# Reliance Nippon Life Insurance Co. Ltd v. Permanent Lok Adalat & Anr

- **Citation:** (2024) 3 ILRA 1830
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-03-01
- **Case number:** Writ -C No. 397 of 2018
- **Bench:** Alok Mathur
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/reliance-nippon-life-insurance-co-ltd-v-permanent-lok-adalat-anr-54544
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

Civil Law - Constitution of India,1950Article 226-The policyholder claimed that
the policies he purchased differed from
the promises made by the insurance
company's agent-he sought to cancel the
policies and refund the premiums paid-the
policyholder approached the insurance
Ombudsman, who directed adjustments to
the premium-unsatisfied, the policyholder
moved to the Permanent Lok Adalat which
ruled in his favour ordering a refund of the
premiums
plus
interest-the
dispute
centered on whether the 15 day "free
look" period, allowing policy cancellations
was adhered to-the insurance company
stated that the cancellation request was
made outside this period-Held, the court
referred to section 9 of the General Clause
Act,1897, which excludes the first day in
calculating a specified time period-the
court upheld that the cancellation request
fell within the 15 day period-and The
Permanent Lok Adalat decision to refund
Rs. 3,23,869/- including interest, to the
the
policy
holder
upheld.
3 All. Reliance Nippon Life Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Permanent Lok Adalat & Anr.
1831
The writ petition is dismissed. .(E-6)

List of cases cited:

## Text

1830 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
into force of the 37th Amendment to the
Rules, 1963, with effect from 22.10.2014.

16. It is noted in the appellate
order of the Commissioner that the site plan
reflected mining and the measurements of
the pits were also taken. The exact quantity
of soil extracted was also specified therein.
In the explanation submitted by the
petitioner pursuant to the notice dated
01.05.2015, in para 8 thereof, they have
specifically stated that the site plan
enclosed with the order of the District
Magistrate is contrary to the factual
situation existing at the site. The aforesaid
facts and circumstances reflects that the
petitioner had full knowledge of the
material existing in the records of the
District Magistrate and were aware of the
site plan also.

17. Under the circumstances, the
grounds taken in the appeal that the
petitioners were not aware of the site plan
and other material on record, does not
appear to be correct. In the counter affidavit
filed by the State on behalf of the Staterespondents, apart from denying the
contents
of
the
writ
petition,
the
explanation to Rule 3 of the Rules, 1963
has been repeated and has been emphasised
that extraction or digging of ordinary clay,
ordinary earth for making bricks and
pottery shall not be treated as mining
operation.

18. It is contended by the learned
Standing Counsel that the petitioners have
failed
to
demonstrate
before
the
respondent-authorities that the extraction
was for making bricks and pottery.

19.

Under
the
facts
and
circumstances of the case, the orders
impugned do not call for interference and
this writ petition is dismissed.
----------
(2024) 3 ILRA 1830
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 01.03.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ALOK MATHUR, J.

Writ -C No. 397 of 2018

Reliance Nippon Life Insurance Co. Ltd.
 ...Petitioner
Versus
Permanent Lok Adalat & Anr.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Abhishek Bhatnagar

Counsel for the Respondent:
Arvind Tilhari, Om Prakash Nag

Civil Law - Constitution of India,1950Article 226-The policyholder claimed that
the policies he purchased differed from
the promises made by the insurance
company's agent-he sought to cancel the
policies and refund the premiums paid-the
policyholder approached the insurance
Ombudsman, who directed adjustments to
the premium-unsatisfied, the policyholder
moved to the Permanent Lok Adalat which
ruled in his favour ordering a refund of the
premiums
plus
interest-the
dispute
centered on whether the 15 day "free
look" period, allowing policy cancellations
was adhered to-the insurance company
stated that the cancellation request was
made outside this period-Held, the court
referred to section 9 of the General Clause
Act,1897, which excludes the first day in
calculating a specified time period-the
court upheld that the cancellation request
fell within the 15 day period-and The
Permanent Lok Adalat decision to refund
Rs. 3,23,869/- including interest, to the
the
policy
holder
upheld.
3 All. Reliance Nippon Life Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Permanent Lok Adalat & Anr.
1831
The writ petition is dismissed. .(E-6)

List of cases cited:

1. Saketh India Ltd. & ors. Vs India Securities
Ltd.(1999) 3 SCC 1

2. Haru Das Gupta Vs St. of W.B.(1972)1 SCC
693

(Delivered by Hon'ble Alok Mathur, J.)

1. Heard Sri Abhishek Bhatnagar,
learned counsel for the petitioner. No one
has put in appearance on behalf of
respondent no. 2, though counter affidavit
has been filed to the present writ petition.

2. By means of present writ petition
the Insurance Company namely Reliance
Nippon LIfe Insurance Company Ltd.
having its registered office in Mumbai has
approached this Court challenging the order
dated 09.06.2017, passed by the Permanent
Lok Adalat thereby allowing the claim
preferred by respondent no. 2 - claimant.

3. The facts of the case in brief are
that the respondent no. 2 had applied for
various insurance policies for his life and
life of his wife by submitting a proposal
form obtaining a insurance policy and by
paying the proposal deposit amount. In all
respondent no. 2 had applied for four
policies and had cumulatively deposited
premium of Rs.2,49,994/- towards the said
policies. All the policies were duly
dispatched to respondent no. 2 and had
been received by him.

4. Subsequent to receipt of the said
policies respondent no. 4 was aggrieved by
the terms and conditions mentioned in the
said policies which according to him were
contrary to the statements made by the
Agent of the petitioner insurance company
who had approached him for selling the
said policies and consequently the policies
being at variance with what was promised
to
him,
he informed
the
Insurance
Company that he wanted to repudiate the
said policies and duly informed the
petitioner also about the same. He also
asked for refund of the premium deposited
by him.

5. The petitioner by means of letter
dated 04.10.2013, which was received by
respondent no. 2, declined to accept the
request made by respondent no. 2. In the
aforesaid circumstances respondent no. 2
approached the Insuarance Ombudsman
with
regard
to
his
grievance.
The
Ombudsman by means of order dated
29.05.2015, directed the petitioner to
cancel all the policies and adjust the
premium into a new single premium policy
in the name of respondent no. 2 or any of
his family member and subjected the award
to the completion of formalities by the
complainant-respondent no. 2.

6. It seems that respondent no. 2
was not satisfied by the order dated
29.05.2015, passed by the Ombudsman and
approached the Permanent Lok Adalat by
filing an application raising all grievance
against petitioner. Notices were issued to
the petitioner, who had put in appearance
and opposed the claim made by respondent
no. 2. In their opposition they have
submitted that 15 days free-look period has
been granted to the insured and it is within
those 15 days that the insured had
discretion to repudiate or rescind from the
conditions of the policies. He submitted
that after expiry of 15 days the insured as
well as the Insurance Company are bound
by the terms and conditions of the Policies.
1832 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
7. The Permanent Lok Adalat
looked into all the evidence and documents
filed by the petitioner and respondent no. 2.
Dispute was also raised with regard to
receipt of Policies and the date from which
the 15 day free look period would
commence.
On
behalf
of
claimantrespondent no. 2, it was stated that from
07.09.2013 the insured and his wife had
gone to Bellur (Tamilnadu) in connection
with their treatment as they were not well
and there they had undergone eye surgery
at
Shanker
Netralaya,
Chennai
on
16.09.2013 and on the said date they were
at Chennai. Then subsequent to the above
surgery their check up took place and
respondent no. 2 returned back to Lucknow
on 22.09.2013. It is only on 24.09.2013 that
respondent no. 2 received four policy bonds
from the servant of his neighbor who had
received the same on 19.09.2013, when he
was away in Tamil Nadu.

8. In support of his submissions,
respondent no. 2 had filed medical papers
issued by the Shanker Netralaya, Chennai
from which the Permanent Lok Adalat was
satisfied that respondent no. 2 was under
treatment from 16.09.2013 to 29.09.2013
and then subsequently on 20.09.2013 he
had gone to Chennai for further check up.
Respondent no. 2 had also filed leave
papers before the Permanent Lok Adalat
which indicated that he was on leave from
09.09.2013 to 31.10.2013 and joined his
duties only on 01.11.2013. The Permanent
Lok Adalat has also stated that no evidence
was filed by the petitioner to so as to
dispute the contention raised by the
complainant-insured.

9. The Permanent Lok Adalat also
looked into the delivery reports filed by the
petitioner to consider the case that the
policies have been sent by registered post
to the insured. From the perusal of delivery
reports it cannot be verified that the said
delivery reports pertain to the petitioner
and as to whether the insurance policies
had been sent alongwith the same. Neither
name nor address of the insured was
recorded in any of the papers produced by
the petitioner nor could the delivery reports
could be linked to the claimant and
consequently the Permanent Lok Adalat
was of the view that the said delivery
reports do not further the case and
contentions raised by the petitioner with
regard to the delivery of the insurance
policies to the insured.

10. It was further considered that
the insured on coming to know about the
contents of the policies issued in his favour
had been purchased through the Agent of
the petitioner and repeated request for
cancelling the policies were made. In
pursuance to the requests made by the
insured, it seems that certain policies which
were yet to be issued were cancelled and
the amount of premium was received back
by the respondent no. 2. The four policies
in question which were issued were not
canceled and accordingly letter dated
14.10.2013 was issued by the petitioner
declining to cancel the said policies. It is
only when the premium was not refunded
to the insured that he communicated to the
officials of the petitioner on telephone from
where he had been informed by the
officials of the petitioner that his request
for cancellation of the policies has been
declined.

11. It was contended by the
insured
that
15
day
period
would
commence from 19.09.2013 when the
documents were alleged to have been
received by the servant of the neighbor of
respondent no. 2 from the date till the
3 All. Reliance Nippon Life Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Permanent Lok Adalat & Anr.
1833
request for cancellation was made on
14.10.2013. The claim of respondent no. 2
was allowed by the Permanent Lok Adalat
holding that repudiation was made by the
insured within the prescribed period of 15
days which was computed from 19.09.2013
to 04.10.2013 and consequently on this
ground claim was allowed and the
petitioner was directed to refund the
amount of premium alongwith interest
which amount comes to Rs.323869/-
alongwith interest which was computed to
Rs.5000/-.

12. Learned counsel for the
petitioner while assailing the impugned
order has reiterated the contentions raised
before the Permanent Lok Adalat. It has
been submitted that 15 day period should
be computed from the date of receipt of
policy i.e. 19.09.2013 till 04.10.2013.
There is no dispute with regard to aforesaid
dates but learned counsel for the petitioner
submits
that
from
19.09.2013
till
04.10.2013, it is sixteen days and not 15
days as computed by the Permanent Lok
Adalat. In this regard learned counsel for
the petitioner has sought to rely upon the
Insurance Regulatory and Development
Authority of India notification dated
22.06.2017 whereby Clause 10 provides
that the free look period will be of 15 days
from the date of receipt of policy
documents. Apart from assailing the time
period petitioner does not assail the
impugned order on any other ground.

13. Heard learned counsel for the
parties and perused the record.

14. The facts of the present case
are undisputed. Respondent no. 2 had made
proposal for taking four policies for which
he had paid premium of Rs.24994/-. The
Policies were delivered to the servant of the
neighbor of respondent no. 2 on 19.09.2013
and when respondent no. 2 returned from
Chennai after his treatment he looked into
the policy documents and found that the
same were at variance from the terms of the
policies which were informed to him
through the Agent of the petitioner and
consequently, made efforts for cancellation
of the said policies. Certain policies were
infact cancelled which had not been issued,
but the four policies which are disputed in
the present case were declined to be
cancelled and a letter to this effect was
issued by the petitioner on 14.10.2013.

15. The dispute in the present case
only pertains to the fact as to whether
cancellation was done by respondent no. 2
within fifteen days period of free look as
provided under the Insurance Regulatory
and Development Authority of India
notification
dated
22.06.2017.
The
Permanent Lok Adalat has computed the
time period from 19.09.2013 to 04.10.2013
as fifteen days.

16. At this stage, reference may be
made to Saketh India Ltd. and Others
Vs. India Securities Ltd., 1999 (3) SCC 1,
wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court has relied
upon findings of Haru Das Gupta Vs.
State of W.B., 1972 (1) SCC 693, has held
as under :-

"6.
Similar
contention
was
considered by this Court in the case of
Haru Das Gupta v. State of W.B. wherein it
was held that the rule is well established
that where a particular time is given from a
certain date within which an act is to be
done, the day on that date is to be
excluded; the effect of defining the period
from such a day until such a day within
which an act is to be done is to exclude the
first day and to include the last day. In the
1834 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
context of that case, the Court held that in
computing the period of three months from
the date of detention, which was 5-2-1971,
before the expiration of which the order or
decision for confirming the detention order
and continuing the detention thereunder
had to be made, the date of the
commencement
of
detention,
namely,
February 5th has to be excluded; so done,
the order of confirmation dated 5-5-1971
was made before the expiration of the
period of three months from the date of
detention. The Court held that there is no
reason
why
the
aforesaid
rule
of
construction followed consistently and for
so long should not be applied. For the
aforesaid principle, the Court referred to
the principle followed in English courts.
The relevant discussion is hereunder:
"5. These decisions show that
courts have drawn a distinction between a
term created within which an act may be
done and a time limited for the doing of an
act. The rule is well established that where
a particular time is given from a certain
date within which an act is to be done, the
day on that date is to be excluded. This rule
was followed in Cartwright v. MacCormack
(1963) 1 All ER 11, where the expression
'fifteen
days
from
the
date
of
commencement of the policy' in a cover
note issued by an insurance company was
construed as excluding the first date and
the cover note to commence at midnight of
that day, and also in Marren v. Dowson
Bentley & Co, Ltd., (1961) 2 QB 135, a
case for compensation for injuries received
in the course of employment, where for
purposes of computing the period of
limitation the date of the accident, being
the date of the cause of action, was
excluded. Thus, as a general rule the effect
of defining a period from such a day until
such a day within which an act is to be
done is to exclude the first day and to
include the last day. There is no reason why
the aforesaid rule of construction followed
consistently and for so long should not also
be applied here."
7. The aforesaid principle of
excluding the day from which the period is
to be reckoned is incorporated in Section
12(1) and (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Section 12(1) specifically provides that in
computing the period of limitation for any
suit, appeal or application, the day from
which such period is to be reckoned, shall
be excluded. Similar provision is made in
sub-section (2) for appeal, revision or
review.
The same
principle
is
also
incorporated in Section 9 of the General
Clauses Act, 1897 which, inter alia,
provides that in any Central Act made after
the commencement of the General Clauses
Act, it shall be sufficient, for the purpose of
excluding the first in a series of days or any
other period of time, to use the word "from"
and for the purpose of including the last in
a series of days or any other period of time,
to use the word "to"."

17. This Court is of the considered
view that the Permanent Lok Adalat has
rightly determined the period of 15 days,
inasmuch as, as per Section 9 of the
General Clauses Act, 1897, the first day of
the series of days has to be excluded.
Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897
is quoted herein below :-

"9.
Commencement
and
termination of time.- (1) In any (Central
Act)
or
Regulation
made
after
the
commencement of this Act, it shall be
sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the
first in a series of days or any other period
of time, to use the word "from", and, for the
purpose of including the last in a series of
days or any other period of time, to use the
word
"to".
3 All. Raju Sahu & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1835
(2) This section applies also to all
(Central Acts) made after the third day of
January, 1868, and to all Regulations made
on or after the fourteenth day of January,
1887."

18. Though the period under
consideration in the present case is of 2013,
while
the
Insurance
Regulatory
and
Development
Authority
of
India
Notification
was
issued
only
on22.06.2017 and consequently same
may not be applicable to the facts of the
present case as admittedly provisions of the
said notification are not retrospective. Even
Clause 1(i) of Section 10 of the said
notification provides that free look period
of 15 days from the date of receipt of the
policy document has to be interpreted and
as per General Clauses Act which applies to
the Central Act or the regulations made
after commencement of the said Act, and
the first day of the series of days has to be
excluded, accordingly, the first day i.e.
19.09.2013 has to be excluded.

19. Accordingly, there is no doubt
that the notification issued by the Insurance
Regulatory and Development Authority of
India has to be interpreted as per the
provisions of Section 9 of the General
Clauses Act which establishes fundamental
foundation for interpretation of legislation.
The 15 day period as provided in Clause 10
of the Notification dated 22.06.2017 is
subjected to Section 9 of the General
Clauses Act and consequently the first day
in the series of the days has to be excluded,
as provided in Section 9 of the General
Clauses
Act.
Undisputedly,
statutory
provision shall prevail over the regulations
framed by the Central Government.

20. In the light of above, the
Permanent Lok Adalat rightly determined
the period of free look from 19.09.2023 to
04.10.2013 being of 15 days and not 16
days as canvassed by the petitioner. No
other ground has been urged by the
petitioner.

21. Accordingly, this Court does
not find any merit in the contentions raised
by learned counsel for the petitioner. The
writ petition being devoid of merits is
dismissed.
----------
(2024) 3 ILRA 1835
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 06.03.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE VIVEK CHAUDHARY, J.
THE HON'BLE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J.

Writ-C No. 1372 of 2024
Along with other connected cases

Raju Sahu & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Opp. Parties

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Amrit Khare, Aishvarya Mathur, Apoorva Tewari,
Kazim Ibrahim, P.C. Maurya

Counsel for the Opp. Parties:
C.S.C.,
Anupam
Dwivedi,
Namit
Sharma,
Ratnesh Chandra

Civil Law - Constitution of India,1950Article 226-U.P. Slum Areas (Improvement
and Clearance)Act,1962 & U.P. In-Situ
Slum Redevelopment Policy 2021-U.P.
Urban
Planning
and
Development
act,1973-Slum dwellers in Akbar Nagar
residing on government land along the
Kukrail water channel, challenged eviction
and demolition orders issued by the
Lucknow
development
Authority-They
sought quashing of these orders and
requested a proper rehabilitation schemes