# Revan Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2022) 1 ILRA 1086
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2021-12-08
- **Case number:** Writ-A No. 15542 of 2021
- **Bench:** Alok Mathur
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/revan-singh-v-state-of-u-p-ors-47637
- **Pages:** 13

## Headnote

A. Service Law - Constitution of India,
1950-Article
226-challenge
tochargesheet and departmental enquirythe petitioner made complaints against his
superior,
the
Jail
Superintendent-He
repeatedly made complaints to all higher
authorities
due
to
personal
grudgepetitioner violated the service rules in his
official capacity-no details disclosed by
the petitioner as to how his superior is
responsible
for
proceedings
initiated
against the petitioner -Merely because in
his official capacity as District Magistrate,
the respondent taken cognizance of an
incident occurred in the jail premises,
cannot be concluded that respondent has
become
inimical
to
the
petitionerpetitioner
failed
to
show
how
the
respondent had acted malafide-Neither
the
disciplinary
proceedings
nor
the
charge-sheet can be quashed at an initial
stage-Gravity of alleged misconduct is a
relevant
factor
to
be
taken
into
consideration
-The
petitioner
cannot
claim the status of a whistleblower as the
same has not been in bonafide manner as
he himself been found to be implicated in
the
irregularities
which
he
himself
brought to fore.(Para 1 to 32)

B. One of the basic requirements of a
person being accepted as a "whistle
blower" is that his primary motive for the
activity should be in furtherance of public
good. The activity has to be undertaken in
public interest, exposing illegal activities
of a public organization or authority. The
conduct of the petitioner does not fall
within the high moral and ethical standard
that would be required of a bonafide
"whistle blower".

The writ petition is dismissed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

_Characters 0–39,982 of 44,902. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39982 for what follows._

1086 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
on the client. We are thus of opinion that
the decision of the two courts below which
had concurrently held this to be jeroyti
land after resumption of the Karnikam
service
inam,
was
correct
in
the
circumstances of the case, and the High
Court was not justified in reversing it.
(emphasis supplied)

24. In Himalayan Coop. Group
Housing Society v. Balwan Singh (2015) 7
SCC 373 a three-judge Bench of this Court
clarified the law of agency with respect to
client-lawyer relationships. The Court held
that while generally admissions of fact by
counsel are binding, neither the client nor
the court is bound by admissions as to
matters of law or legal conclusions:

32. Generally, admissions of fact made
by a counsel are binding upon their principals
as long as they are unequivocal; where,
however, doubt exists as to a purported
admission, the court should be wary to accept
such admissions until and unless the counsel
or the advocate is authorised by his principal
to make such admissions. Furthermore, a
client is not bound by a statement or
admission which he or his lawyer was not
authorised to make. A lawyer generally has no
implied or apparent authority to make an
admission or statement which would directly
surrender or conclude the substantial legal
rights of the client unless such an admission
or statement is clearly a proper step in
accomplishing the purpose for which the
lawyer was employed. We hasten to add
neither the client nor the court is bound by the
lawyer's statements or admissions as to
matters of law or legal conclusions. Thus,
according to generally accepted notions of
professional responsibility, lawyers should
follow the client's instructions rather than
substitute their judgment for that of the client.
We may add that in some cases, lawyers can
make decisions without consulting the client.
While in others, the decision is reserved for the
client. It is often said that the lawyer can make
decisions as to tactics without consulting the
client, while the client has a right to make
decisions that can affect his rights. (emphasis
supplied)

25. Recently, a two-judge Bench of this
Court in Director of Elementary Education,
Odisha v. Pramod Kumar Sahoo (2019) 10
SCC 674 observed that a concession on a
question of law concerning service Rules
would not bind the State:

11. The concession given by the learned
State Counsel before the Tribunal was a
concession in law and contrary to the statutory
rules. Such concession is not binding on the
State for the reason that there cannot be any
estoppel against law. The Rules provide for a
specific grade of pay, therefore, the concession
given by the learned State Counsel before the
Tribunal is not binding on the Appellant.

The concession of the Counsel for the
Appellant before the CAT does not preclude the
finding on the law that is arrived at by this
Court.

(Emphasis by the Court)"

26. Keeping in view the aforesaid
discussion no case for interference is made out.
Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed.
----------
(2022)01ILR A1086
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 08.12.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ALOK MATHUR, J.

Writ-A No. 15542 of 2021

Revan Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
1 All. Revan Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1087
Sri Abhinav Gaur, Sri Vibhu Rai, Sri Anoop
Trivedi (Sr. Adv.)

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

A. Service Law - Constitution of India,
1950-Article
226-challenge
tochargesheet and departmental enquirythe petitioner made complaints against his
superior,
the
Jail
Superintendent-He
repeatedly made complaints to all higher
authorities
due
to
personal
grudgepetitioner violated the service rules in his
official capacity-no details disclosed by
the petitioner as to how his superior is
responsible
for
proceedings
initiated
against the petitioner -Merely because in
his official capacity as District Magistrate,
the respondent taken cognizance of an
incident occurred in the jail premises,
cannot be concluded that respondent has
become
inimical
to
the
petitionerpetitioner
failed
to
show
how
the
respondent had acted malafide-Neither
the
disciplinary
proceedings
nor
the
charge-sheet can be quashed at an initial
stage-Gravity of alleged misconduct is a
relevant
factor
to
be
taken
into
consideration
-The
petitioner
cannot
claim the status of a whistleblower as the
same has not been in bonafide manner as
he himself been found to be implicated in
the
irregularities
which
he
himself
brought to fore.(Para 1 to 32)

B. One of the basic requirements of a
person being accepted as a "whistle
blower" is that his primary motive for the
activity should be in furtherance of public
good. The activity has to be undertaken in
public interest, exposing illegal activities
of a public organization or authority. The
conduct of the petitioner does not fall
within the high moral and ethical standard
that would be required of a bonafide
"whistle blower".

The writ petition is dismissed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:
1. Ajay Kumar Chaudhary Vs U.O.I. thru its
Secy. Civil Appeal No. 1912 of 2015

2. Ratnagiri Gas & Power (P) Ltd. Vs RDS
Projects Ltd. (2013) 1 SCC 524

3. Rajneesh Khajuria Vs Wockhardt Ltd.,(2020)
3 SCC 86

4. St. of Bih. Vs P.P Sharma (1992) Supp (1)
SCC 222: 1992 SCC (Cri) 192

5. St. of Har. Vs Bhajan (1992) Supp (1) SCC
335 :1992 SCC (Cri) 426

6. Prabodh Sagar Vs Punj. SEB (2000) 5 SCC
630 : 2000 SCC (L& S) 731

7. HMT Ltd.Vs Mudappa (2007) 9 SCC 768

8. St. of A.P. Vs Goverdhanlal Pitti (2003) 4 SCC
739

9. U.O.I. Vs Ashok Kumar (2005) 8 SCC 760:
2006 SCC (L&S) 47

10. S. Pratap Singh Vs St. of Punj. (1964) 4 SCR
733: AIR 1964 SC 72

11. E.P. Royappa Vs St. of T.N.(1974) 4 SCC 3:
1974 SCC (L&S) 165

12. Indian Rly. Cons. Co. Ltd. Vs Ajay Kumar
(2003) 4 SCC 579

13. Mstry. of Defence Vs Prabhash Chandra
Mirdha (2012) 11 SCC 565

14. St. of Punj. Vs Ajit Singh (1997) 11 SCC 368

15. Manoj H. Mishra Vs U.O.I. & ors. (2013) 6
SCC 313

(Delivered by Hon'ble Alok Mathur, J.)

1. Heard Sri Anoop Trivedi, Senior
Advocate assisted by Sri Vibhu Rai for the
petitioner as well as learned Additional
Chief Standing counsel Sri Shrawan Kumar
dubey for the respondents.
1088 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

2. By means of present writ petition
the petitioner has assailed the charge sheet
dated 27.7.2021 issued by Director General
(Jail Administration and Reforms).

3. The brief conspectus necessary for
adjudication of the present controversy is
that the petitioner was initially appointed
on the post of Deputy Jailer in 1994 and
was promoted to the post of Jailer in 1999
and subsequently to the post of Jail
Superintendent in 2010 but was reverted to
the post of Jailer after the judgment of
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the year 2015.

4. At the time when the petitioner was
posted as Jailer in District Jail, Meerut
sometime in October, 2000 an incident of
rioting took place between two groups of
jail inmates in the intervening night of
11/12 October, 2000 in Barack No.3-B,
subsequent to which a First Information
Report was lodged against the petitioner. It
is submitted by learned counsel for the
petitioner
that
the
entire
proceedings including filing of the First
Information Report were malafide at the
behest of the then District Magistrate,
Meeut who presently is holding the office
of Principal/Additional Chief Secretary, Jail
Administration
and
Reforms,
U.P.,
Lucknow. It has been stated that the arrest
of the petitioner was stayed pursuant to the
aforesaid First Information Report, the
petitioner had made a complaint against the
then District Magistrate before National
Commission for S.C./S.T. on 26.12.2000
where the proceedings were initiated and
respondent No.1 was also called for
personal appearance and since then it is
stated that he is inimical towards the
petitioner. It is further submitted that in the
year 2017 the departmental proceedings
were sought to be initiated against the
petitioner and he was placed under
suspension by means of order dated
3.11.2017. Aggrieved by the aforesaid
order the petitioner preferred a writ petition
before this Court and this Court stayed the
suspension by means of order dated
16.11.2017 in Writ A No.5472 of 2017. He
challenged the charge sheet and the
departmental inquiry before this Court by
means of Writ petition No.16313 of 2018
and by means of order dated 18.8.2018 this
Court had stayed the further proceedings in
pursuance of the said charge sheet. It is
stated that the petitioner was again placed
under suspension by means of order dated
30.4.2020 and this Court after adverting to
the orders passed in all earlier writ petitions
preferred by the petitioner provided that no
coercive action shall be taken against the
petitioner passed in Writ A No.4947 of
2020. Subsequently the said writ petition
was finally allowed by means of the
judgment and order dated 22.9.2021 relying
upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme
Court
in
the
case
of Ajay
Kumar
Chaudhary Vs. Union of India through its
Secretary
(Civil Appeal
No.1912
of
2015) where Hon'ble Supreme Court had
observed that "the currency of a Suspension
Order should not extend beyond three
months
if
within
this
period
the
Memorandum of Charges/Chargesheet is
not
served
on
the
delinquent
officer/employee; if the Memorandum of
Charges/Chargesheet is served a reasoned
order must be passed for the extension of
the suspension."

5. It has been further submitted that in
the meanwhile the petitioner made several
representations against Mr. Umesh Singh,
Jail
Superintendent,
District
Jail,
Moradabad and also preferred a writ
petition before this Court being writ
petition No.2998 of 2021 praying for
expeditious disposal of the inquiry on the
1 All. Revan Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1089
basis of the multiple complaints made by
the petitioner.

6. In pursuance to the complaints
made by the petitioner the respondents
instituted an inquiry, which was conducted
by Deputy Inspector General of Police
(Jail) Agra/Meerut Zone. The enquiry was
conducted on the basis of the complaint
submitted by the petitioner and in the
exhaustive 81 page report dated 9.3.2021
was submitted finding the petitioner to be
involved in certain acts of misconduct apart
from other officials. All the allegations
made by the petitioner have been duly
enquired into and all the documents in this
regard have been considered and the
allegations against Umesh Singh, the then
Superintendent
of
Jail
District
Jail,
Moradabad were found proved with regard
to
not
properly
maintaining
the
Superintendent Order Book, did not look
after the maintenance of administration and
security of the Jail, did not properly look
into the recommendations made by the
doctors, did not take interest in sending
regular reports to the office of Inspector
General Of Police (Jail) etc. while the
petitioner
along
with
Umesh
Singh,
Superintendent of Jail have been found to
be involved in taking money from the Jail
inmates
for
exempting
them
from
assigining hard duties, money was taken to
give the inmates the benefit of independent
sleeping place in light of the overcrowding,
not taking care to allot the duties of the Jail
Warder, and despite being overall in charge
of Jail the petitioner did not take care to
stop the illegal activities.

7. A perusal of the enquiry report
indicates that the enquiry was conducted on
the basis of complaints made by the
petitioner, and even during the enquiry he
was associated and also produced
documents along with his letter dated
26/09/2020 before the enquiry officer. His
statement was also recorded during the said
enquiry. A number of under trial prisoners
have deposed before the enquiry where
they have said that they had to pay money
for being allotted a new Barrack having
less number of prisoners, gambling was
prevalent in the Jail for which money was
paid, money was taken for meeting the
prisoners by the relatives, the attitude of the
officers were extremely bad and the under
trial prisoners were regularly abused.

8. It has also been taken note that the
District Judge when visited the Jail on
23/05/2020 has recorded that the petitioner
was not present during the said visit, and no
cooperation was given by him and
therefore recorded that he should improve
his work.

9. The enquiry report further indicates
that there are serious allegations against the
petitioner which deserves a regular enquiry.
The details and the manner in which the
enquiry officer has considered the charges
belies the allegations with regard to the
proceedings being malafide. There are
statements of various inmates who have
deposed before the enquiry officer and
supported the allegations made therein.
Various documents have been looked into
and findings recorded, and it cannot be said
that the said enquiry was a sham or has
been done in an objective to implicate the
petitioner.

10. The impugned charge sheet dated
27/07/2021 contains 3 charges against the
petitioner, the first charge relates to Jailer
Report Book, which according to the Jail
manual should have been handed over to
1090 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
his successor, but the same was not done by
him as informed by his successor in his
statement, and consequently he has been
charged with delerection of official duty
and the same is also violative of the service
rules governing the conduct of the
petitioner. In support of the said charges
and
the
statement
of
his
successor
Mritunjaya Panday and the statement of the
petitioner himself recorded in the said
enquiry has been relied.

11. In the charge No.2 it has been
alleged that the jail authorities used to
recieve illegal gratification from the jail
inmates for showing favour for not to
imposing any punishment while those who
could not pay had to suffer punishment, and
the petitioner did nothing to stop this
corrupt practice. In evidence of the said
charges various documents maintained and
the Jail are said to be the evidence of the
aforesaid charge.

12. That third charge relates to the
posting of two Bandirakshaks to the
canteen of the jail, and money was extorted
by them from the inmates for providing
canteen services and the petitioner, who
was incharge had posted the two persons
and, therefore, was deliberately negligent in
his duties.

13. In the present writ petition the
prayer has been made for quashing charge
sheet as well as all the proceedings in
pursuance of the charge sheet dated
27/07/2021.

14. It was submitted by the counsel of
the petitioner that the charge sheet deserves
to be set aside inasmuch as the copy of the
report has neither been furnished to the
petitioner nor the petitioner was afforded an
opportunity before submission of the said
report. The argument raised by the
petitioner is misconceived, apart from
being contrary to the facts on record. There
is no provision in the service rules, nor any
legal provision could be shown by the
counsel of the petitioner that there is the
requirement of handing over of the
preliminary enquiry report to the delinquent
employee before submission of the charge
sheet. The documents required by the
petitioner can be sought from the enquiry
officer during inquiry subject to his
demonstrating that the said documents are
necessary and relevant for his defence.
Considering the fact that the petitioner
participated in the preliminary enquiry and
adduced evidence which has been duly
considered by the enquiry officer it cannot
be said that the enquiry has been done
behind his back or that he has not been
given any opportunity, coupled with the
fact that a copy of the enquiry report is
already annexed along with the writ
petition it cannot be pleaded that he was
not supplied with a copy of the said report
and hence the argument of the petitioner in
this regard are without merit and hance
rejected.

15. The second argument raised was
that the entire proceedings are vitiated in as
much as they have been initiated at the
behest of Principal Secretary/Additional
Chief Secretary (Jail Administration and
Reform Service Uttar Pradesh again. It is
the case of the petitioner that whenever
departmental
proceedings
have
been
initiated against the petitioner the same
have been initiated at the behest of
respondent no.1 while no material is placed
before us so as to indicate as to how
respondent No.1 was responsible for the
same so as to conclude that he was
responsible for initiation of the said
Department proceedings. In order to sustain
1 All. Revan Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1091
an allegation of malafide there should exist
suficient evidence in this regard clearly
pointing out towards his conduct, which
can
demonstate
that
he
has
acted
malafidely. Merely, alleging that a person
has acted malafidely is not sufficient to
sustain any such allegation.

16. The subsequent disciplinary
proceedings
were
also
subjected
to
challenge before this court and by means of
an order dated 29/06/2005 passed in writ
petition No.4656 of 2005 and interim
protection was granted to the petitioner. A
perusal of the said order indicates that the
Court considered the fact that similar
proceedings/inquiry have culminated in
favour of the petitioner earlier and no
opportunity was given to the petitioner
before reinitiating the proceedings. A
perusal of the previous orders of this Court
indicates that the grounds of malafide
against respondent no.1, were neither
pleaded nor considered and it seems that
whenever disciplinary proceedings were
initiated against the petitioner he has raised
the bogey of malafide referring to the
incident occuring in the year 2000 when
respondent No.1 was posted as District
Magistrate, Meerut where the petitioner
was also posted as Jailer. There is no details
disclosed by the petitioner as to how
respondent No.1 is responsible for the
proceedings initiated against the petitioner.

17. In the present case, this Court
has perused the repeated complaints made
by the petitioner against his superior, the
Jail Superintendent. He did not move just
one complaint, but repeatedly continued
to make such complaints to all the higher
authorities, which clearly indicates that
the petitioner has a personal grudge
against
him,
which
he
wanted
to
vindicate, rather than uphold the rule
of law.

18.

Presently,
undoubtedly
respondent no.1 is posted as Principal
Secretary, Additional Chief Secretary
(Jail
Administration
and
Reform
Services) and signed the impugned
charge sheet, but Avnish Kumar Awasthi
has not been made a party in the writ
petition which is the foundation of such
allegation, is missing in the writ petition
and consequently, they cannot be as such
considered. In this regard as per the
judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in the case of Ratnagiri Gas and Power
(P) Ltd. v. RDS Projects Ltd. [Ratnagiri
Gas and Power (P) Ltd. v. RDS Projects
Ltd., (2013) 1 SCC 524] , it was held that
when allegations of mala fides are made,
the persons against whom the same are
levelled need to be impleaded as parties
to the proceedings to enable them to
answer
the
charge.
A
judicial
pronouncement declaring an action to be
mala fide is a serious indictment of the
person concerned that can lead to adverse
civil consequences against him. The
Court held as under: (SCC p. 538, para
27):

"27. There is yet another aspect which
cannot be ignored. As and when allegations
of mala fides are made, the persons against
whom the same are levelled need to be
impleaded as parties to the proceedings to
enable them to answer the charge. In the
absence of the person concerned as a party
in his/her individual capacity it will neither
be fair nor proper to record a finding that
malice in fact had vitiated the action taken
by the authority concerned. It is important
to remember that a judicial pronouncement
declaring an action to be mala fide is a
1092 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
serious indictment of the person concerned
that can lead to adverse civil consequences
against him. Courts have, therefore, to be
slow in drawing conclusions when it comes
to holding allegations of mala fides to be
proved and only in cases where based on
the material placed before the Court or
facts that are admitted leading to inevitable
inferences supporting the charge of mala
fides that the Court should record a finding
in the process ensuring that while it does
so, it also hears the person who was likely
to be affected by such a finding."

19. Despite the fact that respondent
no.1 personally has not been made a party,
there was no requirement of further
examination of the contention of the
petitioner with regard to the malafide, but
this Court on persuation by the counsel for
the petitioner has considered the said
allegations and it is noticed that respondent
no.1 was summoned by the National
Commission for SC/ST at the behest of the
petitioner, but there is no mention in the
entire writ petition as to whether any
adverse comments were made by the said
Commission on respondent No.1 or that he
suffered on account of being summoned by
the said Commission. Merely because a
person is summoned by a Commission
cannot by itself have any adverse effects on
the said person unless some observations
are made against him by the Commission.
It was also very well known that
Commission are also vested with powers of
enquiry, and in exercise of the said power
they are routinely required to summon
officials to produce documents or record
their statements with regard to any incident.
Merely because a person is summoned at
the behest of any individual, it cannot be
said that the person so summoned would
become inimical to the person at who's
instance he was summoned. There is no
averment in the entire petition that
respondent No.1 subsequent to the year
2000 has taken any steps, or passed any
orders against the petitioner so as to
conclude that he has developed inimical
relations to the petitioner, and would take
all steps necessary to harm his career.
Merely because in his official capacity as
District Magistrate, the respondent No.1
has lodged an FIR and taken cognizance of
an incident which occurred in the year 2000
in the premises of the Jail, which was
clearly his responsibility, it cannot be
concluded that respondent no.1 has become
inimical to the petitioner. There is no
averment that he had personally intimidated
the petitioner, or any other fact has been
brought
on
record
indicating
how
respondent no.1 acted beyond the colour of
his office so as to show that he had acted
malafide against the petitioner. The test laid
down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court for
considering
the
allegations
of
malafide/personal bias has to be considered
on the facts and circumstances of each
case. In the case of Rajneesh Khajuria v.
Wockhardt Ltd., (2020) 3 SCC 86 this
aspect of the matter was considered and
observed:-

"16. The act of transfer can be unfair
labour practice if the transfer is actuated
by mala fide. The allegations of mala fides
have two facets -- one malice in law and
the other being malice in fact. The
challenge to the transfer is based upon
malice in fact as it is an action taken by the
employer on account of two officers present
in Conference. In a judgment in State of
Bihar v. P.P. Sharma [State of Bihar v. P.P.
Sharma, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 222 : 1992
SCC (Cri) 192] , this Court held that mala
fide means want of good faith, personal
bias, grudge, oblique or improper motive
or ulterior purpose. The plea of mala fides
1 All. Revan Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1093
involves two questions, namely (i) whether
there is a personal bias or an oblique
motive, and (ii) whether the administrative
action
is
contrary
to
the
objects,
requirements and conditions of a valid
exercise of administrative power. As far as
second aspect is concerned, there is a
power of transfer vested in the employer in
terms of letter of appointment. Even in
terms of the provisions of the Act, the
transfer by itself cannot be said to be an act
of unfair labour practice unless it is
actuated by mala fides. Therefore, to
sustain a plea of mala fides, there has to be
an element of personal bias or an oblique
motive. This Court held as under: (SCC pp.
260 & 264-65, paras 50-51 & 59)

"50. Mala fides means want of good
faith, personal bias, grudge, oblique or
improper motive or ulterior purpose. The
administrative action must be said to be
done in good faith, if it is in fact done
honestly, whether it is done negligently or
not. An act done honestly is deemed to have
been done in good faith. An administrative
authority must, therefore, act in a bona fide
manner and should never act for an
improper motive or ulterior purposes or
contrary to the requirements of the statute,
or
the
basis
of
the
circumstances
contemplated
by
law,
or
improperly
exercised discretion to achieve some
ulterior purpose. The determination of a
plea of mala fides involves two questions,
namely (i) whether there is a personal bias
or an oblique motive, and (ii) whether the
administrative action is contrary to the
objects, requirements and conditions of a
valid exercise of administrative power.

51. The action taken must, therefore,
be proved to have been made mala fide for
such considerations. Mere assertion or a
vague or bald statement is not sufficient. It
must be demonstrated either by admitted or
proved
facts
and
circumstances
obtainable in a given case. If it is
established that the action has been taken
mala fide for any such considerations or by
fraud on power or colourable exercise of
power, it cannot be allowed to stand.

***

59. Malice in law could be inferred from
doing of wrongful act intentionally without any
just cause or excuse or without there being
reasonable relation to the purpose of the
exercise of statutory power. Malice in law is not
established from the omission to consider some
documents said to be relevant to the accused.
Equally reporting the commission of a crime to
the Station House Officer, cannot be held to be
a colourable exercise of power with bad faith or
fraud on power. It may be honest and bona fide
exercise of power. There are no grounds made
out or shown to us that the first information
report was not lodged in good faith. State of
Haryana v. Bhajan
Lal [State
of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
: 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] is an authority for the
proposition that existence of deep seated
political vendetta is not a ground to quash the
FIR. Therein despite the attempt by the
respondent to prove by affidavit evidence
corroborated by documents of the mala fides
and even on facts as alleged no offence was
committed, this Court declined to go into those
allegations and relegated the dispute for
investigation. Unhesitatingly, I hold that the
findings of the High Court [Prem Prakash
Sharma v. State of Bihar, 1990 SCC OnLine Pat
105 : (1990) 2 PLJR 404 (2)] that FIR gets
vitiated by the mala fides of the Administrator
and the charge-sheets are the results of the
mala fides of the informant or investigator, to
say the least, is fantastic and obvious gross
error of law."

19. In another judgment in Prabodh
Sagar v. Punjab
SEB [Prabodh
1094 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Sagar v. Punjab SEB, (2000) 5 SCC 630 :
2000 SCC (L&S) 731] , it was held by this
Court that the mere use of the expression
"mala fide" would not by itself make the
petition entertainable. The Court held as
under: (SCC p. 640, para 13)

"13. ... Incidentally, be it noted that
the
expression
"mala
fide"
is
not
meaningless jargon and it has its proper
connotation. Malice or mala fides can only
be appreciated from the records of the case
in the facts of each case. There cannot
possibly be any set guidelines in regard to
the proof of mala fides. Mala fides, where it
is alleged, depends upon its own facts and
circumstances.
We
ourselves
feel
it
expedient to record that the petitioner has
become more of a liability than an asset
and in the event of there being such a
situation
vis-à-vis
an
employee,
the
employer will be within his liberty to take
appropriate steps including the cessation of
relationship between the employer and the
employee. The service conditions of the
Board's
employees
also
provide
for
voluntary (sic compulsory) retirement, a
person of the nature of the petitioner, as
more fully detailed hereinbefore, cannot
possibly be given any redress against the
order of the Board for voluntary retirement.
There must be factual support pertaining to
the allegations of mala fides, unfortunately
there is none. Mere user of the words "mala
fide" by the petitioner would not by itself
make the petition entertainable. The Court
must scan the factual aspect and come to
its own conclusion i.e. exactly what the
High Court has done and that is the reason
why the narration has been noted in this
judgment in extenso. ..."

20.

In
a
judgment
in HMT
Ltd. v. Mudappa [HMT Ltd. v. Mudappa,
(2007) 9 SCC 768] , quoting from earlier
judgment
of
this
Court
in State
of
A.P. v. Goverdhanlal
Pitti [State
of
A.P. v. Goverdhanlal Pitti, (2003) 4 SCC
739] , it was held that "legal malice" or
"malice in law" means "something done
without lawful excuse". It is an act done
wrongfully and wilfully without reasonable
or probable cause, and not necessarily an
act done from ill feeling and spite. The
Court
held
as
under:
(HMT
Ltd.
case [HMT Ltd. v. Mudappa, (2007) 9
SCC 768] , SCC pp. 775-76, para 24)

"24. The Court also explained the
concept of legal mala fides. By referring
to Words and Phrases Legally Defined, 3rd
Edn., London Butterworths, 1989 the Court
stated:
(Goverdhanlal
case [State
of
A.P. v. Goverdhanlal Pitti, (2003) 4 SCC
739] , SCC p. 744, para 12)

''12. The legal meaning of malice is
"ill will or spite towards a party and any
indirect or improper motive in taking an
action". This is sometimes described as
"malice in fact". "Legal malice" or "malice
in law" means "something done without
lawful excuse". In other words, "it is an act
done wrongfully and wilfully without
reasonable or probable cause, and not
necessarily an act done from ill feeling and
spite. It is a deliberate act in disregard of
the rights of others."'

It was observed that where malice was
attributed to the State, it could not be a case
of malice in fact, or personal ill will or
spite on the part of the State. It could only
be malice in law i.e. legal mala fides. The
State, if it wishes to acquire land, could
exercise its power bona fide for statutory
purpose and for none other. It was observed
that it was only because of the decree
passed in favour of the owner that the
proceedings for acquisition were necessary
and hence, notification was issued. Such an
action could not be held mala fide."
1 All. Revan Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1095

21. In a judgment in Union of India v.
Ashok Kumar [Union of India v. Ashok
Kumar, (2005) 8 SCC 760 : 2006 SCC
(L&S) 47] , it has been held that allegations
of mala fides are often more easily made
than proved, and the very seriousness of
such allegations demands proof of a high
order of credibility. The Court held as
under: (SCC p. 770, para 21)

"21. Doubtless, he who seeks to
invalidate or nullify any act or order must
establish the charge of bad faith, an abuse or
a misuse by the authority of its powers. While
the indirect motive or purpose, or bad faith or
personal ill will is not to be held established
except on clear proof thereof, it is obviously
difficult to establish the state of a man's mind,
for that is what the employee has to establish
in this case, though this may sometimes be
done. The difficulty is not lessened when one
has to establish that a person apparently
acting on the legitimate exercise of power
has, in fact, been acting mala fide in the sense
of pursuing an illegitimate aim. It is not the
law that mala fides in the sense of improper
motive should be established only by direct
evidence. But it must be discernible from the
order impugned or must be shown from the
established
surrounding
factors
which
preceded the order. If bad faith would vitiate
the order, the same can, in our opinion, be
deduced as a reasonable and inescapable
inference from proved facts. (S. Pratap
Singh v. State
of
Punjab
[S.
Pratap
Singh v. State of Punjab, (1964) 4 SCR 733 :
AIR 1964 SC 72] .) It cannot be overlooked
that the burden of establishing mala fides is
very heavy on the person who alleges it. The
allegations of mala fides are often more
easily made than proved, and the very
seriousness of such allegations demands
proof of a high order of credibility. As noted
by this Court in E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N.
[E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N., (1974) 4
SCC 3 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 165] courts would
be slow to draw dubious inferences from
incomplete facts placed before them by a
party, particularly when the imputations are
grave and they are made against the holder
of an office which has a high responsibility in
the administration. (See Indian Railway
Construction Co. Ltd. v. Ajay Kumar, (2003)
4 SCC 579."

22. The allegation in the complaint is
that the transfer was actuated for the
reason that the employee had raised voice
against removal of Shri Khare from the
venue of a Conference. The officers present
in the said Conference were the Regional
Manager or Sales Manager, whereas order
of transfer was passed by Mr Suresh
Srinivasan, General Manager-HR. It is an
admitted fact that there is power of transfer
with the employer. The allegations are
against
the
persons
present
in
the
Conference but there is no allegation
against the person who has passed the
order of transfer. None of the named
persons including the person present in the
Conference have been impleaded as parties
to rebut such allegations. Since the order of
transfer is in terms of the letter of
appointment, therefore, the mere fact that
the employee was transferred will per
se not make it mala fide. The allegations of
mala fides are easier to levy than to prove.

23. Therefore, the allegation that the
transfer of the appellant was an act of
unfair labour practice without impleading
the person who is said to have acted in a
mala fide manner is not sustainable.

24. The other aspect which deserves
due consideration is the fact that the
petitioner has challenged the charge sheet,
1096 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
which is akin to a show cause notice,
inasmuch as the person has liberty to reply
to the charges framed against him and only
subsequently after consideration of the
evidence and other material produced by
the delinquent employee, the disciplinary
authority proceeds to consider the veracity
of the charges and gives his finding
whether the charges are proved or not.
Charge sheet by itself does not have any
adverse
inference
to
the
delinquent
employee and does not invite any civil
consequences and consequently as such,
without there being any jurisdictional issue,
a challenge to the charge sheet would not
normally not lie and this Court would not
interfere in exercise of the powers under
article 226 of the Constitution of India.

In the case of Ministry of Defence v.
Prabhash Chandra Mirdha, (2012) 11
SCC 565 : it has been held as under:-

24. Ordinarily a writ application does
not lie against a charge-sheet or showcause notice for the reason that it does not
give rise to any cause of action. It does not
amount to an adverse order which affects
the right of any party unless the same has
been issued by a person having no
jurisdiction/competence to do so. A writ
lies when some right of a party is infringed.
In fact, charge-sheet does not infringe the
right of a party. It is only when a final
order
imposing
the
punishment
or
otherwise adversely affecting a party is
passed, it may have a grievance and cause
of action. Thus, a charge-sheet or showcause notice in disciplinary proceedings
should not ordinarily be quashed by the
court. (Vide State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt
Sharma [(1987) 2 SCC 179 : (1987) 3 ATC
319 : AIR 1987 SC 943] , Bihar State
Housing
Board v. Ramesh
Kumar
Singh [(1996)
1
SCC
327]
, Ulagappa v. Commr. [(2001) 10 SCC 639
: AIR 2000 SC 3603 (2)] , Special
Director v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse [(2004)
3 SCC 440 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 826 : AIR
2004
SC
1467]
and Union
of
India v. Kunisetty
Satyanarayana [(2006)
12 SCC 28 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 304] .)

25. Thus, the law on the issue can be
summarised to the effect that the chargesheet cannot generally be a subject-matter
of challenge as it does not adversely affect
the rights of the delinquent unless it is
established that the same has been issued
by an authority not competent to initiate the
disciplinary
proceedings.
Neither
the
disciplinary proceedings nor the chargesheet can be quashed at an initial stage as it
would be a premature stage to deal with the
issues. Proceedings are not liable to be
quashed on the grounds that proceedings
had been initiated at a belated stage or
could not be concluded in a reasonable
period unless the delay creates prejudice to
the delinquent employee. Gravity of
alleged misconduct is a relevant factor to
be taken into consideration while quashing
the proceedings.

26. Learned Counsel for the petitioner
has also extensively taken this Court to
various documents to indicate that the
charges itself are false and in fact the
erstwhile Superintendent of Jail against
whom the petitioner had made a complaint,
was responsible for misconduct and even
the allegations have been proved to be
correct in the said enquiry, while none of
the charges against the petitioner can be
sustained. In this regard, this Court is of the
view that it is the domain of the enquiry
officer to conduct the enquiry, and this
Court would not go into the merits of the
charges in writ petition under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India. The law in this
regard it is settled in the case of In State of
1 All. Revan Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1097
Punjab v. Ajit Singh, (1997) 11 SCC 368,
where the Hon'ble Supreme Court set aside
the order of quashing the charge-sheet and
held as under:

"We are, however, of the view that the
High Court was in error in setting aside
the charge-sheet that was served on the
respondent
in
the
disciplinary
proceedings. In doing so the High Court
has gone into the merits of the allegations
on which the charge-sheet was based and
even though the charges had yet to be
proved by evidence to be adduced in the
disciplinary proceedings. The High Court,
accepting the explanation offered by the
respondent, has proceeded on the basis
that there was no merit in the charges
levelled against the respondent. We are
unable to uphold this approach of the
High Court."

27. Lastly, it is submitted that the
petitioner ought to be protected in light of
the fact that he is exposed to the illlegality
in the organisation and consequently he
should be given the protection as is given
to a whistleblower. It is submitted that the
proceedings initiated cannot be initiated
against the petitioner as it is on his
complaints that the entire enquiry was
undertaken and in turn he has been
chargesheeted.

28. In order to consider as to whether
the petitioner is entitled to be given
protection as a whistleblower, it has to be
seen as to whether he has made the
complainant's and disclosures in public
interest, and whether such disclosure was
bonafide and not actuated by malice or with
the intention to satisfy the personal grudge
against a colleague or senior.

29. The Hon'ble Supreme Court
has considered the aforesaid aspect in the
case of Manoj H.Mishra vs Union Of
India & Ors (2013) 6 SCC 313 decided on
9 April, 2013 as under:-