patan Mandal, Gonda & Ors.
1943
punishment
awarded
was
shockingly disproportionate to the offence
which required the interference by the
Tribunal under Section 11A of Act of 1947.
28. Thus, I find that the Tribunal was not
justified in modifying the punishment
awarded by the disciplinary authority
having been confirmed by the Appellate
Authority as well as by the Division Bench
of this Court in Special Appeal No.251 of
2006 from that of dismissal to compulsory
retirement with superannuation benefits.
29.
Considering
the
facts
and
circumstances of this case, I find that the
impugned
award
dated
22.08.2016
published on 05.09.2016 is unsustainable in
the eyes of law and the same is hereby set
aside. The order passed by disciplinary
authority dismissing respondent No.2 from
services
stands
confirmed.
30. The writ petition succeeds and is hereby
allowed.
----------
(2024) 3 ILRA 1943
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 07.03.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SAURABH LAVANIA, J.

Writ -C No. 9403 of 2023

Ritesh Agrawal ...Petitioner
Versus
Commissioner, Devi Patan Mandal, Gonda
& Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Rajeev Kumar Singh

Counsel for the Respondent:
C.S.C., Raj Mishra, Pankaj Gupta, Ratnesh
Singh, Shivam Srivastava

Civil Law - Constitution of India,1950Article
226-U.P.Revenue
Code,2006Section 210,116-The petitioner challenged
the order dated 24.08.2023 passed by
commissioner which set aside the SDM's
status quo order dated 4.08.2023 in a
property division dispute-Held, the SDM's
status quo order qualifies as an injunction
order,
making
an
appeal
u/s
207
appropriate rather than a revision u/s
210-The
comissioner's
order
is
set
aside.(Para 1 to 30)

The writ petition is allowed. .(E-6)

List of cases cited:

1. Jean Marc Nken, petitioner Vs Eric H. Holder,
Jr., Attorney General(2009)556 U.S 418

2. Weinberger Vs Romero-Barcelo(1982) 456
U.S 305 (1982)

3. Chamundi Mopeds Ltd Vs Church of South
India Trust MANU/SC/0501/1992: JT 1992 (3)
SC 98

(Delivered by Hon'ble Saurabh Lavania, J.)

1. Heard learned counsel for the
petitioner, Shri Dharm Raj Mishra and Shri
Ratnesh Singh, learned counsel for the
respondents and Shri Hemant Kumar
Pandey, learned State Counsel.

2. By means of the present
petition, the petitioner has assailed the
order
dated
24.08.2023
passed
by
respondent
No.1-Commissioner,
Devi
Patan Mandal, District-Gonda in the
Revision instituted under Section 210 of
U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 (in short "Code
of 2006"), registered as Case No.1201 of
2023, (Rahul Agrawal vs. Ritesh Agrawal).

3. The brief facts are to the effect
that in a Case No. 5244 of 2023 (Ritesh
Kumar vs. Rahul Agrawal& Others),
Computerized Case No. 20230815050244,
instituted under Section 116 of the Code of