# Rishipal & Ors. Revisionists v. State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2026) 4 ILRA 1942
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-04-16
- **Case number:** Criminal Revision No. 1617 of 2011
- **Bench:** Manoj Baja
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/rishipal-ors-revisionists-v-state-of-u-p-anr-54447
- **Pages:** 5

## Text

1942 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Act of 2015, and therefore it can be cured by the Appellate Court/Authority created under Statute
itself i.e. the Act of 2015.
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(2026) 4 ILRA 1942
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 16.04.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MANOJ BAJAJ, J.

Criminal Revision No. 1617 of 2011

Rishipal & Ors. ...Revisionists
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Issue for Consideration
(i) Whether the trial court was justified in exercising powers under Section 319 Cr.P.C. to summon the
unmarried sisters of the husband as additional accused on the basis of general allegations contained in the
F.I.R. and the depositions of prosecution witnesses?

(ii) Whether reiteration during trial of allegations already available before the Investigating Officer and found
insufficient for prosecution constitutes fresh evidence warranting exercise of powers under Section 319
Cr.P.C.?
(iii) Whether the trial court could invoke Section 319 Cr.P.C. by relying upon the F.I.R. and statements
recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. instead of the evidence adduced during trial?

Headnotes
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - S. 319 - Summoning of additional accused - Extraordinary
power - Nature and scope of jurisdiction.

HELD: The power conferred under Section 319 Cr.P.C. is extraordinary in nature and cannot be exercised
casually. Such jurisdiction can be invoked only where the evidence adduced during trial strongly indicates the
involvement of a person not already facing trial. Mere existence of allegations or suspicion does not justify
summoning an additional accused unless the evidence satisfies the higher degree of satisfaction contemplated
under Section 319 Cr.P.C. [Paras 6 and 7]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - S. 319 - Additional accused - Persons exonerated during
investigation - General allegations in F.I.R. - Evidence merely reiterating prosecution version -
Summoning impermissible.

HELD: The unmarried sisters of the husband were exonerated during investigation as neither the F.I.R. nor the
dying declaration contained any specific allegation regarding demand of dowry or participation in the alleged
offence. The depositions of P.W.-1 and P.W.-2 merely reiterated the allegations already contained in the F.I.R.
and did not disclose any fresh incriminating material emerging during trial. Such evidence, having already
been considered by the Investigating Officer while exonerating the proposed accused, could not constitute the
basis for exercising powers under Section 319 Cr.P.C. [Paras 8 and 9]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Ss. 161 and 319 - Summoning of additional accused -
Reliance upon F.I.R. and statements recorded during investigation - Legality.
4 All. Rishipal & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1943
HELD: The trial court committed a serious error of law by exercising jurisdiction under Section 319 Cr.P.C. on
the basis of allegations contained in the F.I.R. and statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. The power
under Section 319 Cr.P.C. can be exercised only on the strength of evidence adduced during trial and not on
the basis of material collected during investigation, which had already been considered at the stage of
cognizance and framing of charge. [Para 10]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - S. 319 - Dying declaration - Absence of allegation against
proposed accused - Effect.

HELD: Where the dying declaration of the deceased implicated only the mother-in-law and did not attribute
any role to the unmarried sisters of the husband, the bald allegations made by prosecution witnesses during
trial could not be regarded as strong prima facie evidence justifying their summoning as additional accused.
The trial court failed to examine the evidentiary value of the dying declaration while exercising jurisdiction
under Section 319 Cr.P.C. [Paras 8, 10 and 11]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Ss. 397 and 401 - Revision - Order under Section 319
Cr.P.C. - Interference.

HELD: Since the trial court exercised jurisdiction under Section 319 Cr.P.C. on legally impermissible
considerations and without the existence of strong evidence emerging during trial against petitioner nos. 3 to
5, the impugned order suffered from grave illegality and impropriety and was liable to be set aside. The
revision, however, stood dismissed as infructuous in respect of petitioner nos. 1 and 2, who had already faced
trial and were acquitted. [Paras 10 and 11]

Revision partly allowed. Impugned order set aside qua petitioner nos. 3 to 5; revision dismissed
as infructuous qua petitioner nos. 1 and 2. (E-14)

Case Law Cited
Nil

List of Acts / Statutes
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Indian Penal Code, 1860; Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

List of Keywords
Additional accused; Extraordinary jurisdiction; Dowry death; Dying declaration; Fresh evidence; Investigation;
Revisional jurisdiction; General allegations; Strong prima facie evidence.

Case Arising From
 Order dated 03.03.2011 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Baghpat in Sessions Trial
No. 185 of 2010, State v. Smt. Munesh and Others, arising out of Case Crime No. 13 of 2010, Police
Station Baraut, District Baghpat
Appearance for Parties
For the Appellant: Sri Ali Hasan and Sri Manish Kumar Singh
For the Respondents: Learned Government Advocate and Sri Mohd. Akbar Shah Alam Khan

(Delivered by Hon'ble Manoj Bajaj, J.)

Petitioners have filed this revision petition to challenge the impugned order dated 3.3.2011
passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Baghpat in Sessions Trial No. 185 of 2010,
titled State Vs. Smt. Munesh and others, arising out of Case Crime No. 13 of 2010, under Sections
498-A, 304-B I.P.C. and Section 3/4 D.P. Act, Police Station Baraut, District Baghpat,whereby the
1944 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
application under Section 319 Cr.P.C. filed by prosecution was allowed and the petitioners were
summoned as additional accused.

Learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that the complainant's daughter namely, Rachna
was married to Pradeep on 6.3.2009, who died of burn injuries on 8.1.2010, within a period of one
year, whereupon the complainant-opposite party no.2 implicated the petitioners and others for
alleged commission of offences punishable under Section 304-B I.P.C. etc. Learned counsel has
drawn the attention of the Court to the subject F.I.R to argue that the allegations by complainantMainpal against the petitioner nos.3 to 5 (unmarried sisters of Pradeep-husband) are absolutely
vague and no specific attribution of demand of dowry is made against them. Learned counsel
further submits that the victim gave her statement before death and the said dying declaration only
implicates Munesh (mother-in-law of victim), whereas nothing is mentioned by victim about other
accused persons, therefore, after investigation, the petitioners were declared innocent and the
charge sheet was filed against Pradeep and Munesh.

Learned counsel for the petitioners has further argued that the statements of Mainpal (P.W.-1)
and Neeraj Kumar (P.W.-2) echoes the allegations in the F.I.R. and on the basis of those
statements, the trial court proceeded to summon the petitioners as additional accused, but the said
order is not sustainable. Learned counsel has pointed out that initially the impugned order dated
3.3.2011 was stayed by this Court qua the petitioner nos.3 to 5 namely, Renu, Nidhi @ Chinu and
Ritu, whereas the petitioner nos.1 and 2 were directed to associate with the trial, and during the
pendency of the revision petition, the trial ended in acquittal of four accused persons namely,
Munesh (mother-in-law), Pradeep (husband), Nitin (brother-in-law) and Rishipal (father-in-law).
The judgment of acquittal dated 29.3.2012 is on record as Annexure No.SA-1. Learned counsel
prays that the impugned order dated 3.3.2011 be set aside.

Learned A.G.A. while opposing the prayer has argued that the impugned order dated 3.3.2011
is based upon proper appreciation of testimonies of P.W.-1 and P.W.-2 and when the impugned
order was passed, the trial was pending. He submits that the judgment of acquittal passed in respect
of other accused persons may not be relevant as the evidence adduced during trial of the acquitted
accused persons cannot be read qua the petitioners, if, the impugned order dated 3.3.2011 is upheld.
He prays that the revision petition be dismissed.

After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and considering their submission, this Court
finds that as far as petitioner nos.1 and 2 are concerned, qua them the revision petition is rendered
infructuous, who faced the trial and stand acquitted vide judgment dated 29.3.2012.

Before analyzing the merits of the petition, it would be appropriate to have a glance of section
319 Cr.P.C., which reads as under:

319. Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence.-(1) Where, in
the course of any inquiry into, or trial of, an offence, it appears from the evidence that any person
not being the accused has committed any offence for which such person could be tried together
with the accused, the Court may proceed against such person for the offence which he appears to
have committed.
4 All. Rishipal & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1945

(2) Where such person is not attending the Court, he may be arrested or summoned, as the
circumstances of the case may require, for the purpose aforesaid.

3) Any person attending the Court, although not under arrest or upon a summons, may be
detained by such Court for the purpose of the inquiry into, or trial of, the offence which he appears
to have committed.

(4) Where the Court proceeds against any person under sub-section (1) then-(a) the
proceedings in respect of such person shall be commenced afresh, and the witnesses re-heard;

(b) subject to the provisions of clause (a), the case may proceed as if such person had been an
accused person when the Court took cognizance of the offence upon which the inquiry or trial was
commenced."

A perusal of the above provision makes it abundantly clear that the power vested with the trial
court under Section 319 Cr.P.C. is extraordinary in nature, and by now it is settled law that such a
power can not be exercised in a casual manner. The trial court would be justified in resorting to the
above provision where the evidence recorded during trial strongly suggests about the involvement
of any other person(s), who is not before the trial court.

While examining the alleged involvement of petitioner nos.3 to 5 i.e. unmarried sisters of
Pradeep, this Court finds that F.I.R. does not contain any specific allegation against them regarding
demand of dowry and even according to the complainant, on 7.1.2010 husband-Pradeep had called
Neeraj Kumar (P.W.-2) to demand a sum of Rs.1 lac and motorcycle. That apart, the dying
declaration also implicates only one accused namely, Munesh, therefore, the investigating officer
proceeded to exonerate the petitioners and filed charge sheet against Pradeep and Munesh. A
reading of the testimonies of Mainpal (P.W.-1) and Neeraj Kumar (P.W.-2) also makes it clear that
both these witnesses had attributed demand of dowry to accused Pradeep, who telephonically
contacted Neeraj on 7.1.2010 to demand cash and motorcycle, therefore, the depositions of these
witnesses P.W.-1 and P.W.-2, if, reiterates the version contained in the F.I.R. cannot be construed
as a new piece of evidence emerging only during trial as the same stood analyzed and tested by
Investigating Officer while declaring them innocent.

Most importantly, the trial court exercised the extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 319
Cr.P.C. while relying upon the allegations in the F.I.R. and the statements of witnesses recorded
under Section 161 Cr.P.C., and in the considered opinion of this Court this is a serious error of law,
as the powers under Section 319 Cr.P.C. can be exercised only on the strength of the evidence
adduced during trial. The material relied upon by trial court was already before it when it took
cognizance and framed charges against the accused, but at that stage, no such order was passed
against the petitioner nos.3 to 5.

Notably, in the present case the dying declaration of the deceased does not at all implicate the
unmarried sisters of Pradeep, therefore, the bald allegations in the deposition of P.W.-1 and P.W.-2
before the trial court cannot be construed as a strong prima faice evidence suggesting involvement
of petitioner nos.3 to 5 in the alleged commission of crime. A perusal of the impugned order dated
1946 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
3.3.2011 would show that the trial court has not carefully examined the evidence on record relied
upon by prosecution while exercising powers under Section 319 Cr.P.C. Thus, the impugned order
dated 3.3.2011 suffers from grave illegality and impropriety, which calls for interference by this
Court.

Resultantly, the revision petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 3.3.2011 is set aside
qua the petitioner nos.3 to 5, whereas in respect of petitioner nos.1 and 2, the petition is dismissed
as infructuous in view of their acquittal recorded on 29.3.2012.
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(2026) 4 ILRA 1946
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 23.04.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SAURABH SHYAM SHAMSHERY, J.

Writ A No. 34539 of 2009

Vinod Kumar Sethi ...Petitioner
Versus
UCO Bank & Ors. ...Respondents

Issue(s) for consideration
(a) Whether inquiry was conducted by a Competent Authority or not?
(b) Whether during disciplinary proceeding due procedure was followed or not?
(c) Whether punishment, i.e., removal from Bank service, was contrary to bipartite agreement that petitioner
was denied pension?

Headnotes
A. Service Law - UCO Bank Officers Employees' (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1976:
Regulation 17 - The Petitioner was working as a Manager at the Ghaziabad Branch of UCO Bank from
August 2000 to 19.07.2004. He was initially suspended on 11.09.2004, following allegations of several acts of
omissions and commissions. A charge sheet with five charges was issued on 18.10.2004. Following a deeper
internal investigation, a fresh, specialized Article of Charge and Statement of Allegations dated 29.03.2005,
was served to the Petitioner, strictly isolating and detailing the "Fake Bank Guarantee" fraud.
The investigation revealed that the Petitioner issued Bank Guarantee No. 28/02 dated 09.11.2002, for Rs.
47.00 Lakhs in favor of U.P. Jal Nigam, NOIDA, on behalf of M/s Bhavya Credits. He bypassed all mandatory
bank guidelines.
The Petitioner later extended the guarantee's validity up to 09.11.2004, via an off-the-record letter on a Rs.
100/- stamp paper. On the strength of this unauthorized document, the private company fraudulently secured
a mobilization advance of Rs. 45.89 Lakhs from U.P. Jal Nigam, which was funneled through their current
account on 12.11.2004. It was also alleged that the Petitioner personally pocketed Rs. 94,000/- given as an
off-market commission by the company's representatives. Parallel to the departmental action, a criminal FIR
was lodged u/Ss. 420, 409, 467, 468, 471, and 120B of the IPC. The Petitioner was arrested and subsequently
released on bail by the High Court on 23.09.2005.