# Rev. K.V. Abraham v. Commissioner, Varanasi & Ors

- **Citation:** (2016) 8 ILRA 248
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2016-08-23
- **Bench:** Ashwani Kumar Mishra
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/rev-k-v-abraham-v-commissioner-varanasi-ors-44241
- **Pages:** 19

## Text

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248 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(2016) 8 ILRA 248
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 23.08.2016

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ASHWANI KUMAR MISHRA, J.

Writ C No.- 30501 Of 2016

Rev. K.V. Abraham ...Petitioner
Versus
Commissioner, Varanasi & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for Petitioner:
Ashish Kumar Srivastava

Counsel for Respondents:
Somesh Khare
Held

The Commissioner under Section 12-D(2) of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 is a quasijudicial authority and not a 'court', hence the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply directly to such
proceedings.
Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act are not directly applicable to proceedings before such quasijudicial authorities.
However, the principles underlying Section 14 of the Limitation Act (exclusion of time spent in
bona fide proceedings) are applicable even to quasi-judicial proceedings.
Where a party has bona fide pursued a wrong remedy with due diligence, the time spent therein can
be excluded while computing limitation.
The absence of express power to condone delay under the Societies Registration Act does not bar
application of equitable principles derived from Section 14.
The Commissioner was justified in condoning delay since the appellant had first approached the High
Court and thereafter promptly filed the appeal.
Denial of such benefit would cause grave injustice and defeat substantive rights, hence a liberal and
justice-oriented interpretation is warranted.
Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act does not automatically extend Limitation Act provisions to
quasi-judicial bodies unless proceedings are before a "court".
The distinction between "court" and "tribunal/quasi-judicial authority" is crucial, and Limitation Act
applies strictly to courts.
The writ court will not interfere with condonation of delay when it is based on sound legal principles
and promotes justice.

CASE LAW CITED

M.P. Steel Corporation v. Commissioner of Central Excise, (2015) 7 SCC 58
Kerala State Electricity Board v. T.P. Kunhaliumma, (1976) 4 SCC 634
CST v. Parson Tools and Plants, (1975) 4 SCC 22
Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary, (2008) 7 SCC 169
8 All. Rev. K.V. Abraham Vs Commissioner, Varanasi & Ors.
249
Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker, AIR 1995 SC 2272
Vidyacharan Shukla v. Khubchand Baghel, AIR 1964 SC 1099
Andhra Pradesh Power Coordination Committee v. Lanco Kondapalli Power Ltd., (2016) 3 SCC
468

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ashwani Kumar Mishra, J.)

1. This writ petition is directed against an order passed by the appellate authority i.e.
Commissioner, Varanasi Division, Varanasi, condoning delay in filing of appeal under Section 12D(2) of the Societies Registration Act, 1860. The order is challenged essentially on the ground that
the Divisional Commissioner exercising his jurisdiction under the Societies Registration Act, 1860
(hereinafter referred to as the 'Act of 1860') has no authority to condone delay under the Act, and
since authority does not act as a 'Court', the provisions of the Limitation Act are not attracted,
rendering the order illegal for want of jurisdiction.

2. Facts relevant for the present purposes are that Pilgrim's Mission, 12, Bungalow,
Varanasi, U.P. is a society registered under the provisions of Societies Registration Act, 1860,
bearing Registration No.2838 of 1973-74. The society was lastly renewed on 10.10.2010, vide
certificate of registration dated 19.10.2010. An application was filed by respondent no.2 before the
Registrar, stating that renewal of the society had been obtained by playing fraud, and therefore, it
be cancelled. An affidavit was also filed stating facts in support of such application. The Assistant
Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits rejected the application of respondent no.2, vide his order
dated 12th March, 2012. This order of Assistant Registrar was challenged before this Court in a
Writ Petition No.23181 of 2012, which came to be dismissed, in view of the availability of
alternative remedy of filing an appeal, vide order dated 11th May, 2012, which reads as under:-

"1. Learned counsel for the petitioner could not dispute that in the present case the
registration of society and its renewal was already over and in effect the petitioner wanted its
cancellation, therefore, the application of petitioner was referable to Section 12-D of Societies
Registration Act, 1860 and the order passed by Registrar under Section 12-D is appealable under
sub-section (2) thereof.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner states that petitioner would avail the statutory
alternative remedy.

3. The writ petition is dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy."

3. In view of the observations made, an appeal has been preferred by respondent no.2
before the Commissioner, Varanasi Division, Varanasi, on 17th May, 2012, alongwith an
application under Section 5 readwith Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for condoning delay in
filing of appeal. The appeal was admitted by the Commissioner on 13th April, 2015. An application
was filed by the present petitioner for recall of the order dated 13th April, 2015, on the ground that
no opportunity of contest on the aspect relating to condonation of delay had been granted. The
250 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

Commissioner vide order dated 6.8.2015 adjourned the matter to 20th August, 2015 for hearing the
parties on the aspect relating to condonation of delay. An affidavit in opposition to the delay
condonation application was also filed. The appellate authority accordingly proceeded to pass an
order on 21st September, 2015 observing that since the appeal has already been admitted, it would
be appropriate that all issues be examined together on merits. This order then came to be
challenged by filing a Writ Petition No.56016 of 2015, which was entertained, and following
interim protection was granted on 1.10.2015:-

"Sri Somesh Khare and Smt. Komal Khare have put in appearance on behalf of
second respondent.

Sri Khare prays for and is granted three days time to file a counter affidavit.
Rejoinder affidavit, if any, may be filed within two days thereafter.

Put up on 14 October 2015 in the additional cause list.

The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that an appeal was
preferred by the private respondent before the Commissioner, under Section 12-D of the Societies
Registration Act assailing the order of Registrar(Societies) which admittedly being time barred
could not have been entertained by the Commissioner as the provision provides for filing of appeal
within 30 days, there being no provision for extension of time in case of delay, the Commissioner,
therefore was not competent under law to entertain and admit the appeal.

The submission requires consideration.

Till then, further proceedings in Appeal No.191 of 2012 pending before the
Commissioner, Varanasi Division, Varanasi shall remain stayed."

4. Ultimately the writ petition got disposed of on 24.11.2015, vide following order:-

"Heard Sri Ashish Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner, learned
Standing Counsel appearing for the State-respondents and Sri Somesh Khare along with Ms.Komal
Khare, learned counsel for respondent no. 2.

Through this writ petition the petitioner has prayed for issuing a writ of certiorari
quashing the orders dated 13.4.2015 and 21.9.2015 passed in Appeal No. 191 of 2012 (Pilgrim's
Mission Inc. California vs. Assistant Registrar and others). Vide order dated 13.4.2015 the
Divisional Commissioner, Varanasi Division, Varanasi (in short the Commissioner) has admitted
the appeal and fixed 11.5.2015 for hearing after issuing notice to the other side whereas vide order
dated 21.9.2015 the Commissioner, on the application of the petitioner to decide the question of
limitation first, has directed to consider the question of limitation at the time of deciding the appeal
on merits.
8 All. Rev. K.V. Abraham Vs Commissioner, Varanasi & Ors.
251
While assailing these orders Sri Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner
submits that the respondent-appellant has filed an application for condonation of delay in filing the
appeal before the Commissioner, therefore, without condonnation of delay there could be no
appeal and unless there was an appeal it could not be entertained. In his submissions the court
below has erred in admitting the appeal vide order dated 13.4.2015 without condoning the delay in
filing the appeal. In support of his submission he has placed reliance upon the judgment of Full
Bench of this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax, Kanpur vs. Mohd. Farooq (2009) 84 Taxman
191 (Alld) and another decision of this Court in Prabhu and another vs. Deputy Director of
Consolidation, Ghazipur and others (2013 (1) ADJ 554).

Sri Khare, who appears for respondent no.2 submits that in view of sub-section (2)
of Section 29 of the Limitation Act read with Section 12-D of the Societies Registration Act the
appeal is within time and if it is treated to be beyond time the Commissioner has power to condone
the delay. In support of his submission he has placed reliance upon the judgment the Apex Court in
Mukri Gopalan vs. Cheppilat Pathanpurayil Aboobacher (AIR 1995 SC 2272).

Without addressing myself on the points and the cases cited by the learned counsel
for the parties, considering the fact that the appeal has been filed along with an application for
condonation of delay and without condoning the delay the appeal has been admitted, in view of the
settled legal position that without condoning the delay appeal could not be admitted, reference may
be had in the case of Shambhu Sharan Chaubey and others vs. State of U.P. and others (2012
(10)ADJ 742, the Commissioner has erred in admitting the appeal. However taking note of the
concept of speedy justice without disturbing the order of admission, it is provided that before
deciding the appeal on merit the question of limitation shall be decided first by the Commissioner
after hearing both the sides, if possible within a period of three months from the date of production
of a certified copy of the order of this Court. Further fate of the appeal would depend upon the fate
of the order passed on the point of limitation.

With the aforesaid observation, the writ petition is disposed of."

5. Pursuant to the directions issued by this Court, the appellate authority has considered the
application for condonation of delay. It has observed that against the order dated 12th March, 2012,
a writ petition had been filed before this Court, which had been dismissed on the ground of
alternative remedy of filing appeal, on 11th May, 2012, and immediately thereafter, an appeal was
preferred on 18th May, 2012. Accordingly, delay has been condoned by allowing the application
under Section 5/14 of the Limitation Act with the observation that there was no intentional delay in
filing of the appeal, and sufficient grounds for its condonation was disclosed. It is this order of
Commissioner dated 13th June, 2016, which is put to challenge in the present writ petition.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Divisional Commissioner while
exercising his powers under Section 12-D(2) of the Act does not act as a court, and consequently,
the provisions of Limitation Act are not attracted. It is also contended that Societies Registration
Act is a special law, which specifically provides for a period of 30 days limitation for filing of
252 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

appeal, and does not confer jurisdiction upon the appellate authority to condone delay, and
consequently, in absence of applicability of Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act 1963 (hereinafter
referred to as the 'Act of 1963'), the delay on account of pursuing a wrong remedy could not be
condoned. Learned counsel in support of such contention placed reliance upon judgments of the
Apex Court in Hukumdev Narain Yadav Vs. Lalit Narain Mishra [AIR 1974 SC 480], The
Commissioner of Sales Tax, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow Vs. M/s Parson Tools and Plants, Kanpur
[AIR 1975 SC 1039], Anwari Basavaraj Patil and others Vs. Siddaramaiah and others [1993(1)
SCC 636], Gopal Sardar Vs. Karuna Sardar [2004 (4) SCC 252], L.S. Synthetics Ltd. Vs.
Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd. And another [2004(11) SCC 456], Consolidated Engineering
Enterprises Vs. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department and others [2008 (7) SCC 169],
Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise Vs. Hongo India Private Limited and another
[2009(5) SCC 791], as well as judgments of this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax, Kanpur
Vs. Mohd. Farooq in IT Appeal Nos.11 of 2001, 78 of 2002, 5 and 6 of 2003, decided on 3.9.2009,
Commissioner of Central Excise, Meerut Vs. M/s. Salora International Limited in Central Excise
Reference Application No.(4) of 2001, decided on 13.9.2005, Mantri Khadi Gram Udyog Samiti,
Harijan Gurukul Heera Patti, Sadar, District Azamgarh Vs. The Prescribed Authority, Azamgarh
and others in Writ Petition No.45385 of 2012, decided on 25.9.2012, as well as judgment of the
Madhya Pradesh High Court in Seth Banshidhar Kedia Rice Mills Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State Bank of India
in Writ Petition No.2393 of 2011, decided on 5.9.2011.

7. Sri Somesh Khare, learned counsel for the respondents, per contra, submits that the
provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 are attracted to proceedings undertaken before the
Commissioner, by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Act of 1963. Learned counsel submits that there is
no express or implied exclusion of the provisions of Limitation Act. Learned counsel further
submits that the Commissioner while hearing the appeal under Section 12-D(2) discharges quasijudicial functions, akin to a 'court', under the special law, even if not under the provisions of Code
of Civil Procedure, and the time spent in pursuing a wrong remedy since was bona fide, it is liable
to be excluded by virtue of Section 14 of the Act. Learned counsel has placed reliance upon
Constitution Bench judgment in Vidyacharan Shukla Vs. Khubchand Baghel reported in AIR 1964
SC 1099, as well as judgment of Apex Court in Mukri Gopalan Vs. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil
Aboobacker reported in AIR 1995 SC 2272.

8. I have heard Sri Ashish Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner, Learned
Standing Counsel and Sri Somesh Khare for the respondents, and have perused the records as well
as the judgments relied upon.

9. Before adverting to the submissions made, it would be appropriate to take note of
relevant statutory provisions. Section 12-D has been inserted in the Act of 1860, by way of a State
amendment in 1975, which reads as under:-

"12D. Registrar's power to cancel registration in certain circumstance.-
8 All. Rev. K.V. Abraham Vs Commissioner, Varanasi & Ors.
253
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the Registrar may, by order in
writing, cancel the registration of any society on any of the following grounds:--

(a) that the registration of the society or of its name or change of name is contrary
to the provisions of this Act or of any other law for the time being in force;

(b) that its activities or proposed activities have been or are or will be subversive
of the objects of the society or opposed to public policy;

[(c) that the registration or the certificate of renewal has been obtained by
misrepresentation or fraud]:

Provided that no order of cancellation of registration of any society shall be
passed until the society has been given a reasonable opportunity of altering its name or object or of
showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to it.

[(2) An appeal against an order made under sub-section (1) may be preferred to
the Commissioner of the Division in whose jurisdiction the Headquarter of the society lies, within
one month from the date of communication of such order.

(3) The decision of the Commissioner under sub-section (2), shall be final and
shall not be called in question in any court.]"

10. Section contemplates filing of appeal against an order made under sub-section 1 of
Section 12-D, within one month from the date of communication of such order. The Act does not
confer jurisdiction upon the appellate authority to condone delay in filing of appeal. According to
the respondents, power to condone delay is available to the appellate authority by virtue of Section
29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, which reads as under:-

"29(2). Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or
application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the
provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and
for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or
application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive)
shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such
special or local law."

11. Submission is that Act of 1860 is a special law relating to societies, which prescribes a
period of limitation in filing of appeal. Since no corresponding provision exists in the schedule to
Limitation Act, 1963, as such a different period exists providing for Limitation Act and Act of
1860, and accordingly necessary ingredients exist for Section 29 to operate in the field. Reliance is
placed upon following observation of the Supreme Court in para-20 in Mukri Gopalan (supra):-
254 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

 "20. Our attention was also invited by counsel for the appellant to a later decision of this
court in the case of The Sahkari Ganna Vikas Samiti Ltd., Vs. Mahabir Sugar Mills (P) Ltd., (AIR
1982 SC 119). In that case a bench of two learned Judges was concerned with the question whether
Divisional Commissioner acting under the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase)
Act, 1953 acted as a revenue court or whether he was a persona designata. It was held that the
Divisional Commissioner had been constituted as appellate authority under the Act. That showed
that the Divisional Commissioner was made an appellate court not as persona designata but as a
revenue court. That being so it was obvious that Section 5 of the Act applied to appeals before
Divisional Commissioner and he could condone the delay in filing appeals. It becomes obvious that
this court in the aforesaid decision was dealing with revenue court constituted under U.P.
Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act which was a special law. It was in terms held
that Section 5 of the Limitation Act was applicable to revisional proceedings before such Revenue
Courts. It is of course true as pointed out by Mr. Nariman that in the said decision no other
decision of this court was cited and Section 29(2) was not expressly referred to but the ratio of the
decision is necessarily and implicitly based on the applicability of Section 29(2) but for which
Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not have been made applicable to such revision proceedings
before revenue court functioning under the special law. Before parting with the discussion on this
question we may also refer to one submission of Shri Nariman. He submitted that Sections 4 to 24
of the Limitation Act would apply to civil courts as duly constituted under the Civil Procedure
Code and if that is so even if they are to be made applicable to suit, appeal or application governed
by periods of limitation prescribed by any special or local law, they necessarily require such suit,
appeal or application to be filed under special or local law before full-fledged civil courts as
otherwise Sections 4 to 24 by themselves would not apply to them. It is difficult to agree. It has to
be kept in view that Section 29(2) gets attracted for computing the period of limitation for any suit,
appeal or application to be filed before authorities under special or local law if the conditions laid
down in the said provision are satisfied and once they get satisfied the provisions contained in
Sections 4 to 24 shall apply to such proceedings meaning thereby the procedural scheme
contemplated by these Sections of the Limitation Act would get telescoped into such provisions of
special or local law. It amounts to a legislative shorthand. Consequently, even this contention of
Shri Nariman cannot be countenanced."

12. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, submits that Commissioner while deciding
the appeal under Section 12-D does not act as a 'court', and therefore, provisions of Sections 5 & 14
of the Limitation Act cannot be exercised by him. Judgments relied upon by the counsel for the
parties in support of their submissions have already been noticed above.

13. This Court, however, is not required to examine all cited decisions, inasmuch as rival
contentions have been answered by the Apex Court in M.P. Steel Corporation Vs. Commissioner of
Central Excise, reported in 2015(7) SCC 58. Question as to whether provisions of the Limitation
Act would be applicable in proceedings before quasi-judicial tribunal/forum or would be applicable
only to a 'court', as is understood in strict sense of being part of judicial branch of the State, has
been answered. The dispute was examined by Apex Court in the context of an appeal filed under
Section 128 of the Customs Act. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court after noticing the statutory
8 All. Rev. K.V. Abraham Vs Commissioner, Varanasi & Ors.
255
scheme as well as the judgments delivered previously on the issue have been pleased to hold that
provisions of Limitation Act apply only to suits, appeals and applications filed in 'courts' and not to
quasi-judicial bodies. The distinction between 'court' and 'quasi-judicial proceedings' have also
been examined, with reference to the judgments delivered previously on the issue. After noticing
the scheme of Limitation Act, 1963 in paras-11 onwards their Lordships observed as under in para19 of the report:-

"19. When it comes to applications, again Articles 124, 130 and 131 throw a great
deal of light. Only review of judgments by a "court" is contemplated in the Third Division in the
Schedule. Further, leave to appeal as a pauper again can be made either to the High Court or only
to any other court vide Article 130. And by Article 131, a revision petition filed only before Courts
under the Code of Civil Procedure Code or the Code of Criminal Procedure are referred to. On a
plain reading of the provisions of the Limitation Act, it becomes clear that suits, appeals and
applications are only to be considered (from the limitation point of view) if they are filed in courts
and not in quasi- judicial bodies."

Issue for consideration is specified in following words in para-21:-

"21. Under our constitutional scheme of things, the judiciary is dealt with in
Chapter IV of Part V and Chapter V of Part VI. Chapter IV of Part V deals with the Supreme Court
and Chapter V of Part VI deals with the High Courts and courts subordinate thereto. When the
Constitution uses the expression "court", it refers to this Court system. As opposed to this court
system is a system of quasi-judicial bodies called Tribunals. Thus, Articles 136 and 227 refer to
"courts" as distinct from "tribunals". The question in this case is whether the Limitation Act
extends beyond the court system mentioned above and embraces within its scope quasi-judicial
bodies as well?

Reliance has been placed upon a 3-Judge Bench of Apex Court in para-23 as under:-

23. In Kerala State Electricity Board v. T.P. Kunhaliumma, (1976) 4 SCC 634, a 3Judge Bench of this Court followed the aforesaid two judgments and stated:-

"22. The conclusion we reach is that Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act will
apply to any petition or application filed under any Act to a civil court. With respect we differ from
the view taken by the two-judge bench of this Court in Athani Municipal Council case [(1969) 1
SCC 873 : (1970) 1 SCR 51] and hold that Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act is not confined to
applications contemplated by or under the Code of Civil Procedure. The petition in the present
case was to the District Judge as a court. The petition was one contemplated by the Telegraph Act
for judicial decision. The petition is an application falling within the scope of Article 137 of the
1963 Limitation Act."

This judgment is an authoritative pronouncement by a 3-Judge Bench that the
Limitation Act applies only to courts and not to quasi- judicial Tribunals. Athani's case was
256 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

dissented from on a different proposition - that Article 137 is not confined to applications under the
Code of Civil Procedure alone. So long as an application is made under any statute to a Civil
Court, such application will be covered by Article 137 of the Limitation Act."

After noticing the judgments of the Supreme Court in Mukri Gopalan (supra), CST
Vs. Madan Lal Das & Sons [1976(4) SCC 464], and CST Vs. Parson Tools and Plants [1975(4)
SCC 22], their Lordships observed as under in paras-28 to 33 of the report:-

"28. Two other judgments of this Court need to be dealt with at this stage. In Mukri
Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker, (1995) 5 SCC 5, a 2-Judge Bench of this Court
held that the Limitation Act would apply to the appellate authority constituted under Section 13 of
the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act , 1965. This was done by applying the provision
of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. Despite referring to various earlier judgments of this Court
which held that the Limitation Act applies only to courts and not to Tribunals, this Court in this
case held to the contrary. In distinguishing the Parson Tools' case, which is a 3-Judge Bench
binding on the Court that decided Mukri Gopalan's case, the Court held:-

"18. ... If the Limitation Act does not apply then neither Section 29(2) nor Section
14(2) of the Limitation Act would apply to proceedings before him. But so far as this Court is
concerned it did not go into the question whether Section 29(2) would not get attracted because the
U.P. Sales Tax Act Judge (Revisions) was not a court but it took the view that because of the
express provision in Section 10(3)(B) applicability of Section 14(2) of the Sales Tax Act was ruled
out. Implicit in this reasoning is the assumption that but for such an express conflict or contrary
intention emanating from Section 10(3)(B) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act which was a special law,
Section 29(2) would have brought in Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act even for governing period
of limitation for such revision applications. In any case, the scope of Section 29(2) was not
considered by the aforesaid decision of the three learned Judges and consequently it cannot be held
to be an authority for the proposition that in revisional proceedings before the Sales Tax
authorities functioning under the U.P. Sales Tax Act Section 29(2) cannot apply as Mr. Nariman
would like to have it."

It then went on to follow the judgment reported in The Commissioner of Sales Tax,
U.P. v. M/s. Madan Lal Das & Sons, Bareilly, (1976) 4 SCC 464 which, as has been pointed out
earlier, is not an authority for the proposition that the Limitation Act would apply to Tribunals. In
fact, Mukri Gopalan's case was distinguished in Om Prakash v. Ashwani Kumar Bassi, (2010) 9
SCC 183 at paragraph 22 as follows:

"22. The decision in Mukri Gopalan case [(1995) 5 SCC 5] relied upon by Mr Ujjal
Singh is distinguishable from the facts of this case. In the facts of the said case, it was the District
Judges who were discharging the functions of the appellate authority and being a court, it was held
that the District Judge, functioning as the appellate authority, was a court and not persona
designata and was, therefore, entitled to resort to Section 5 of the Limitation Act. That is not so in
the instant case where the Rent Controller appointed by the State Government is a member of the
8 All. Rev. K.V. Abraham Vs Commissioner, Varanasi & Ors.
257
Punjab Civil Services and, therefore, a persona designata who would not be entitled to apply the
provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, as in the other case."

The fact that the District Judge himself also happened to be the appellate authority
under the Rent Act would have been sufficient on the facts of the case for the Limitation Act to
apply without going into the proposition that the Limitation Act would apply to tribunals.

29. Quite apart from Mukri Gopalan's case being out of step with at least five earlier
binding judgments of this Court, it does not square also with the subsequent judgment in
Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v. Principal secy., Irrigation Deptt., (2008) 7 SCC 169. A 3-Judge
Bench of this Court was asked to decide whether Section 14 of the Limitation Act would apply to
Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. After discussing the various provisions
of the Arbitration Act and the Limitation Act, this Court held:

"23. At this stage it would be relevant to ascertain whether there is any express
provision in the Act of 1996, which excludes the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act.
On review of the provisions of the Act of 1996 this Court finds that there is no provision in the said
Act which excludes the applicability of the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act to an
application submitted under Section 34 of the said Act. On the contrary, this Court finds that
Section 43 makes the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 applicable to arbitration proceedings.
The proceedings under Section 34 are for the purpose of challenging the award whereas the
proceeding referred to under Section 43 are the original proceedings which can be equated with a
suit in a court. Hence, Section 43 incorporating the Limitation Act will apply to the proceedings in
the arbitration as it applies to the proceedings of a suit in the court. Sub-section (4) of Section 43,
inter alia, provides that where the court orders that an arbitral award be set aside, the period
between the commencement of the arbitration and the date of the order of the court shall be
excluded in computing the time prescribed by the Limitation Act, 1963, for the commencement of
the proceedings with respect to the dispute so submitted. If the period between the commencement
of the arbitration proceedings till the award is set aside by the court, has to be excluded in
computing the period of limitation provided for any proceedings with respect to the dispute, there
is no good reason as to why it should not be held that the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation
Act would be applicable to an application submitted under Section 34 of the Act of 1996, more
particularly where no provision is to be found in the Act of 1996, which excludes the applicability
of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, to an application made under Section 34 of the Act. It is to be
noticed that the powers under Section 34 of the Act can be exercised by the court only if the
aggrieved party makes an application. The jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act, cannot be
exercised suo motu. The total period of four months within which an application, for setting aside
an arbitral award, has to be made is not unusually long. Section 34 of the Act of 1996 would be
unduly oppressive, if it is held that the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act are not
applicable to it, because cases are no doubt conceivable where an aggrieved party, despite
exercise of due diligence and good faith, is unable to make an application within a period of four
months. From the scheme and language of Section 34 of the Act of 1996, the intention of the
legislature to exclude the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act is not manifest. It is well
258 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

to remember that Section 14 of the Limitation Act does not provide for a fresh period of limitation
but only provides for the exclusion of a certain period. Having regard to the legislative intent, it
will have to be held that the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would be
applicable to an application submitted under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 for setting aside an
arbitral award."

30. While discussing Parson Tools, this Court held:

"25......In appeal, this Court held that (1) if the legislature in a special statute
prescribes a certain period of limitation, then the Tribunal concerned has no jurisdiction to treat
within limitation, an application, by excluding the time spent in prosecuting in good faith, on the
analogy of Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act, and (2) the appellate authority and the revisional
authority were not "courts" but were merely administrative tribunals and, therefore, Section 14 of
the Limitation Act did not, in terms, apply to the proceedings before such tribunals.

26. From the judgment of the Supreme Court in CST [(1975) 4 SCC 22 : 1975 SCC
(Tax) 185 : (1975) 3 SCR 743] it is evident that essentially what weighed with the Court in holding
that Section 14 of the Limitation Act was not applicable, was that the appellate authority and the
revisional authority were not "courts". The stark features of the revisional powers pointed out by
the Court, showed that the legislature had deliberately excluded the application of the principles
underlying Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act. Here in this case, the Court is not called upon
to examine scope of revisional powers. The Court in this case is dealing with Section 34 of the Act
which confers powers on the court of the first instance to set aside an award rendered by an
arbitrator on specified grounds. It is not the case of the contractor that the forums before which the
Government of India undertaking had initiated proceedings for setting aside the arbitral award are
not "courts". In view of these glaring distinguishing features, this Court is of the opinion that the
decision rendered in CST [(1975) 4 SCC 22 :1975 SCC (Tax) 185 : (1975) 3 SCR 743] did not
decide the issue which falls for consideration of this Court and, therefore, the said decision cannot
be construed to mean that the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act are not applicable to
an application submitted under Section 34 of the Act of 1996."

31. In a separate concurring judgment Justice Raveendran specifically held:

"44. It may be noticed at this juncture that the Schedule to the Limitation Act
prescribes the period of limitation only to proceedings in courts and not to any proceeding before a
tribunal or quasi-judicial authority. Consequently Sections 3 and 29(2) of the Limitation Act will
not apply to proceedings before the tribunal. This means that the Limitation Act will not apply to
appeals or applications before the tribunals, unless expressly provided."

While dealing with Parson Tools, the learned Judge held:

"56. In Parson Tools [(1975) 4 SCC 22] this Court did not hold that Section 14(2)
was excluded by reason of the wording of Section 10(3-B) of the Sales Tax Act. This Court was
8 All. Rev. K.V. Abraham Vs Commissioner, Varanasi & Ors.
259
considering an appeal against the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court. Two Judges of
the High Court had held that the time spent in prosecuting the application for setting aside the
order of dismissal of appeals in default, could be excluded when computing the period of limitation
for filing a revision under Section 10 of the said Act, by application of the principle underlying
Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act. The minority view of the third Judge was that the revisional
authority under Section 10 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act did not act as a court but only as a Revenue
Tribunal and therefore the Limitation Act did not apply to the proceedings before such Tribunal,
and consequently, neither Section 29(2) nor Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act applied. The
decision of the Full Bench was challenged by the Commissioner of Sales Tax before this Court,
contending that the Limitation Act did not apply to tribunals, and Section 14(2) of the Limitation
Act was excluded in principle or by analogy. This Court upheld the view that the Limitation Act did
not apply to tribunals, and that as the revisional authority under Section 10 of the U.P. Sales Tax
Act was a tribunal and not a court, the Limitation Act was inapplicable. This Court further held
that the period of pendency of proceedings before the wrong forum could not be excluded while
computing the period of limitation by applying Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act. This Court,
however, held that by applying the principle underlying Section 14(2), the period of pendency
before the wrong forum may be considered as a "sufficient cause" for condoning the delay, but then
having regard to Section 10(3-B), the extension on that ground could not extend beyond six months.
The observation that pendency of proceedings of the nature contemplated by Section 14(2) of the
Limitation Act, may amount to a sufficient cause for condoning the delay and extending the
limitation and such extension cannot be for a period in excess of the ceiling period prescribed, is in
the light of its finding that Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act was inapplicable to revisions under
Section 10(3-B) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. These observations cannot be interpreted as laying down
a proposition that even where Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act in terms applied and the period
spent before wrong forum could therefore be excluded while computing the period of limitation, the
pendency before the wrong forum should be considered only as a sufficient cause for extension of
period of limitation and therefore, subjected to the ceiling relating to the extension of the period of
limitation. As we are concerned with a proceeding before a court to which Section 14(2) of the
Limitation Act applies, the decision in Parson Tools [(1975) 4 SCC 22 : 1975 SCC (Tax) 185 :
(1975) 3 SCR 743] which related to a proceeding before a Tribunal to which Section 14(2) of the
Limitation Act did not apply, has no application."

32. Obviously, the ratio of Mukri Gopalan does not square with the observations of
the 3-Judge Bench in Consolidated Engineering Enterprises. In the latter case, this Court has
unequivocally held that Parson Tools is an authority for the proposition that the Limitation Act will
not apply to quasi-judicial bodies or Tribunals. To the extent that Mukri Gopalan is in conflict with
the judgment in the Consolidated Engineering Enterprises case, it is no longer good law.

33. The sheet anchor in Mukri Gopalan was Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act.
Section 29(2) states:-

"29. Savings.-- (1) * * *
260 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a
period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section
3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of
determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special
or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as,
and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law."