# Rishi Kumar Jain & Anr v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 9 ILRA 1067
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-09-18
- **Case number:** Writ - C No. 21150 of 2014
- **Bench:** Mahesh Chnadra Tripathi, Anish Kumar Gupta
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/rishi-kumar-jain-anr-v-state-of-u-p-ors-54759
- **Pages:** 25

## Headnote

A) Whether the provisions of Section 24 (2) of
the Act, 2013 would apply to the acquisition
made under the Adhiniyam, 1965?
B) Whether under the facts and circumstances,
the benefit under Section 24 (2) of the Act,
2013 would be applicable?
C) Whether the proceeding is barred by delay
and laches?

Head Notes
The Constitution of India, 1950-Article
226; The Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas
Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965-Sections 28, 32
; The Land Acquisition Act, 1894- Section
17; Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency
in
Land
Acquisition,
Rehabilitation
and
Resettlement
Act,
2013- Section 24 - Petitioners have
chosen multiple forums and instituted
several cases, which resulted in delay of
the proceedings - Against the acquisition
the
petitioners'
father
had
already
approached to the Supreme Court but the
same had been negated by the Supreme
Court and the acquisition was upheld. The
petitioners'
father
as
well
as
the
petitioners had also knocked the doors of
various authorities/ courts but eventually
they
failed
to
get
any
relief
from
anywhere. The possession of the land had
been taken by the authorities and the
same had been transferred to the Trust.
On the said land institution had also been
built, which is also imparting education to
students. We find that once the land
vested in the State, the same is free from
all encumbrances, it cannot be divested or
revested- The stale and dead claims
cannot be permitted to be canvassed on
the pretext of enactment of Section 24 -
Petition dismissed.

Held-
A) The contention relating to lapsing of
acquisition under Section 24 (2) of the Act, 2013
when the land was acquired under the
provisions of the Act, 1894 would, therefore, not
come to the aid of the petitioner.
B) The proceeding had been challenged in
different forums and initially interim injunction
was also obtained but it is apparent that the
acquisition had been upheld upto Supreme
Court. Once the award has been made, it was
not open for the petitioner to challenge the
notification under Section 28 of the Adhiniyam,

## Text

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9 All. Rishi Kumar Jain & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1067
it may not be possible for the
petitioner no.2 to take examination in Class
Xth for this academic year and keeping in
view his performance on the academic side,
the respondent no.4 shall permit the
petitioner no.2 to undergo the studies for
Class IXth.

16.
The
writ
petition
stands
allowed in terms of the said directions.
----------
(2025) 9 ILRA 1067
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 18.09.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MAHESH CHNADRA
TRIPATHI, J.
THE HON'BLE ANISH KUMAR GUPTA, J.

Writ - C No. 21150 of 2014

Rishi Kumar Jain & Anr. ...Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Ram Prakash Srivastava

Counsel for the Respondents:
S.C., Ravi Anand Agarwal

Issue for Consideration
A) Whether the provisions of Section 24 (2) of
the Act, 2013 would apply to the acquisition
made under the Adhiniyam, 1965?
B) Whether under the facts and circumstances,
the benefit under Section 24 (2) of the Act,
2013 would be applicable?
C) Whether the proceeding is barred by delay
and laches?

Head Notes
The Constitution of India, 1950-Article
226; The Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas
Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965-Sections 28, 32
; The Land Acquisition Act, 1894- Section
17; Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency
in
Land
Acquisition,
Rehabilitation
and
Resettlement
Act,
2013- Section 24 - Petitioners have
chosen multiple forums and instituted
several cases, which resulted in delay of
the proceedings - Against the acquisition
the
petitioners'
father
had
already
approached to the Supreme Court but the
same had been negated by the Supreme
Court and the acquisition was upheld. The
petitioners'
father
as
well
as
the
petitioners had also knocked the doors of
various authorities/ courts but eventually
they
failed
to
get
any
relief
from
anywhere. The possession of the land had
been taken by the authorities and the
same had been transferred to the Trust.
On the said land institution had also been
built, which is also imparting education to
students. We find that once the land
vested in the State, the same is free from
all encumbrances, it cannot be divested or
revested- The stale and dead claims
cannot be permitted to be canvassed on
the pretext of enactment of Section 24 -
Petition dismissed.

Held-
A) The contention relating to lapsing of
acquisition under Section 24 (2) of the Act, 2013
when the land was acquired under the
provisions of the Act, 1894 would, therefore, not
come to the aid of the petitioner.
B) The proceeding had been challenged in
different forums and initially interim injunction
was also obtained but it is apparent that the
acquisition had been upheld upto Supreme
Court. Once the award has been made, it was
not open for the petitioner to challenge the
notification under Section 28 of the Adhiniyam,
1965.
C) At this belated stage the petitioner cannot be
permitted to revive the dead and stale claims.
(E-15)
(Para 30,33,46 & 47)

Case Law Cited
Atul Sharma & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors L. A.
No. 159 of 2014; Jagbeer Singh & Ors. v. State
of U.P. & Ors 2018 (2) AWC 1639; Indore
Development Authority v. Manoharlal & Ors SLP
(C) Nos. 9036 - 9038 of 2016 dt. 6.3.2020;
Urban Development Trust, Udaipur v. Bheru Lal
1068 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
& Ors 2003 (1) AWC 73 (SC); State of U.P. v.
Smt. Pista Devi & Ors AIR 1986 SC 2025;
State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. D.R. Laxmi &
Ors (1996) 6 SCC 445; Ramniklal N. Bhutta
vs. State of Maharashtra (1997) 1 SCC 134;
Swaika Properties Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. State
of Rajasthan & Ors (2008) 4 SCC 695;
Gajraj & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors 2011
(11) ADJ 1 (FB); Satendra Prasad Jain v.
State of U.P. & Ors AIR 1993 SC 2517;
Aflatoon & Ors. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi &
Ors (1975) 4 SCC 285; Kendriya Karamchari
Evam Mitra Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd. and
Anr. v. State of U.P. and Anr 1988 UPLBEC
645; V. Chandrasekaran & Anr. v. The
Administrative Officer & Ors CIVIL APPEAL
No. 6342 - 6343 of 2012 decided on
18.9.2012;

List of Acts
The Constitution of India, 1950; The Uttar
Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam,
1965; The Land Acquisition Act, 1894; Right to
Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act,
2013

List of Keywords
Petitioner cannot be permitted to revive the
dead and stale claims; award been made,
Not open for the petitioner to challenge the
notification
under
Section
28
of
the
Adhiniyam,
1965;
Multiple
forums
and
instituted several cases instituted

Case Arising From
Parishad proposed to acquire the land for
its "Sikandra Grah Sthan and Sarak Yojana
at Agra" and published a notification under
Section
28
dated
04.04.1970
and
declaration
under
Section
32
dated
28.06.1080 of the Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam
Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965 . As there
was
an
urgency,
a
notification
dated
23.01.1981 was issued under Section 17 of
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 notifying the
lands of the petitioners.

Appearances for Parties
Counsel for Petitioners(s) : Ram Prakash
Srivastava
 Counsel for Respondent(s) : Standing Counsel,
Ravi Anand Agarwal
(Delivered by Hon'ble Mahesh Chandra
Tripathi, J.)

1. Heard Shri Pramod Jain, learned
Senior Counsel assisted by Shri Ram
Prakash Srivastava, learned counsel for the
petitioners; Shri Suresh Singh, learned
Addl. Chief Standing Counsel and Shri
Fuzail Ahmad Ansari, learned Standing
Counsel for State respondents and Shri
Ravi Anand Agarwal, learned counsel for
U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad1.

2. The instant writ petition has been
preferred for following reliefs:-

(i) to issue a writ, order or
direction in the nature of certiorari
quashing the order dated 6.2.2012 by the
respondent no.1 (Annexure-15);

(ii) to issue a writ, order or
direction in the nature of certiorari
quashing the entire acquisition proceeding
initiated by Notification dated 4.4.1970 and
28.6.1980 issued under Section 28 and 32
of the U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad
Adhiniyam insofar as it relates to the land
of the petitioners comprised in Khasra Plot
No.898, 899, 901, 902, 905, 906 and 909
situated at Kakretha, Tehsil and District
Agra, within the Section No.10 of the
Yojana;

(iii) to issue a writ, order or
direction
declaring
the
acquisition
proceedings against the petitioners land
as described above in prayer (ii) deemed to
have lapsed;

(iv) to issue a writ, order or
direction in the nature of mandamus
commanding the respondents to give vacant
and peaceful possession of the land
described above to the petitioners;
9 All. Rishi Kumar Jain & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1069

(v) to issue a writ, order or
direction in the nature of mandamus
commanding the respondents to settle/
adjust the land of the petitioners in their
favour as per Government Order dated
11.3.2003;

(vi) to issue a writ, order or
direction in the nature of mandamus
commanding the respondents to pay
compensation of the land acquired by
virtue of the aforesaid notification at the
current market value and in accordance
with the Act 30 of 2013;

A. ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF
THE PETITIONERS

3. It is contended that the petitioners
father Late Raj Narain Jain was the
bhumidhar in possession of the lands
comprised in Khasra Plot No.898, 899,
901, 902, 905, 906 and 909 situated at
Kakretha, Tehsil and Distt. Agra. After his
death, the petitioners have inherited the
same as legal heirs of their deceased father.

4. The Parishad proposed to acquire the
aforesaid land along with other lands for its
Sikandra Grah Sthan and Sarak Yojana at
Agra2 and published a notification under
Section 28 dated 04.04.1970 and declaration
under Section 32 dated 28.06.1080 of the
Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad
Adhiniyam, 19653. As there was an urgency,
a notification dated 23.01.1981 was issued
under Section 17 of the Land Acquisition
Act, 18944 notifying the lands of the
petitioners. The petitioners land falls within
Sector 10 of the Scheme in question and they
submitted
their
objection
against
the
aforesaid notification on 04.04.1970.

5. The petitioners father challenged
the said notifications published under
Section 28 and 32 of the Adhiniyam, 1965
before the Honble Supreme Court by
means of Writ Petition No.2136-2137 of
1982, which was dismissed on 07.04.1993
and the Honble Supreme Court upheld
the
validity
of
the
aforesaid
two
notifications.

6. At the dismissal of the aforesaid
writ petition, Shri Raj Narain Jain filed
O.S. No.892 of 1993 for permanent
injunction against Parishad seeking an
order restraining them from interfering in
his peaceful possession. In the said suit,
initially temporary injunction was accorded
on 23.03.1994. However, eventually the
said injunction was set aside vide order
dated 12.02.1998. During pendency of said
suit, Shri Raj Narain died leaving behind
his
eight
legal
heirs
including
the
petitioners. Eventually the said suit was
dismissed on 8.3.2000. Thereafter, out of
said eight heirs/ legal representatives of late
Raj Narain Jain, only the petitioners had
filed Original Suit No.973 of 1999 in the
Court of Civil Judge (SD), Agra against the
State of U.P. seeking permanent injunction
restraining the defendants from interfering
in their peaceful possession. Ultimately, the
said suit was also dismissed on 18.02.2000.

7. In the meantime, possession of the
plots in question was transferred by the
State
Government
to
Parishad
on
28.12.1999 and it was published in Dainik
Jagran dated 29.12.1999. Meanwhile, an
area of 20,037 sq. mtrs. of land out of the
area of the Scheme in question was allotted
to Dr. Virendra Swarup Memorial Trust,
Kanpur Nagar5, which is duly registered,
and the plots in question are part of the said
allotted land. This was done by the
Parishad on 29.1.1999 and 24.06.1999.
Thereafter, the Parishad executed a lease
agreement in favour of the Trust on
1070 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
30.12.2000 and possession of the plot was
handed over to the Trust on 30.12.2000
itself. Thereafter, the Trust submitted the
building plan to the Parishad and paid the
fee to sanction the same. Then the school
building was constructed by Trust and even
the name of the school was also recorded in
khasra of the village.

8. The petitioners had also filed
Original Suit No.5 of 2001 against the
Trust
seeking
permanent
injunction
restraining the defendant therein from
interfering in their possession. In the said
suit,
initially
interim
injunction
was
accorded
on
03.01.2001,
which
subsequently got vacated on 26.05.2001.
Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioners
filed Misc. Appeal No.113 of 2001 before
the District Judge, Agra on 29.05.2001, in
which no interim order was accorded and
the said appeal is also stated to be pending
consideration. Aggrieved by the order of
the District Judge refusing to grant
temporary injunction, the petitioners filed
Writ Petition No.25558 of 2001, which too
was dismissed on 16.07.2001. On 8.6.2001,
the
petitioners
had
also
moved
an
application before the City Magistrate,
Agra and obtained exparte order dated
9.6.2001 to maintain the status quo with
respect to land in question. However, the
same was vacated by the City Magistrate
on 13.06.2001.

9. In addition to filing Original Suit
No.973 of 1999, the petitioners had also
preferred Writ Petition No.407 of 2000
challenging the proceeding undertaken by
the Parishad. In the said writ petition,
interim order was accorded on 10.01.2000
to the effect that no final award would be
made in the proceeding and that the
petitioners shall not be dispossessed, if not
already dispossessed. During the pendency
of the above-mentioned writ petition, the
petitioners also approached the State
Government for de-notification/ adjustment
of the lands after charging development
fees. The State Government passed an
order dated 11.03.2003 for adjusting the
land in question after taking development
charges. Aggrieved with the same, the
Parishad moved a recall application before
the
State
Government.
The
State
Government after considering the recall
application cancelled the order dated
11.03.2003 vide order dated 24.06.2005.
The order dated 24.06.2005 passed by the
State Government became subject matter of
challenge in Writ Petition No.60335 of
2005. The said writ petition was disposed
of on 21.07.2011 and while quashing the
order dated 24.06.2005, the matter was
remanded to the State Government for
fresh consideration. Consequently, after
considering
the
reply
filed
by
the
petitioners/ other interested persons, the
State Government, by the order impugned,
rejected the application for adjustment of
the land of the petitioners and also
cancelled the G.O. dated 11.3.2003, which
was earlier issued by the State Government.
Hence, this writ petition has been filed with
aforequoted prayers.

B. ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF
THE RESPONDENT- PARISHAD

10. Learned counsel for the Parishad
has vehemently opposed the writ petition.
He states that the petitioners father Raj
Narain Jain has challenged the notifications
of the acquisition of the plots in dispute
before the Honble Apex Court in Writ
Petition (C) Nos.2136-2137 of 1982.
Honble the Supreme Court had affirmed
the notifications of the acquisition under
Section 28 and 32 (1) of the Adhiniyam,
1965. The petitioners had been challenging
9 All. Rishi Kumar Jain & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1071
the acquisition of the plots in dispute on
one ground or the other before the civil
court and this Court. In most of the
proceedings, the petitioners had initially
obtained the interim orders arresting the
proceedings of the acquisition. However,
eventually almost all the interim orders had
been vacated and the claim of the
petitioners had been rejected. The delay in
taking possession and declaring the award
of the plots in dispute have occurred due to
frivolous
litigations
initiated
by
the
petitioners in a planned manner. The
amount of compensation of the land in
dispute have already been deposited by the
Parishad to the account of the Special Land
Acquisition Officer6 on 21.07.1999.

11. The possession of the land of the
plots in dispute including the other land
was
delivered
to
the
Parishad
on
28.12.1999 and thereafter the allotment of
some area of land was made to the Trust.
The possession of land allotted to the Trust
was delivered on 30.12.2000. Over the said
land, school building had already been
constructed and the Trust is imparting
education to the students upto 12th
standard. The allotment of land in favour of
Trust was made only for educational
purposes. The allotment was made only
when the land had been vested with the
Parishad. The allotment order was made as
per the policy of the scheme.

12. The SLAO vide notice dated
22.12.1999 sent an intimation for receiving
the amount of compensation and the said
notice had been received by the family
members of the land owner-Raj Narayan.
Instead of accepting the compensation, the
petitioners have raised flimsy technical
objections. The petitioners and his father
themselves are responsible for the delay in
the matter as they involved the respondents
in frivolous litigations. The petitioners
started raising claim with respect of
applicability
of
the
Right
to
Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition,
Rehabilitation
and
Resettlement
Act,
20137
for
the
computation
of
compensation/
award
before various authorities. It is contended
that actually the petitioners were never
interested in accepting the award. It is also
stated that even Section 24 of the Act, 2013
is not applicable in the present case. The
Parishad deposited the amount before the
SLAO way back in the year 1997 and
hence the liability of non-preparation of
award cannot be fastened upon the
Parishad.

13. Learned counsel for the Parishad
has contended that the provisions of
Section 24 (2) of the Act, 2013 would not
apply to the acquisition made under the
provisions of Adhiniyam, 1965. The said
issue is no longer res integra in view of the
Division Bench judgment of this Court in
Atul Sharma & Ors. v. State of U.P. &
Ors8., and Jagbeer Singh & Ors. v. State of
U.P. & Ors9. Learned counsel for the
Parishad has also placed reliance on the
averments
contained
in
the
counter
affidavit filed on behalf of Parishad,
wherein, a categorical stand has been taken
that
regarding
land
in
dispute
the
respondents had taken physical possession
way back. He has submitted that the award
of the entire scheme has been made by the
SLAO and the adequate compensation had
also been deposited in the account of the
SLAO. It was also contended that inspite of
information to the concerned land owners,
the reason best known to the petitioners,
they did not lift their compensation,
therefore, at this belated stage it cannot be
claimed that neither the possession has
been taken nor the award has been made.
1072 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
The
entire
compensation
has
been
deposited, therefore, present writ petition is
liable to be dismissed on the ground of
delay and laches. Lastly it has been
contended that challenge to the acquisition
at this stage cannot sustain in view of the
order passed by Honble Apex Court in
earlier round of litigation and, therefore,
the writ petition is liable to be dismissed
with heavy cost.

C. ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF
STATE RESPONDENTS

14. Shri Suresh Singh, learned Addl.
Chief Standing Counsel along with Shri
Fuzail Ahmad Ansari, learned Standing
Counsel, supporting the arguments of
learned
counsel
for
the
Parishad,
vehemently submitted that the petitioners
are themselves responsible for the nonpayment of compensation as they have
chosen multiple forums and instituted
several cases, which resulted in delay of the
proceedings. Infact, since the Supreme
Court had already upheld the proceedings
of
acquisition,
the
same
cannot
be
challenged before this Honble Court in
the garb of the present proceeding by
giving
a
different
complexion.
The
impugned order is legal and just, and does
not call for any interference.

15. Heard rival submissions and
perused the record.

D. ANALYSIS BY THE COURT

16. In the instant matter, what we find
that successive litigations were made.
Initially the father of the petitioners namely
Raj Narain Jain (bhumidhar of plots in
question) had straightaway approached to
Honble Apex Court in Writ-C No.21362137 of 1982 under Section 32 of the
Constitution of India challenging the
validity of the acquisition proceeding in
which initially an interim order was
accorded not to dispossess the petitioner.
However, eventually the said writ petition
was dismissed on 7.4.1993. We are
surprised that even though the matter was
already decided pertaining to acquisition
and no such injunction could be accorded
by the competent civil court but reason best
known to him, Shri Raj Narain Jain had
preferred O.S. No.892 of 1993 in which
temporary
injunction
was,
however,
accorded on 23.3.1994. Against the same,
Misc. Appeal No.224 of 1994 had been
filed, which was allowed only on the
premise that the disputed site had already
been developed and the Parishad had also
proceeded to allot the same to public by
charging premium from them. During
pendency of said suit proceeding, said Raj
Narain Jain died leaving behind his legal
representatives including the petitioners.
Later on the petitioners were impleaded in
the said proceeding and eventually the said
suit was also dismissed on 8.3.2000.

17. Even though aforesaid suit was
dismissed, another suit was instituted by the
petitioners being Suit No.973 of 1999 asking
for injunction against the State. In the said
suit proceeding, initially injunction was
accorded but later on the same was dismissed
on 18.02.2000. Once there was no legal
impediment, State had issued notice under
Section 9 of the Act, 1894 and consequently
the State Government had taken over the
possession on 27.12.1999. Later on the same
was transferred to Parishad on 28.12.1999.
Thereafter, some portion of the acquired land
including the land of the petitioners had been
transferred to the Trust.

18. It is also reflected from the record
that as the Trust was established for
9 All. Rishi Kumar Jain & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1073
running the institution, the Parishad has
approved the building plan of school and
the name of the school was also duly
recorded in the Khasra of the village. The
petitioners had again instituted another suit
being Suit No.5 of 2011 before the Civil
Judge, JD, Agra for injunction restraining
the defendants from interfering in their
possession. Even in that suit proceeding
initially exparte injunction was obtained on
3.1.2001 but later on the same was vacated
on 26.5.2001. Aggrieved with the same, the
petitioners had preferred Misc. Appeal
No.113 of 2001 before the District Judge,
Agra on 29.05.2001 but no injunction was
accorded in the said appeal. Consequently,
the petitioners had preferred Writ Petition
No.25558 of 2001 that too was dismissed
on 16.07.2001. Multiple forums had been
availed by the petitioner with an object to
get injunction, concealing the previous
litigation. It also appears from the record
that they had also moved an application to
the City Magistrate, Agra in the year 2001
concealing the previous orders passed by
the Honble Apex Court and competent
civil court and had succeeded to obtain
exparte order on 8.6.2001 to maintain
status quo regarding the disputed land. No
doubt the said order was also vacated by
the
City
Magistrate
on
13.06.2001.
Thereafter,
the
petitioners
had
also
preferred suit against each other under
Section 176 of UPZA & LR Act
impleading the Trust also as opposite party.
In the said proceedings, initially exparte
status quo order was obtained on 15.6.2001
but later on the same was vacated on
20.06.2001. Eventually the said suit was
dismissed on 15.5.2002.

19. We find that inspite of aforesaid
successive orders passed by the competent
courts, reason best known to him, an
application was moved by the petitioners to
the State Government, which was initially
entertained on 11.03.2003. Later on the Trust
had
made
detailed
objections
in
the
proceeding, which was pending before the
State Government. In the objection, the Trust
had taken a categorical stand that Parishad
had made allotment of the said land and lease
deed had also been made in favour of Trust
for school purpose. The Trust had also paid
huge amount towards lease agreement to the
Parishad. The Trust had also taken an
objection that prior to passing the order dated
11.3.2003 no opportunity was accorded to the
trust. Precise objection had also been taken in
the said proceeding before the State
Government that the order dated 11.03.2003
had been obtained by willful and deliberate
concealment of fact without noticing the fact
that the said plot had already been allotted
and transferred to Trust and the construction
of residential school had been completed. As
such there was no occasion to accept the
ground of the petitioners before the State
Government that no such possession was
taken. Not only possession was taken much
prior by the State Government but later on
the same had been transferred to the Trust in
the month of December, 2000.

20. We are surprised to note that
petitioners father Raj Narain Jain had
approached to the Honble Apex Court.
Initially he had obtained stay order but later
on the same was dismissed and the
acquisition proceeding had never been
touched. Successive suit proceedings were
drawn against the respondents in which
initially exparte order had been obtained.
Successive litigations demonstrate that on
account of various interim injunctions, the
actual award could not be made.

21. We find that while challenging the
acquisition proceeding in Writ Petition
No.407 of 2000 initially the petitioners had
1074 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
taken a stand that if the period of litigation
in the Honble Supreme Court is excluded,
more than six years are lapsed, therefore,
bar of two years created through Section
11A of the Act, 1894 shall have to be
adhered to. In the said proceeding, the
Court had accorded interim order dated
10.01.2000 to the extent that the petitioners
will participate in the award proceeding,
the proceeding shall go on but no final
award shall be signed or pronounced.
Nowhere it had been brought into notice of
the Honble Court in the said writ
proceeding that after dismissal of the writ
petition by Honble Apex Court on
7.4.1993, Raj Narain Jain had filed suit for
permanent injunction being O.S. No.892 of
1993 in which temporary injunction was
accorded on 23.03.1994. Even though
Misc. Appeal No.224 of 1994 had been
preferred, which was allowed and the
injunction was vacated. Eventually, the suit
was dismissed on 8.3.2000. Even prior to it,
another suit being Suit No.973 of 1999 had
been preferred by the petitioners against the
respondents
for
permanent
injunction
restraining
them
from
interfering
in
peaceful possession, which was dismissed
on 18.02.2000. The possession was taken
by the State Government on 27.12.1999
and later on the same was transferred to
Parishad on 28.12.1999.

22. We find that once the land had
been acquired under the Adhiniyam, 1965
and the urgency clause under Section 17 (1)
of the Act, 1894 was also invoked,
consequently, the land stood vested in the
State free from all encumbrances. It is no
more res integra that under the Adhiniyam,
1965 the proceeding would not lapse. It is
also reflected from the record that relying
upon the order dated 11.3.2003, another
Writ Petition No.60355 of 2005 was also
instituted by the petitioners, even though
they were fully conscious to the fact that
earlier they failed to succeed before
Honble Apex Court or before High Court
and various suits were dismissed. In the
said writ petition, the Division Bench has
considered the only point involved whether
a beneficial proceeding that has been
initiated by the Government can be revoked
or
withdrawn
without
hearing
the
beneficiary. In the said writ petition, the
matter
was
relegated
to
the
State
Government vide order dated 21.7.2011. In
response thereof, the order impugned had
been passed.

23. It is not in dispute that in the
instant matter the urgency clause under
Section 17 (1) of the Act, 1894 had been
invoked, possession was taken over by the
State Government and later on it was
transferred to Parishad on 28.12.1999.
Admittedly the allotment also took place in
favour of the Trust and consequently lease
deed was also executed in favour of the
Trust by the Parishad. The map of the Trust
was also approved by the Parishad.

24. It is also reflected from the record
that notice under Section 9 for taking
possession had also been issued by the
competent authority on 22.12.1999. While
passing the order impugned, the State
Government
has
also
taken
specific
objection that on account of various
litigation, which were thrusted upon the
respondents, the award could not be made
within
reasonable
time.
However,
eventually the Parishad had deposited the
amount towards compensation in the office
of concerned SLAO on 21.07.1999. As
such the main plank of argument that the
possession was not taken in accordance
with law and the notice had been served
upon dead person for taking possession is
not acceptable under the present facts and
9 All. Rishi Kumar Jain & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1075
circumstances, as at the time of initiation of
acquisition proceeding late Raj Narain Jain
was alive and he had preferred initial writ
before Honble Apex Court, which was
later on dismissed. Notice of taking
possession was duly served upon the
daughter-in-law of late Raj Narain Jain,
who is wife of second petitioner.

25.
In
view
of
the
successive
proceeding, which were taken either by the
petitioners or their father, it is crystal clear
that the petitioners were well conversant
with the acquisition proceeding. For either
one
reason
or
the
other,
multiple
proceeding had been drawn by the
petitioners but so far as possession and
deposit of amount, the same cannot be
denied. Admittedly, the possession was
taken over in the year 1999 and only,
thereafter, the Parishad, under the scheme,
had not only executed the lease deed but
the map was also sanctioned in favour of
the Trust for running an institution, which
has been established in the year 2000.

26. It is admitted by the parties that the
proceedings for acquisition of land were
initiated by notification under Section 28 of
the Adhiniyam, 1965 on 04.04.1970. This
was followed by declaration made under
Section 32 of the Adhiniyam, 1965 on
28.06.1980. The award was also made. The
possession of the plot was also handed over
to Trust on 30.12.2000. The entire claim
has been set up on the pretext that since
neither the possession has been taken well
within time nor compensation has been
paid, therefore, the acquisition proceeding
would lapse in view of Section 24 (2) of the
Act, 2013. In this backdrop, it is necessary
to examine the following questions:-

(i) Whether the provisions of
Section 24 (2) of the Act, 2013 would apply
to
the
acquisition
made
under
the
Adhiniyam, 1965?

(ii) Whether under the facts and
circumstances, the benefit under Section 24
(2) of the Act, 2013 would be applicable?

(iii) Whether the proceeding is
barred by delay and laches?

E.
CONSIDERATION
OF
QUESTION NO.(i)

(i) Whether the provisions of
Section 24 (2) of the Act, 2013 would
apply to the acquisition made under the
Adhiniyam, 1965?

27. The said issue is no longer res
integra. The authoritative pronouncement
in this regard has been made by the
Division Bench of this Court in Atul
Sharma & Ors. (Supra) and Jagbeer Singh
& Ors. (Supra). The operative portion of
the judgment in Atul Sharma & Ors.
(Supra) is quoted as under:-

".............The
aforesaid
observations
have
been
later
on
reproduced, considered and explained by
the Apex Court in at least three decisions
which deserve mention, the leading being
Ch. Tika Ramji and Ors etc. vs. The State
of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. (AIR 1956
Supreme Court 676), paragraphs 30 to 39.
The second decision is in the case of the
State of T.N. and Anr. vs. Adhiyaman
Educational & Research Institute and
Ors,(1995 (4) SCC 104) paragraphs 15 to
18 and the third decision is in the case of
Thirumuruga
Kirupananda
Variyarthavathiru Sundara Swamigalme
vs. Stae of Tamil Nadu and Ors. (1996 Vol.
3 SCC 15) paragraphs 19, 20, 23 to 26.
There are many more decisions to the same
1076 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
effect and it is not necessary for us to
burden this judgment with anything further.

The basic principle that can be
culled out from a perusal of these
judgments is that the test of repugnancy is
whether the law made by Parliament and
that by the State Legislature occupy the
same field and whether the Parliament
intended to lay down a exhaustive code in
respect of the subject matter replacing the
act of the State Legislature.

The non-inclusion of the 1965
Act in the 4th Schedule to the 2013 Act in
terms of section 105 thereof does not
necessarily mean that the 2013 Act was
extended to be applied in acquisitions
under the 1965 Act. The intent of the 2013
Act was to eclipse the anomalies and
improve the conditions of payment of
compensation to acquisitions made under
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 only.
Since the 1894 Act has been repealed, and
the 1965 Act continues to exist without
any amendment there does not arise any
issue of repugnancy or inconsistency. This
has to be viewed from another angle. The
benefit of deemed lapse is by a fiction
under a specific statute. A provision of
fiction has to be strictly construed and it
cannot
be
impliedly
treated
to
be
incorporated unless the 1965 Act also
contemplates any such fiction. It is for this
reason that an amendment will have to be
expressly brought about in the 1965 Act if
the provisions of 2013 Act have to be
applied and not otherwise in relation to the
procedure of acquisition. A provision of
deemed lapse cannot be read into by way of
interpretation into 1965 Act without
specific amendment therein.

The other question is can this be
construed the other way around by
presuming an implied applicability of the
2013 Act merely because section 55 of the
1965 Act incorporates the procedure of
acquisition under the 1894 Act. We may put
on record that the issue of lapse of an
acquisition proceeding under section 11-A
of the 1894 Act was specifically held to be
not applicable in acquisitions under the
1965 Act in Jainul Islam's case. The same
situation exists here where the issue of
deemed lapse under section 24(2) is sought
to be introduced and read into the 1965
Act. We cannot accept this proposition
inasmuch as section 55 of the 1965 Act has
not been amended so as to include any
provision
relating
to
the
acquisition
resulting in any lapse as contained in the
2013 Act. Thus, such applicability cannot
be
implied
when
it
has
not
been
incorporated in the 1965 Act.

There is yet another reason
namely the provisions of 2013 Act as
contained
in
section
24(2)
are
not
inconsistent with any provision of the State
Act that exists from before. Conversely the
State Act also does not include any
provision that may said to be inconsistent
or in conflict with 2013 Act. The noninclusion of the benefit of the clause of
deemed lapse does not make the enactment
inconsistent, conflicting or repugnant.

To understand this recourse can
be had to the provisions quoted herein
above in the 2013 Act that clearly provide
that the 2013 Act and its provisions are in
addition and not in derogation of any law
for the time being in force. Consequently
the States have been left to enact any law
that may provide for any better facilities
relating to acquisition over and above that
has been provided for in the 2013 Act. This,
therefore, also removes the elements of
discrimination or arbitrariness. It is open
9 All. Rishi Kumar Jain & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1077
to the State to provide better facility or
benefit in matters of acquisition by
bringing about any amendment in the 1965
Act.

Coming to the last limb of this
argument
namely
the
resultant
discrimination in relation to acquisitions
having been made prior to 01.01.2014, we
may point out that when there is a
legislation by incorporation then it is only
that part of legislation which stands
incorporated and continues to exist and not
a new legislation which refers to the
proceedings under the old legislation. The
reason is what can be incorporated is that
which exists. It is for this reason that
section 55 of the 1965 Act incorporated the
then existing provisions of 1894 Act. The
1894 Act has now been repealed and is not
in existence. Thus, it is only the provisions
of 1894 Act that have been incorporated in
section 55 of the 1965 Act that will
continue to exist for that purpose only to
that limited extent. The same does not
within its fold draw the elements of the
2013 Act which has never been intended to
be incorporated or included in the 1965 Act
or vice-versa. Thus, these are two sets of
acquisitions under the different Acts and
the question of applying Article 14 to
invoke discrimination does not arise.

However, there is another shade
of this discrimination which has to be
avoided keeping in view the ratio of the
Jainul Islam's case. To that extent we hold
that if any acquisition is made by the
authority under the 1965 Act after
01.01.2014
then
it's
actions
or
the
assessment of compensation cannot be less
than what has been contemplated in 2013
Act. The determination of the quantum of
compensation, therefore, on principles will
have
to be applied
in
relation
to
acquisitions made by the Awas Vikas
Parishad under the 1965 Act after
01.01.2014 as per the 2013 Act.

Consequently for all the reasons
aforesaid the relief claimed in the writ
petition with regard to the lapse of the
proceedings cannot be availed of and the
petition is accordingly dismissed."

(Emphasis Supplied)

28. For ready reference, the operative
portion of the judgment in Jagbeer Singh
& Ors., (Supra) is quoted as under:-

.........The
Fourth
Schedule
contained in the 2013 Act makes reference
to 13 Acts but does not make reference to
the Parishad Act.

This issue was also considered by
a Division Bench of this Court in Atul
Sharma. It was sought to be contended that
Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act would apply
to acquisitions made under the Parishad
Act. This contention was repelled by the
Division Bench holding that the absence of
exclusion of the applicability of the 2013
Act would not necessarily mean that the
2013 Act would apply to the acquisitions
made under the Parishad Act. The
observations of the Division Bench are as
follows:

"The non-inclusion of the 1965
Act in the 4th Schedule to the 2013 Act in
terms of section 105 thereof does not
necessarily mean that the 2013 Act was
extended to be applied in acquisitions
under the 1965 Act. The intent of the 2013
Act was to eclipse the anomalies and
improve the conditions of payment of
compensation to acquisitions made under
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 only.
1078 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Since the 1894 Act has been repealed, and
the 1965 Act continues to exist without
any amendment there does not arise any
issue of repugnancy or inconsistency. This
has to be viewed from another angle. The
benefit of deemed lapse is by a fiction
under a specific statute. A provision of
fiction has to be strictly construed and it
cannot
be
impliedly
treated
to
be
incorporated unless the 1965 Act also
contemplates any such fiction. It is for this
reason that an amendment will have to be
expressly brought about in the 1965 Act if
the provisions of 2013 Act have to be
applied and not otherwise in relation to
the procedure of acquisition. A provision
of deemed lapse cannot be read into by
way of interpretation into 1965 Act
without specific amendment therein.

(emphasis supplied)

In this connection, the Division
Bench also observed that since Section 11A of the Acquisition Act was held not to be
applicable to acquisitions made under the
Parishad Act, the same position would exist
in regard to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act
and the observations are:

"The other question is can this be
construed the other way around by
presuming an implied applicability of the
2013 Act merely because section 55 of the
1965 Act incorporates the procedure of
acquisition under the 1894 Act. We may put
on record that the issue of lapse of an
acquisition proceeding under section 11-A
of the 1894 Act was specifically held to be
not applicable in acquisitions under the
1965 Act in Jainul Islam's case. The same
situation exists here where the issue of
deemed lapse under section 24(2) is sought
to be introduced and read into the 1965
Act. We cannot accept this proposition
inasmuch as section 55 of the 1965 Act has
not been amended so as to include any
provision
relating
to
the
acquisition
resulting in any lapse as contained in the
2013 Act. Thus, such applicability cannot
be
implied
when
it
has
not
been
incorporated in the 1965 Act."

(emphasis supplied)

The decisions referred to by the
learned counsel for the petitioners relating
to lapsing of acquisition under Section
24(2) of the 2013 Act when land was
acquired under the provisions of the
Acquisition Act would, therefore, not come
to the aid of the petitioners.

Thus, for all the reasons stated
above, it is not possible to accept the
contention of the learned counsel for the
petitioners that Section 24(2) of the 2013
Act would be applicable to the acquisitions
made under the Parishad Act.